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I NT ROD UCTI ON 
THE PROBLEM of the economic development of underdeveloped coun-
tries has received worldwide attention, mainly since the end of the 
Second World War. This is a late beginning, indeed; but it has been 
marked with great intellectual activity and keen academic enthusiasm. 
In the last few years, the stream of fresh literature on the subject has 
assumed enormous proportions, and much of it is not easily accessible. 
While some of this literature represents real advancement of knowledge 
a large part of it is of only secondary importance, being policy-
oriented in character, based on concepts which are not always care-
fully defined, and generally lacking in scientific analysis and mature 
treatment. But it would perhaps be unjust to censure such literature 
too harshly, as it has had a historic role to play, being inherent in the 
formative stages of new doctrines. It should also be remembered that 
this literature has not only succeeded in focusing attention on the eco-
nomics of underdevelopment but has led in fact to the creation of a 
separate branch of economic studies. This process has been accompanied 
and stimulated by the appearance of some remarkable works of sci-
entific analysis and construction, which have become the nucleus of 
it. The economics of underdevelopment is a subject of growing im-
portance to the developed as well as to the underdeveloped nations 
of the world. 
Although many useful ideas on the economics of underdevelopment 
can be found in the works of the great economists of the past, as a 
serious subject of study it began to emerge only during the 'forties 
of the present century. The contributions of the 'forties played a highly 
useful and educative role. They attracted the attention of other econ-
omists to the subject as well as themselves assisting in its advancement. 
Some brilliant work of great and lasting value was also done in this 
period, e.g. an article by Rosenstein-Rodan and three celebrated mono-
graphs by Eugene Staley, A. J. Brown and K. (now M.) Mandelbaum. 
Since 1950, there has been in evidence a marked trend towards spe-
cialization in study and rigour and depth in analysis. Moreover, it is now 
realized that the subject can no longer be confined within the bounds 
of articles, monographs and reports, and scientific treatises have begun 
to appear. The works of Ragnar Nurkse and W. Arthur Lewis have 
initiated this trend and have served to raise the standard of analysis, 
discussion and contemplation. 
Even so, most of the contributions of basic significance are still scat-
tered in a number of journals and periodicals, access to which is not 
easy, especially in India. Also it is our experience that students and 
researchers in many centres of learning in the underdeveloped countries 
often lack facilities of reference and remain unaware of the more im-
portant articles and of the relative worth and significance of each of 
them. We thought, therefore, that we could help to overcome these 
difficulties by bringing together reprints of certain articles which can 
be said to have given a direction to, or raised the level of, economic 
3 
4 Introduction 
studies in this particular sphere in recent years. The present volume 
is therefore designed to assist research students and those reading 
for the separate paper now devoted in many universities to the subject 
of underdevelopment. 
We should like to emphasize the importance of fostering the study 
of this new subject in underdeveloped countries themselves. Under-
standing depends not only on a familiarity with the outer form of un-
derdeveloped economies, which is a superficial affair at best, but on an 
emotional appreciation of the spirit, culture and aspirations of the peo-
ples of the underdeveloped areas. Such an appreciation, although not 
beyond the capacity of those who belong to industrially advanced 
economies, must, in their case, be the result of conscious effort, and 
there is therefore the risk of faulty appreciation with its concomitant 
dangers of mistaken conclusion and unsound theory. Thus it is neces-
sary for economists belonging to underdeveloped countries to parti-
cipate actively in this field and to formulate doctrines which are based 
on an inherent understanding of the forces and conditions existing 
around them. They should not be content with modifications or special 
applicationS of existing doctrines. And economic science can be a basis 
of economic policy only if it carefully promotes and jealously preserves 
an intimate relationship with the actualities of fact. 
The work of the economists of underdeveloped areas may not by 
itself be sufficient for the full development of the subject, nor can any-
body claim monopoly rights in any domain of knowledge; but help 
can be given in providing the point of view of the underdeveloped 
peoples and in offering verification of the theories and ideas propounded 
in other parts of the world. It has been a standing criticism of the 
economics taught in underdeveloped countries that it is a carbon copy 
of the economics taught in and appropriate to industrially advanced 
countries. It is hoped that the studies presented in this volume will 
stimulate those in the underdeveloped countries to think further for 
themselves. 
This volume includes only those contributions which make a general 
and overall approach to the various aspects of the economics of under-
development. We have not included any article which pertains either to 
specific policy-issues, or to descriptions or analyses of economic 
conditions and institutions. The articles comprise reprints of a chapter 
from a book, two papers read at conferences and eighteen papers pub-
lished in various economic journals. These twenty-one items have been 
classified into six sections. 
The first section, entitled 'Approaches to the Problem of Under-
development', contains five contributions- by Jacob Viner, Colin 
Oark, G. M. Meier, Paul A. Baran and H. Myint. It is hoped that they 
will acquaint the reader with the criteria that can be adopted in defining 
underdevelopment, the causes and factors contributing to the phe-
nomenon of underdevelopn;ent, and the varied approaches that are 
generally made in analysing and discovering solutions to the problems 
of underdevelopment. 
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The second section contains only two papers- by Simon Kuznets 
and W. W. Rostow- which examine the problem of underdevelop-
ment in an historical context. While Kuznets draws a highly illustra-
tive comparison between the present-day underdeveloped countries and 
the pre-industrial phase in advanced countries, Rostow launches his 
well-known 'take-off into self-sustained growth' approach which, it 
is believed, is pregnant with possibilities for the future. 
The third section contains three papers- by Henry C. Wallich, 
V. K. R V. Rao and H. J. Bruton- which seek to analyse the problem 
of underdevelopment in the light of three important economic theories. 
Wallich analyses in the light of Schumpeter's theory of economic de-
velopment, Rao in the context of Keynes's general theory of employ-
ment, and Bruton in the light of the currently developing growth 
economics of Harrod, Damar, Joan Robinson, Fellner and others. 
The fourth section, entitled 'External Economies and Balanced 
Growth', contains five papers. The first is a contribution by P. N. 
Rosenstein-Rodan in which the celebrated 'balanced development' ap-
proach based on Young's ideas of external econo!llies found its first 
expression as early as I943· A similar but more far-reaching 'balanced 
growth' approach has been developed by Ragnar Nurkse during recent 
years. It has been elucidated by him at several places and finds fullest 
expression in his 1953 treatise on capital formation. The article which 
we have included in the present volume represents an early but perhaps 
the shortest expression of the theme. These ideas are examined critically 
by J. Marcus Fleming in the third paper of this section. The fourth 
paper, by Tibor Scitovsky, is short but serves to remove much of the 
fog that has gathered round the concept of external economies and 
the appropriateness of its use in the economics of underdevelopment. 
The fifth paper, by Celso Furtado, is a detailed, critical and useful 
commentarY, on the Nurksian thesis of balanced growth. 
The fifth section contains only two papers. The first paper by Al-
fredo and Ifigenia Navarrete presents a succinct and useful analysis 
of underemployment in relation to underdevelopment. The second 
paper, by R. S. Eckaus, contains an instructive and thorough analysis 
of the factor~proportions problem and affords a useful perspective for 
understanding factor-disequilibrium, which is widely recognized to 
be a corollary of underdevelopment in the contemporary world. 
The last section presents four models of economic development of an 
underdeveloped country, by H. W. Singer, W. A. Lewis, Hollis B. 
Chenery and M. Bronfenbrenner. The first two models (we hope we 
are correct in calling Lewis's paper a model) have already earned a 
place of repute and need no introduction. Their treatment of indus-
trialization, savings and investment, and surplus labour is well-
articulated and sufficiently realistic. Moreover, Lewis's paper deserves 
special attention because,it is written in the classical tradition. Chenery's 
contribution is of comparatively recent origin but contains a useful 
exercise in model-building in that it provides scope for the treatment 
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of factor-disequilibrium, of the foreign exchange gap, and the inter-
connectedness of productive sectors. Bronfenbrenner's triplets, though 
analytically very simple, are important because they contain an ex-
ploration into the communistic line of thinking. He provides an inter-
esting analysis of the role of confiscation in economic development. 
It should be mentioned that the articles in this volume are reproduced 
as originally published, with only slight modification to regularize 
style. We do not claim any special virtue for the contents or arrange-
ment and we are conscious that some other method might be preferred 
by some of our readers. The task of planning and editing such a volume 
is rendered difficult by the many lines of approach open to us. For 
instance, a plausible case could be made for the inclusion of more items 
in this volume, though not perhaps for excluding any of those which 
have been included. In fact, so many varied and sometimes incon-
sistent considerations are involved that it is difficult to justify all edi-
torial decisions. The appropriateness of each article ftom the editors' 
point of view, the necessity of covering a wide range of authors and 
topics, the limitations imposed by space and the requirements dictated 
by the need for commercial success are some of the conflicting con-
siderations involved in the venture. There are certain topics on which 
appropriate articles are not available, while many excellent articles 
which are available do not fit into the general scheme of things. More-
over, the personal prejudices of the editors play, inevitably, a decisive 
part. This, however, neither explains nor justifies the blemishes and 
shortcomings of this volume, for which the responsibility is clearly the 
editors'. We are sorry we have not been able to include in this volume 
the contributions of Duesenberry and Spengler. Other important con-
tributions were omitted either because they are readily available in 
other edited volumes or because they are not relevant to the scope 
of this volume. 
The reader will understand that this volume contains papers on 
only certain aspects of the economics of underdevelopment, and that 
other important aspects have been left out. We really have an ex-
tended plan of work, and hope, if this volume is well received, to prepare 
two further volumes containing contributions on the remaining aspects 
of the subject, to be followed by a detailed bibliography. 
The editors have pleasure in acknowledging a heavy debt of grati-
tude to all the authors whose contributions comprise this volume and 
who so promptly and generously allowed us to reprint them; in fact, 
their kindness has been overwhelming. The editors are also indebted to 
all the original publishers who helped in a similar manner; individual 
acknowledgements are to be found in footnotes to the various chapters 
and this explains the omission of individual names here. But particular 
assistance was extended by Mr H. W. Singer of the United Nations, 
Mrs Elizabeth Henderson of the International Economic Papers, 
Rome, Mr A. 0. Reyna! of Fonda de Cultura Economica, Mexico, the 
Secretary to the Delegates of the Clarendon Press, Oxford, and by 
Professor W. W. Rostow, to each of whom special thanks are due. 
I. APPROACHES TO THE PROBLEM 
OF UNDERDEVELOPMENT 
THE ECONOMICS OF DEVELOPMENT* 
by Jacob Viner 
THE OUTPUT OF LITERATURE ON 'ECONOMIC' DEVELOPMENT HAS 
in recent years reached massive proportions. The literature, 
however, is extraordinarily lacking in explicit definition of the 
basic terms it employs, and if one attempts to find from the 
context what definitions are implicit one discovers that a 
wide range of different and often conflicting concepts is being 
covered by a single verbal label. What, for instance, is an 
'underdeveloped country' ? Let me examine the most common 
criteria of 'underdevelopment' as they appear in the current 
literature. 
r. A country is often labelled as underdeveloped merely or 
mainly because it has a low ratio of population to area. Since 
the term 'underdeveloped' always carries with it the implica-
tion that development is feasible and desirable, this usage 
overrates the importance of mere space, whether for economic 
or any other significant purpose. There are 'empty spaces' 
which it is not in anyone's interest to have filled. In the present 
state of knowledge, the Arctic and the Antarctic, the Sahara 
Desert, and even the great tropical jungles, are not properly 
to be regarded as underdeveloped areas unless' underdeveloped' 
is to be used as synonymous with undeveloped. 
It is a different matter if the sparsely settled area is 'rich' 
in natural resources in an economically significant sense. In 
the ordinary geography and travel books, and in the official 
handbooks of most countries, however, all areas tend to be 
labelled rich in resources, even when the 'resources' are un-
proven, or are of low quality, or are inaccessible, or are of a 
kind which has low economic value per unit of volume even 
at the point of consumption so that they are valuable assets 
only when located near important centres of population. The 
technique of discovery of hidden mineral resources is constantly 
improving, and new uses are constantly being found for organic 
• International Trade and Economic Development-Lectures delivered 
at the National University of Brazil, 1953, Chapter VI. Reprinted 
with the permission of the Clarendon Press, Oxford, and the author. 
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and mineral materials which previously had no or limited 
serviceability. It is proper therefore to regard any extensive 
area as having potential value even if to date no one has found 
a way of making a decent living in it or from it. It nevertheless 
seems to be true that in the entire past century the only' empty 
spaces' of any size which have been settled by a population 
which has succeeded in earning therein even a moderately 
high per capita income have been areas with good soil and good 
climate, and no more of such large empty spaces seem to exist. 
There is no sense in wasting scarce resources in 'developing' 
areas which cannot provide a decent living for human beings, 
but a good deal of effort and wealth, and even a greater deal 
of talk, are being wasted on such areas. 
2. Scarcity of capital as shown by the prevalence of high 
interest rates is often used as a sign that there is underdevelop-
ment. This is not a decisive test, however. Until tight national 
controls on the export of capital became common, there was 
a high degree of international mobility of capital, with the 
consequence that borrowers of equal creditworthiness were 
able to borrow at not greatly dissimilar rates of interest regard-
less of their location. Before rgq, India, Canada, the United 
States, the Argentine, and Australia borrowed long-term capital 
in the London money-market at· substantially similar rates 
of interest. Where debtors were charged high rates, it was not 
because they operated in underdeveloped countries but because 
their past records showed them to be uncreditworthy or because 
the prospects that they would be able to meet their debt 
obligations were unfavourable. 
High interest rates, moreover, are an ambiguous test as to 
the kind of 'scarcity' of capital which is prevailing. Interest 
rates may be high because the risk premium is high, or because 
the marginal productivity function of capital is high and has 
high elasticity, or because capital has so far been available 
only for the most urgent purposes but would have low marginal 
productivity if more abundantly used. All three would ordinari-
ly be regarded as instances of capital scarcity, but there would 
be important economic differences between them. It can be 
taken for granted that for substantial economic expansion 
increase of capital is always a necessary condition. But only 
in the second case would it be clear that substantially increased 
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investment would be economically justifiable, that is, would 
add sufficiently to the national output to meet depreciation 
and reasonable interest costs. 
Another type of criterion of scarcity of capital is often used, 
namely, the ratio of capital supply to the supplies of other 
categories of factors of production. As a practical test, this 
probably has a substantial measure of validity, although 
abstract theory gives only qualified support to the proposition 
that where the ratio of capital to other resources is low, the 
marginal productivity of capital will be high. Cases are con-
ceivable, because of, let us say, an unfavourable climate, or of 
bad government, where the marginal productivity functions 
of all the factors taken seriatim, and therefore the overall 
productivity of the combined factors whatever the proportions 
in which they are combined, are low. The factors of production, 
moreover, are in some degree rival or competitive even if it 
is true that in general they are more complementary or co-
operative than rival. It is for this and other reasons at least 
theoretically conceivable, therefore, that there may be national 
economies where the marginal productivity function of capital 
is low beyond a fairly early stage of investment even though 
natural resources are abundant and good in quality and even 
though the marginal productivity function of labour is high 
and has high elasticity, provided the marginal productivity 
function of labour is high even at low levels of investment. 
If such cases exit, increase in the amount of capital investment 
per unit of labour employed, or per acre, would not result in 
an appreciable increase in per capita output after allowance 
for the costs of the capital itself and its maintenance. These 
capital costs must not be neglected. Even if the capital came 
from abroad as a free grant, there would be the costs of maint-
enance, and of defraying time-depreciation, use-depreciation, 
product-obsolescence, and process-obsolescence. And when 
the capital is the result of domestic accumulation, or is borrowed 
from abroad, the interest charges have to be met, either as 
payments to the lenders, or as opportunity-costs reflecting the 
sacrifice of alternative uses of the capital. 
3· The most commonly used criterion for classification of 
countries as developed or underdeveloped is the ratio of indus-
trial output to total output or of industrial population to total 
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population. In an earlier lecture, I pointed out that while it is 
true that the ratio of non-agricultural to total population tends 
to be highly correlated positively with per capita income, the 
degree of industrialization may be and often is a consequence 
rather than a cause of the level of prosperity, and that where 
agriculture is prosperous not only do tertiary or service indus-
tries tend spontaneously to grow, but there is widespread 
tendency to use disposable surplus income derived from agricul-
tural prosperity to subsidize uneconomic urban industry, with 
the consequence that the ovet:all level of per capita income, 
while still comparatively high, is lower than it would be if 
urban industry were not artificially stimulated. 
I do not challenge the semantic sovereignty of economists or 
of anyone else, and if there is determination to continue to use 
'underdevelopment' and' non-industrialization' as synonymous 
terms, I must reconcile myself to the fact even if I do not 
approve of it. What I do have a right and a professional duty 
to insist upon, however, is that the practice is either arbitrary, 
or is more or less conscious question-begging, having as its 
consequence, and sometimes as its deliberate intention, the 
evasion of analysis which would lead to unwelcome conclusions. 
4· I would question also the expediency of identifying' under-
developed' countries with 'young countries'. There are no 
satisfactory criteria for the 'age' of a country, and if, as is 
common, date of settlement by people of European stock is 
taken as the test of age, Brazil is an older country than the 
United States, and China and India have not been born yet. 
Except for the United States, the countries outside Europe 
with the highest levels of per capita income are countries which 
were 'empty spaces' until fairly late in the nineteenth century, 
and some of the 'oldest' countries are the poorest. Time brings 
all things, but not to the same country. To some it brings 
prosperity; to others persistent poverty. 
s. A more useful definition of an underdeveloped country is 
that it is a country which has good potential prospects for 
using more capital or more labour or more available natural 
resources, or all of these, to support its present population on a 
higher level of living, or, if its per capita income level is already 
fairly high, to support a larger population on a not lower level 
of living. This definition puts the primary emphasis where I 
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would think it properly belongs, on per capita levels of living, 
on the issue of poverty and prosperity, although it leaves room 
for secondary emphasis on quantity of population. On the basis 
of this definition, a country may be underdeveloped whether 
it is densely or sparsely populated, whether it is a capital-rich 
or a capital-poor country, whether it is a high-income per capita 
or low-income per capita country, or whether it is an industria-
lized or an agricultural country. The basic criterion then 
becomes whether the country has good potential prospects of 
raising per capita incomes, or of maintaining an existing high 
level of per capita income for an increased population. 
This definition, I am aware, would not be universally accept-
able. It is not only that it would be objectionable to those who 
want 'economic development' even at the cost of a lowering 
of per capita income levels provided it brings the filling up of 
empty spaces, or urbanization, or industrialization. Patriotic 
citizens may want their national economies to grow in size of 
aggregate income or of aggregate output because of prestige consi-
derations or strategic considerations even if this involves a lower-
ingofaveragelivingstandards. To others, living standards may 
be a weighty consideration, but in terms of the living standards-
and conceivably also the size--of a particular class or a particular 
regional category of the population, rather than and perhaps 
to the total disregard of the average standard of living of the 
people as a whole. A colonial power may be interested in the 
economic development of a possession as an incident to its 
becoming an enlarged market for the mother country's export 
products or an enlarged source of supply of cheap foodstuffs, 
or raw materials, or military manpower, without regard to the 
economic welfare of the colonial population. All of these con-
siderations have at one time or another been associated with 
the term 'economic development'. I do not question their 
claims to attention. 
While the supplementing of data as to economic aggregates 
by per capita averages provides additional and often essential 
information, however, even this does not suffice for some pur-
poses. Let us suppose, for instance, that a country which has 
embarked on a programme of economic development engages 
in periodic stock-taking of its progress, and finds not only that 
aggregate wealth, aggregate income, total population, total 
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production, are all increasing, but that per capita wealth, 
income, production, are also all increasing. All of these are 
favourable indices, but even in combination do they suffice to 
show that there has been 'economic progress', an increase in 
economic 'welfare', rather than retrogression ? 
Suppose that someone should argue that the one great 
economic evil is the prevalence of a great mass of crushing 
poverty, and that it is a paradox to claim that a country is 
achieving economic progress as long as the absolute extent of 
such poverty prevailing in that country has not lessened or 
has even increased? Such a country, nevertheless, might be 
able to meet all the tests of economic development which I 
have just enumerated. If its population has undergone sub-
stantial increase, the numbers of those living at the margin of 
subsistence or below, illiterate, diseased, undernourished, may 
have grown steadily consistently with a rise in the average 
income of the population as a whole. 
Not only this, but if immigration is a significant factor, these 
statistical tests are consistent with no native having undergone 
an improvement in his economic status beyond having more 
children survive to their teens instead of dying in infancy, and 
with no adult descendant of native parents having a higher level 
of income than did his parents or grandparents. It requires 
only one additional condition, that the immigrants shall not 
be as well off as they would have been if they had stayed in 
their native land, to make these statistical indexes of 'success-
ful' economic development be consistent with no single indivi-
dual being better off than or even as well off as his parents 
were. 
Were I to insist, however, that the reduction of mass poverty 
be made a crucial test of the realization of economic develop-
ment, I would be separating myself from the whole body of 
literature in this field. In all the literature on economic develop-
ment I have seen, I have not found a single instance where 
statistical data in terms of aggregates and of averages have not 
been treated as providing adequate tests of the degree of ach-
ievement of economic development. I know, mareover, of no 
country which regards itself as underdeveloped which provides 
itself with the statistical data necessary for the discovery of 
whether or not growth in aggregate national wealth and in per 
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capita income are associated with decrease in the absolute or 
even relative extent to which crushing poverty prevails. 
There is a school of thought with respect to economic develop-
ment which is aware of the point I have been discussing, but 
believes that to subject a national programme of economic 
development to the requirement that it shall prevent an in-
crease in the absolute extent of severe poverty may doom the 
programme to failure without lasting benefit to any sector of 
the population. They hold that in many cases all that is practi-
cable, at least for some time, is to increase the national area of 
economic health and strength, perhaps relatively but at least 
absolutely, without preventing or even retarding, and possibly 
even while stimulating, the growth of the area of desperate 
poverty. Eventually, they contend, the prosperity will trickle 
down to the lower levels of the population, and the national 
resources will become abundant enough to make possible large-
scale programmes to rescue them from their poverty, whereas 
a direct and immediate attack on mass poverty would result 
only in the squandering of the limited national resources on 
temporary palliatives, with increases in the number of .the 
desperately poor as the only important result. 
This school is unaware, I suspect, that the views it holds are 
very close to one of Malthus's doctrines. Malthus was deeply 
concerned about the difficulty of raising the masses of the 
English poor from their level of desperate poverty, because of 
their tendency, as he believed, to absorb any increase in produc-
tivity in an increase in their numbers instead of using it to 
raise their standard of living. The remedy which he most 
emphasized was the limitation of births through postponement 
of marriage, with or without 'moral restraint', but without 
births, before marriage. He obviously did not have much 
confidence, however, in the practicality of this remedy, and he 
supported as an alternative or supplementary remedy the 
promotion within the English economy of what might be termed 
enclaves of economic privilege, whose members would be 
recruited from those sections of the population which could be 
relied upon not to absorb increases in income wholly in natural 
increase of population. It was largely on this ground that 
Malthus supported tariff protection for English agriculture 
as a means of increasing the prosperity of the landed classes 
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and thus increasing the numbers of those who could be relied 
upon to use increased income either to raise their standard of 
living or for investment instead of to increase the size of their 
families. It is not an attractive doctrine. I am not aware, how-
ever, that where the population problem as Mal thus envisaged 
it is a fact, and capital is scarce, patently superior alternatives 
are readily discoverable and applicable. 
I proceed to an attempt at a schematic presentation of the 
obstacles to economic development, with the reminder that I 
use the term to signify not merely economic growth, but econo-
mic growth with which is associated either rising per capita 
levels of income or the maintenance of existing high levels of 
income. The classification of these obstacles about to be pre-
sented is admittedly a somewhat artificial one, since thecate-
gories of obstacles distinguished are not only not independent 
of each other but overlap and in some cases may represent 
the same factors looked at from different points of view rather 
than different factors. 
First come low productivity functions. Foremost in res-
ponsibility for these are qualitative factors, physical or human. 
In the first lecture, I used, as an illustration of a type of assump-
tion in the construction of economic models for theoretical 
analysis which was peculiarly destructive of the practical 
usefulness of economic theory, the assumption that each of the 
factors of production was universally homogeneous, so that the 
productivity functions were everywhere identical. Adherence 
to such a model would prevent consideration of the responsi-
bility of international differences in the economic quality of 
factors, in their· effectiveness', to use Taussig's term, for differ-
ences in the levels of per capita income as between countries. 
What follows is an amplification of the comments in the first 
lecture. 
Much obviously depends on the character of the physical 
environment, or the 'quality', in my terminology, of the 
natural rt>sources considered as factors of production. Here 
are involved such things as the character of the soil, the forest 
resources, topography as favouring or hindering cheap trans-
portation, mineral resources, the availability of water-power, 
and rainfall and temperatures. The geographical situation of a 
country is also significant with respect to its opportunities for 
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profitable foreign trade, since proximity to foreign markets 
and sources of supply can be of great importance. 
An unfavourable physical environment can be a major 
obstacle to economic development. That it need not be a fatal 
obstacle, however, that it can be overcome by high quality in 
its human resources, is demonstrated inter alia by the case of 
Switzerland. Except for the one advantage of its strategic 
location across some major trade routes, Switzerland has 
scarcely a single physical advantage for economic development; 
taking all physical factors into account, it is one of the most 
poorly endowed countries in the world. Nevertheless, in wealth 
per capita it ranks at or near the top, and it ranks high also in 
per capita income. 
Of great importance also is the 'quality' of the working 
population, including the rank-and-file of industrial and agri-
cultural labour, the entrepreneurial and managerial elite, and 
the skilled engineers and technicians. I have in mind here not 
biological or 'racial' differences, which authoritative scientific 
opinion overwhelmingly holds to be undetectable or of minor 
importance, but the differences which result from historical 
and cultural factors, from environment, quality of health, 
nutrition, and education, and from the quality of the leader-
ship provided by government and the social elite. 
The first requirements for high labour productivity under 
modern conditions are that the masses of the population shall 
be literate, healthy, and sufficiently well fed to be strong and 
energetic. In many countries, I feel sure, if this were achieved 
all else necessary for rapid economic development would come 
readily and easily of itself. I also feel sure that whenever this 
has not been accomplished and is not being strongly promoted 
to the utmost limits which the national resources permit, it is not 
necessary to look for the other factors, although they are certain 
to exist, to explain pervasive poverty and slow economic growth. 
Where there is a traditional agriculture, there is often a 
strong resistance to technical education, and to change in 
working processes. Aside from this, however, it seems to be 
common experience that it is not difficult to train peoples to 
new methods, to the use of machinery, to new products, once 
it is made clear that acceptance of the training brings substan-
tial and prompt economic reward. 
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The real bottleneck is likely to be not the lack of adequate 
responsiveness of the masses to the new teaching, but the 
scarcity of the teaching and of teachers able to impart it. The 
process can be greatly speeded, however, if there is initiative 
in importing teachers to train teachers, or in sending abroad 
selected nationals to learn how to train teachers. It is fortunate 
that modern industry is not as much dependent on the skills 
of the rank-and-file workers which can be learnt only slowly 
as was industry in the past or as agriculture in some of its 
phases continues to be. The difficult skills tend nowadays 
to be built into the machine, or to be concentrated in a relatively 
small number of supervisors and mechanics, and where these 
are not initially available locally, they can be readily imported 
through selective immigration. The higher levels of designing, 
engineering, and scientific 'know-how' are often needed only 
in small quantities. High-grade managerial and technological 
skill is always on sale at a competitive price, and provided it 
can adapt itself to local conditions, local materials, and the 
requirements of local markets, is cheap almost regardless of 
its price. Managerial and engineering 'know-how' are the most 
mobile internationally of economic goods, and where they are 
lacking it is because of the absence of genuine local demand, 
or unwillingness to import them, rather than because of 
unavailability. 
As far as lower-grade skills are concerned, however, it is 
probably not sound policy for any country which is not sparsely 
populated to plan to meet its needs for them by general im-
migration instead of by training its own people, with the aid 
perhaps of imported teachers. I am assuming, as before, that 
the national objective is a growth in per capita income and 
not merely in aggregate income, and that its concern is pri-
marily with the prosperity of its own people rather than of the 
world at large. 
Scarcity of capital is the second type of obstacle to economic 
development which I will consider. Capital-scarcity may be 
absolute, or may be relative only to the opportunities for 
profitable investment. The United States was a relatively high 
interest-rate country and a borrower of capital until shortly 
before the First World War, but it probably even then had 
more capital per industrial worker than some of the countries 
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from whom it borrowed. The amount of capital per capita in 
use within a country is probably more significant for present 
purposes than the amount of capital per capita O\\'Iled within 
the country, since capital often, and probably usually, promotes 
the economic development of the country using it more than 
that of the country supplying it where these are not the same 
country. Canada provides an apt illustration. But the signi-
ficance of international payments and receipts of interest and 
dividends on the economic growth of a country is not to be 
disregarded. 
The domestic accumulation of capital in a poor country is 
bound to be slow. Income is the source of savings, and where 
income per capita is low, the annual rate of voluntary saving 
per capita will also tend to be low. It is generally agreed, 
however, that, in a given population at a given time, the 
percentage of income annually saved will be greater for higher-
income than for lower-income groups, so that the greater the 
inequality in the distribution of income the greater will be the 
percentage of the aggregate income which will be saved. It 
may also be true that as average income through time increases, 
the percentage of the national income which will be annually 
saved will also increase. But empirical evidence in support 
of this is lacking, and there are some a priori reasons for being 
sceptical about it. What can be said with more confidence, 
however, is that as average income rises through time, the 
absolute amount of annual savings per capita will also rise. 
It is also to be considered that the greater the amount of 
per capita wealth and income, the better will be the credit 
status of a population, and the more therefore will it be able 
to borrow from abroad per capita if it wishes to. To him that 
hath more is available on loan. 
I have been referring to general tendencies, and these may 
in particular countries or at particular times be offset or 
counteracted by special institutional or other factors. Before 
the Industrial Revolution in western Europe, and up to the 
present day in non-industrialized countries, the bulk of ac-
cumulated wealth has consisted of landed property. Keynes 
in his General Theory presents an argument, which I am not 
sure that I understand, that in the past landed property, 
like money, was regarded as a liquid asset, that money was 
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therefore borrowed at low rates of interest on the security of 
land, that this operated to retard the growth of wealth from 
current real investment, and that this explains why the world 
is as poor as it is today in accumuJ.ated capital. What Keynes 
may have had in mind was that landowners borrowed for 
spendthrift purposes, and that if land had not been regarded 
as good security for loans, capitalists, instead of lending to 
landlords, would have invested directly or indirectly, in produc-
tive enterprises. If this is what Keynes meant, it comes close 
to the proposition often encountered that in countries which 
are predominantly agricultural and where land is held in large 
estates, the rich, who should do the saving and investment, 
commonly are non-savers and spend their incomes in luxurious 
living, with the result that economic development of these 
countries is retarded. 
I am sceptical as to the validity historically of Keynes's 
proposition. The English and Scottish landowners of the 
eighteenth century were 'improving' landowners, that is, 
they developed their estates by investing in them not only 
their own incomes but additional capital borrowed from the 
'moneyed-men', and the resultant agricultural revolution 
was a more important contribution to the growth of British 
wealth than was in its early stages the partially simultaneous 
industrial revolution. 
Wealthy landowners have greater opportunity to invest 
their savings in the improvement and embellishment of their 
own properties than does the ordinary urban saver. Peasant 
proprietors have notoriously been the greatest savers of all. 
For rural landowners spending and investing may be hard to 
distinguish, since improvement of an estate can be at the same 
time the most conspicuous way of displaying wealth and the 
most effective way of adding to it. As long as a country has a 
comparative advantage in the expansion of agriculture over 
the expansion of manufacturing, the investment in their own 
estates of their savings by rural landowners may be the most 
productive and the most efficient investment under way in the 
national economy. 
The rate of savings, outside of Keynesian economics, depends, 
of course, on many factors in addition to the size of income, 
but we really have very little reliable knowledge about the 
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psychological and other determinants of the volume of savings. 
It is generally held that inflation is an obstacle to private 
saving. This is probably true where the alternative to inflation 
is not mass unemployment. It is probably true also, under all 
conditions, for persons of middle incomes who are not able 
to find what they regard as effective hedges against the de-
preciation of the real value of their liquid assets and therefore 
flee from money and from assets having fixed money-values 
to consumable goods. 
In past experience, however, the inflationary process has 
generally involved a shift of income and wealth from wage-
earners, the salaried class, the holders of small pensions, savings 
accounts, government bonds, and life insurance policies, to 
the more wealthy classes, the landowners, entrepreneurs, 
middlemen, who automatically or by the exp~oitation of 
superior skill and opportunity were able to derive profit from 
the rise in prices which for the poorer classes brought only 
loss. Since those who profited from inflation were as a class 
those who saved larger fractions of their current incomes, it is 
conceivable, therefore, that in the net inflation as it has usually 
operated in the past has tended to increase rather than to 
decrease the proportion of national savings to national income. 
Inflation, however, also operates arbitrarily to distort the 
direction of investment and also othenvise to generate economic 
waste. It brings profits to entrepreneurs even if they are 
inefficient, and thus dulls the incentives to efficiency. It 
artificially enlarges the field of operation of the middleman 
and the broker, and diverts talent and personnel from produc-
tion to non-productive speculation. It puts a premium on 
investment in urban real estate and in idle inventories, and 
makes difficult the financing of enterprises whose prices because 
of regulation are not easily raised or which commonly obtain 
capital through the issue of bonds, largely regardless of the 
real productivity for the national economy of such enterprises. 
If a government draws off from its citizens in taxes a part 
of what they otherwise would have spent for current consump-
tion, and uses the proceeds in useful public works, the govern-
ment is performing the saving function for the community. I 
do not think, however, that many well-authenticated instances 
of such procedures can be cited. In any case, it is much easier 
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to cite instances where governments have either taxed away 
or borrowed private savings and used them to defray current 
expenditures of a non-investment, and often of a spendthrift, 
character. It is always incumbent on government in private-
enterprise countries to create a favourable setting for saving 
and for private investment not only by providing a good 
example in its own financial housekeeping, but also by establish-
ing an atmosphere of political and legal security for private 
investment, and by providing efficient and honest administra-
tion of the ordinary functions of government. The contributions 
which governments can make to sound economic development 
are often undoubtedly greater in these prosaic and old-fashioned 
fields than in the now fashionable 'plans' which have as their 
goals the diversion of private savings from the financing of 
routine private investment to the financing of spectacular 
and grandiose programmes of public investment not subject 
to the tests of profit-and-loss accounting. 
In countries where the marginal productivity function of 
capital is high and elastic, capital scarcity can be a major 
brake on economic development, and its pace can be greatly 
speeded if capital can be borrowed abroad at moderate rates 
of interest. The obstacles to international investment, however, 
both on the creditor and the debtor side, have grown formidably 
in recent years, and while there has been no previous period 
in which as much reliance has been put on international invest-
ment as prevails today, it is long since the actual prospects 
for large-scale international investment have been as un-
favourable as they now seem to be. 
Main reliance is being placed today on governmental rather 
than on private international lending, both because debtor 
countries prefer to borrow from governments and because 
private capital shows great reluctance to go abroad except 
when it is fleeing from domestic perils. Through war losses, 
heavy taxation, and socialization, the fund of disposable 
private capital potentially available for foreign investment 
has been drastically reduc_ed in some at least of the countries 
which formerly were important exporters of capital. The 
special hazards of foreign investment have increased and are 
increasing further by all appearances. Many capital-poor 
countries gave a grudging welcome to the private foreign 
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investor, but if he nevertheless ventures his capital they give 
him cause to regret it. The popular prejudice which has always 
existed in all countries against the export of capital has become 
more effective in recent years with the decline in the political 
power of the propertied classes, the evaporation of laissez-faire 
objections to governmental regulation of capital flows, and the 
growth in the scale and the effectiveness of regulatory 
machinery. 
There is no justification for more than very modest expecta-
tions as to the scale on which governmental foreign investment 
will take place, in the absence of pressure from political and 
strategic considerations which may tend to operate as much 
to make the potential borrowers unwilling to borrow as they 
do to convert otherwise reluctant lenders to willingness to 
lend. National economic planning has become general, and. 
planning governments, as I have already found occasion to 
point out, tend always to get themselves into financial difficul-
ties which foreign lending would alleviate in the short-run 
but augment in the long-run. The universal growth of national 
debts, moreover, makes all governments feel poor. Few govern-
ments have had substantial experience in foreign lending and 
most of such experience as they have had has been unhappy. 
The loans in the past have commonly brought neither lasting 
goodwill nor repayment. It is too early as yet for confident 
judgement that present-day governmental lending will have 
more gratifying results for the lenders. The number of potential 
lenders on a large scale is very small, scarcely larger than one, 
while· the actual and potential seekers of credit number at 
least fifty. It would be easy to extend this list of reasons why 
it is not realistic for underdeveloped countries to place major 
reliance on foreign investment in their territories as an aid to 
their economic development. 
To capital-poor countries, for reasons good and bad, borrow-
ing from governments seems preferable to borrowing from 
private capitalists, and borrowing from multinational agencies 
to be preferable to borrowing from individual governments. 
So far, however, despite the establishment of new multina-
tional lending agencies, there are no obvious grounds for 
expectation or hope that either existing multinational agencies 
or new agencies still to be established will make quantitatively 
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important contributions to the international flow of capital. 
Such agencies, to recruit capital subscriptions, must accept 
limitations on their range of activities and on the terms which 
they are permitted to offer which force them to be, on debtors' 
standards, exacting creditors. The debtor countries find these 
limitations galling, and press continuously and strongly for 
relaxations of their severity. The result is that in their opera-
tions these agencies fail to satisfy the borrowing countries 
while impressing the potential lenders with the advantages 
of retaining national autonomy with respect to the extent of 
their foreign lending, the selection of the debtors, and the 
conditions on which they shall make loans available to prospec-
tive borrowers. 
If it is accepted that interest and dividends must be paid on 
foreign borrowings and that it will always be a contingent 
possibility that some day, not necessarily a convenient day 
for the debtor, there will have to be repayment of principal, 
it should be recognized that there are economic limits to the 
profitability of borrowing, and that if the borrowing is by 
governments and for public expenditure programmes the 
limits are likely to be narrow. Unremunerative investment 
is possible, and has been common, even in countries starved 
for capital. Relative provision of capital in comparison with 
the technical opportunities for its productive investment is so 
unequal internationally, however, that it is difficult to over-
estimate the service to world prosperity that a free and abun-
dant international flow of capital is capable of rendering if 
it is wisely conducted. In the light of the factors I have been 
discussing which make the prospects of large-scale international 
lending seem dim, I am regretfully forced to the conclusion 
that foreign capital, in the absence of major changes in the 
international scene, will make but a marginal contribution 
to the capital needs of underdeveloped countries. This makes 
all the more urgent the fostering of such internal conditions 
by these count.ries as will encourage domestic saving and the 
prudent use of the proceeds in the development of productive 
facilities, material and human. 
The third category of obstacles to economic development 
which I will examine consists of conditions in foreign trade 
which have or are alleged to have peculiarly unfavourable 
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impacts on relatively poor countries and on countries whose 
exports consist predominantly of primary products and whose 
imports consist largely of the products of industrially advanced 
countries. 
It has been claimed by some of my professional colleagues, 
on the strength both of theoretical analysis and of statistical 
records, that the terms of trade of countries exporting primary 
products with countries exporting manufactures are generally 
adverse to the former and have a secular tendency to become 
worse, and from this proposition they derive the conclusion 
that such countries should strive to industrialize, and, I 
presume, either to become substantially self-sufficing, or to 
become exporters of manufactures and importers of food-
stuffs and raw materials. In so far as the argument rests on an 
inherent inferiority in productivity of resources engaged in 
primary industries over similar resources engaged in manu-
facturing, I have in an earlier lecture stated with some fullness 
my reasons for rejecting the doctrine. I will now examine the 
phase of the doctrine which maintains that in trade between 
primarily agricultural countries and primarily industrialized 
countries the gains from trade go predominantly to the latter. 
It should be noted, however, that an adverse movement of 
the commodity terms of trade, although always in itself an 
unfavourable factor, is not necessarily associated with an 
adverse movement in the material gains from or the profit-
ability of foreign trade. Other factors which are favourable, 
such as growth in the volume of trade, or a decline in the real 
costs of the exports more rapid than the decline in their prices, 
may more than counterbalance the loss from the adverse 
movement of the terms of trade. 
The terms on which a country trades depend on the scale 
on which it unloads its products on export markets as compared 
to the world demand for these products. The greater the 
increase in a country's population, other things equal, the 
greater will tend to be the volume of its staple export products 
which it will attempt to market abroad, provided these are 
not also its staple•articles of domestic consumption, and there-
fore the worse will its terms of trade tend to be. But this will 
apply equally, as a tendency, to countries whether they are 
predominantly agricultural or predominantly industrial, and 
26 Approaches to the Problem of Underdevelopment 
the appropriate remedy in either case would be to check the 
rate of growth of population. In a predominantly agricultural 
country rapid growth of population unaccompanied by pro-
portionate growth in demand for its agricultural products will 
under free-market conditions bring spontaneously into action 
forces tending to industrialize the country, by making agricul-
tural production relatively less remunerative. In industrialized 
countries it will have the reverse effect. 
Primary commodities generally have a wider amplitude of 
fluctuation in their prices during the business cycle than do 
manufactured commodities. Countries exporting primary com-
modities are consequently squeezed during a depression by a 
greater drop in their export than in their import prices. This 
is true, and regrettable. But the obverse side of the shield should 
also be looked at. During booms, primary products rise more 
in price than do manufactures. The profits of the fat years 
should be balanced against the losses of the lean years. With 
good fiscal and monetary management, it would even be 
feasible-it has occurred without being planned in the past, 
notably in New Zealand-to conserve some of the boom-time 
profits in foreign trade to meet the deficits of the depression 
years. Still better, of course, would be, by international action, 
to iron out the cycles. 
It is claimed that statistical data show a secular trend in the 
terms of trade between agricultural and manufactured products 
adverse to the former. As far as the data go, no such uniform 
trend can be shown. English economists have, indeed, often 
claimed to have found the reverse trend to have been operating 
in the past, and on the invalid assumption that the law of 
diminishing returns is peculiar to agriculture have often fore-
cast the continuance of an adverse trend for the future for 
manufactures as against agricultural products. They are, in 
fact, making such forecasts now. For comparisons over long 
periods, moreover, the available data are largely irrelevant. 
The primary commodities whose average prices for broad 
categories are used in the computations of the terms of trade 
are for the most part, for averages so computed, not superior 
in quality, and in some cases are perhaps inferior, to the cor-
responding commodities of earlier years. The articles whose 
prices are used are always a much smaller sample of the total 
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exports of manufactures than of agricultural products, and 
no weight is given to the gain in utility from the new commodi-
ties which have become available, such as the automobile, 
the tractor, and penicillin. Where the manufactures are nomi-
nally the same, moreover, they have over the years become 
incomparably superior in quality. It may perhaps take more 
pounds of coffee, or of cotton, to buy a lamp today than it did in 
1900, but today's coffee and cotton are, I presume, not appre-
ciably better in quality than those of 1900, whereas today's 
electric lamp is incomparably superior to the kerosene lamp of 
1900. The decline in transportation costs, moreover, has made 
possible the seeming paradox of the commodity terms of trade 
improving simultaneously for both sets of countries. 
It is claimed also that there is an historical 'law' of more 
rapid technological progress in manufacturing than in agricul-
ture. If this were true, and manifested itself in a more rapid 
rate of improvement of the quality of manufactures than of agri-
cultural commodities, it would <'perate to deprive an adverse 
trend of the terms of trade for agricultural products of its signi-
ficance, for the adverse trend in prices would be offset by a 
reverse trend in quality. If this were true, and manifested itself 
in a relative decline in real cost of production of manufactures, 
it would tend to result in a favourable and not in an unfavour-
able movement in relative prices for agricultural products. 
I know of no grounds, however, which justify acceptance of 
the proposition that there is any tendency for technological 
progress to be more rapid in manufacturing than in agriculture, 
except as such tendency is a consequence--not a cause--of 
countries which are more advanced technologically being often 
more industrial than agricultural. There is not, as far as I know, 
any marked backwardness in technology of the agriculture of 
Denmark, of England, of New Zealand, or of Iowa. 
I will grant, however, that where agriculture is primitive in 
its methods it will tend to be resistant to more efficient proce-
dures involving change in long-established practices and habits, 
and that this will not be equally true of manufactures, which 
are less susceptible to conservative adherence to obsolete 
methods. The more backward a country is in its procedures, 
however, the greater is the field for technological progress. 
A country with the most modern processes can advance farther 
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only by new inventions and discoveries. A country which is 
backward technologically can make great advances merely by 
borrowing from the already existing stock of knowledge. For 
countries which have a comparative advantage in agriculture 
despite their failure to use advanced techniques, it is not a 
subsidized industrialization at the expense of agriculture which 
is the appropriate remedy, but education and training for a 
modernized agriculture. This will require capital, and capital 
is scarce, but industrialization will generally require even 
more capital per worker, or per unit of product. It is an import-
ant consideration, moreover, that whereas in international 
trade in manufactures the product of obsolete methods or 
styling is often absolutely unsaleable in a competitive market, 
so that for a country dependent to an important extent on 
exports of manufactures to finance its essential imports any 
lag in technological progress can be fatal, this is not true to 
anything like the same degree, if true at all, for a country 
which exports mainly primary products. 
The claim has also been made, invoking Engel's law, that as 
per capita income rises the proportion of the income spent on 
primary products shrinks, so that there results, with rising 
per capita incomes, a relative trend of demand unfavourable 
to agriculture. I do not dispute this, nor that it would be better 
for agricultural countries if Engel's law did not hold. But the 
relative decline in demand for agricultural products will not 
be a positive decline, and therefore will not prevent but will 
only lessen the rate of progress in per capita agricultural in-
comes, if agriculture does not increase disproportionately-
which is again mainly a question of population growth. Even 
the relative decline in demand for agricultural products, more-
over, is mainly a loss to services, and the provision of services 
is always predominantly a local industry, not directly affected 
by commercial policy. All that the most extreme free trader 
contends for, in any case, is that resources should not be pre-
vented from being applied to their most productive uses. If a 
relative shift in demand makes employment in agriculture less 
productive than other employment, resources should be guided 
out of agriculture to these superior uses. 
The opportunities open to an underdeveloped country in the 
foreign trade field are certain to be a vital factor in determining 
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the rate at which it can make economic progress. No country 
except the United States has attained a high level of per capita 
income which has not maintained a high ratio of imports to 
total national product, and no country, except possibly Russia, 
can in this respect make the United States its model without 
courting perpetual poverty. The high degree of self-sufficiency 
of the United States was due in part to a deliberate national 
policy of high tariff protection. But it was the continental 
character of the United States, its richness and variety of 
natural resources and the great obstacle which internal trans-
portation costs presented to international trade, as well as the 
technical skills of its people, which enabled the American to 
dispense with foreign products without having to pay a heavy 
cost in terms of either deprivation of products of any important 
kind or of extreme expensiveness of domestic substitutes, and 
which thus enabled the United States to achieve economic 
prosperity despite its commercial policy and its low ratio of 
foreign to domestic trade. 
The individual country has, as a rule, little control over the 
treatment its exports shall receive in foreign markets or over 
the terms on which it can obtain its imports. What it has full 
control of, however, is the extent to which imports shall be 
hindered from entering by its own artificial barriers. There is 
no underdeveloped country which has not a great stake in the 
removal or reduction of foreign trade barriers, however, and 
in the past few years these countries have had an opportunity, 
which they have cast away, to bring about a lasting and sub-
stantial reduction in the world network of trade restriction by 
giving genuine and strong support to the American proposals 
in this direction. The Havana Charter, even if ratified, will, for 
the reasons I have given in an earlier lecture, constitute only a 
modest first step in this direction, and the underdeveloped 
countries must acknowledge their great share of responsibility 
for its failure to achieve more radical progress in removing the 
barriers to mutually profitable international division of labour. 
If the Havana Charter is not ratified, a second opportunity is 
not likely to come soon, and retrogression is the most likely 
prospect. Even the American conversion to freer trade was only 
superficial, and failure to exploit it when the opportunity was 
available may result in making it only a transitory conversion. 
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The fourth and final category of obstacles to economic 
development, as I prefer to define the term, is associated with 
a rapid rate of increase of population. I have found it necessary 
already to refer to this factor as an obstacle to the attainment 
of economic prosperity in the sense of a high level of per capita 
income and the absence of mass poverty. Population increase 
hovers like a menacing dark cloud over all poor countries. It 
can offset, and more than offset, the contribution to economic 
prosperity which all other factors can make. Whatever the 
opportunities for economic betterment created by technological 
progress, by the discovery of new natural resources, by econo-
mic aid from abroad, and by the removal of foreign trade 
barriers, they can have as their chief consequence an increase 
in the number of children who survive to a short and wretched 
adulthood. Population increase may merely retard economic 
progress and under some circumstances may promote economic 
welfare, by increasing the number of those who share it, if it is 
a by-product of increasing per capita incomes operating, 
through better nutrition, better education, and better sanitary 
conditions, to enable more children to survive to a healthy 
and productive adult life. It will be most damaging if the in-
crease in population is mainly the consequence of the application 
of modem public-health techniques which result in a decrease 
in infant mortality rates more rapid than the improvement in 
health conditions at later ages and more rapid than the rate 
of expansion of opportunities for productive employment. 
What is most discouraging is that there are' no easy and 
certain remedies for the overpopulation problem ; that the 
remedy, birth control, which to most social scientists appears 
to be the only promising one requires a fairly high level of 
education and of income to be wisely available and effective, 
and is moreover bitterly opposed by many on moral and 
religious grounds ; and that many persons, and many govern-
ments, refuse to recognize the existence of a problem here, or, 
if they do recognize it, to face it frankly and seek for a remedy. 
It is a paradox of the population problem that on the gro1,1nds 
of historical experience and of theoretical analysis the attain-
ment of high levels of per capita income and of education appear 
to be almost essential prerequisites of a cure of the problem 
and that the excessive rate of increase of population is itself 
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the most important barrier to the establishment of these prere-
quisites. Here once more, the curse of the poor is their poverty, 
and no easy and certain way to break the vicious circle which 
is widely acceptable has as yet been discovered. 
In this discussion of the obstacles to economic development, 
I have had occasion to deal with both external and internal 
obstacles. It is a natural and understandable tendency in 
underdeveloped countries to stress and to exaggerate the weight 
of the external obstacles, and to assign major responsibility 
for the removal of obstacles to economic betterment to govern-
ments and peoples other than their own. I do not wish to balance 
the exaggeration on one side by minimization on the other. 
The external factors are important, and I would wish to see 
the world at large, and the richer countries in particular, make 
their appropriate contribution to a solution of the world's 
greatest, most serious, economic problem : the problem of 
much over half the world's population living under conditions 
of acute poverty. The promotion of general reduction in trade 
barriers, the freer international movement of capital on rea-
sonable terms, the facilitation of the general diffusion of the 
world's stock of technical knowledge and skills, these are the 
major contributions which the more favourably situated coun-
tries of the world can make to those less advanced and less 
prosperous. They are contributions of the greatest importance. 
But they will not suffice. Without genuine co-operation from 
the countries to be benefited they will not be effective, except 
perhaps in increasing still further the amount of hunger, sick-
ness, premature mortality, and poverty in the world. 
I do not contend that the underdeveloped countries have their 
economic futures in their own hands. On the contrary, in the 
absence of aid from external sources, I would have only pessimis-
tic expectations with respect to the economic future of most of 
the underdeveloped countries. Given, however, the utmost help 
from these external factors which there is any reasonable ground 
to expect, the problem will not even begin to have a practic-
able solution unless the underdeveloped countries dedicate their 
own resources, human, physical, and financial, to a sound, 
large-scale, and persistent attack on those basic internal causes 
of mass poverty which I have tried to identify and whose 
nature and method of operation I have tried to explain. 
POPULATION GROWTH AND 
LIVING STANDARDS* 
by Colin Clark 
THE FIRST AND MOST IMPORTANT FACT ON THIS SUBJECT THAT 
we must take into account is that most religions (using the 
word religion in its broad sense, to include all the codes of 
belief and conduct by which men feel themselves bound, so 
that in this sense of the word all but a minority of mankind 
has a religion) welcome and encourage the birth of a child. 
This is as much or more the case with Confucianism, Hinduism 
or Buddhism as it is with Christianity, Judaism or Islam. It is 
true that ideas and codes of conduct concerning family life 
differ somewhat and are subject to qualification between 
different religions and in different times and places, but the 
general statement remains true. 
The next fact that must be recorded is that many people 
approach this subject with strong materialistic preconceptions. 
A basic aversion to religious belief is the essence of their position 
(glad though they are to receive support, from time to time, 
from various minority groups within the different religions). 
Their object of devotion, which takes the place of religion for 
them, is economic and material welfare. Such welfare is thought 
of, not only as an object good in itself (a proposition with 
which all sensible men would agree), but as an objective of 
such transcendent importance that any belief which conflicts 
with it has to go by the board. This point of view sometimes 
shows itself in its most extreme form among some of the younger 
American writers and propagandists concerned with the dev-
elopment of backward economies. Some religions, they say, 
such as Hinduism (but meaning others by implication, too) 
teach that man ought to practise, at any rate in certain cir-
cumstances, asceticism, or the renunciation of material goods 
for the sake of certain religious objectives. As material advance-
ment and the selling of more goods are our basic objectives 
* International Labour Review, August 1953. Reprinted by permission 
of the International Labour Office, Geneva, and the author. 
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(these writers state) it is clear that we must do our best to 
discredit and destroy such religious beliefs. 
Many Malthusians • would deny that they had any anti-
religious preconceptions. Their point of view, they say, is 
purely scientific. If that is so there cannot be any other group 
of scientists so ill informed on the facts with which they are 
supposed to deal. Many Malthusians have no knowledge of 
the simplest facts about population ; and those who do know 
some demography seem to be almost universally uninformed 
on economics. 
In another respect also most Malthusian propagandists give 
an extraordinary illustration of their unawareness of facts. 
They believe that if they can have the latest European and 
American contraceptives sufficiently advertised and cheaply 
distributed (presumably through some system of subsidization) 
throughout the oriental countries, the number of children 
born in the Orient would immediately and permanently fall. 
Nothing seems more improbable. Children are born in the 
Orient, as they were among our ancestors, and as most children 
are born in the Christian world today, because of their parents' 
wishes and consciences and religious beliefs, not because their 
parents wish to prevent them from being born but are unable 
to obtain contraceptives. There have certainly been occasions 
in the past when men have wished artificially to restrict their 
families, without any thought or knowledge of modern con-
traceptives. They have used the method described in the Book 
of Genesis, which is almost as old as the human race itself. 
Orientals at the present time would restrict their families if 
they really desired to do so. Nothing could be more futile-
apart from the morality of it-than to attempt to distribute 
contraceptives among people who do not wish to use them. 
It is, however, equally clear-and this is one of the most 
important of all religious teachings-that we are bound to 
promote the material welfare of our neighbour. But this objec-
tive clearly has qualifications in morals. When Hitler was 
plundering and enslaving the peoples around him he doubtless 
reflected "'1.th considerable pride on the way he was promoting 
the material welfare of the German people. 
The International Labour Review is not, however, the place 
to discuss disputed points of religion or rrwral philosophy, 
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though every prudent man should know when his political or 
economic proposals are likely to involve him in controversy 
on these subjects. 
Subject to these qualifications, we can now discuss the rela-
tionship between population increase and economic and 
material welfare. 
It seems to come as a surprise to many people to learn that 
there are a great many industries-probably the majority of 
industries in the modern community-which are quite specifi-
cally benefited by increasing population. These are the indus-
tries that work under the law of increasing returns rather than 
the law of diminishing returns. This is one of the simplest but 
at the same time most important propositions in economics. 
Many modern students of economics have their heads so filled 
with new but comparatively unimportant formulae that they 
do not give adequate attention to these important truths. 
The law of increasing returns prevails in any industry where, 
as a consequence of an increased scale of output, we can expect 
to obtain increasing returns per unit of labour or other economic 
resources employed. 
What category of businesses can be more economically run 
on a large scale ? The list includes most forms of large-scale 
manufacture, transport, postal communications, banking, 
insurance and the like. In fact most of the economic operations 
of a modern community are carried out in such a way that, if 
there were an increase in the population and the size of the 
market, organization would become more economical and 
productivity per head would increase, not decrease. Without 
the large and densely settled population of North America 
and Western Europe, most modern industries would be working 
under great difficulties and at very high costs-it is doubtful, 
indeed, whether they could have come into existence at all. 
Industries working under the law of diminishing returns are 
agriculture, mining, forestry and fishing, and some others which 
are dependent upon the use of scarce materials. Certain other 
industries, such as building, where the limiting economic 
factor appears to be shortage of men of the right kind of skill 
and organizing ability, probably work under constant returns, 
i.e., intermediate between increasing and diminishing returns. 
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On the other hand, some of the most highly mechanized bran-
ches of agriculture-production of sugar-cane is probably the 
most interesting example-show every sign of working under 
increasing returns. That is to say, a district organized for pro-
ducing sugar-cane on a large scale, with its crushing mill and 
haulage systems laid out accordingly, probably enjoys a higher 
return per unit of labour than a smaller scale system. 
At the time when Malthus wrote-or for that matter Ricardo 
-the law of diminishing returns was supposed to be universal. 
Although the businessman must have understood, in his own 
way, the advantages of production on a large scale, it was not 
until much later in the nineteenth century, at the time of 
Marshall and his contemporaries, that the law of increasing 
returns in industry was more clearly formulated. It is now, 
of course, fully understood and statistically measurable. 
(Dr Verdoorn, the Netherlands statistician, has assembled a 
good deal of evidence to show that something like a definite 
mathematical law governs the extent to which product per 
man can rise as the scale of industry is increased.) But at the 
moment, for various reasons, it seems to receive inadequate 
attention in economic teaching and practically none in popular 
writings on economics. 
The law of diminishing retqrns does not in the least mean 
what most people believe it to mean. It certainly does not 
mean that the returns from agriculture, or any other economic 
activity, diminish from year to year. The law has no reference 
to any supposed diminution in time. What the law of diminish-
ing returns says, or at any rate the form of it which is applicable 
to our present discussion, is that if you put an increasing num-
ber of men to farm a limited area of land, then the returns per 
man will diminish (though the total returns from the land will 
increase). 
But even stated in this way the law is only valid under certain 
conditions. A man's experience must be very limited if he does 
not know of some examples of densely populated farm areas 
producing more per head than less densely populated areas. 
The law of diminishing returns can only be said to be, in any 
sense of the word, a law if two further conditions are fulfilled: 
first, that the inhabitants of the more densely settled area do 
not use any different farming methods from those of the less 
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densely settled area, and secondly, that they do not employ 
any more capital per head. 
These two further conditions make the law of very limited 
application indeed. For the use of improved farming methods 
and greater quantities of capital per man are precisely the steps 
taken by progressive countries when they find their population 
increasing and their area of agricultural land limited. If the 
law has much validity in practice, the statistician should be 
able to detect its operation by preparing a diagram in which 
one co-ordinate measures the number of men engaged in 
agricultural work per square kilometre of cultivable land and 
the other co-ordinate measures the real product obtained per 
man. Anyone who draws a diagram of this sort will soon see 
that the exceptions are more numerous than the cases in which 
the rule applies. It is interesting to see, however, that the rule 
holds moderately well when we are comparing the different 
provinces or regions within one country-for farming methods 
and skill and the amount of capital available per head do not 
differ very much between one region of the country and 
another. 
AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION AND POPULATION 
In the following table are summarized the figures for all the 
countries for which comparable results can be obtained. 
Density of agricultural population is classified by the number 
of persons engaged in agriculture per square kilometre of culti-
vable land {the definition of cultivable land will be given later). 
The only countries excluded are a few of the highest-income 
non-European countries. In countries like the United States, 
Australia and Argentina there is obviously no question of a 
shortage of land, so there is no need to put such countries in 
the table. 
We have to use some standard of value to compare agricul-
tural production per head in the different countries. As almost 
every country has its own pricing system for agricultural 
products, some international system of prices has to be used. 
For some purposes United States dollar prices can be used. 
In this case, however, it is more convenient to use Indian rupee 
prices of the year 1948-49. The relative prices of different 
agricultural products in India give results more akin to the 
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price relationships prevailing in most of the low-income coun-
tries under study than do the United States relative prices. 
Classification of 26 countries with respect to the relationship between the 
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We can see from the table how little relation there is, if any, 
between density of settlement and average product per head. 
About the same density of settlement prevails in Denmark as 
in Soviet Russia, but product per man in one case is five times 
what it is in the other. Many people are concerned about the 
density of the agricultural population in India, and it is un-
doubtedly high. But it is equally high in Italy, where the 
average cultivator produces about twice as much as does the 
Indian. There is much talk about the possibility of introducing 
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the Indian to tractors and milking machines and all the most 
modem agricultural equipment. Let us defer discussing this 
for the present-its time will come-and meanwhile set our-
selves the much easier question, whether the Indian could learn 
and practise the simple arts of the Italian peasant, and use his 
simple equipment, for dairying, rice growing, fruit growing 
and similar activities. For if he could, he would be, within a 
few years, twice as well off as he is now. 
It is difficult to teach the Indians any new agricultural 
methods. Better to try to obtain the same objective by reducing 
population density. For the sake of argument, let us consider 
this latter proposition. To carry it out, you will have to reduce 
the Indian population to one-quarter of what it is now. (A 
statistical estimation of the operation of the law of diminishing 
returns, made by comparing different provinces or regions in 
the same country, indicates that there is probably an inverse 
square root relationship between the density of settlement and 
productivity per man.) The stoutest Malthusian would hesitate 
at the prospect of having to reduce the population by three-
quarters and, in any case, how long would it take him to do it, 
even if he had his way in every respect, short of murder? 
Any observation of these facts must make us realize what 
immense improvements are possible in agricultural productivity 
in most parts of the world. Such improvements cannot, of 
course, be had for the asking. To get them, an immense dis-
semination of education and technical knowledge will be needed, 
new equipment to a steadily increasing degree, and capital to 
provide equipment, livestock and buildings. Whether there is 
any hope of obtaining this capital is a question which will be 
discussed shortly. 
The most successful farming, as judged by the ability to 
obtain the highest product at the highest density of settlement, 
is to be found in Denmark and the Netherlands, with Belgium 
and Britain not far behind. In Denmark the high figure is 
obtained with a density of settlement of IO men engaged in 
agricultural work per square kilometre of cultivable land, in 
the Netherlands with 17. Farm economists in the Netherlands 
mostly agree, in the interests of efficient operation, that they 
would not like to see this high density further exceeded. 
However, the Netherlands farmers have provided very con-
Population Growth and Living Standards 39 
crete evidence that agricultural land can be worked, and yield 
a high product, at this high density of settlement. Their country 
has, however, a soil of unusual fertility, and some may prefer 
to take Denmark, with ten men per square kilometre, as the 
reasonable standard. At any rate, it cannot be said that here 
we are dealing with soil of unusual fertility. Rather the 
reverse. 
Now we must discuss what we mean by cultivable land. In 
Western Europe we come to think of practically the whole 
land surface as cultivable (if we include intensive livestock 
grazing as cultivation) except for a few swamps and extremely 
mountainous areas. But extending our view we see that limits 
are imposed by cold (as we approach the Arctic Circle or moun-
tainous regions) or by aridity (as in parts of Spain). In dealing 
with other parts of the world these climatic limits are of much 
greater importance. 
Cultivable land is measured in climatic terms. It is true that 
in some countries there are large areas where, although climatic 
conditions are satisfactory, the soil is believed to be so poor 
that no cultivation is possible, particularly in tropical areas. 
But the consensus of opinion among chemists is that these 
defects can be remedied, though it is costly to do so. Climatic 
defects, on the other hand, can only be remedied by extremely 
costly methods (irrigation or glass houses) and we can assume 
that no really large-scale operations of this nature will be 
practicable. 
Using the Thornthwaite climatic classification,1 we assume 
that the poleward limit of cultivable land is where the cold 
'taiga' climates begin. At the other end we must exclude all 
arid deserts and all but a very small fraction of the semi-arid 
land-of which there is a great deal in India, Africa and Aus-
tralia-where only sparse grazing is possible. The next cat-
egory is the subhumid lands, half of which are regarded as 
cultivable, except that where they have a regular rainy season 
the proportion may rise to two-thirds or five-sixths. The main 
body of cultivable land in all continents, however, is the land 
with wet or humid temperate or subtropical climate. The only 
1 All these workings and classifications were set out in detail in the 
author's paper to the United Nations Scientific Conference on the 
Conservation and Utilization of Resources (Lake Success, Aug. 1949). 
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further exception we must make is that in the areas where high 
tropical temperatu):"es combine with all-the-year-round rainfall, 
the land (if fertilized) is capable of growing two crops a year, 
and is accordingly counted as double in compiling the total 
estimate of cultivable land. 
Denmark has no more than 39,000 square kilometres of cul-
tivable land. Denmark's net exports (i.e., exports less imports) 
of farm products are as much as 45 per cent of net product 
(defined as output less seeds and fodder used up in the process 
of production). Denmark, therefore, in effect, feeds not only 
her own population of 4 ·4 million, but another 3·6 million 
people elsewhere, or 8 million in all ; that is, about 200 people 
are fed per square kilometre of cultivable land. 
The question is often asked, how many people can now be 
fed by one man working on the land? There is, of course, no 
single answer. Net productivity of a man on the land varies in 
different places and at different times. We must also remember 
that the amount of food which people expect to have supplied 
to them also varies. But, under modem Danish conditions, 
you have ten men working per square kilometre of land and 
200 people supplied thereby, or 20 people supplied by one man. 
If we take dependants into account, we can say that one farm 
family supplies about eight families all told-itself and seven 
others. Or, if you like to put it more prosaically, we can say 
that if we assume that there is no net import or export of farm 
products a country with agriculture as productive as in Den-
mark and with a population whose standards of feeding are as 
high as those of the Danes will have to keep about r2t per cent 
of its labour force occupied in agriculture. 
In some of the non-European countries we can of course 
obtain higher figures of the number of persons fed per agricul-
tural worker, or lower figures of the proportion of the labour 
force required in agriculture. 
At Danish standards, therefore, of productivity on the one 
hand and of diet on the other, a square kilometre of cultivable 
land will provide for about 200 people, or a square mile for 
about soo. On this standard, how much of the world is over-
populated, or how much additional population can it support ? 
On the criterion of having sufficient land to feed one's popula-
tion at these Danish standards, the only countries in the world 
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which are overcrowded (not counting a few small isolated 
settlements) are Japan, the Netherlands, Belgium and probably 
Switzerland (if we take its high proportion of mountainous 
area into account). The Federal Republic of Germany is just 
on the borderline. England is overcrowded if considered in 
isolation, but not if the territory and populations of Scotland 
and Northern Ireland are considered in conjunction with it. 
The population of India and Pakistan per square mile of culti-
vable land is about 40o-high, but not above the limit. The 
corresponding figure for China is lower, probably between 300 
and 350. For Indonesia it is much lower, but here the position 
is complicated by the greater part of the population being 
concentrated in the one island of Java, while the rest of a very 
large cultivable area is almost uninhabited. 
In countries like Britain, Belgium and Germany it is taken 
for granted that the population will not try to support itself 
entirely on its own limited land area and that a substantial 
proportion of the inhabitants will be engaged in export indus-
tries in order to purchase food and raw materials from elsewhere. 
Until recently this was taken for granted in the case of Japan 
also. Some people now talk about Japan having difficulty in 
supporting her increasing population on her limited area. This 
sort of statement only has meaning if one assumes that Japan 
is to be excluded from all export trade. 
Enrope, excluding the U.S.S.R. (pre-war territory), has 
I,400,000 square miles of cultivable land. In this area live 450 
million people, who obtain (taken altogether) some 95 per cent 
of their food supplies from European agricultural production. 
If all of Europe were as closely settled as Denmark, 700 million 
people would be able to obtain their food supplies from this 
area. Europe is the most densely settled of the continents. 
The United States and Canada have 2,275,ooo square miles of 
cultivable land, with only 175 million people on it, only a 
small fraction of the numbers it could feed, even on European 
standards of cultivation. Latin America has approximately 
the same numbers, about 170 million people, but in this case 
there are 7 million square miles of cultivable land. Africa, with 
6 million square miles, has a population of only 210 million 
and Oceania only 30 million population with a million square 
miles of cultivable land. 
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One of the world's most congested regions is the Middle East, 
where 78 million people live with only 171,000 square miles of 
cultivable land. Even so, the density is below the limit which 
we set ourselves; the land is farmed in the Middle East much 
less efficiently than in Denmark, and a good deal of now arid 
land could be brought into cultivation by means of irrigation 
if sufficient capital were available. 
The rest of south-east Asia, apart from Indonesia, is also 
lightly populated, with only 95 million people on 1,25o,ooo 
square miles of cultivable land. There has been so much talk 
about south-east Asia and its problems that it comes as a shock 
to realize that a great deal of it is uninhabited. This is the case 
for almost the whole of Malaya, large areas of Burma and Siam, 
and a considerable part of the monsoon-climate area of Burma. 
Most of the world, therefore, is populated at far below its 
potential density. The world's total area of cultivable land 
(allowing for double cropping in the highest-rainfall tropical 
areas) is 24 million square miles, and at Danish standards of 
cultivation and consumption could support 12,000 million 
people, as opposed to the 2,300 million people it supports now. 
Now let us leave economics and go back to demography. 
Some demographers may admit the truth of these economic 
and geographical facts, but then go on to say that Danish (or 
any other) standards of high cultivation could never be reached, 
for the reason that population increases in many of the coun-
tries concerned are so unbearably rapid that they are bound 
to overtake any increase in production. Statements like this, 
which are often made a priori without ascertaining the available 
facts, soon tend to be generalized until they form a theoretical 
Malthusian statement that population everywhere and at 
every time is tending to press upon the means of subsistence. 
The true facts ~m this subject are simple, but seem to be known 
by very few people and conflict with popular belief at almost 
every point. 
THE FERTILITY OF THE HUMAN RACE 
If every woman married young, and there were no restriction 
of births of any kind, what would the average size of the family 
be? (We are discussing now not the number of children survi-
ving, but the number born.) The answer is about six. That is 
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to say, this would be the average number of living children 
born to the average woman who had survived to the age of 45 
and had been married all the time. The families of women who 
died earlier would of course be smaller. 
What is the evidence for this ? First, uncertain and imprecise, 
but covering a very wide range of time and place, comes the 
evidence of the anthropologists. According to their evidence, 
this seems to be the average number of children born in primi-
tive communities. In these communities every woman marries 
young, and, as there is nearly always a surplus of males, a 
woman left widowed will probably be remarried almost 
immediately. Practices for the artificial prevention of concep-
tion, though known among some primitive peoples, appear to 
be rare. 
The next evidence, much more precise but from far fewer 
sources, comes from certain countries with a simple agricultural 
economy where good demographic records are available. {The 
reader should be aware that outside Western Europe, North 
America, Australasia and Japan most countries have no proper 
record of the number of births and deaths, much less the accu-
rate census tables and other material needed for demographic 
calculation.) Brazil and Ceylon are among the few countries 
for which proper census records are available from which 
demographic calculation can be made. China has had no sort 
of census for more than a century, but one or two carefully 
conducted sample inquiries by Western observers in limited 
areas give us some interesting material. The third piece of 
evidence, from an entirely different source and only recently 
available, is very concrete. The medical sub-committee of the 
recent British Royal Commission on Population collected a 
good deal of information from women which, by an ingenious 
statistical method, was put together in such a form as to show 
what the total fertility of the modern English woman would 
be if she married early and if throughout her married life no 
restriction were imposed upon conception. The answer here also 
came to a figure in the neighbourhood of six. 
Most people (including many biologists and doctors) have 
somehow acquired the opinion that the natural fertility of the 
human race is much higher than this. Popular opinion is even 
more misinformed. Ask anyone what was the size of the average 
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Victorian family and he will probably say that it was about 
I2 ; in fact the average family in Victorian England (or in 
most of nineteenth century Europe) was about five. 
The next point which must be made clear is that, in the 
conditions in which mankind has been living throughout the 
greater part of its history on this earth, and in which the majo-
rity of mankind is living today, an average family of six children 
barely suffices to maintain the population. Primitive popula-
tions, generally speaking, do not increase. 
At the beginning of the Christian era the estimates of 
historians put the population of the world at about 250 million. 
We can accept this estimate with the widest margin of error. 
It does not matter very much, from our present point of view, 
whether we put the figure at ISO million or soo million. The 
point is that the human race began, so the geologists tell us, 
soo,ooo years ago. (The evidence accepted by geologists and 
by biologists appears to be of a far lower order of accuracy 
than that used by economists and demographers, low though 
that may be; the geologists sometimes behave as if an extra 
zero in their figure were a comparatively minor matter, while 
some of the biologists have recently tried to raise the figure 
from half a million to a million years.) But on this assumption 
of half a million years we must deduce that the average rate of 
increase in numbers of the human race, over the greater part 
of its existence, was not more than ·004 per cent per annum. 
Between the beginning of the Christian era and the seven-
teenth century, for which period we have rather more popula-
tion information, the average rate of increase of mankind 
accelerated somewhat, but was still no more than ·04 per cent 
per annum. A rate of increase of as much as I per cent per 
annum became apparent in Britain and Ireland towards the 
end of the eighteenth century, and from about the middle of 
the nineteenth century onwards the average rate of increase 
of the whole world has been slightly over I per cent per annum. 
In some areas the figure has been as high as 2 per cent per 
annum and in a few cases as high as 3 per cent (natural increase, 
apart from immigration), for example in the United States in 
its early years of development and in modem Ceylon. 
It is clear that there is, among primitive people, a mortality 
such as to require an average family of six just to maintain the 
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population. Though wars and famines do occur among primitive 
people, it would not be in accordance with the evidence to 
describe them as chronic. Most of their mortality seems to be 
due to the general hardships of life and the absence of any form 
of medical treatment. 
But we must also realize how widely these conditions have 
applied, in the past, among supposedly civilized as well as 
primitive peoples, and how extensively they still apply today. 
The evidence of Indian history seems to show that the popula-
tion was much the same in the fourth century B.c., the seven-
teenth century A.D., and also in the early nineteenth century. 
It was quite late in the nineteenth century that any real 
expansion of the Indian population began. It is obviously 
wrong to say that India's population over this long period 
was held in check by some natural limits ; it stood over most 
of this period at about 150 million, or not much more than a 
third of the population which India and Pakistan (without 
any great improvement in agricultural methods) are carrying 
now. The long history of India shows varying phases of order 
and good government, followed by war, disorder and anarchy. 
In the latter phases not only production but also population is 
reduced. 
More or less similar conclusions can be drawn from a study 
of Chinese history. What very few people realize, however, is 
that the Chinese population has apparently been in a station-
ary or declining phase ever since r8so-this is the opinion of 
two of the world's most careful demographers, Sir Alexander 
Carr-Saunders and Professor Wilcox. The tragic events of the 
last two decades have apparently greatly accelerated the 
decline, and there is evidence now that large areas of cultivable 
land in China are uninhabited. 
Still more striking is the possibility of seeing in our own 
times an actual change of trend taking place. Indonesia, before 
1941, caused some concern among demographers by main-
taining a persistent rate of increase, under Netherlands rule, 
of as high as z per cent per annum. The problem was cvmpli-
cated, as has been mentioned before, by the concentration of 
almost the whole of the population in Java while the other 
islands were largely uninhabited. But now the (extremely 
uncertain) estimates of population are only a few per cent 
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above the 1941 level. Sir Alexander Carr-Saunders has evidence 
to show that in Africa population has been stationary over 
very long periods. Probably it only began to increase in this 
century. Still more surprisingly, in Latin America, which was 
supposedly civilized, there were long periods of stagnation 
in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. 
Both the historical and present-day evidence seems to point 
to the same conclusion, that any appreciable population 
increase is only possible when two conditions are fulfilled, 
namely, the establishment of a firm and ordered political 
system and the dissemination and utilization of some medical 
knowledge. It is doubtful whether there has ever been, in 
historical fact, an actual instance of the supposed Malthusian 
universal, of population overtaking agricultural productivity, 
multiplying right up to the limits of subsistence, and then 
being held in check by some new form of 'vice or misery'. 
Agricultural methods themselves are susceptible of considerable 
change. In most modern communities improvements in techni-
que lead to a rise in agricultural productivity, without any 
additional labour force or the cultivation of any additional 
land, at a rate faster than any probable rate of increase in 
population. This does not apply in the West alone. In Japan 
product per man in agriculture has risen steadily since the 
18gos at a rate of 2 per cent per annum. 
Ireland is sometimes quoted as an example. Population 
increased fairly rapidly in the eighteenth century, not because 
of abnormally large families but because of good health and 
reduced mortality. British legislation forbade this increasing 
population to find employment in industry, but a new form 
of agriculture based on potato growing provided adequate food 
supplies-until the famine of 1845. But the important point 
is that the Irish population had practically stopped increasing 
by 1831---emigration was outbalancing almost the whole of 
the natural increase. The famine was mainly due to a fungal 
disease of potatoes which could easily be checked under modem 
conditions, and its worst consequences could have been avoided 
under more far-sighted and humane administration. 
Another example sometimes quoted is that of the irrigation 
settlements in India. It is said that as soon as additional land 
is made available for cultivation through irrigation works the 
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population of the district rapidly increases, and density of 
population per square mile of cultivable land is soon as high 
as it was before. This is probably true ; but there is no evidence 
that it is due to either increased births or reduced mortality 
among the inhabitants ; all the probabilities are against this. 
What has happened is precisely what one might have expected 
-the migration of a large number of would-be settlers from 
other parts of India. 
All the above facts and reasoning constitute a very un-
expected approach to the problem, though it may be claimed 
that they are both true and important. Some readers may 
accept them, but still have misgivings. They may grant that 
no part of the world has ever yet come within sight of over-
population in the Malthusian sense of the term, and that 
Malthus's ideas of history were as odd as his ideas of agricul-
ture. They may grant that the world still contains enormous 
areas of cultivable land capable of settlement. But they will 
also point out the immense acceleration of the pace of medical 
improvement during the past generation. There is some (not 
complete) evidence that the rate of decline of mortality in 
Asia in this century is far more rapid than was the rate of 
decline of mortality in nineteenth century Europe. With the 
prospect of continuously decreasing rates of mortality, and 
with the hope of world peace and good government (for which 
we are all certainly labouring our hardest), will we not create 
in the course of the next century a world population problem 
of quite unmanageable dimensions? An average of six children 
per family, which appears to be the natural rate of reproduc-
tivity of the human race, just suffices to keep population 
stationary under primitive conditions and allows for a rate of 
population increase of r or 2 per cent per annum in a settled 
and civilized agrarian economy, but what might it lead to if 
the whole world enjoyed rates of mortality as low as those of 
advanced western communities? Under such conditions about 
go per cent of the children born survive to child-bearing age, 
and even if we allow that a certain proportion of them remain 
unmarried we are still going to get a rate of population increase 
of about 4 per cent per annum, or population doubling every 
20 years. The 3 per cent per annum rates of increase already 
observed in the early years of the United States and in 
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preseqt-day Ceylon arise from the conjuncture of very large 
families with low mortality rates. 
This all turns on the question of whether the average family 
is likely to remain as high as six. Instances have been given 
from the primitive and the modern world. But in India, for 
which we have a considerable number of sample studies, it 
appears doubtful whether the average family of Hindus was 
ever more than five. (Among the Moslem and Christian mino-
rities larger families are found.) This is apparently due to the 
curious Hindu rule which forbids the remarriage of widows. 
In Japan we can trace the fall from six at the beginning of the 
present century to a figure of only four by 1940, and apparently 
lower again now. Dr Lorimer's study of Soviet Russia traces a 
similar movement up to 1938. In India sample studies show a 
considerable fall in the size of family in industrial cities, and 
some statisticians qualified to judge think that, taking India 
as a whole, the average family may now be as low as four. 
We have not enough information to make a detailed and 
accurate analysis of what is going on in most of these countries, 
and it will probably be many years before such information is 
available. But one point which is brought out in the writings 
of Dr Ghosh about Indian population is that the marked dec-
line in reproductivity in the partially industrialized areas of 
the Orient is probably due not to the restriction of births in 
marriage, but to later marriage. Throughout the Orient very 
early marriages have been until recently the rule, and a defer-
ment of only a year or two may make a very considerable 
difference to total fertility. Alike in the medical and statistical 
evidence of the fertility of the average human family we see 
clearly that the greater part of the births occur in the 
comparatively early years of married life. 
Even though the statistical interpretations of it may differ 
somewhat, there can be no doubt about the deceleration of 
the rate of India's population growth. Prior to 1921 the rate 
of growth was less than I per cent per annum. From 1921 to 
1931 India's population grew by II per cent, and from 1931 
to 1941 by r6 per cent, but between 1941 and 1951 the increase 
was again only about II per cent (taking India and Pakistan 
together for the latter year). The Bengal famine of 1943 and 
the massacre of refugees on both sides of the border at the time 
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of the separation of Pakistan from India in 1947 were both 
dreadful events, but they cannot account for more than a 
small fraction of the observed deceleration of the population 
increase. For the decade 1951-6I, on the basis of the informa-
tion available, there is every indication that the net rate of 
population growth will prove to be less than I per cent per 
annum. 
In Ceylon, likewise, there is fairly clear evidence that the 
average total fertility has fallen from six to five in one 
generation. 
There is neither need nor space to attempt to trace all the 
causes of these phenomena. In an urban population the desires 
to accumulate money and achieve social position are a far 
greater force than in a static peasant community, and the 
incentives to bring up families are thereby weakened. To what 
extent religious beliefs become weakened when a peasant 
community becomes urbanized is also a matter for discussion ; 
sometimes it undoubtedly occurs, but even among those ur-
banized Hindus, for instance, who retain their religious beliefs 
in full, there is clearly some tendency to reduce the size of the 
family. 
In India, therefore, which many people thought to possess 
the world's most intractable population problem, the situation 
is very different from what is commonly supposed. The work 
of Indian statisticians shows that the rise in production has 
since 1870 been far greater than the rise in population, and there 
is every prospect that, with increasing industrialization, this 
process will continue. 
Neither is this the place to discuss the extraordinary change 
in the population trend in North America and Western Europe 
that has occurred during the past decade. Many of these western 
communities now have a rate of natural increase far higher 
than that of Asia, and look like maintaining it. 
High net rates of population increase are found in Latin 
America, in Africa, in the Middle East (it is here that the 
problem is so serious, because resources of land are very limited, 
and increasing cultivation by irrigation works is bound to be 
a slow and costly process) and in some, but not all, of the 
countries of south-east Asia. Most of the countries with the 
highest rates of population increase are those which have very 
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considerable resources of unused agricultural land. There 
cannot, therefore, be said to be any serious danger of food short-
age, except that which is brought about by their own 
misgovernment. 
CAPITAL RESOURCES 
We can now bring this discussion to a conclusion, and also 
examine one final point-capital accumulation-on which 
serious misgivings may be felt. For the more advanced coun-
tries, which already have a fairly dense population and a good 
transport system, the obvious line of development is indus-
trialization. Once the earliest difficulties have been overcome-
admittedly a slow and hazardous process-the law of increasing 
returns comes into operation, and every further increase in 
population makes the industrialization process more remunera-
tive. 
Industrialization for the purpose of developing exports is 
not a possibility open to every country. In some cases even 
industrialization to supply local needs is hopelessly uneconomic. 
Generally speaking a sparse population, lack of transport, lack 
of education and remoteness from world markets are factors 
which may make industrialization very difficult. The presence 
or absence of local raw materials is a matter of very secondary 
importance. Japan and Switzerland are examples of highly 
successful industrialization, and both are virtually lacking in 
indigenous raw materials. 
Where industrialization is not possible, or involves too great 
difficulties and hazards, the alternative policy of extended 
agriculture must be followed. Most of the countries involved 
have resources of unused land. This is not the case in a few 
isolated densely populated areas, mostly islands, such as 
Mauritius, the Cape Verde Islands, and the British West Indies. 
In such cases, where transport difficulties impede industrializa-
tion, emigration is the only satisfactory solution. 
But we must mention in this connexion Puerto Rico, which 
for many years has been sitting heavily upon the American 
conscience, and has provoked many Americans into believing 
it to be a case of overpopulation. The American conscience can 
now be at rest. After a long period of stagnation Puerto Rico 
has shown since 1939 a rate of development of real income, and 
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economic development generally, without parallel in world 
history, leaving the Japanese rate of growth far behind. This 
has depended upon two elements, an intensification and techni-
cal improvement of sugar production and a widespread pro-
gramme of industrialization. Emigration has played a com-
paratively minor role. Though dependent upon a rather costly 
shipping service Puerto Rico is near enough to the United 
States market (and within the same tariff wall) to be able to 
participate very remuneratively in the United States industrial 
structure. 
But, whether for industrialization or for the extension of 
agricultural production, considerable capital resources are 
required. It is very easy to underrate the amounts necessary. 
Satisfactory agricultural development often requires amounts 
comparable with those required for industrial development. 
It is a great mistake to consider solely factories or livestock. 
Whoever hears now of the Bombay Plan, the project which 
attracted world-wide attention in 1945, whereby India's real 
national income was to be doubled in 15 years ? This Plan was 
prepared by businessmen, and made quite careful estimates 
of the capital which would be required for the large-scale indus-
trialization of India. These were literally true ; what the Plan 
forgot was the enormous further investment which would be 
needed for housing, transport, education and other social 
needs. 
The amount of capital required per head in these countries 
is generally equal to about four years' income per head. The 
figures, of course, vary enormously between trades. A carpenter 
needs no more capital than a bag of tools ; the capital used by 
a telephone operator is more than she could earn in a lifetime. 
But generally speaking, averaging all trades together, the four 
to one rule holds. (Some people may ask, does this mean that 
each unit of additional capital earns a 25 per cent return ? 
It does, in the sense that 100 units of capital invested cause 
national income to rise by 25 units per annum. But of this 
additional product labour will demand at least 15 units, even 
in an oriental country-more like 20 units iu a western 
country-leaving something between 5 and IO units per 
annum as a remuneration to the investor of the IOO units of 
capital.) 
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This means that, to cover an increase in the labour force of 
I per cent, a capital investment equal to 4 per cent of the 
national income will be necessary. We thus get a very simple 
rule. Take the expected rate of population increase and multiply 
it by four. This gives us the percentage of national income 
which has to be invested in order to provide employment, of 
the same average kind as now exists, for the increasing popula-
tion. This investment may come from internal savings or 
external borrowing. It is only in so far as the rate of investment 
exceeds the rate of population increase multiplied by four that 
anything will be left over for industrialization or for raising 
standards of real income per head. 
It is unfortunately impossible to test out this interesting 
rule because of the almost complete lack of reliable statistics 
of the rate of saving in the underdeveloped countries. Some 
figures from India before the war indicate a rate of saving of 
about 6 per cent of the national income. There are unfortunately 
some signs that this rate of saving was not resumed in the 
post-war years, but if anything like this figure prevails now 
it is well in excess of four times the rate of population growth, 
and therefore leaves a margin (though less than might be 
desired) for industrialization, before any inflow of external 
capital is considered. But India is in a more fortunate position 
than many of the underdeveloped countries. In many cases, 
where rates of population increase are higher and rates of saving 
in all probability lower, there will be a retrogression of economic 
standards unless a substantial inflow of external capital IS 
possible. 
CONCLUSION 
We can bring it all down in the end then to a single con-
clusion. Any foreseeable rate of population increase, in any 
part of the world, can be economically provided for at a satis-
factory and indeed rising standard of real income, subject to 
three conditions. The first, which is of comparatively minor 
importance, is that free emigration should be facilitated from 
a few isolated overcrowded areas. Here the numbers involved 
are small. Emigration is not a necessary economic solution for 
the problems of the larger countries, whatever may be the 
rights and wrongs of it in general. 
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The next condition is that for large and densely populated 
countries, such as India, which have reached the stage where 
industrialization is obviously their only suitable prospect of 
economic advancement, the rest of the world, even if it cannot 
offer direct help for such industrialization, should at least 
co-operate by leaving markets open for these countries to sell 
their goods and not place tariff and quota restrictions upon 
their trade. Japan was treated with gross unfairness by the 
Western powers in the 1930s, and this played a considerable 
part in forming her determination to go to war. 
Countries which have already reached the size and stage of 
development of India and Brazil, for instance, will probably 
be able to proceed with industrialization using their own 
resources only, though it will be much slower than would be 
possible if they received external assistance. In the smaller, 
weaker countries the receipt of external assistance is a necessary 
condition without which further development will not be 
possible. How this should be organized, and how the responsi-
bilities should be shared among the different lending countries, 
cannot now be discussed. 
It may well be that many of those who advocate population 
limitation in the oriental countries do so precisely because they 
do not like the idea either of emigration or of leaving markets 
open to oriental goods, or of giving any capital assistance to 
weaker countries. If there are any such it is time that their 
uncharitable motives were exposed. 
THE PROBLEM OF 
LIMITED ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT* 
by Gerald M. Meier 
THESE NOTES CONSIDER A PROBLEM WHICH HAS LONG BEEN 
central to economic thought-the determinants of differential 
rates of growth among nations. Although from the time of 
Adam Smith to the present group of growth theorists there has 
been a formidable succession of contributions explaining 'the 
nature and causes of the wealth of nations', the emphasis has 
usually been on the factors that promote growth-not on the 
converse problem of limitations to growth ; attention has been 
given mainly to advanced economies-not underdeveloped 
countries1 ; and the analysis has usually concerned a dosed 
economy-not an open economy. It may, therefore, be worth 
while to consider the more particular problem of why, within 
the framework of the world economy, development has been 
retarded in underdeveloped countries. No other period is 
more illustrative of the process of international development 
than that of 1870 to 1913. We may, accordingly, consider the 
problem in this historical context. 
It is apparent that during the period 1870 to 1913 some 
countries proceeded at a rapid rate through the transition 
from being underdeveloped countries to becoming advanced 
economies (for example, Argentina, Australia, Canada, New 
Zealand), while other countries remained underdeveloped (for 
example, Bolivia, Brazil, Ceylon, China, India, Indonesia, 
Java, Malaya). Some economies which were economically 
backward in 1870 are still so ;2 in some areas there has been a 
• Economia Inte1'nazionale, Vol. VI, No. 4, 1953· Reprinted by per-
mission of the Director of the Istituto di Economia Internazionale, 
and the author. The author is indebted to Dr Hla Myint and to his 
colleagues for helpful comments. 
1 We adopt the usual definition of an underdeveloped country as 
being one which is extremely poor relatively to other economies ; in a 
ranking of countries of the world by real income per head, the under-
developed countries would be at the bottom. 
I Compare the income distribution of countries given in the U.S. 
Department of State, Point Fou1', Economic Cooperation Series No. 24, 
January 1950, pp. II3-14. 
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tendency towards a condition which might be termed 'under-
development equilibrium'!. What forces may account for this 
limited development? 
In examining this question we might survey various possible 
answers and note the extent to which they can explain the 
situation in underdeveloped countries between 1870 and 1913. 
It will be seen that the principal explanations of why develop-
ment was retarded may be found in some basic elements of the 
classical 'stationary state' and in some implications of the 
international features of development. 
POSSIBLE OBSTACLES TO DEVELOPMENT 
Although a commonplace, it is nevertheless necessary to 
recognize at the outset that the socio-political environment 
within a country may or may not be conducive to develop-
ment. Certain religious and social attitudes are more favourable 
to development than are others, as has been stressed in the 
writings of Sombart, Weber, and Professor Tawney, among 
others. Current literature on development also frequently 
emphasizes the political and sociological aspects of the problem. 
The following two quotations are representative: 
' Economic progress will not occur unless the atmosphere is 
favourable to it. The people of a country must desire progress, and 
their social, economic, legal and political institutions must be 
favourable to it. '1 
'It is the realization that true economic growth is a many-sided 
individual and social process which is the most important lesson 
of past attempts to link underdeveloped territories and peoples in 
a wider world economy. It consists in the re-fashioning of aptitudes, 
and belief of individuals to give them new freedom in their multitu-
dinous daily tasks-many of them not assessable in accounting or 
financial terms. 'a 
Assuredly, the socio-political aspects are so important that 
to a certain extent the problem of why some areas have re-
mained underdeveloped might be answered by merely noting 
1 Ragnar Nurkse, Some Aspects of Capital Accumulation in Under-
developed Countries, Cairo, 1952, p. 4· 
I United Nations, Measures for the Economic Development of Under-
developed Countries, New York, May 1951, p. 13. 
3 S. H. Frankel, Some Conceptual Aspects of International Economic 
Development of Underdeveloped Territories, Essays in International 
Finance, No. 14, Princeton, 1952, p. 22. 
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that they have lacked the socio-political prerequisites for 
development. The restrictive character of semi-feudal institu-
tions, weak governments, lack of social legislation, absence of 
incentives, inadequate education, and poor health all bear 
witness to this. There is, indeed, much truth in maintaining 
that a country is economically backward because it is politically, 
socially, and physically backward. 
Nevertheless, relevant as the sociological approach is, it 
is in many respects too easy a way out of the problem, and 
one may suspect that it does not get to the essence of the pro-
blem. Certainly from a purely economic viewpoint, there is 
more to be said about the process of development per se. For 
the present purposes of analysis, we might leave the socio-
political elements on one side and concentrate on the more 
fundamental problem of whether the economy of an under-
developed country might not contain within itself certain 
economic factors and forces which retard the country's rate of 
advance. 
A popular answer to our problem immediately suggests 
itself-lack of resources and overpopulation. If a country has 
no natural resources which can be tapped, the possibility of 
development is, of course, obviated. But regarding how many 
underdeveloped countries in r87o could it be said that there 
were no resources for import-competing commodities, or no 
resources for increasing exports, or that no increase in food 
production was possible? The answer must be very few. In 
fact, in some underdeveloped areas-for example, Africa and 
Brazil-the amount of resources per head was quite high. 
It might, however, be contended that in many countries 
resources were scarce relatively to existing population or 
potential population. Although this is now true in several 
backward areas, it was much less apparent during the r8Jo-
I9I3 period. The present phenomenon of a low amount of 
resources per head is the result of either the exhaustion of 
resources or such a rapid growth in population that over-
population now puts pressure on the available resources. The 
beginnings of these trends are noticeable between r87o and 
1913, but, in that period, except for a few areas, population 
pressure was not the serious problem it now is. In some coun-
tries, such as Ceylon, the West Indies, and Malaya, there was 
The Problem of Limited Economic Development 57 
even a shortage of labour, and to secure an adequate labour 
supply immigration was necessary. To explain the lack of dev-
elopment in these countries in terms of population pressure 
would be anachronistic, so far as their failure to develop in 
the nineteenth century is concerned. 
Where there was population pressure, development was 
certainly handicapped. Contrary to the stagnation theory, 
population growth, if it is in a backward country, does not 
induce capital-widening investment or innovations. Instead, 
it diminishes the rate of capital accumulation, raises costs in 
extractive industries, increases the amount of disguised un-
employment, and in large part simply diverts capital to main-
taining children who die before reaching a productive age. 
In short, resources go to the formation of population, not 
capital.1 As Malthus remarked, 'A man whose only possession 
is his labour can make no effectual demand if his labour is not 
wanted .... It will be found that those states often make the 
slowest progress in wealth where the stimulus arising from the 
population alone is the greatest. '2 
Yet, overpopulation is not the answer to the problem we 
have posed. In a real sense, it is the problem; overpopulation 
is synonymous with underdevelopment. In Ricardo's words, 
'to say there is a great abundance of labour, is to say that there 
is not an adequate capital to employ it '.3 The problems of 
increasing capital per head and raising per capita real income 
are common to all backward economies, whether overpopulated 
or not. In those countries which had a supra-optimum 
population the problems were intensified in degree, but not 
character. 
If, then, many underdeveloped countries had resources which 
could have been utilized, and if overpopulation is simply a 
manifestation of underdevelopment, what other reasons might 
be offered to explain why development was retarded in some 
1 For a more complete discussion of problems raised by a supra-
optimum population, see J. J. Spengler, 'The Population Obstacle to 
Economic Betterment', American Economic Review Papers and Pro-
ceedings, May 1951. 
• T. R. Malthus, Principles of Political Economy, London, 1820, 
Chapter VII, section ii. 
3 David Ricardo, Notes on Malthus's Principles of Political Economy, 
Sraffa edition, Cambridge, England, 1951, p. 241. 
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countries ? A review of the literature on development suggests 
many obstacles to development. Most of these obstacles, 
however, can be classified under the following three categories: 
(i) market imperfections, (ii) 'the vicious circle', and (iii) the 
repercussions of foreign investment. We may now consider 
each of these in turn. 
MARKET IMPERFECTIONS 
If we may be allowed to conceive of a production frontier 
(production possibility curve or transformation curve) for the 
underdeveloped country, it may be said that the actual pro-
duction frontier has been far within the maximum possible 
frontier which might have been achieved by an optimum alloca-
tion of resources. The production functions which have actually 
been .used have been very much 'inferior' or 'pseudo' produc-
tion functions. 
Many market imperfections might be listed as having pre-
vented an optimum allocation of resources, thereby limiting 
the extension of the actual production frontier out to the 
maximum possible frontier. The imperfections most frequently 
cited are those of imperfect knowledge, imperfect mobility, 
specificity of factors, and imperfect divisibility of factors. 
Ignorance of potential resources and ignorance of technique 
were two manifestations of the imperfect knowledge. Ignorance 
of domestic, let alone world, market conditions was another. 
Dominated by custom and status, indigenous labour was 
immobile both geographically and occupationally. Nor were 
the prospects of higher economic rewards effective in removing 
this immobility. Many of the socio-political elements previously 
mentioned also fall into place here as additional frictions. 
Although the imperfections in an underdeveloped economy 
cannot be denied, their significance would be overemphasized 
if it were claimed that the problem of development merely 
consists in a removal of these frictions in order to extend the 
actual frontier out to the maximum possible frontier, through 
the achievement of an optimum allocation of resources. For 
strong doubts may be expressed as to whether the attainment 
of an optimum allocation of resources, in so far as it depends 
on the fulfilment of marginal conditions, has much relevance 
in a backward economy. To gain any substantial increase in 
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output, what is needed is not so much the fulfilment of 'margi-
nal conditions' as 'total conditions'. More important than the 
'tightening up' of the economy is a consideration of whether 
capacity should be created or destroyed-whether the total 
output might not be increased by introducing or abandoning 
the production or consumption of a commodity. One can 
scarcely interpret as a marginal adjustment the production 
of a new commodity or the introduction of a railway which 
might alter the entire productive structure of the region. 
Before marginal refinements become relevant, there must first 
be many 'once-over' structural changes, plus a great deal of 
'hump investment' spread simultaneously over a broad front 
so that the utilization of the investments will approach full 
capacity. 
Low output in backward countries, therefore, may be more 
realistically attributed to the absence of these large changes, 
rather than to the non-fulfilment of marginal conditions. To 
rely on marginal adjustments for the purpose of pushing the 
actual inferior production frontier out to the maximum frontier 
is to seek a will-o' -the-wisp, which, even if its achievement 
could be gratuitously assumed, would still not yield an increase 
in output comparable to that which is possible from the large 
changes involved in the fulfilment of total conditions. So far 
as an increase in output is concerned, marginal adjustments 
have been of secondary importance compared to the prime 
requirement of net capital formation, not only to provide 
intensive investment, but also to outstrip the growth in 
population and allow the amount of capital per head to 
increase. 
The foregoing emphasis on total conditions and the mini-
mization of the view that development can be achieved by 
marginal adjustments should not be interpreted, however, as 
meaning that market imperfections and frictions have been 
without significance. On the contrary, they have been import-
ant, as we shall see, not so much because they have limited 
marginal adjustments, but rather because they have been 
obstacles to the fulfilment of total conditions and have pre-
vented the growth which has occurred in the export sectors 
of the underdeveloped economy from being diffused throughout 
the rest of the economy. 
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THE VICIOUS CIRCLE 
According to the second view of underdevelopment, a back-
ward economy remains backward because its total output is 
low, and reserve stocks are negligible, so that after consump-
tion needs are fulfilled, little remains for capital accumulation. 
Consequently, there can be no marked increase in output. In the 
extreme form, such an economy remains a subsistence economy. 
As is well known, a host of conditions may combine to limit 
capital accumulation. Although many underdeveloped areas 
have possessed potential resources, there was not adequate 
knowledge of these potentialities. Native peasants, producing 
for local markets, were unaware of possibilities extending 
beyond their particular localities. Only with foreign investment 
and the coming of extra-territorial enterprises was there a 
reasonable assessment of resources. But this knowledge was 
possessed by the foreign enterprises, not the native producers. 
And, due to the low level of home demand and the interest in 
realizing foreign exchange receipts, the foreign enterprise was 
attracted by production of exports, not production for the 
backward country's internal market.l 
Yet, even if there had been knowledge of resources, the 
underdeveloped country would still have lacked the co-operant 
factors necessary for the full utilization of its resources. 
Without a supply of capital and entrepreneurship, without 
knowledge of industrial techniques, and without administrative 
and organizational skills, the economy specialized to a high 
degree in the production of a few labour-intensive or land-
intensive primary products. Much of the production was com-
monly devoted to food crops, and in some countries only 
monoculture prevailed. Moreover, the labour supply was 
inefficient, and although employment per unit of output was 
1 Considering Britain's total foreign investment in the period 1870· 
1913, more than 40 per cent was used directly in railways, 15 per cent 
in the development of mines and raw materials, and a large proportion 
of an additional 30 per cent in governmental loans was directed to these 
activities. Less than 5 per cent of the value of public issues was for 
commercial and industrial enterprises serving the borrowing countries' 
home markets. Cf. Sir George Paish, 'Great Britain's Capital Invest-
ments in Individual Colonial and Foreign Countries', journal of Royal 
Statistical Society, January I9II; A. K. Cairncross, Home and Foreign 
Investment, I870-I9I3, Cambridge, 1953· 
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high, labour supply curves were frequently backward-sloping, 
and surplus population on the land took the form of disguised 
unemployment. Feudal systems of land tenure and production 
for narrow village markets also kept productivity low. A large 
proportion of labour, accordingly, was required to produce 
only a small surplus above subsistence needs. 
Further, the individual agriculturalist's scale of production 
was very small because of his limited amount of capital, lack 
of storage facilities, inadequate cash reserves, and narrow 
markets. Such concentration on small-scale primary production 
meant, in turn, that the underdeveloped country's capital 
stock was not only low absolutely, but also low relatively to 
investment opportunities, and especially low relatively to the 
capital stock in an advanced country. For, as measured by the 
ratio of capital stock to real output, the capital coefficients in 
the backward economy's main activities of agriculture and 
mining were generally considerably smaller than are the capital 
coefficients associated with manufacturing, housing, and public 
utilities. What negligible manufacturing there was in these 
countries was characterized by small size of plant and was 
highly labour-intensive; there was little or no urbanization with 
attendant developments in housing and metropolitan improve-
ments ; and there was not the extensive transportation and 
communication systems which require large capital coefficients. 
All the backward economies were thus primary producing 
areas in which land and labour were the relatively abundant 
factors and in which the total capital coefficient was very low. 
The small capital coefficient and low per capita productivity 
formed the vicious circle. To break the circle, capital accumu-
lation was necessary. But the low level of real income kept 
the level of home savings low. Moreover, not only was the 
supply of investible funds small in magnitude, but what there 
was of it was canalized, because of the strong desire for liquidity, 
into commercial outlets, real estate, short-term lending, and 
capital flights, instead of into investment in industry, public 
utilities, or the processing of primary products. 
Nor were the government's fiscal and monetary policies 
sufficiently refined to allow internal development to proceed 
via a budgetary surplus. Because of their impracticability or 
the lack of financial controls, income, profit, and other direct 
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taxes formed but a minor proportion of public revenue. 
Instead, the revenue structure was dominated by customs 
receipts. The negligible amount of direct taxes, together with 
the general inadequacy of taxable resources and the ineffectual 
budgetary control, meant that a government surplus was 
infrequent : expenditures generally expanded to or beyond 
the level of available revenues. Lacking sufficient home savings 
or a budgetary surplus, the underdeveloped areas, therefore, had 
to rely on external borrowings for long-term investment funds. 
It is interesting to note that, though stated in more modem 
terminology, much of the foregoing is little more than an elab-
oration of elements contained in the classical model of devel-
opment. Smith, Ricardo, Mal thus, and J. S. Mill concentrated 
on how the market might be extended, on the possibilities of 
increasing productivity by the division of labour, and on the 
problem of capital accumulation. Instead of restricting their 
attention to the 'scarcity' concept of the economic problem, 
to the 'tightening up' of allocative efficiency within a given 
productive framework, the classical economists actually devoted 
considerable attention to the problem of 'widening' the 
economy. Indeed, it has been stated that when 
'we come to the mainstream of classical economic thought domi-
nated by the Ricardian tradition we find the physical output 
approach of the labour theory firmly established almost to a com-
plete neglect of the allocative problem. It continued to be so until 
the "marginal revolution" ... considerations concerning "allocative" 
efficiency were eclipsed by broader considerations concerning the 
means of raising the physical productivity of labour and expanding 
the total volume of economic activity .... The central principle, 
which successfully unifies the various classical economic doctrines 
from Adam Smith to J. S. Mill, embodies the following fundamental 
propositions : viz. the economic welfare of society can be more 
effectively promoted (i) by increasing the physical productivity 
of labour, and (ii) by increasing the volume of economic activity, 
rather than by tamely accepting the given quantity of productive 
resources and making refined adjustments in allocating them among 
different industries. From this follow the two major canons of 
classical economic policy, (i) free trade which extends the scope of 
division of labour and brings fresh resources into the productive 
framework, and (ii) capital accumulation which enables society to 
maintain a greater quantity of labour. '1 
1 Hla Myint, Theories of Welfare Economics, London, 1948, pp. 6, 
12, 13. 
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It is within this context that we can appreciate Smith's 
emphasis on capital accumulation as a prerequisite of the 
division of labour, on the need for a marketable surplus above 
subsistence, and on increasing real wages. Attention of the 
classical economists to the wages-fund doctrine, to the principle 
that 'a demand for commodities is not a demand for labour '1 
and to the relation between population growth and the sub-
sistence level are all close to the core of the problem of limited 
development. The classical concept of the 'stationary state' 
is indeed suggestive of some elements which have characterized 
underdeveloped countries. 
Finally, to recognize that such a writer as J. S. Mill clearly 
realized the problems of the underdeveloped economy, the 
following, which is really a succinct summary of much recent 
discussion on the subject, might be quoted: 
'In countries where the principle of accumulation is as weak 
as it is in the various nations of Asia ; where people will neither 
save, nor work to obtain the means of saving, unless under the 
inducement of enormously high profits, nor even then if it is neces-
sary to wait a considerable time for them ; where either productions 
remain scanty, or drudgery great, because there is neither capital 
forthcoming nor forethought sufficient for the adoption of the con-
trivances by which natural agents are made to do the work of human 
labour; the desideratum for such a country, economically considered, 
is an increase of industry, and of the effective desire of accumulation. 
The means are ... a better government ; more complete security 
of property ; ... a more permanent and more advantageous tenure 
of land ... improvement of the public intelligence ... the decay of 
usages or superstitions which interfere with the effective employment 
of industry ... the introduction of foreign arts, which raise the 
returns derivable from additional capital to a rate corresponding 
to the low strength of the desire of accumulation ; and the importa-
tion of foreign capital, which renders the increase of production no 
longer exclusively dependent on the thrift or providence of the 
inhabitants themselves, while it places before them a stimulating 
example, and by instilling new ideas and breaking the chains of 
habit, if not by improving the actual condition of the population, 
tends to create in them new wants, increased ambition, and greater 
thought for the future. ' 2 
1 We are concerned here with the questions raised by this principle, 
n&t the validity of Mill's particular statement. 
2 J. S. Mill, Principles of Political Economy, London, 1842, 3rd 
edition, pp. 230-31. 
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Somewhat paradoxically, however, for all their attention to 
the problems of development and foreign trade considered 
separately, the classical economists did not relate the two 
problems by considering how international relations might 
cut both ways so far as development is concerned-in some 
cases stimulating development, in other cases limiting develop-
ment. The latter possibility is of immediate relevance and 
might be investigated further. 
REPERCUSSIONS OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT 
The need for external borrowings does not mean that the 
development problem is solely a financial one, solved if only 
foreign investment is forthcoming. A recollection of nineteenth 
century experience dispels this view. Many countries which 
were recipients of large amounts of British capital in the pre-
1914 era had made relatively little progress by the end of the 
period. There was, moreover, no clear positive correlation 
between the amount of capital inflow and the extent of develop-
ment. Even though the relative magnitudes of the development 
problem differed among countries, it is nevertheless significant 
that by 1914 British foreign investment in Brazil had amounted 
to four times that in New Zealand, and foreign investment in 
India surpassed that in Argentina or Australia. 
While it has broken the vicious circle, the mere access to 
foreign capital has not alone been sufficient to guarantee 
development. The repercussions of the foreign investment are 
what have been crucial :the direction of the foreign investment, 
the type of economic organization which accompanied it, and 
its income effects. 
The foreign investor was generally attracted not by 
opportunities in the underdeveloped country's domestic market, 
but rather by the expectation of higher profits from its export 
industries and by the possibilitie,s of realizing foreign exchange 
receipts. This caused foreign capital to become concentrated 
in plantations and mines producing for export and in railways 
connecting export-producing areas with the seaports. 
According to the traditional theory of foreign investment, 
when capital flows from areas where it is relatively abundant 
and has a low marginal product to areas where it is relatively 
scarce and has a high marginal product, the flow will contribute 
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to the achievement of an optimum distribution of resources 
in the world economy and will mean an increase in the com-
bined national incomes. This conclusion, however, depends 
on the adoption of a cosmopolitan viewpoint, on the implicit 
assumption that private marginal net product and social 
marginal net product are equal, and on the qualification of 
ceteris paribus (particularly no change in the terms of trade). 
If the problem is considered only from the underdeveloped 
country's standpoint, or a divergence between social and private 
returns is recognized (especially with respect to external 
economies), or the ceteris paribus clause is relaxed, the tradi-
tional conclusion may be contradicted. So far as development 
is concerned, all we can really say is that for an underdeveloped 
country some foreign investment is better than no foreign 
investment, but foreign investment directed according to 
private profit expectations is not necessarily the best direction.1 
Nevertheless, an outstanding result of foreign borrowings 
has been their contribution to a substantial increase in the 
exports of the recipient countries, an increase which is especially 
striking over the longer period. Tea production in India and 
Ceylon, coffee production in Brazil, rice production in Burma 
-all these show sizeable increases. The same is true for exports 
of these commodities. In many instances, the export output 
grew not merely at a steady rate, but at an increasing rate. 
There may have been a period of gestation before the fruits of 
the investment appeared, but ultimately there was an increased 
supply of exportable primary products from most of the 
borrowing countries. 
At bottom, the persistence of underlying differences in com-
parative costs and a sustained absolute demand for primary 
products by advanced countries were the principal reasons 
why the backward country's exports grew. Productivity in-
creased more rapidly in the export sector than in the rest of 
the underdeveloped economy because a relatively small amount 
of investment allowed the utilization of a large amount of 
hitherto untouched natural resources ; with the foreign 
1 This applies only to development objectives. It is not meant to 
apply to the additional question of whether development which is 
contrary to comparative advantage would diminish, instead of increase, 
economic welfare. 
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investment there appeared efficiently-managed and technically-
organized plantation and mining units producing for export ; 
and, low as was the total capital coefficient for the whole 
economy, nevertheless the capital coefficient became highest 
in the export sector. The latter resulted from the establishment 
of mills and factories to process some raw materials and food-
stuffs for export and the extension of utilities to serve the 
export industries. Moreover, while productivity rose most 
rapidly in export production, the pressure of population and 
lack of bargaining power prevented labour from absorbing 
through rising money wages the increase in productivity. 
At the same time, the rate of increase in productivity was 
greater in industrial nations than in underdeveloped areas, 
and industrial countries became ever-more industrialized. 
The upshot was that the underdeveloped country's comparative 
advantage widened for primary products, and the industrial 
country's comparative advantage turned against these products. 
Now, at this point, it might be thought that instead of 
disclosing limitations to development, we have done just the 
opposite and have actually established a favourable case for 
potential development. After all, we have said that many of 
the underdeveloped countries have not lacked resources; 
they have had access to foreign capital; their exports have 
grown ; and with foreign borrowings the capital coefficient 
has risen in the export sector. It might even be thought that 
we have assembled the elements for a model similar to Professor 
Hicks' cycle and growth model.1 The increasing exports might 
have had effects analogous to those of increasing autonomous 
investment,2 and induced investment might have followed 
from the increase in exports, so that, based on an upward 
trend in exports, a multiplier-accelerator process might have 
caught hold and become the engine of growth. 
Yet, it did not. The increased ·supply of exports was not 
translated into an increase in demand in the rest of the economy. 
The proximate reason for this lies in a factor which so far has 
only been implied in our discussion-the lack of internal 
1 J. R. Hicks, A Contribution to the Theory of the Trade Cycle, Oxford, 
1950, Chapter 8. 
2 J. S. Duesenberry, 'Some Aspects of the Theory of Economic Dev-
elopment', Explorations in Entrepreneurial History, Vol. III, No. 2, 
15 December 1950, p. 100. 
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demand due to a low level of real income. The deficiency of 
internal demand is but another way of looking at the vicious 
circle ; the low level of real income is a limitation on the de-
mand side, just as it is on the supply side. 1 AsMalthus remarked, 
'an inferior mode of living is a cause as well as a consequence 
of poverty '2 and 'it is unquestionably true that wealth pro-
duces wants, but it is a still more important truth that wants 
produce wealth .... The greatest of all difficulties in converting 
uncivilized and thinly populated countries into civilized and 
populous ones, is to inspire them with the wants best calculated 
to excite their exertions in the production of wealth '.3 The 
vicious circle on the demand and supply sides have met at a 
common point-the low level of real income : 'the capacity 
to buy depends on the capacity to produce, and the division 
of labour depends on the extent of the market but the extent 
of the market depends upon the division of labour.'' 
Thus, the important question is why the level of real income 
remained low, even though foreign investment occurred and 
exports increased. The imperfections and frictions previously 
mentioned had some influence in preventing the expansion in 
exports from having an impact on the rest of the economy. So 
did the fact that external economies were confined to the export 
sector. It is also generally recognized that certain other factors, 
acting individually or in combination, may be responsible for 
smaller incomes to agricultural producers than to non-agricul-
tural producers. These need only be recalled here : low price 
elasticity of demand for many basic agricultural products, 
the influence of Engel's Law, periodic overproduction which 
depresses prices more than the reduction of costs by increasing 
productivity, immobility of agricultural labour and agricultural 
capital, and highly competitive conditions of agricultural 
production.5 But in so far as these factors have also been 
present in some primary-producing countries which have none 
l Nurkse, op. cit., pp. 2-4. 
2 Malthus, op. cit., pp. 427-8. 
3 ibid., p. 428. 
4 Allyn Young, 'Increasing Return and Economic Progress' The 
Economic journal, Vol. XXXVIII, December 1928, p. 539. ' 
s Cf. A. W. Ashby, 'General Causes of Agricultural Poverty', Farm 
Economist, Vol. V, No. 7, 1946; E. A. Ojala, Agriculture and Economic 
Progress, Oxford, 1952, pp. 179-80. 
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the less become advanced countries, we must seek more basic 
explanations. These might be found in the type of economic 
organization which secured the increase in exports and in the 
income leakages abroad which dampened the effects of both 
the multiplier and accelerator. 
The export products which display the most rapid rates 
of growth--coffee, tea, sugarcane, sisal, and rubber-were 
produced mainly under the plantation system. Although the 
superior techniques, knowledge, and capital of the plantation 
units allowed production and exports to expand, these units were 
under foreign control. There was, accordingly, a considerable 
drain of profits and interest out of the underdeveloped economy, 
even though some profits were reinvested within the country. 
Moreover, the plantation system relied on the presence of 
a large supply of unskilled labour, With the intensive use of 
labour, labour's marginal product was low, and so were real 
wages. It may not be too much of an exaggeration to say that 
in some underdeveloped areas the elasticity of the labour 
supply has been almost infinite at the subsistence wage level. 
An internal surplus of food is what has been required, but not 
achieved, in many countries which have remained backward. 
Not all the increase in exports, however, was due to the 
plantation system. In some areas where population density 
was too high for the plantation system, peasant production 
continued to prevail even after the inflow of foreign capital. 
Foreign enterprises merely advanced credit to peasants and 
provided transportation and marketing facilities. Other crops 
such as groundnuts, rice, and jute remained essentially peasant 
crops. But regarding these instances, some writers allege that 
it commonly happened that the natives, ignorant of world 
market conditions and dependent on middlemen operating 
between them and the foreign company, were in the position 
of confronting a monopsonistic middleman or foreign com-
pany when selling their produce and a monopolist when buying 
imports, so that the native's real income did not rise as much 
as it would have if he had sold directly to the foreign market.! 
1 Sir Alan Pim, Colonial Agricultural Production, London, 1946, 
pp. 29, 33; W. H. Hancock, Survey of British Commonwealth Affairs, 
London, 1940, Vol. II, pp. 221-2; A. McPhee, The Economic Revolution 
in British West Africa, London, 1926, pp. g8-1oo. 
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How much validity there is in this contention is difficult to 
establish, since the degree of monopoly or monopsony power is 
at best an ambiguous concept, and evidence of its existence is 
not easy to obtain or assess. 
Considering the 'income effects' of the foreign investment, 
however, it is clear that although there were basic ingredients 
for a multiplier-accelerator process, the income-generating 
forces were damr)ened considerably by leakages abroad. 
Because of the remittance of profits, interest, and dividends 
to the lending country, as well as the high marginal propensity 
to import and high income elasticity of demand for imports, a 
given amount of investment in the underdeveloped country 
generated a much smaller amount of income than would have 
an equivalent amount of investment in an advanced country. 
Although the underdeveloped economy had a :l:tigh marginal 
propensity to consume, leakages abroad were high, so the 
multiplier effect was weak. Similarly, the acceleration effects in 
the backward country were negligible compared to those in an 
advanced country. Not only was the total capital coefficient 
smaller, but whatever induced investment occurred was geared 
mainly, if not entirely, to changes in foreign demand for exports. 
This is quite a different situation from that in an advanced coun-
try where the total capital coefficient is much higher and where 
investment is induced not only by changes in foreign demand but 
also, more significantly, by home demand. It must also be recog-
nized that the additional capital equipment associated with 
induced investment had to be imported from industrial nations. 
Finally, to realize a positive rate of growth the underdevelop-
ed region was dependent on a trend rate of increase in exports. 
But although exports rose over the long period, so did the 
propensity to import. As the products of the advanced countries 
were introduced into the backward region, and as contact was 
made with superior consumption patterns, the region's pro-
pensity to import increased-that is, Professor Duesenberry's 
'demonstration effect ' might operate internationally as well 
as domestically.1 In part, the backward area's marginal 
1 Cf. Ragnar Nurkse, 'Some International Aspects of the Problem of 
Economic Development', reprinted in the present volume, pp. 256-71. 
Earlier uses of this concept have been made by Professors Stolper and 
Kindleberger. 
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propensity to import tended to be greater, the higher was its leYel 
of income, because there was not a once-for-all introduction 
of the advanced countries' commodities, but rather a more 
gradual process of preliminary 'want development' for the 
advanced country's exports,1 and these commodities, especially 
consumer goods, were of such a nature that they entered into 
the backward country's standard of consumption only after 
the country's income had risen above minimum levels. 
It might further be argued that over the long period the 
distribution of income in the backward country tended to shift 
in favour of profits and rents, since as the level of activity rose, 
a multiplicity of intermediary traders emerged and benefited 
from the secular inflationary pressures, the demand for land 
increased, and money wages did not rise commensurately 
because of the abundance of unskilled labour without bargain-
ing power. Traders and landlords may be expected to have a 
higher marginal propensity to import than do the other 
classes, so that again for this reason the marginal propensity 
to import for the community tended to increase as the•level 
of income rose. All these elements, therefore, combined to 
cause the expansion in exports to be in effect dissipated on 
imports, and the upward trend in exports had no significant 
carry-over to output for the domestic market. 
DEVELOPMENT THROUGH INFLATION AND PROTECTION 
Having considered how the obstacles imposed by imperfec-
tions, the vicious circle, and the income leakages abroad have 
been historical limitations to development, we may conclude 
by briefly enquiring whether development might not have 
proceeded further if the underdeveloped countries had pursued 
policies designed to raise the level of home demand and reduce 
the dependence on foreign trade. Two policy areas are imme-
diately suggested-inflation and protection. Although a 
thorough study of the effects of these policies would necessitate 
detailed case studies, we may offer some general observa-
tions on a programme of development through inflation and 
protection. 
1 Elizabeth E. Hoyt, 'Want Development in Underdeveloped Areas', 
journal of Political Economy, Vol. LIX, No. 3, June 1951. 
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Deliberate inflation, say through credit creation, may well 
increase the level of money demand as the supply of money 
increases, and not all is absorbed in idle cash balances. It is 
also likely to stimulate investment by raising profit expecta-
tions and may be a means of extracting forced savings to match 
the investment made with bank credit. But the increase in 
money demand is, of course, not a solution to the problem of 
the demand side of the vicious circle. What is needed is an 
increase in real demand. Real income, not money income, must 
rise before home demand will offer sufficient inducement to 
home investment. 
Concerning the extraction of forced savings and investment 
through inflation, there is considerable literature indicating 
the disadvantages of this policy.1 These need only be recalled 
here: (a) the misdirection of savings into foreign assets, real 
estate, and inventories instead of to industry and agriculture ; 
(b) the shift in the distribution of real national income in favour 
of profits ; (c) the pressures on the balance of payments and 
the possibility of continuous currency depreciation ; (d) the 
ever-greater divergencies between private marginal product 
and social marginal product ; and (e) the loss in consumption 
by some multiple of the amount of investment provided through 
forced savings. II 
Although these disadvantages weaken the case for inflation, 
the advocacy of protection merits more serious attention. 
Unlike the neo-classical theory of international trade which 
determines a once-for-all allocation of given resources, the 
modern arguments for protection disclaim any static inter-
pretation of the division of gains from trade. Instead they 
proceed from a dynamic theory of comparative costs which 
associates a different comparative cost structure with each 
level of income and production. Incorporating an overall 
view of foreign investment and development, they argue for 
a distribution of benefits from development more favourable 
1 See, for example, Nurkse, Some Aspects of Capital Accumulation 
in Underdeveloped Countries, op. cit., pp. 53-65; United Nations, 
Measures for the Economic Development of Unde'fdeveloped Count'fies, 
New York, May 1951, chapter VI ; E. M. Bernstein and I. G. Patel, 
'Inflation in Relation to Economic Development', International 
Monetary Fund Staff Papers, Vol. II, No. 3. November 1952. 
s ibid., pp. 381-2. 
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to the backward countries in the long period and for a mitiga-
tion of cyclical dis~quilibria in the short period. 
Considering the long period problem, those arguments which 
stem from a naive desire for autarkic industrialization can be 
readily dismissed ; on the other hand, the element of truth in 
the 'infant industry', 'attracting direct investment', and 
'servicing the foreign debt' arguments can be admitted. In a 
broader context, however, there are other arguments which 
should be examined further. Specifically, a combination of 
import duties, export taxes, and subsidies are frequently 
advocated to (i) avoid a potential deterioration in the terms 
of trade, or to improve the terms of trade, (ii) to alter the 
domestic distribution of income, and (iii) to stimulate the 
movement of resources into secondary production. 
It is highly problematical whether protective devices actually 
can accomplish these objectives and whether they could do so 
without being at the expense of real income. In general, it 
might be submitted that the protectionist must prove that 
gains concentrated at the margin on the terms of trade are 
not more than offset by diffused average losses from a restric-
tion in the international division of labour : that protective 
devices which stimulate greater domestic production result 
in greater total production than could be obtained indirectly 
by trade ; and that alternative domestic and international 
measures might not yield similar results without the adverse 
beggar-my-neighbour effects of protection. 
More particularly, for the immediate problem, the protec-
tionist must demonstrate that the quantitative efficacy of the 
devices he advocates is not exaggerated. Such exaggeration 
is likely to be the case for underdeveloped countries since many 
of these have relatively little bargaining power and, more 
significantly, the devices are most effective in the short period, 
whereas their objectives, in terms of the secular phenomena of 
development, are of a long run character. 
It should also be realized that a decrease in imports is of 
minor benefit to the underdeveloped country nnless the portion 
of income which was formerly spent on imports is now not 
spent on home produced consumer goods but is made available 
for domestic capital formation. If protection is to contribute to 
development it is necessary to stimulate basic key industries 
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rather than merely the production of import-competing con-
sumer goods. 
Moreover, the several objectives of protection might be 
mutually inconsistent. As Professor Metzler has shown, if the 
demand for a country's exports as a whole is sufficiently in-
elastic, as is probable for many backward primary-producing 
countries, its terms of trade will improve, and this favourable 
movement may more than offset the initial effects of the tariff 
in raising domestic prices of manufactured goods.1 Without an 
increase in the domestic prices of imports (including tariffs) 
relative to the domestic prices of exports, there may be no 
incentive to shift resources from export to import-competing 
industries. Then, in contrast to the Stolper-Samuelson con-
clusion that impediments to imports preserve or increase the 
'scarcity' of the scarce factor of production and thereby 
increase the scarce factor's relative and absolute share of the 
national income,2 the result would be that the scarce factor 
which is relatively most important in the import-competing 
industries would suffer both a relative decline in its share of 
the national income and an absolute decline in its real return. 
If, then, the foreign elasticity of demand for its products 
is sufficiently inelastic, a backward country may find it im-
possible to impose a tariff which will simultaneously improve 
its terms of trade, attract resources into import-competing 
industries, and increase the share of labour in the national 
income (assuming labour is the scarce factor which is used in 
comparatively large amounts in relation to other factors in the 
protected industries). As in most problems relevant to welfare 
economics, the conflict may be between a larger national 
income and its specific distribution. This is true not only for 
the tariff, but for most impediments to trade which are essen-
tially reducible to a system of taxes and subsidies affecting 
the distribution of income as well as the allocation of resources. 
Finally, it must be recognized that the objective of develop-
ment should be not only to raise the level of per capita real 
1 L. A. Metzler, 'Tariffs, the Terms of Trade, and the Distribution 
of National Income', Journal of Political Economy, Vol. LVII, No. I, 
February 1949, pp. x-29. 
1 W. F. Stolper and P. A. Samuelson, 'Protection and Real Wages', 
Review of Economic Studies, Vol. IX, November 1941, pp. 58-73· 
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income but also to reduce the absolute number of individuals 
and the percentage of total population below a minimum level 
of real income.1 Even if protection were successful in raising 
the level of per capita real income, it is conceivable that through 
the misallocation of resources it might at the same time 
increase the absolute numbers beneath a minimum level of 
real income. 
1 Cf. Jacob Viner, 'America's Aims and the Progress of Under-
developed Areas', in B. F. Hoselitz (editor), The Progress of Under-
developed Areas, Chicago, 1952, p. 187. 
ON THE POLITICAL ECONOMY 
OF BACKWARDNESS* 
by Paul A. Baran 
THE CAPITALIST MODE OF PRODUCTION AND THE SOCIAL AND 
political order concomitant with it provided, during the latter 
part of the eighteenth century, and still more during the entire 
nineteenth century, a framework for a continuous and, in spite 
of cyclical disturbances and setbacks, momentous expansion 
of productivity and material welfare. The relevant facts are 
well known and call for no elaboration. Yet this material 
(and cultural) progress was not only spotty in time but most 
unevenly distributed in space. It was confined to the Western 
world ; and did not affect even all of this territorially and 
demographically relatively small sector of the inhabited globe. 
Germany and Austria, Britain and France, some smaller 
countries in Western Europe, and the United States and 
Canada occupied places in the neighbourhood of the sun. 
The vast expanses and the multitude of inhabitants of Eastern 
Europe, Spain and Portugal, Italy and the Balkans, Latin 
America and Asia, not to speak of Africa, remained in the 
deep shadow of•backwardness and squalor, of stagnation and 
misery. 
Tardy and skimpy as the benefits of capitalism may have 
been with respect to the lower classes even in most of the 
leading industrial countries, they were all but negligible in 
the less privileged parts of the world. There productivity 
remained low, and rapid increases in population pushed living 
standards from bad to worse. The dreams of the prophets of 
capitalist harmony remained on paper. Capital either did not 
move from countries where its marginal productivity was low 
to countries where it could be expected to be high, or if it did, 
it moved there mainly in order to extract profits from back-
ward countries that frequently accounted for a lion's share 
of the increments in total output caused by the original 
• The Manchester School, January 1952. Reprinted by permission 
of The Manchester School and the author. 
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investments. Where an increase in the aggregate national pro-
duct of an underdeveloped country took place, the existing dis-
tribution of income prevented this increment from raising the 
living standards of the broad masses of the population. Like 
all general statements, this one is obviously open to criticism 
based on particular cases. There were, no doubt, colonies and 
dependencies where the populations profited from inflow of 
foreign capital. These benefits, however, were few and far 
between, while exploitation and stagnation were the prevailing 
rule. 
But if Western capitalism failed to improve materially the 
lot of the peoples inhabiting most backward areas, it accom-
plished something that profoundly affected the social and 
political conditions in underdeveloped countries. It introduced 
there, with amazing rapidity, all the economic and social 
tensions inherent in the capitalist order. It effectively disrupted 
whatever was left of the 'feudal' coherence of the backward 
societies. It substituted market contracts for such paternalistic 
relationships as still survived from century to century. It 
reoriented the partly or wholly self-sufficient economies of 
agricultural countries toward the production of marketable 
commodities. It linked their economic fate with the vagaries 
of the world market and connected it with the fever curve of 
international price movements. 
A complete substitution of capitalist market rationality 
for the rigidities of feudal or semi-feudal servitude would have 
represented, in spite of all the pains of transition, an important 
step in the direction of progress. Yet all that happened was 
that the age-old exploitation of the population of under-
developed countries by their domestic overlords, was freed of 
the mitigating constraints inherited from the feudal tradition. 
This superimposition of business mores over ancient oppression 
by landed gentries resulted in compounded exploitation, more 
outrageous corruption, and more glaring injustice. 
Nor is this by any means the end of the story. Such export 
of capital and capitalism as has taken place had not only far-
reaching implications of a social nature. It was accompanied 
by important physical and technical processes. Modern 
machines and products of advanced industries reached the 
poverty stricken backyards of the world. To be sure most, 
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if not all, of these machines worked for their foreign owners-
or at least were believed by the population to be working for 
no one else-and the new refined appurtenances of the good 
life belonged to foreign businessmen and their domestic counter-
parts. The bonanza that was capitalism, the fullness of things 
that was modem industrial civilization, were crowding the 
display windows-they were protected by barbed wire from 
the anxious grip of the starving and desperate man in the street. 
But they have drastically changed his outlook. Broadening 
and deepening his economic horizon, they aroused aspirations, 
envies, and hopes. Young intellectuals filled with zeal and 
patriotic devotion travelled from the underdeveloped lands to 
Berlin and London, to Paris and New York, and returned home 
with the 'message of the possible'. 
Fascinated by the advances and accomplishments observed 
in the centres of modem industry, they developed, and pro-
pagandized the image of what could be attained in their 
home countries under a more rational economic and social order. 
The dissatisfaction with the stagnation (or at best, barely 
perceptible growth) that ripened gradually under the still-calm 
political and social surface was given an articulate expression. 
This dissatisfaction was not nurtured by a comparison of reality 
with a vision of a socialist society. It found sufficient fuel 
in the confrontation of what was actually happening with what 
could be accomplished under capitalist institutions of the 
Western type. 
The establishment of such institutions was, however, beyond 
the reach of the tiny middle classes of most backward areas. 
The inherited backwardness and poverty of their countries 
never gave them an opportunity to gather the economic 
strength, the insight, and the self-confidence needed for the 
assumption of a leading role in society. For centuries under 
feudal rule they themselves assimilated the political, moral, 
and cultural values of the dominating class. 
While in advanced countries, such as France or Great 
Britain, the economically ascending midd.le-classes developed 
at an early stage a new rational world outlook, which they 
proudly opposed to the medieval obscurantism of the feudal 
age, the poor, fledgling bourgeoisie of the underdeveloped 
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countries sought nothing but accommodation to the prevailing 
order. Living in societies based on privilege, they strove for 
a share in the existing sinecures. They made political and 
economic deals with their domestic feudal overlords or with 
powerful foreign investors, and what industry and commerce 
developed in backward areas in the cOurse of the last hundred 
years was rapidly moulded in the straitjacket of monopoly-
the plutocratic partner of the aristocratic rulers. What resulted 
was an economic and political amalgam combining the 
worst features of both worlds--feudalism and capitalism-
and blocking effectively all possibilities of economic 
growth. 
It is quite conceivable that a 'conservative' exit from this 
impasse might have been found in the course of time. A younger 
generation of enterprising and enlightened businessmen and 
intellectuals allied with moderate leaders of workers and 
peasants--a 'Young Turk' movement of some sort-might 
have succeeded in breaking the deadlock, in loosening the 
hide-bound social and political structure of their countries and 
in creating the institutional arrangements indispensable for a 
measure of social and economic progress. 
Yet in our rapid age history accorded no time for such a 
gradual transition. Popular pressures for an amelioration of 
economic and social conditions, or at least for some perceptible 
movement in that direction, steadily gained in intensity. 
To be sure, the growing restiveness of the underprivileged was 
not directed against the ephemeral principles of a hardly yet 
existing capitalist order. Its objects were parasitic feudal 
overlords appropriating large slices of the national product and 
wasting them on extravagent living; a government machinery 
protecting and abetting the dominant interests; wealthy 
businessmen reaping immense profits and not utilizing them 
for productive purposes; last but not least, foreign colonizers 
extracting or believed to be extracting vast gains from their 
'developmental' operations. 
This popular movement had thus essentially bourgeois, 
democratic, anti-feudal, anti-imperialist tenets. It found 
outlets in agrarian egalitarianism ; it incorporated 'muck-
raker' elements denouncing monopoly; it strove for national 
independence and freedom from foreign exploitation. 
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For the native capitalist middle-classes to assume the 
leadership of these popular forces and to direct them into the 
channels of bourgeois democracy-as had happened in Western 
Europe-they had to identify themselves with the common 
man. They had to break away from the political, economic, 
and ideological leadership of the feudal crust and the mono-
polists allied with it ; and they had to demonstrate to the 
nation as a whole that they had the knowledge, the courage, 
and the determination to undertake and to carry to victorious 
conclusion the struggle for economic and social improvement. 
In hardly any underdeveloped country were the middle-
classes capable of living up to this historical challenge. Some 
of the reasons for this portentous failure, reasons connected 
with the internal make-up of the business class itself, were 
briefly mentioned above. Of equal importance was, however, 
an 'outside' factor. It was the spectacular growth of the 
international labour movement in Europe that offered the 
popular forces in backward areas ideological and political 
leadership that was denied to them by the native bourgeoisie. 
It pushed the goals and targets of the popular movements far 
beyond their original limited objectives. 
This liaison of labour radicalism and populist revolt painted 
on the wall the imminent danger of a social revolution. Whether 
this danger was real or imaginary matters very little. What 
was essential is that the awareness of this threat effectively 
determined political and social action. It destroyed whatever 
chances there were of the capitalist classes joining and leading 
the popular anti-feudal, anti-monopolist movement. By 
instilling a mortal fear of expropriation and extinction in 
the minds of all property-owning groups the rise of socialist 
radicalism, and in particular the Bolshevik Revolution in 
Russia, tended to drive all more or less privileged, more or less 
well-to-do elements in the society into one 'counter-revolu-
tionary' coalition. Whatever differences and antagonisms 
existed between large and small landowners, between mono-
polistic and competitive business, between liberal bourgeois 
and reactionary feudal overlords, between domestic and 
foreign interests, were largely submerged on all important 
occasions by the over-riding common interest in staving off 
socialism. 
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The possibility of solving the economic and political dead-
lock prevailing in the underdeveloped countries on lines of 
a progressive capitalism all but disappeared. Entering the 
alliance with all other segments of the ruling class, the capitalist 
middle-classes yielded one strategic position after another. 
Afraid that a quarrel with the landed gentry might be exploited 
by the radical populist movement, the middle-classes aban-
doned all progressive attitudes in agrarian matters. Afraid that 
a conflict with the church and the military might weaken the 
political authority of the government, the middle-classes moved 
away from all liberal and pacifist currents. Afraid that hostility 
toward foreign interests might deprive them of foreign support 
in a case of a revolutionary emergency, the native capitalists 
deserted their previous anti-imperialist, nationalist platforms. 
The peculiar mechanisms of political interaction charac-
teristic of all underdeveloped (and perhaps not only under-
developed) countries thus operated at full speed. The aboriginal 
failure of the middle-classes to provide inspiration and leader-
ship to the popular masses pushed those masses into the camp 
of socialist radicalism. The growth of radicalism pushed the 
middle-classes into an alliance with the aristocratic and 
monopolistic reaction. This alliance, cemented by common 
interest and common fear, pushed the populist forces still 
further along the road of radicalism and revolt. The outcome 
was a polarization of society with very little left between the 
poles. By permitting this polarization to develop, by abandon-
ing the common man and resigning the task of reorganizing 
society on new, progressive lines, the capitalist middle-classes 
threw away their historical chance of assuming effective control 
over the destinies of their nations, and of directing the gathering 
popular storm against the fortresses of feudalism and reaction. 
Its blazing fire turned thus against the entirety of existing 
economic and social institutions. 
The economic and political order maintained by the ruling 
coalition of owning classes finds itself invariably at odds with 
all the urgent needs of the underdeveloped countries. Neither 
the social fabric that it embodies nor the institutions that rest 
upon it are conducive to progressive economic development. 
The only way to provide for economic growth and to prevent 
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a continuous deterioration of living standards (apart from 
mass emigration unacceptable to other countries) is to assure 
a steady increase of total output-at least large enough to 
offset the rapid growth of population. 
An obvious source of such an increase is the utilization of 
available unutilized or underutilized resources. A large part 
of this reservoir of dormant productive potentialities is the 
vast multitude of entirely unemployed or ineffectively employed 
manpower. There is no way of employing it usefully in agricul-
ture, where the marginal productivity of labour tends to zero. 
They could be provided with opportunities for productive 
work only by transfer to industrial pursuits. For this to be 
feasible large investments in industrial plant and facilities 
have to be undertaken. Under prevailing conditions such 
investments are not forthcoming for a number of important 
and interrelated reasons. 
With a very uneven distribution of a very small aggregate 
income (and wealth), large individual incomes exceeding what 
could be regarded as 'reasonable' requirements for current 
consumption accrue as a rule to a relatively small group of 
high-income receivers. Many of them are large landowners 
maintaining a feudal style of life with large outlays on housing, 
servants, travel, and other luxuries. Their 'requirements for 
consumption' are so high that there is only little room for 
savings. Only relatively insignificant amounts are left to be 
spent on improvements of agricultural estates. 
Other members of the 'upper crust' receiving incomes 
markedly surpassing 'reasonable' levels of consumption are 
wealthy businessmen. For social reasons briefly mentioned 
above, their consumption too is very much larger than it would 
have been were they brought up in the puritan tradition of a 
bourgeois civilization. Their drive to accumulate and to expand 
their enterprises is continuously counteracted by the urgent 
desire to imitate in their living habits the socially dominant 
'old families', to prove by their conspicuous outlays on the 
amenities of rich life that they are socially (and therefore 
also politically) not inferior to their aristocratic partners in 
the ruling coalition. 
But if this tendency curtails the volume of savings that 
could have been amassed by the urban high-income receivers, 
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their will to re-invest their funds in productive enterprises is 
effectively curbed by a strong reluctance to damage their 
carefully erected monopolistic market positions through 
creation of additional productive capacity, and by absence of 
suitable investment opportunities-paradoxical as this may 
sound with reference to underdeveloped countries. 
The deficiency of investment opportunities stems to a 
large extent from the structure and the limitations of the 
existing effective demand. With very low living standards the 
bulk of the aggregate money income of the population is spent 
on food and relatively primitive items of clothing and household 
necessities. These are available at low prices, and investment 
of large funds in plant and facilities that could produce this 
type of commodities more cheaply rarely promises attractive 
returns. Nor does it appear profitable to develop major enter-
prises the output of which would cater to the requirements 
of the rich. Large as their individual purchases of various 
luxuries may be, their aggregate spending on each of them is 
not sufficient to support the development of an elaborate 
luxury industry-in particular since the 'snob' character of 
prevailing tastes renders only imported luxury articles true 
marks of social distinction. 
Finally, the limited demand for investment goods precludes 
the building up of a machinery or equipment industry. Such 
mass consumption goods as are lacking, and such quantities of 
luxury goods as are purchased by the well-to-do, as well as the 
comparatively small quantities of investment goods needed by 
industry, are thus imported from abroad in exchange for 
domestic agricultural products and raw materials. 
This leaves the expansion of exportable raw materials 
output as a major outlet for investment activities. There the 
possibilities are greatly influenced, however, by the technology 
of the production of most raw materials as well as by the 
nature of the markets to be served. Many raw materials, in 
particular oil, metals,_ certain industrial crops, have to be 
produced on a large scale if costs are to be kept low and satis-
factory returns assured. Large-scale production, however, 
calls for large investments, so large indeed as to exceed the 
potentialities of the native capitalists in backward countries. 
Production of raw materials for a distant market entails, more-
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over, much larger risks than those encountered in domestic 
business. The difficulty of foreseeing accurately such things 
as receptiveness of the world markets, prices obtainable in 
competition with other countries, volume of output in other 
parts of the world, etc., sharply reduces the interest of native 
capitalists in these lines of business. They become to a pre-
dominant extent the domain of foreigners who, financially 
stronger, have at the same time much closer contacts with 
foreign outlets of their products. 
The shortage of investible funds and the lack of investment 
opportunities represent two aspects of the same problem. 
A great number of investment projects, unprofitable under 
prevailing conditions, could be most promising in a general 
environment of economic expansion. 
In backward areas a new industrial venture must frequently, 
if not always, break virgin ground. It has no functioning 
economic system to draw upon. It has to organize with its 
own efforts not only the productive process within its own 
confines, it must provide in addition for all the necessary 
outside arrangements essential to its operations. It does not 
enjoy the benefits of 'external economies'. 
There can be no doubt that the absence of external econo-
mies, the inadequacy of the economic milieu in underdeveloped 
countries, constituted everywhere an important deterrent to 
investment in industrial projects. There is no way of rapidly 
bridging the gap. Large-scale investment is predicated upon 
large-scale investment. Roads, electric power stations, rail-
roads, and houses have to be built before businessmen find 
it profitable to erect factories, to invest their funds in new 
industrial enterprises. 
Yet investing in JiOad building, financing construction of 
canals and power stations, organizing large housing projects, 
etc., transcend by far the financial and mental horizon of 
capitalists in underdeveloped countries. Not only are their 
financial resources too small for such ambitious projects, but 
their background and habits militate against entering commit-
ments of this type. Brought up in the tradition of merchandiz-
ing and manufacturing consumers' goods-as is characteristic 
of an early phase of capitalist development-businessmen in 
underdeveloped countries are accustomed to rapid turnover, 
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large but short-term risks, and correspondingly high rates of 
profit. Sinking funds in enterprises where profitability could 
manifest itself only in the course of many years is a largely 
unknown and unattractive departure. 
The difference between social and private rationality that 
exists in any market and profit-determined economy is thus 
particularly striking in underdeveloped countries. While 
building of roads, harnessing of water power, or organization of 
housing developments may facilitate industrial growth and thus 
contribute to increased productivity on a national scale, the 
individual firms engaged in such activities may suffer losses 
and be unable to recover their investments. The nature of the 
problem involved can be easily exemplified : starting a new 
industrial enterprise is predicated among other things upon 
the availability of appropriately skilled manpower. Engaging 
men and training them on the job is time-consuming and 
expensive. They are liable to be unproductive, wasteful, and 
careless in the treatment of valuable tools and equipment. 
Accepting the losses involved may be justifiable from the 
standpoint of the individual firm if such a firm can count with 
reasonable certainty on retaining the services of those men 
after they go through training and acquire the requisite skills. 
However, should they leave the firm that provided the training 
and proceed to work for another enterprise, that new employer 
would reap the fruits of the first firm's outlays. In a developed 
industrial society this consideration is relatively unimportanJ. 
Losses and gains of individual firms generated by labour turn-
over may cancel out. In an underdeveloped country the chances 
of such cancellation are very small, if not nil. Although society 
as a whole would clearly benefit by the increase of skills of at 
least some of its members, individual businessmen cannot 
afford to provide the training that such an increase demands. 
But could not the required increase in total output be 
attained by better utilization of land-another unutilized or 
inadequately utilized productive factor ? 
There is usually no land that is both fit for agricultural 
purposes and at the same time readily aceessible. Such terrain 
as could be cultivated but is actually not being tilled would 
usually require considerable investment before becoming 
suitable for settlement. In underdeveloped countries such 
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outlays for agricultural purposes are just as unattractive to 
private interests as they are for industrial· purposes. 
' 
On the other hand, more adequate employment of land 
that is already used in agriculture runs into considerable 
difficulties. Very few improvements that would be necessary 
in order to increase productivity can be carried out within the 
narrow confines of small-peasant holdings. Not only are the 
peasants in underdeveloped countries utterly unable to pay for 
such innovations, but the size of their lots offers no justification 
for their introduction. 
Owners of large estates are in a sense in no better position. 
With limited savings at their disposal they do not have the 
funds to finance expensive improvements in their enterprises, 
nor do such projects appear profitable in view of the high 
prices of imported equipment in relation to prices of agricultural 
produce and wages of agricultural labour. 
Approached thus via agriculture, an expansion of total 
output would also seem to be attainable only through the 
development of industry. Only through increase of industrial 
productivity could agricultural machinery, fertilizers, electric 
power, etc., be brought within the reach of the agricultural 
producer. Only through an increased demand for labour could 
agricultural wages be raised and a stimulus provided for a 
modernization of the agricultural economy. Only through the 
growth of industrial production could agricultural labour 
displaced by the machine be absorbed in productive 
employment. 
Monopolistic market structures, shortage of savings, lack 
of external economies, the divergence of social and private 
rationalities do not exhaust, however, the list of obstacles 
blocking the way of privately organized industrial expansion 
in underdeveloped countries. Those obstacles have to be con-
sidered against the background of the general feeling of un-
certainty prevailing in all backward areas. The coalition of the 
owning classes formed under pressure of fear, and held together 
by the real or imagined danger of social upheavals, provokes 
continuously more or less threatening rumblings under the 
outwardly calm political surface. The social and political 
tensions to which that coalition is a political response are not 
liquidated by the prevailing system ; they are only repressed. 
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Normal and quiet as the daily routine frequently appears, the 
more enlightened and understanding members of the ruling 
groups in underdeveloped countries sense the inherent in-
stability of the political and social order. Occasional outbursts 
of popular dissatisfaction assuming the form of peasant up-
risings, violent strikes or local guerrilla warfare, serve from time 
to time as grim reminders of the latent crisis. 
In such a climate there is no will to invest on the part of 
monied people ; in such a climate there is no enthusiasm for 
long-term projects ; in such a climate the motto of all parti-
cipants in the privileges offered by society is carpe diem. 
Could not, however, an appropriate policy on the part of 
the governments involved change the political climate and 
facilitate economic growth? In our time, when faith in the 
manipulative omnipotence of the State has all but displaced 
analysis of its social structure and understanding of its political 
and economic functions, the tendency is obviously to answer 
these questions in the affirmative. 
Looking at the matter purely mechanically, it would appear 
indeed that much could be done, by a well-advised regime in 
an underdeveloped country, to provide for a relatively rapid 
increase of total output, accompanied by an improvement 
of the living standards of the population. There is a number of 
measures that the government could take in an effort to over-
come backwardness. A fiscal policy could be adopted that, by 
means of capital levies and a highly progressive tax system, 
would syphon off all surplus purchasing power, and in this way 
eliminate non-essential consumption. The savings thus enforced 
could be channelled by the government into productive invest-
ment. Power stations, railroads, highways, irrigation systems, 
and soil improvements could be organized by the State with a 
view to creating an economic environment conducive to the 
growth of productivity. Technical schools on various levels 
could be set up by the public authority to furnish industrial 
training to young people as well as to adult workers and the 
unemployed. A system of scholarships could be introduced 
rendering acquisition of skills accessible to low-income strata. 
Wherever private capital refrains from undertaking certain 
industrial projects, or wherever monopolistic controls block the 
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necessary expansion of plant and facilities in particular 
industries, the government could step in and make the requisite 
investments. Where developmental possibilities that are 
rewarding in the long-run appear unprofitable during the 
initial period of gestation and learning, and are therefore beyond 
the horizon of private businessmen, the government could 
undertake to shoulder the short-run losses. 
In addition an entire arsenal of 'preventive' devices is 
at the disposal of the authorities. Inflationary pressures result-
ing from developmental activities (private and public) could 
be reduced or even eliminated, if outlays on investment projects 
could be offset by a corresponding and simultaneous contrac-
tion of spending elsewhere in the economic system. What this 
would call for is a taxation policy that would effectively 
remove from the income stream amounts sufficient to neutra-
lize the investment-caused expansion of aggregate money 
income. 
In the interim, and as a supplement, speculation in scarce 
goods and excessive profiteering in essential commodities 
could be suppressed by rigorous price controls. An equitable 
distribution of mass consumption goods in short supply could 
be assured by rationing. Diversion of resources in high demand 
to luxury purposes could be prevented by allocation and 
priority schemes. Strict supervision of transactions involving 
foreign exchanges could render capital flight, expenditure of 
limited foreign funds on luxury imports, pleasure trips abroad, 
and the like, impossible. 
·What the combination of these measures would accomplish 
is a radical change in the structure of effective demand in 
the underdeveloped country, and a reallocation of productive 
resources to satisfy society's need for economic development. 
By curtailing consumption of the higher-income groups, the 
amounts of savings available for investment purposes could 
be markedly increased. The squandering of limited supplies 
of foreign exchange on capital flight, or on importation of 
redundant foreign goods and services, could be prevented, and 
the foreign funds thus saved could be used for the acquisition 
of foreign-made machinery needed for economic development. 
The reluctance of private interests to engage in enterprises 
that are socially necessary, but may not promise rich returns 
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in the short-run, would be prevented from determining the 
economic life of the backward country. 
The mere listing of the steps that would have to be under-
taken, in order to assure an expansion of output and income 
in an underdeveloped country, reveals the utter implausibility 
of the view that they could be carried out by the governments 
existing in most underdevelop~d countries. The reason for this 
inability is only to a negligible extent the non-existence of the 
competent and honest civil service needed for the administra-
tion of the programme. A symptom itself of the political and 
social marasmus prevailing in underdeveloped countries, this 
lack cannot be remedied ·without attacking the underlying 
causes. Nor does it touch anything near the roots of the matter 
to lament the lack of satisfactory tax policies in backward 
countries, or to deplore the absence of tax 'morale' and 
'discipline' among the civic virtues of their populations. 
The crucial fact rendering the realization of a developmental 
programme illusory is the political and social structure of the 
governments in power. The alliance of property-owning classes 
controlling the destinies of most underdeveloped countries, 
cannot be expected to design and to execute a set of measures 
running counter to each and all of their immediate vested 
interests. If to appease the restive public, blueprints of pro-
gressive measures such as agrarian reform, equitable tax 
legislation, etc., are officially announced, their enforcement is 
wilfully sabotaged. The government, representing a political 
compromise between landed and business interests cannot 
suppress the wasteful management of landed estates and the 
conspicuous consumption on the part of the aristocracy ; 
cannot suppress monopolistic abuses, profiteering, capital 
flights, and extravagant living on the part of businessmen. 
It cannot curtail or abandon its lavish appropriations for a 
military and police establishment, providing attractive careers 
to the scions of wealthy families and a profitable outlet for 
armaments produced by their parents-quite apart from the 
fact that this establishment serves as the main protection 
against possible popular revolt. Set up to guard and to abet 
the existing property rights and privileges, it cannot become 
the architect of a policy calculated to destroy the privileges 
standing in the way of economic progress and to place the 
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property and the incomes derived from it at the service of 
society as a whole. 
Nor is there much to be said for the 'intermediate' position 
which, granting the essential incompatibility of a well-
conceived and vigorously executed developmental programme 
with the political and social institutions prevailing in most 
underdeveloped countries, insists that at least some of the 
requisite measures could be carried out by the existing political 
authorities. This school of thought overlooks entirely the 
weakness, if not the complete absence, of social and political 
forces that could induce the necessary concessions on the part 
of the ruling coalition. By background and political upbringing, 
too myopic and self-interested to permit the slightest encroach-
ments upon their inherited positions and cherished privileges, 
the upper-classes in underdeveloped countries resist doggedly 
all pressures in that direction. Every time such pressures grow 
in strength they succeed in cementing anew the alliance of all 
conservative elements, by decrying all attempts at reform as 
assaults on the very foundations of society. 
Even if measures like progressive taxation, capital levies, 
and foreign exchange controls could be enforced by the corrupt 
officials operating in the demoralized business communities of 
underdeveloped countries, such enforcement would to a large 
extent defeat its original purpose. Where businessmen do not 
invest, unless in expectation of lavish profits, a taxation system 
succeeding in confiscating large parts of these profits is bound 
to kill private investment. Where doing business or operating 
landed estates are attractive mainly because they permit luxuri-
ous living, foreign exchange controls preventing the importation 
of luxury goods are bound to blight enterprise. Where the only 
stimulus to hard work on the part of intellectuals, technicians, 
and civil servants is the chance of partaking in the privileges of 
the ruling class, a policy aiming at the reduction of inequality 
of social status and income is bound to smother effort. 
The injection of planning into a society living in the twilight 
between feudalism and capitalism cannot but result in addi-
tional corruption, larger and more artful evasions of the law, 
and more brazen abuses of authority. 
There would seem to be no exit from the impasse. The ruling 
Approaches to the Problem of Underdevelopment 
coalition of interests does not abdicate of its own volition, nor 
does it change its character in response to incantation. Although 
its individual members occasionally leave the sinking ship 
physically or financially (or in both ways), the property-owning 
classes as a whole are as a rule grimly determined to hold fast 
to their political and economic entrenchments. 
If the threat of social upheaval assumes dangerous propor-
tions, they tighten their grip on political life and move rapidly 
in the direction of unbridled reaction and military dictatorship. 
Making use of favourable international opportunities, and of 
ideological and social affinities to ruling groups in other 
countries, they solicit foreign economic and sometimes military 
aid, in their efforts to stave off the impending disaster. 
Such aid is likely to be given to them by foreign govern-
ments regarding them as an evil less to be feared than the 
social revolution that would sweep them out of power. This 
attitude of their friends and protectors abroad is no less short-
sighted than their own. 
The adjustment of the social and political conditions in 
underdeveloped countries to the urgent needs of economic 
development can be postponed; it cannot be indefinitely 
avoided. In the past, it could have been delayed by decades 
or even centuries. In our age it is a matter of years. Bolstering 
the political system of power existing in backward countries 
by providing it with military support may temporarily block 
the eruption of the volcano ; it cannot stop the subterranean 
gathering of explosive forces. 
Economic help in the form of loans and grants given to the 
governments of backward countries, to enable them to promote 
a measure of economic progress, is no substitute for the domes-
tic changes that are mandatory if economic development is to 
be attained. 
Such help, in fact, may actually do· more harm than good. 
Possibly permitting the importation of some foreign-made 
machinery and equipment for government or business sponsored 
investment projects, but not accompanied by any of the steps 
that are needed to assure healthy economic growth, foreign 
assistance thus supplied may set off an inflationary spiral 
increasing and aggravating the existing social and economic 
tensions in underdeveloped countries. 
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If, as is frequently the case, these loans or grants from 
abroad are tied to the fulfilment of certain conditions on the 
part of the receiving country regarding their use, the resulting 
investment may be directed in such channels as to conform 
more to the interests of the lending than to those of the borrow-
ing country. Where economic advice as a form of 'technical 
assistance' is supplied to the underdeveloped country, and its 
acceptance is made a prerequisite to eligibility for financial 
aid, this advice often pushes the governments of underdeveloped 
countries toward policies, ideologically or otherwise attractive 
to the foreign experts dispensing economic counsel, but not 
necessarily conducive to economic development of the 'bene-
fited' countries. Nationalism and xenophobia are thus 
strengthened in backward areas-additional fuel for political 
restiveness. 
For backward countries to enter the road of economic growth 
and social progress, the political framework of their existence 
has to be drastically revamped. The alliance between feudal 
landlords, industrial royalists, and the capitalist middle-
classes has to be broken. The keepers of the past cannot be 
the builders of the future. Such progressive and enterprising 
elements as exist in backward societies have to obtain the 
possibility of leading their countries in the direction of economic 
and social growth. 
What France, Britain, and America have accomplished 
through their own revolutions has to be attained in backward 
countries by a combined effort of popular forces, enlightened 
government, and unselfish foreign help. This combined effort 
must sweep away the holdover institutions of a defunct age, 
must change the political and social climate in the under-
developed countries, and must imbue their nations with a new 
spirit of enterprise and freedom. 
Should it prove too late in the historical process for the 
bourgeoisie to rise to its responsibilities in backward areas, 
should the long experience of servitude and accommodation to 
the feudal past have reduced the forces of progressive capitalism 
to impotence, the backward countries of the world will inevit-
ably turn to economic planning and social collectivism. If the 
capitalist world outlook of economic and social progress, 
propelled by enlightened self-interest, should prove unable to 
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triumph over the conservatism of inherited positions and 
traditional privileges, if the capitalist promise of advance and 
reward to the efficient, the industrious, the able, should not 
displace the feudal assurance of security and power to the 
well-bred, the well-connected and the conformist-a new social 
ethos will become the spirit and guide of a new age. It will 
be the ethos of the collective effort, the creed of the predomin-
ance of the interests of society over the interests of selected 
few. 
The transition may be abrupt and painful. The land not 
given to the peasants legally may be taken by them forcibly. 
High incomes not confiscated through taxation may be elimi-
nated by outright expropriation. Corrupt officials not retired 
in orderly fashion may be removed by violent action. 
Which way the historical wheel will tum and in which way 
the crisis in the backward countries will find its final solution 
will depend in the main on whether the capitalist middle-
classes in the backward areas, and the rulers of the advanced 
industrial nations of the world, overcome their fear and myopia. 
Or are they too spell-bound by their narrowly conceived 
selfish interests, too blinded by their hatred of progress, grown 
so senile in these latter days of the capitalist age, as to commit 
suicide out of fear of death ? 
AN INTERPRETATION OF 
ECONOMIC BACKWARDNESS* 
by H. Myint 
IN CURRENT DISCUSSIONS THE TERMS 'UNDERDEVELOPED' AND 
'backward' are generally used as though they were completely 
interchangeable by applying them to aggregate geographical 
concepts such as 'countries', 'areas', and 'regions', or by 
equating them with certain broad indices such as low incomes 
or capital investment per head. It is more illuminating, in my 
view, to give these terms different connotations by using the 
former to mean underdeveloped resources, and the latter to 
refer to the backward people of a given area. In this paper 
I shall argue that this distinction is fundamental to the under-
standing of the nature of economic backwardness. 
I 
The difference in approach in terms of 'underdeveloped 
resources' and in terms of 'backward people '1 can best be 
illustrated by examining the current fashion of including not 
only the natural resources but also the so-called 'human 
resources' under the generic heading of 'underdeveloped 
resources', which seems to imply that the two terms we have 
distinguished really ovtrlap. But is it merely a matter of taste 
or tact whether we choose to speak of ' backward people ' or of 
'underdeveloped human resources' ? On a close examination 
it will be seen that each term has its own hinterland of 
associated ideas and the two cannot be superimposed on 
each other without creating a number of serious logical 
difficulties. 
* Oxford Economic Papers, June 1954. Reprinted by permission of 
the Clarendon Press, Oxford, and the author. 
1 In order to avoid misunderstanding I had better say at once that in 
speaking of a 'backward people', in contrast to 'an advanced people', I 
am referring only to economic life and do not in the least imply general 
cultural' backwardness'. The qualifying word 'economic' is dropped 
merely for the sake of brevity. 
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In common-sense terms, a 'backward people' may be defined 
as a group of people who are in some fashion or other unsuccess-
ful in the economic struggle to earn a livelihood. Thus we are 
starting from a Classical or Marshallian distinction between 
man, on the one hand, and his environment on the other: only 
then can we think of a group of people as being successful or 
otherwise in adapting themselves to their environment. Further, 
the idea of 'backwardness' inevitably implies a comparison of 
different degrees of success in this economic struggle : some 
groups of people are less successful or 'backward' compared 
with other more successful or 'advanced' groups. Thus the 
nature of backwardness would lose much of its signifisance if 
applied to a homogeneous group of people without international 
economic relations. It is when a self-sufficient primitive or 
medieval economy has been opened up to outside economic 
forces and its people come into contact with other economically 
more 'advanced' people that the idea of backwardness suggests 
itself. 
This way of approach at once raises a number of issues. 
Firstly, we shall have to make a more systematic analysis of 
the continuous process of mutual adaptation between wants, 
activities, and environment which we have described as 
'economic struggle'. Secondly, in order to make a valid com-
parison of the varying degrees of success in the economic 
struggle of different groups of people we require the assumption 
that these different groups are in fact pursuing the same or 
comparable sets of ends. This is a big assumption which will 
have to be examined closely. Finally, we shall have to consider 
whether it is sufficient to measure the degree of 'backwardness' 
or 'advancement' of different groups of people merely in terms 
of the relative distribution of final incomes among them ; or 
whether the patt<irn of distribution of economic activity among 
the different groups and the different roles they play in econo-
mic life might not in the long run offer a more significant clue 
to the future potential development of each group. 
These will be discussed at a later stage (section IV). For the 
purpose of a preliminary contrast, however, it is sufficient to 
note that when we adopt the approach in terms of 'backward 
people' we are by definition making their failure in the economic 
struggle the centre of the problem and that this involves : 
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(a) a fundamental contrast between them (the 'backward 
people') and the natural resources and the economic environ-
ment of their country, and (b) a deliberate concentration of 
attention on their share of incomes or economic activity either 
within their own country or in relation to the world at large 
as distinct from the total volume of output or economic 
activity. 
When we turn to the approach in terms of 'underdeveloped 
resources', however, we are led to quite a different set of ideas. 
To treat 'human resources' on exactly the same footing as 
natural resources as part of the common pool of 'under-
developed resources' is to abandon the older man-against-
environment approach in favour of the modern 'allocative 
efficiency' approach. We are then concerned, not with the 
success or failure of a given group of people in their struggle 
against their economic environment (including other groups 
of people), but with the allocation of given 'resources' among 
alternative uses as determined by the price system or by the 
central planner or by a mixture of both. The aim of this alloca-
tive process is to maximize total output, and 'underdevelop-
ment' becomes a species of deviation from the productive 
optimum defined in some sense or other. 
We can now see that although, physically speaking, the same 
people are involved when we speak of 'backward people' and 
of 'underdeveloped human resources', the standpoint adopted 
in each case is different. From the first standpoint, these people 
are regarded as actors (even if unsuccessful ones) in the econo-
mic struggle. From the second, they are regarded as impersonal 
units of 'underdeveloped' resources not distinguishable from 
units of other types of underdeveloped resources except by 
the degree of underdevelopment defined in some functional 
sense. Thus we are not specially concerned with 'human 
resources' more than with other types of resources except in 
so far as it could be shown that 'developing' the human 
resources would in fact increase the total output by 
a greater extent than by developing other 'material' 
resources. 
The difference between the 'backwardness' and the 'under-
development' approach becomes very clear when we exclude 
human resources from the definition of 'underdeveloped 
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resources' and confine it entirely to natural resources. This is 
by no means an unusual or deliberately contrived 'strong case' 
to boost our distinction. As a matter of fact, much of the think-
ing on the subject is still influenced by the idea of 'under-
developed countries' as those which (whatever their 'human 
resources') possess a greater amount of potential natural 
resources waiting to be developed compared with the' developed 
countries' whose natural resources have already been fully 
brought into use. We may also note how the use of such expres-
sions as 'underdeveloped countries', 'underdeveloped areas', 
'underdeveloped regions', etc., tends to foster this belief in the 
existence of potential natural resources. 
Here, once we have excluded the human beings from the 
'underdeveloped resources', a number of propositions emerge. 
Since they will recur again in the course of our argument, they 
may be summarily stated at this stage. (r) 'Underdevelopment' 
of natural resources and 'backwardness' of people are two 
distinct phenomena and they need not even always coexist: 
thus the inhabitants of the 'overpopulated' countries which 
admittedly have very little natural resources left for further 
unaided development are also generally 'backward'. (z) When 
'underdeveloped' natural resources and 'backward' people 
coexist, they mutually aggravate each other in a 'vicious 
circle' ; but this mutual interaction is an essentially dynamic 
and historical process taking place over a period of time and 
may be too complicated and qualitative to be easily fitted into 
the formal quantitative framework of optimum allocation 
of resources (including capital resources) suggested by the pure 
'underdevelopment' approach. (3) Although the 'under-
development' of natural resources may cause the 'backward-
ness' of the people, it does not necessarily follow that any 
efficient development of natural resources resulting in an in-
crease in total output will always and pari passu reduce the 
backwardness of people. On the contrary, the problem of econo-
mic backwardness in ma:ny countries has been made more 
acute, not because the natural resources have remained 'under-
developed', but because they have been as fully and rapidly 
developed as market conditions permitted while the inhabitants 
have been left out, being either unable or unwilling or both 
to participate fully in the process. 
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Let us now turn to the logical difficulties which arise from 
attempts to superimpose the 'backwardness' and the 'under-
development' approach on each other. These can be best 
illustrated by examining some of the typical arguments in 
favour of increasing the flow of investment from the 'advanced' 
to the 'underdeveloped' countries. 
Advocates of plans for the international economic develop-
ment of the underdeveloped countries generally start by saying 
that the case for alleviating the poverty and discontent, ill 
health and ignorance of the peoples of these countries can be 
made whether we approach the subject from a humanitarian 
standpoint or purely in self-defence to ease the storm-centres 
of international relations. At this stage therefore the problem 
seems to be set out in terms of human misery and discontent, 
in terms of 'backwardness' rather than in terms of 'under-
development' of resources. Indeed, the existence of 'under-
developed' natural resources at least, far from creating a 
'problem' in the relevant sense, may be regarded as part of 
the means of solving it. When, however, we pass from this 
initial statement of the problem to the later parts of the 
economic development plans which contain a more technical 
treatment of the proposals and 'target figures' for investment, 
we generally encounter a shift from the 'backwardness' to 
the 'underdevelopment' approach. The existence of 'under-
developed' natural resources is no longer regarded as the means 
of solving the problem; it has become the problem itself. The 
argument then proceeds as though the phenomenon of the 
'backwardness' of the people can be satisfactorily accounted 
for purely in terms of the 'underdevelopment' of the resources 
and deviations from the optimum allocation of world's capital 
resources.1 
It is now time to consider the meaning of 'underdeveloped 
resources' more closely. In the language of optimum theory, 
it seems to describe two types of deviation : (i) less than opti-
mum amounts of these 'underdeveloped' resources have been 
used in producing final output, and (ii) less than optimum 
amounts of capital have been invested to augment the quantity 
1 Cf., for example, United Nations Report, Measures for the Economic 
Development of Underdeveloped Countries, ch. viii. 
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and improve the quality of these 'underdeveloped' resources. 
Where the first occurs by itself it would be possible to increase 
the total output of the underdeveloped countries without 
outside investment merely by reorganizing their own existing 
resources by such measures as legal and administrative reforms, 
the mobilizing of domestic savings, and so on. In current 
discussion, although this possibility is admitted, it is considered 
that as a rule the two types of deviation occur simultaneously, 
the first caused by the second. That is to say, the scope for a 
more productive reorganization of 'development' of the 
resources of the underdeveloped countries is limited without 
first removing the basic cause of 'underdevelopment', viz. an 
insufficient flow of investment from the 'advanced' countries. 
The typical arguments in favour of increasing investment 
in the underdeveloped countries may now be examined. They 
may be classified according to the degree of optimism concern-
ing the richness of the 'underdeveloped resources'. 
i. The most optimistic type of argument assumes that as 
a rule underdeveloped countries possess natural resources 
capable of being developed by private investors on a purely 
commercial basis and this process will automatically help to 
raise the standard of living of the people of these countries. 
'Underdevelopment' is therefore caused by 'artificial' obstacles 
and restrictions to the free international movement of private 
capital. Whatever our views about the richness of potential 
natural resources, this type of argument serves to illustrate a 
sharp clash between the 'underdevelopment' and the 'back-
wardness' approach. For, on a closer examination, it turns 
out that the only type of investment which private investors 
are willing to undertake in the underdeveloped countries is 
the exploitation of raw materials, e.g. petroleum, and it is 
precisely in this field that the governments of the underdev-
eloped countries are frequently unwilling to admit private 
foreign capital because t~y fear that this 'nineteenth-century 
type of investment' will merely develop the natural resources 
and not the people and will result in 'foreign economic domina-
tion' aggravating the economic 'backwardness' of their peoples. 
This is a genuine deadlock to which no satisfactory answer 
can be given in terms of the simple 'underdevelopment' 
approach. And to dismiss the whole thing merely as irrational 
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economic nationalism seems suspiciously like throwing the 
baby away with the bath water (see section VI below). 
ii. The next type of argument may be regarded as an 
attempt to retrieve the 'underdevelopment' approach by 
introducing the Pigovian concept of the 'social' productivity 
as distinguished from the 'private' productivity of investment. 
Here it is argued that although the underdeveloped countries 
may not possess (or are unwilling to make available) resources 
which can be developed by private enterprise, they can never-
theless very profitably absorb large sums of international 
investment in the form of public enterprises using a broader 
criterion of 'social' productivity. These enterprises would 
include public utilities, transport, hydro-electric and irrigation 
schemes, &c., which offer economies of large scale and scope 
for complementary investment and where only a public agency 
can collect the diffused social returns by means of taxation. 
A good example of a direct application of this argument may 
be found in the United Nations Report on National and Inter-
national Measures for Full Employment. Here the authors, 
after recommending that the International Bank for Recon-
struction and Development should be used as the main channel 
of inter-governmental lending to reduce political risks on both 
sides, lay down the following conditions : 
'The criteria of worthwhileness for the loans should be their effect 
on national income, taxable capacity and export capacity. The 
Bank should not in general lend, unless it is convinced that in conse-
quence of the loan, the borrowing country's current balance of 
payments will improve sufficiently to permit interest and amor-
tization payments to be made. '1 
'Development loans should be made at interest rates uniform for 
all borrowing countries.' (Op. cit., pp. 93-4.) 
These two conditions may be regarded as the logical limits 
to which the investment policy towards the underdeveloped 
countries can be liberalized on the basis of the Pigovian con-
cept of 'social' productivity of investment. It may be noted 
that fairly substantial amounts of capital can still be absorbed 
1 We are not concerned here with the question how far this rule can 
be reconciled with the authors' practical proposals for stabilizing longer-
term lending by fixing target figures. Cf. also A. E. Kahn, 'Investment 
Criteria for Development Programmes', Quarterly Journal of Econo-
mics, February 1951. 
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by some of the underdeveloped countries within these limits. 
But comparing this view with the general run of discussions 
on the subject, it soon becomes apparent that many advocates 
of international development plans would consider the Pigovian 
conditions as too restrictive to be regarded as a serious basis 
of investment policy towards the underdeveloped countries. 
There are two possible ways out of this impasse. The first, 
which we shall recommend in the later part of this paper, is 
to make a clean break with the whole 'underdevelopment' 
approach and to adopt a more direct approach to the problem 
of economic backwardness of the people. The second an_d more 
popular alternative is to try to broaden the 'underdevelopment' 
approach still further ; and this brings us to the third type of 
the underinvestment argument. 
iii. The argument at this stage consists in attempts to 
stretch the concept of 'social productivity' or 'desirability' 
by invoking (a) the principle of 'needs', and (b) the dynamic 
principle of trying to stimulate further rounds of loan invest-
ment by 'productive' grants to 'improve social capital', 
particularly in the fields of public health, education, and com-
munications. A good example of this may be found in a later 
United Nations Report on Measures for the Economic Develop-
ment of the Underdeveloped Countries. 
Here the authors argue : 
(a) that 'the amount that can be profitably invested at a 4 per 
cent rate of interest depends on the amount which is being spent 
at the same time on improving social capij:al ; and especially on 
public health, on education and on roads and communications. 
There is much to be done in this way in the underdeveloped countries 
before they will be in a position to absorb large amounts of loan 
capital' (para. 269) ; 
(b) that the underdeveloped countries 'cannot borrow' for these 
purposes, presumably because 'they could not meet the full burden 
of loan finance' (paras. 270 and 277) ; 
(c) that, therefore, grants-in-aid should be made to the under-
developed countries, but purely for 'productive' purposes (paras. 
271 and 276). 
The authors do not, however, hesitate to invoke the principle 
of needs. Thus : 
'The principle that the better off should help to pay for the educa-
tion, the medical services and other public services received by the 
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poorer classes of the community is now well established within every 
Member nation of the United Nations. The idea, that this principle 
should also be applied as between rich and poor countries is relatively 
new. It has however been put into practice on several occasions.' 
(Para. 272.) 
How far are these attempts to stretch the idea of 'social' 
productivity successful ? 
To begin with, t.'lere is an important shift in the basic defini-
tion of the 'underdeveloped countries' which is not as clearly 
stated as it might be. Up to now the main burden of the argu-
ment has been on the proposition that 'underdeveloped 
countries' possess a greater amount of 'underdeveloped' 
resources than the developed countries and that therefore the 
'social' productivity of investment is higher in the former than 
in the latter. From now on the emphasis has shifted to the fact 
that the underdeveloped countries have lower per capita 
incomes and therefore suffer from greater needs than the 
developed countries. 
The introduction of the principle of needs does not create 
any difficulties provided we are prepared to keep it clearly 
apart from the principle of productivity. Theri loans should 
continue to be made strictly on the productivity principle 
while grants should be made separately on the need principle. 
This, however, results in somewhat unpalatable conclusions. 
(a) When we are allocating loans, our main concern is to maxi-
mize the total world output and not to equalize international 
incomes. Thus the social productivity curves of investment 
must be constructed objectively, and independently of our 
value judgements concerning needs. This means that capital 
should not be diverted in the form of low interest loans or 
grants to the poorer countries simply because they are poor. 
A more economic way of reducing inequalities in the inter-
national distribution of income is to allocate the world capital 
resources in uses where its social productivity is highest even 
if it happens to be in the richest countries, and to redistribute 
the resultant output after first ensuring that it is maximized. 
(b) Conversely, when we are allocating grants, our concern is 
with a more equitable international distribution of incomes 
and not with their effects on total output. Thus grants should 
be made in the form of final consumers' goods and services, 
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directed not only towards the poorer countries but also to-
wards the poorer sections within each country. The principle 
of need in its strict form is an argument for diverting final 
incomes from the richer to the poorer countries for consump-
tion purposes and not an argument for diverting capital grants 
for 'productive' purposes. 
These conclusions are not without relevance to the practical 
issues of economic policy in the underdeveloped countries. 
Thus critics of the unsuccessful developmental ventures of 
the British Overseas Food Corporation and the Colonial 
Development Corporation may reasonably maintain that the 
root cause of the failure lies not as much in the wrong choice 
of men and inefficient methods of administering the ventures 
but in the vagueness of the mandate itself which tries to com-
promise between the principle of obtaining economic returns 
and the principle of needs. They may say that rather than 
waste huge sums of money by investing in projects which 
cannot be justified on the strict productivity principle, it were 
better to distribute them as free gifts of consumers' goods and 
services among the poor of Africa. Again, individuals and 
governments in underdeveloped countries sometimes find 
themselves with large sums of money which they cannot pro-
fitably or safely invest locally ; and then, following the strict 
productivity principle and the need to protect their capital, 
they have found it wiser to invest it in the most developed 
countries such as the U.S.A. or the U.K. 
The last example, however, brings out the unsatisfactoriness 
of trying to apply the static rules of the productive optimum 
to the problem of the underdeveloped countries. This, however, 
is rather damaging to the conventional definitions of the 
'underdeveloped' countries both in terms of 'underdeveloped' 
resources and in terms of low per capita incomes. For now it 
begins to transpire : (a) that if we take the productivity curves 
of international investment on the basis of existing economic 
conditions in the • developed' and the 'underdeveloped' coun-
tries, more often than not capital is likely to be more productive 
in the former than the latter and the Pigovian distinction 
between 'social' and 'private' product will not appreciably 
change the broad picture; (b) that therefore if we were to 
allocate capital according to the existing productivity curves, 
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even taking a generous view of 'social' productivity, this 
would still result in relatively greater quantities of capital 
being invested in the 'developed' than in the 'underdeveloped' 
countries, accentuating the unequal rate of economic develop-
ment between the two types of country; and (c) that a policy 
of a more equal redistribution of international incomes based 
on the pure principle of needs, although it may relieve the 
burden of cumulative unequal rates of economic development, 
does not touch the heart of the problem ; for fundamentally 
the problem of the 'underdeveloped' countries is not merely 
that of low or unequal distribution of final incomes but also 
that of unequal participation in the processes of economic 
activity. 
Faced with these considerations, those who wish to retain 
the 'underdevelopment' approach are obliged to 'dynamize' 
it and to refer to social productivity in the longer run as dis-
tinct from the present social productivity of investment. 
We are now in a position to examine the argument of the 
authors of the United Nations Report on the Measures for the 
Economic Development of the Underdeveloped Countries. It will 
be seen that the crux of their argument lies in the question 
how far 'improving social capital' in public health, education, 
and communications, whether financed by grants or loans, 
can successfully stimulate further rounds of loan capital. 
Thus the authors' appeal to the principle of need in para. 272 
(also implicit earlier on, e.g. para. 248) turns out to be a side-
issue. It is a confusing side-issue at that because the require-
ments for creating incentives for further investment and those 
for promoting economic equality do not always conveniently 
coincide in the same policy as the authors have implied. On 
the contrary, there are many instances where the incentives 
for further investment can be created only by pursuing rela-
tively disequalizing policies, such as control of domestic wages, 
tax exemptions to new (foreign) enterprises, etc.1 
Turning to their main argument, the extent to which further 
rounds of loan investment can be effectively stimulated by a 
policy of 'improving social capital' by grants must depend 
1 Cf., for instance, 'Industrialization of Puerto Rico', Caribbean 
Economic Review, December 1949, by Professor A. Lewis, one of the 
authors of the Report. 
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on a wide variety of circumstances which vary from country to 
country and about which no definite generalizations can be 
made. We are no longer in the static world where 'under-
investment' in a particular line can be deduced in principle 
by an inspection of the given social marginal productivity 
curves and where there is a definite functional relationship 
between the quantity of capital invested and the quantity of 
'returns' in the form of final output. Thus given favourable 
circumstances, a small amount of 'investment' in social capital 
might start a chain-reaction and yield 'returns' in the form of 
secondary rounds of investment out of all proportion to the 
initial investment. On the other hand, if circumstances are 
not favourable, even a larger amount of initial investment 
might not successfully start these secondary rounds of activities, 
and there is no real guarantee that increasing the amount of 
the initial investment still further would induce the desired 
results. In reply to such objections, the authors can only 
appeal to the general presumption that if average incomes per 
head or expenditure per head in the type of social services 
they have chosen is low, then longer-run social productivity 
of investment in 'social capital' is likely to be high. This 
general presumption is not as strong as it appears,· and 
there are two general arguments which may be advanced 
against it. 
The first is clearest in the case of education and technical 
training although it can be applied also to other types of 'social 
capital'. It is the fairly common experience of the under-
developed countries to find themselves, not merely with an 
overall shortage of educated people, but also with a relative 
shortage of those regarded as 'socially productive', such as 
engineers and doctors, combined with a relative abundance 
of those regarded as less socially productive, such as lawyers 
and clerks. The reason for this is, of course, that with the exist-
ing social and economic organization of these countries there 
is a relatively greater market demand for the latter type of 
person than the former. This would seem to suggest that the 
problem of creating and organizing demand for trained per-
sonnel in the underdeveloped countries may even be more 
important than the problem of creating the supply by invest-
ment in 'social capital'. Given the demand, the supply of 
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trained personnel of most types {including those trained 
abroad) would seem to respond more automatically and to a 
greater extent than is usually allowed for. On the other hand, 
there is less indication that the demand can be effectively 
stimulated merely by creating the supply without simultane-
ously introducing far-reaching changes into the economic 
structure. Thus most underdeveloped countries can provide 
numerous instances of graduates from technical and agricul-
tural colleges who cannot be absorbed, because the existing 
economic structure cannot be changed quickly enough to 
absorb them, although in terms of broad averages the amount 
of money spent per head of education and technical training 
is quite modest. The common fate of these people is to suffer a 
form of intellectual 'disguised unemployment' by taking up 
appointments as clerks and ordinary school-teachers.1 Thus 
there is a genuine tendency for a great deal of investment 
in 'social capital' to be wasted, although the full extent of 
this wastage is concealed because expenditure on education 
and technical training is classed under the head of social 
services and not subject to the strict profit-and-loss accounting 
of other types of state enterprises. 
This leads us to the second argument, which is rather dis-
concerting to the economic theorist. The application of fairly 
sophisticated economic theory involving concepts of social 
productivity and induced investment tends to create the 
impression that we have now opened up new possibilities of 
investment in the underdeveloped countries which were un-
appreciated and unexplored by the governments and adminis-
trators of these countries. This, however, overlooks two cir-
cumstances. Firstly, a substantial part of capital inflow into 
the underdeveloped countries was in the form of government 
borrowing even in the heyday of private investment. Secondly, 
the governments of the newly-opened-up countries have always 
been impelled by a powerful 'self-interest' to try to obtain 
adequate revenues to meet the expanding costs of administra-
tion. Thus, untutored as they may be in economic theory, they 
have been obliged by practical necessity to borrow and deploy 
their loans and grants in ways not so different from the 
1 Cf. J. S. Furnivall, Colonial Policy and Practice, pp. 380-82. 
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recommendations of the present-day economic experts.l The 
moral of this argument is not merely that there is less scope for 
the deployment of' productive' loans and grants (as distinct from 
those social service expenditures which are frankly based on 
the principle of need) than appears at first sight. There is a 
further consideration which cuts across the whole of the 
'underdevelopment' approach. For, as we shall see, ironically 
enough, where the governments of the underdeveloped countries 
have been successful in stimulating private (foreign) invest-
ment, the result has frequently been too great and rapid an 
expansion in a few lines of primary production for export which 
fnrther aggravated the problem of the adjustment of the in-
digenous peoples of these countries to outside economic forces. 
Thus again, we are led back from the consideration of the total 
quantity of investment and the total volume of output and · 
economic activity to a consideration of the type of investment 
and the distribution of economic activities and economic roles 
between the backward peoples and the others. 
This is a convenient point at which to pause and summarize 
our argument so far. (i) The problem of the so-called 'under-
developed countries' consists, not merely in the 'underdevelop-
ment' of their resources in the usual senses, but also in the 
economic 'backwardness' of their peoples. (ii) Where it exists, 
the 'underdevelopment' of natural resources and the back-
wardness of people mutually aggravate each other in a 'vicious 
circle'. (iii) While (ii) is very important, it needs to be handled 
with care, for it is liable to distract our attention from the real 
problem of economic backwardness. Thus, impressed by the 
connexion between the 'backwardness' of the people and the 
'underdevelopment' of the resources, many have sought to 
superimpose these two concepts on each other and to explain 
the former entirely in terms of the latter. In doing so, however, 
they are continually obliged to stretch and shift the basis of 
their argument : from the 'underdeveloped' natural resources 
to the 'underdeveloped' human resources ; from the 'private' 
1 In some cases, however, there may be an important divergence 
between the social productivity of investment to the community and the 
• private' productivity to the government interpreted narrowly in terms 
of quick revenue receipts. Sometimes governments may actually dis-
courage new domestic industries to protect their vested interests in 
customs and excise duties. 
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to the 'social' productivity of investment ; from the principle 
of 'productivity' to the principle of 'need' ; and finally, from 
the static idea of the optimum allocation of investable resources 
to the dynamic idea of stimulating further rounds of investment 
by 'productive' grants. It is fair to say that, in spite of all 
these contortions, the real issues of backwardness seem to 
have eluded the grasp of the 'underdevelopment' approach. 
(iv) Thus in order to push our analysis farther to the heart 
of the problem, it would seem desirable to make a clean break 
with the 'underdevelopment' approach and to recognize the 
problem of 'backwardness' as a major problem in its own right 
which may occur even where there is no important 'under-
development' of resources in any of the acceptable senses. 
To emphasize this we shall speak from now on of 'backward' 
and not 'underdeveloped' countries. 
III 
At this stage it will be seen that there are at least two other 
'obvious' explanations of 'backwardness' which must be 
considered as seriously as 'underdevelopment' in relation to 
some of the backward countries. But like 'underdevelopment' 
itself, we shall have to leave them aside in our search for a 
more general approach to the problem. 
The first, of course, is the 'overpopulation' approach which 
not so long ago used to occupy a central position in discussions 
now dominated by the idea of 'underdevelopment'. Here 
again we may agree that backward peoples generally tend to 
have high birth-rates and that therefore 'overpopulation' 
and 'backwardness' tend to aggravate each other in another 
of those 'vicious circles' which are a feature of the whole subject. 
But this still leaves important gaps in the explanation. While 
overpopulation may be a major cause of backwardness in 
some countries, it does not explain why other countries not 
suffering from manifest population pressure should also be 
similarly backward. Moreover, some backward countries, e.g. 
most of those in south-east Asia, initially started from sparse 
populations in relation to their natural resources. It is only 
after they have been 'opened up' to international trade that 
they have tended to become overpopulated, partly because 
their death-rates have been reduced and partly because their 
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resources have been developed in a few special lines of primary 
production for export which are subject to diminishing returns. 
Here, overpopulation cannot be regarded as the cause of 
backwardness ; rather it is a manifestation of the maladjust-
ment of backward peoples to outside economic forces at the 
physical level. Nor need this maladjustment always take the 
form of overpopulation. In some cases of extreme backwardness 
the size of the backward populations has been known to 
diminish to the point of extinction. Finally, the degree of 
overpopulation depends, not only on the relation between the 
physical quantity of natural resources and the size of popula-
tion, but also on the level of technical and economic develop-
ment of the people. Thus advanced industrial countries can 
usually maintain a denser population at a higher standard of 
living than the backward agricultural and pastoral countries. 
Further, in the past the advanced countries have absorbed 
very large increases in population without lowering their 
standard of living ; indeed, many would maintain that these 
increases were a necessary part of their even greater rates of 
expansion in output and economic activity.1 Thus to try to 
account for economic backwardness purely in terms of popula-
tion pressure is to leave unanswered the question why the 
economically backward peoples have been unable to increase 
their productivity to match the increase in their population 
while the economically advanced people have managed to 
increase their standard of living on top of large increases in 
population. 
The second possible line of approach is in terms of the 
deliberate and legalized political, economic, and racial dis-
criminations imposed on the 'backward' peoples by the 
'advanced' peoples. Here again, although this appears to be 
a major factor in certain countries, notoriously in Mrica, it 
does not explain why the indigenous peoples of other countries 
who are not subject to such obvious discriminations to the 
same extent should also be similarly backward. Here, of course, 
the definition of the nature and extent of discriminations raises 
very formidable difficulties which we must frankly by-pass if 
we are to get farther on with our analysis. We shall thus content 
1 Cf. J. R. Hicks, Value and Capital, p. 302 n. 
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ourselves with drawing a somewhat crude working distinction 
between the deliberate and therefore directly remediable 
causes of backwardness in the form of open and legalized 
discriminations and the more fortuitous and intractable dis-
equalizing factors which may operate even where there is a 
perfect equality of formal legal rights between different groups 
of people in their economic relations with each other (cf., 
however, section V below). 
We are now able to sketch the general outlines of our problem. 
When the backward countries were 'opened up' to economic 
relations with the outside world, their peoples had to face the 
problem of adapting themselves to a new environment shaped 
by outside economic forces. In this, whatever their degree of 
cultural advance in other spheres, they seem to have been 
conspicuously unsuccessful or 'backward' compared with the 
other groups of economically 'advanced' people-whatever 
their degree of cultural advance in other spheres. Our problem 
is to explain this gap, to explain why the backward people 
cannot stand on a 'competitive footing' with the advanced 
people in this 'economic struggle'. The problem is further 
complicated by the fact that the gap between the advanced 
and backward peoples instead of being narrowed has been 
frequently widened by the passage of time. Thus an inquiry 
into the causes of economic backwardness essentially consists 
in searching for those disequalizing factors which instead of 
being neutralized are cumulativell exaggerated by 'the free 
play of economic forces'. 
In order to isolate these disequalizing factors, we can adopt 
a 'model' of a backward country which has the following broad 
negative specifications. (i) Initially the country started with 
a fairly sparse population in relation to its potential natural 
resources; so it cannot be said to have been suffering from 
'overpopulation' to begin with. (ii) Its natural resources are 
then 'developed', usually in the direction of a few specialized 
lines of primary production for export, as fully as the world 
market conditions permit. This process of 'development' is 
generally carried out by foreign private enterprise under 
conditions of laissez-jaire ; but frequently the process may be 
aided by a government policy of stimulating expansion in 
investment, export, and general economic activity motivated 
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by a desire to expand taxable capacity. So the country's 
natural resources cannot be said to be obviously 'underdevel-
oped'. (iii) Whatever its political status, its native inhabitants 
at least enjoy a perfect equality of formal legal rights in their 
economic relations with other people, including the right to 
own any type of property and to enter into any type of occupa-
tion; so they cannot be said to suffer from obvious discrimina-
tions in economic matters. 
To those who are firmly wedded to the conventional explana-
tions of economic backwardness this may seem like assuming 
away the entire problem. But when we tum and survey the 
different types of backward countries, it will be seen that there 
is a large group, for example those in south-east Asia, British 
West Africa, Latin America, which approximates more to our 
model than to any models of obvious 'underdevelopment', 
'overpopulation', or 'discrimination' or a combination of all 
of them, if the first and the second can in fact be combined. 
Further, even in the other groups of backward countries where 
these conventional explanations are obviously very important, 
our model is still useful in turning attention to the residual 
causes of backwardness which may tum out to be by no means 
negligible. 
IV 
Before we consider our 'model' further let us examine the 
concept of economic backwardness more closely. We may begin 
by distinguishing between the 'backward country' as an 
aggregate territorial and economic unit and the 'backward 
people' who frequently form merely a group within it confined 
to certain sectors of the economy. Now the disequalizing factors 
which we are seeking must be considered as operating, not 
only between the backward and the advanced countries as 
aggregate units, but also between the backward and advanced 
groups of peoples within the same backward country itself. 
Obviously a complete analysis of economic backwardness 
must take into account both sets of disequalizing factors which 
are closely interrelated with each other. Even so, we shall 
come to realize that the familiar 'countries A and B' approach 
of the conventional theory of international trade is seriously 
inadequate for our purpose and that to study the actual impact 
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of outside economic forces on the backward people we shall 
have to go behind these macro-economic units to those dis-
equalizing factors which operate within the backward country 
itself. 
But much still remains to be done even in terms of the con-
ventional approach, using these versatile letters A and B to 
denote the 'advanced' and the 'backward' countries respec-
tively. It is only recently that the general run of economists 
have turned their attention to the long-run problem of unequal 
rates of economic growth and productivity among the different 
countries participating in international trade. But even so, 
it is fair to say that this has somewhat shaken the belief in 
the adequacy of the static theory of comparative costs to deal 
with the essentially dynamic process of growth of the inter-
national economy. Thus it is now increasingly admitted that 
the existing ratios of comparative costs are by no means 
immutable and rigidly rela,ted to the original natural resources 
of the countries but may be influenced to a great extent by 
such factors as education, experience, technical skills, and so 
on, which arise out of the process of international trade itself 
and may exert a cumulatively disequalizing influence against 
the countries which have a later start. Following on from this, 
it would seem that the gains from international trade cannot 
be adequately measured merely in the form of the conventional 
'terms of trade' and the distribution of final incomes among 
the participating countries ; we must also take into account 
the distribution of economic activities, in the form of induced 
investment and secondary rounds of employment, growth of 
technical knowledge and external economies, and all those 
dynamic stimuli which each participating country receives 
as a consequence of a given increase in the volume of its trade.1 
Although different views may be held about the practical 
policies most likely to induce these secondary rounds of invest-
ment and economic activity, there is little doubt that the 
concept of 'induced' investment affords great theoretical 
insight into the nature of economic backwardness. In a sense, 
one might say that the difference between the 'advanced' 
1 Cf. H. W. Singer, 'The Distribution of Gains between Investing and 
Borrowing Countries', The American Economic Review Papers and 
Proceedings, May 1950. 
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and the 'backward' country lies in the fact that the former, 
subject to the powerful 'accelerator' effect, can generate its 
own trade-cycle while the latter merely receives the fluctuations 
transmitted to it from outside, although of course the size of 
the impact need not be smaller for that reason. 
Having said this, however, it is necessary to add that an 
approach to backwardness which stops short at this level will 
be seriously inadequate and that many of the discussions on 
the subject have been vitiated precisely because they are 
couched in terms of such geographical aggregates as 
'countries', 'areas', 'territories', etc. A natural consequence 
of this is a preoccupation with such macro-economic quantities 
as the aggregate and per capita national income, total volume 
of exports, total and average amount of investment, etc. 
Whence follow those economic development plans which aim 
to increase either the total or the per capita national income 
by a certain percentage by means of target figures for invest-
ment calculated on the basis of average capital requirements 
per head of population. 
This type of macro-economic model of economic develop-
ment may be suitable for the advanced countries, 1 but there 
are a number of reasons why it cannot be satisfactorily 
extended to the backward countries. To begin with, the 
advanced country, by definition, is in the middle of a self:, 
generating process of economic growth characterized by a 
steady rate of technical innovation and increase in productivity. 
Thus is seems reasonable to rule out diminishing returns and 
assume that a given rate of net investment will, on the whole, 
result in a corresponding rate of increase in total output or 
productive capacity. Further, certain basic ratios, such as 
the propensity to consume, are not obviously unstable and 
may be used as constants for the process analysis. When we 
turn to the backward country, however, these assumptions 
are no longer plausible. The problem here is not to trace the 
working of the process of economic growth on the basis of 
certain constant proportions but to try to start that process 
itself. We cannot stop short at thinking in terms of overall 
rates of net investment and increase in total output because 
1 Cf .. however, T. \Vilson, 'Cyclical and Autonomous Inducements 
to Invest', Oxford Economic Papers, March 1953. 
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the two rates are no longer connected in a determinate manner 
by a stable average ratio of capital to output.I Indeed, even 
if we could assume constant average productivity of capital, 
this will not be sufficient for the purpose of many economic 
development plans because they rely to varying degrees on 
the assumption of 'external economies' and increasing returns 
to scale. Further, none of the basic ratios required as constants 
for the process analysis can be assumed to be stable for the 
relevant long period. Under the impact of outside economic 
forces, most of these ratios, such as propensity to consume 
and import, population growth, etc., have been changed or 
are in the process of changing. Here again it is the accepted 
task of economic development policy, not merely to accept 
these ratios as given, but to try to change them in directions 
considered to be favourable for development. This is not to 
say that all economic development plans based on macro-
economic analysis will always fail. It is merely to say that it 
is not sufficient to stop short at this level and assume as a 
matter of course that, provided the required supply of capital1 
is forthcoming, the process of economic growth will work 
itself out automatically as it does in the advanced countries. 
Thus the very nature of our problem, which is to start this 
process of economic growth, obliges us to go behind the macro-
economic units and investigate the actual structure and 'grow-
ing-points' of the backward economy. For the same reason, 
we cannot treat the changes in the basic ratios and propensities 
as 'exogenous' changes in data but must inquire into their 
nature and causes. 
So far we have been concerned only with the mechanical 
difficulties of applying the macro-economic models to the 
backward countries. Even more serious difficulties are en-
countered when we inquire into the meaningfulness of macro-
economic quantities such as the aggregate national income or 
the per capita income to the peoples of the backward countries. 
These arise in addition to the complication already noted-
1 'The law of large numbers' is unconvincing when applied to the 
industrial sector of backward economies, where instead of n number 
of firms in full working order the State is trying to start a few odd new 
industrial units. 
1 Including' productive' grants to stimulate investment. Cf. section II 
above. 
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that 'backward peoples' normally form only a sector of the 
economy of their 'countries'-so that the fortunes of the 
'country' and the 'people' cannot be closely identified. 
Even in the advanced countries, such concepts as the in~ 
crease in national income or aggregate output capacity create 
serious problems of interpretation once we drop the static 
assumption of given and constant wants and enter the real 
world of a continual stream of new wants and commodities 
and improvements in the quality of existing goods. We can, 
however, put aside these 'index~number' problems in favour 
of a 'commonsense' interpretation, since we can assume that 
the 'measuring rod of money' and physical productivity are 
meaningful to the individuals concerned and broadly approxi~ 
mate to the social goals they are pursuing as groups in a fairly 
simple and straightforward manner. When we come to the 
backward countries, however, this assumption has to be 
carefully re~examined. The peoples of backward countries 
have had shorter periods of contact with the 'money economy' 
so that the habits of mind and the symbolism associated with 
monetary accounting may not be deep rooted in their minds.t 
Further, as groups, they are subject to complex pulls of nationa~ 
lism and racial status, so that there may not be a simple means-
end relationship between the increase in national output 
ahd the achievement of their social goals. Thus, in many 
backward countries, people seem to desire up-to-date factories 
and other trappings of modern industrialism, not so much for 
the strictly material returns they are expected to yield as for 
the fact that they are in themselves symbols of national 
prestige and economic development. Following Veblen, one 
might describe this as a case of 'conspicuous production'. 
There is then a greater need in the study of backward coun-
tries than in that of the advanced countries to go behind the 
'veil' of conventional social accounting into the real processes 
1 Cf. S. H. Frankel, Some Conceptual Aspects of International Economic 
Development of Underdeveloped Countries (Princeton, May 1952), now 
reprinted in The Economic Impact ott Underdeveloped Societies (Black~ 
well, Oxford, 1953). My debt to my colleague Professor Frankel cannot, 
however, be adequately expressed in terms of specific points, for I have 
had the benofit of discussing with him the fundamental issues of the 
subject for several years. I cannot, of course, claim his authority for the 
particular conclusions I have arrived at in this paper. 
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of adaptation between wants, activities, and environment 
which we have described earlier on as the 'economic struggle'. 
When we do this we shall see that the 'problem' of the back-
ward countries as it is commonly discussed really has two 
distinct aspects: on the subjective side it might be described 
as the economics of discontent and maladjustment ; on the 
objective side it might be described as the economics of stagna-
tion, low per capita productivity and incomes. In principle 
the latter should be a counterpart to the former and provide 
us with quantitative indices of it. In practice there is a real 
danger of the macro-models of economic development 'running 
on their mvn steam' without any reference to the funda-
mental human problems of backwardness on the subjective 
side. 
To illustrate this, let us begin by considering the backward 
country as a stationary state. In terms of the objective approach 
this is a standard case of economic backwardness and 'over-
population' popularly attributed to the Classical economists.1 
In terms of the subjective approach the situation may not 
appear so gloomy. Many of the backward countries before they 
were 'opened up' were primitive or medieval stationary states 
governed by habits and customs. Their people might live near 
the 'minimum subsistence level' but that, according to their 
own lights, did not appear too wretched or inadequate. Thus 
in spite of low productivity and lack of economic progress, 
there was no problem of economic discontent and frustration : 
wants and activities were on the whole adapted to each other 
and the people were in equilibrium with their environment. 
This is not to say that everything was idyllic: there may have 
been frequent tribal wars and insecurity of life and property. 
But on the whole it is fair to say that there was no 'problem' 
of backward countries in the modem sense and that the situa-
tion perhaps resembled J. S. Mill's picture of the stationary 
state more than that of his predecessors. 2 
Now consider the second stage particularly in the second half 
of nineteenth century and the beginning of twentieth century 
when these stationary backward societies were opened up to 
the outside economic forces. Here we can see why the term 
1 Cf., however, Ricardo's Principles, Sraffa ed., p. 99 and p. roo n. 
a Cf. Mill, Principles, bk. iv, ch. vi. 
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'backward' which we have been obliged to use for lack of a 
better alternative is so loose and liable to different inter· 
pretations. For at this stage, and to a certain extent even 
today, the economic backwardness of a society was simply 
measured by the lack of response of its members to monetary 
incentives. This in effect meant measuring the backwardness 
of a people, not by their inefficiency and inaptness in satisfying 
their given wants or in pursuing their own social goals, but by 
their tardiness in adopting new Western standards of wants 
and activities. Measures for 'economic development' then 
consisted mainly in attempts to persuade or force the backward 
people into the new ways of life represented by the money 
economy-for example, by stimulating their demand for 
imports and by taxing them so that they were obliged to tum 
to cash crops or work in the newly opened mines and planta· 
tions. Whether it was meaningful or not to the people, the 
accepted yardstick of economic development of a 'country' 
was its export and taxable capacity. 
'Backwardness' in the sense of economic discontent and 
maladjustment does not fully emerge until the third stage of 
the drama when the natural resources of the backward countries 
have been 'developed' to a large extent, usually by foreign 
private enterprise, and when tne backward peoples have been 
partly converted to the new ways of life. Here the irony of the 
situation lies in the fact that the acuteness of the problem of 
backwardness at this stage is frequently proportional to the 
success and rapidity of 'economic development' at the second 
stage. To begin with, it becomes apparent that the backward 
peoples can be only too successfully converted to new ways 
of life on the side of wants and aspirations while this cannot 
be matched by a corresponding increase in their earning capa-
city. We then have a progressive maladjustment between 
wants and activities, the former outstripping the latter at 
each round of 'education' and contact with the outside world. 
{This may spread from the individual to the national level 
when at the fourth stage the independent nQtional governments 
of the backward countries find their resources insufficient to 
carry out ambitious schemes of economic development and 
social welfare.} Further, the backward peoples now find that 
they cannot successfully adapt themselves to the new economic 
An Interpretation of Economic Backwardness IIJ 
environment shaped by outside forces and that they lag behind 
in the 'economic struggle' with other economically advanced 
groups of people who have initiated the 'opening-up' process. 
Thus they find themselves with a relatively smaller share of 
the economic activities and the national incomes of their 
countries although these may be rapidly increasing in the 
aggregate (at least up to the limits set by the diminishing 
returns in the new lines of the primary production for export). 
Here then we have the problem of economic backwardness 
in its full efflorescence charged with the explosive feeling of 
discontent and grievance against 'lop-sided economic develop-
ment', 'foreign economic domination', 'imperialistic exploita-
tion', and so on. 
We can now see why it is so unsatisfactory to approach the 
problem of the backward countries as the source of international 
tension purely at the macro-economic level of the conventional 
development plans. Aggregates such as the total national 
income and volume of exports are very unsatisfactory as 
indices of economic welfare of a 'plural society' made up of 
different groups of people sucb as that which exists in many 
backward countries. Here the well-known maxim of static 
welfare economics, that the economic welfare of a country 
is increased if some people can move to a better position 
while leaving the others exactly as they were before, must 
sound somewhat galling to the backward peoples who 
frequently happen to be those left 'exactly as they were 
before'. 
Nor is per capita income very satisfactory as an index of 
'poverty'. The sort of maladjustment between wants and 
earning capacity which we have been describing may occur 
even if per capita incomes are rising. Indeed a greater amount 
of discontent may be created where incomes rise enough to 
introduce new commodities into the consumers' budget and 
then fluctuate and decline (a common experience in export 
economies) than where incomes per head remain stationary 
or decline slowly. Further, we should note that the degree of 
discontent depends, not as much on the absolute level of per 
capita incomes as in their relative ranking. Thus motives of 
'conspicuous consumption' and the external diseconomies of 
consumption of higher income groups associated with Veblen 
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and more recently with Professor J. S. Duesenberry should be 
taken into account.! 
It is important to point this out since low income per head 
has now crystallized into the definition of backward countries. 
Some have even tried to put it on a 'scientific' basis by arguing 
that since the existing low incomes of the backward peoples 
are insufficient to provide them with the minimum nutritional 
requirements, their physical efficiency and productivity is 
lowered, thus creating a 'vicious circle'. While this may be an 
important long-run factor, it is a dangerous over-simplification 
of the complex motivations and aspirations of the backward 
peoples both at the individual and national levels to assume 
that Communism can be 'contained' by calories. Even in the 
backward countries, perhaps particularly there, men do not 
live by bread alone. Thus as a Times correspondent has recently 
written about the wage claims in the African Copper Belt : 
'Another factor which drives the African to make demands is his 
increasing needs. He is beginning to buy smarter clothes ; to eat 
foods he never did before ; to drink wine and English beer instead 
of native liquor. It is, indeed, an almost impossible task today to 
compile a reasonable family budget because of this transitional 
stage in African' consumer' requirements. This, too, however much 
people may disapprove of the elaborately dressed up African 'spiv' 
with his cowboy hat, sunglasses, and new bicycle, is a healthy trend; 
it is obviously essential if the African is to be weaned from a subsist-
ence to a cash economy that he should develop the needs that create 
incentive.' (The Times, rg january 1953.) 
If the backward peoples as individuals desire those com-
modities one associates with the 'American way of life', at 
the national level they seem to desire the latest models of social 
security schemes associated with the 'British Welfare State'. 
It would thus be a crowning-point of irony if some backward 
countries were to tum towards Communism through an 
excessive fondness for the American and British ways of life. 
v 
In the light of what has been said above, the study of the 
'disequalizing factors' at work against the backward peoples 
within the economies-of their countries emerges as an essential 
1 Cf. Ragnar Nurkse, Some Aspects of Capital Accumulation in Unde1'-
devlloped Countries, Cairo, 1952, Third Lecture. 
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link between the two aspects of the problem of backwardness : 
the economics of discontent and maladjustment on the one 
side and the economics of stagnation or relatively slow rates 
of growth in total or per capita national income and productivity 
on the other. 
When we consider these 'disequalizing factors' we shall see 
that the exclusion of the 'obvious' explanations in terms of 
'underdevelopment', 'overpopulation', and 'discrimination' 
still leaves us with a great variety of residual causes of back-
wardness. To analyse them in detail is beyond the scope of 
this paper. For our purpose of obtaining a general interpreta-
tion of the nature of backwardness it is sufficient to point out 
certain broad patterns of backwardness in which the initial 
differences in experience, opportunities, capital supply, etc., 
between the economically backward and advanced groups of 
people seem to have been 'fossilized' or accentuated by the 
'free play of economic forces'. We s.hall illustrate these patterns 
with reference to the backward peoples in their typical roles 
as unskilled workers, peasant producers, and borrowers of 
capital which between them cover most types of economic 
contacts between the backward and the advanced peoples. 
In order to do this we shall introduce three characteristic 
features of the 'opening-up' process into our 'model' of the 
backward economy. 
'i. The first concerns the nature of 'specialization' for the 
export market. Now it is commonly realized that 'specializa-
tion' does not merely mean moving along the given' production-
possibility' curve of the textbook; and that in practice it 
involves an irreversible process whereby much of the resources 
and the productive equipment, e.g. transport and communica-
tions, of the backward economy have been moulded and made 
'specific' to satisfy the special requirements of the export 
market. (Hence the well known argument for diversification.) 
But the habit of thinking in terms of 'countries' or 'areas' 
leads to the inadequate appreciation of one further fundamental 
fact : in spite of the striking specialization of the inanimate 
productive equipment and of the individuals from the economi-
cally advanced groups of people who manage and control them, 
there is really very little specialization, beyond a natural 
adaptability to the tropical climate, among the backward 
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peoples in their roles as unskilled labourers or peasant pro-
ducers. Thus the typical unskilled labour supplied by the 
backward peoples is an undifferentiated mass of cheap man-
power which might be used in any type of plantation or in any 
type of extractive industry within the tropics and sometimes 
even beyond it.1 This can be seen from the range of the primary 
industries built on the immigrant Indian, Chinese, and African 
labour. Thus all the specialization required for the export 
market seems to have been done by the other co-operating 
factors, the whole production structure being built around the 
supply of cheap undifferentiated labour. 
When we tum to the backward peoples in their role as 
peasant producers, again the picture is not appreciably changed. 
Some backward economies 'specialize' on crops which they 
have traditionally produced, and thus 'specialization' simply 
means expansion along the traditional lines with no per-
ceptible change in the methods of production (e.g. rice in south-
east Asian countries). Even where a new cash crop is introduced, 
the essence of its success as a peasattt crop depends on the fact 
that it does not represent a radical departure from the existing 
techniques of productiona (e.g. yams and cocoa in West Africa). 
Thus as a historian has said about the palm-oil and ground-nuts 
trade of West Africa : 'They made little demand on the energies 
or thought of the natives and they effected no revolution in the 
society of West Africa. That was why they were so readily 
grafted on to the old economy and why they grew as they did. •a 
Here again one is tempted to say that much of the 'specializa-
tion' seems to have been done by nature and the comple-
mentary investment in transport and processing. On the side 
of productive activities, the fact that the crop is sold for the 
export market instead of for domestic consumption is an 
accidental detail. It is only on the side of wants that disturbing 
changes seem to have been introduced, including a decline of 
skills in the domestic handicraft industries now no longer able 
to compete against the imported commodities. To prevent 
1 Cf. S. H. Frankel, Capital Investment in Africa, pp. 142-6. 
2 If this condition is not fulfilled, the peasant system soon gives way 
to the plantation system or the peasant is so supervised and controlled 
that he is reduced to the status of a wage-earner except in name (cf. 
J. H. Boeke, The Evolution of Netherland Indies Economy, p. II). 
• A. McPhee, The Economic Revolution of West Africa, pp. 39-40. 
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misunderstanding, it should be added that frequently the 
peasant methods are found to have lower costs than the 
'modem' scientific methods, and that is the reason why 
peasant production has been able to withstand the competition 
of the plantation system in some countries. But at the best 
this merely means the survival of old skills rather than a 
steady improvement in the methods of production through 
'specialization' for the export market. 
Thus, paradoxically enough, the process of 'specialization' 
of a backward economy for the export market seems to be most 
rapid and successful when it leaves the backward peoples in 
their unspecialized roles as unskilled labour and peasant pro-
ducers using traditional methods of production. 
ii. The second characteristic feature of the • opening-up' 
process is the monopoly power of varying degrees which the 
foreign business concerns exercise in relation to the backward 
economy. Here again the actual process of the growth of trade 
between the advanced and the backward countries differs 
from the textbook picture of two countries coming into trading 
relations with each other under conditions of perfect competi-
tion. Indeed, if we were to insist on applying the rules of perfect 
competition to foreign enterprises, very few backward countries 
would have been • developed'. The process of opening up a 
new territory for trade is an extremely risky and costly business, 
and it is only..t>y offering some sort of monopolistic concessions 
that foreign business concerns can be induced to accept the 
risks and the heavy initial costs, which include not only those 
of setting up transport and communications and other auxiliary 
services but may also include the ordinary administrative 
costs of extending law and order to places where it does not 
exist. Hence the age-old method of economic development by 
chartered companies. In the case of mining this is reinforced 
by the technical advantages of large-scale enterprise. 
Even where there is no formal concession of monopoly 
power, as in a peasant economy, conditions are generally very 
favourable for its growth. To begin with, only fairly big firms 
with large enough reserves to meet the heavy initial costs and 
risks may venture into the new territory. Further, although 
there may be no restriction to free entry, potential competitors 
may be put off by the 'economies of experience' which give a 
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great differential advantage to the pioneers. Thus there are 
usually a small ·number of fairly big export-import firms 
engaged in a 'cut-throat' competition with each other in their 
effort to increase their turnover and spread their heavy over-
head costs. This need not be limited to 'horizontal' competition 
among the export-import firms ; it may also result in a 'vertical' 
competition between the export-import firms and the steamship 
companies which control the trade routes. After some time this 
trade war generally results in 'pools' and 'combinations' both 
of the horizontal and vertical types, 1 for 'the small trader 
must grow to greatness, either in himself, or in combination 
with others. The alternative is his failure and ultimate dis-
appearance. In fact, economic conditions of England are 
exhibited on an intenser scale in West Africa, where businesses 
grow, decay and combine with mushroom rapidity. '2 
Thus in a typical process of 'development', the backward 
peoples have to contend with three types of monopolistic 
forces : in their role as unskilled labour they have to face the 
big foreign mining and plantation concerns who are mono-
polistic buyers of their labour ; in their role as peasant pro-
ducers they have to face a small group of exporting and 
processing firms who are monopolistic buyers of their crop; 
and in their role as consumers of imported commodities they 
have to face the same group of firms who are the monopolistic 
sellers or distributors of these commodities. 
iii. The third characteristic feature of the 'opening-up' 
process is the growth of the middlemen between the big 
European concerns and the economically backward indigenous 
populations. They are the necessary adjuncts to any process 
of rapid economic development and fill in the gaps between 
the highly specialized Western economic structure and the 
relatively unspecialized roles of the backward peoples. Although 
they may operate in the labour market, they are more im-
portant in their activities as collectors of produce from the 
1 This 'vertical integration' may also spread downwards towards a 
greater supervision and control of peasant producers resulting in a 
'mixed' system between peasant and plantation systems (cf. Boeke, 
op. cit., ch. i). 
2 McPhee, op. cit., p. 103 ; cf. W. K. Hancock, Survey of British 
Commonwealth Affairs, vol. ii, part 2, eli. iii, sec. iii; also J. S. Furnivall, 
op. cit., pp. 95-7 and pp. 197-8. 
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peasant farmers, as distributors of imported articles to the 
indigenous consumers, and, most important of all, as money-
lenders. In most backward countries they seem to owe their 
special position to their longer contact with Western economic 
life ; frequently they may start as immigrant labour and work 
their way up as small traders and money-lenders. The racial 
distribution of the middlemen. groups among the backward 
countries is familiar: thus we have the Indians and Chinese 
in south-east Asia, Indians in East Africa, Syrians and 'Coast 
Africans' in West Africa, etc. Thus the economic hierarchy 
of a typical backward country is generally a pyramid with 
Europeans on top, then the middle men, and lastly the 
indigenous people at the bottom. 
Each of the characteristic features outlined above tends to 
reduce the relative share of the national incomes of the back-
ward countries accruing to the indigenous peoples. But, as we 
have said before, the nature of economic backwardness cannot 
be fully appreciated until we go beyond the distribution of 
incomes to the distribution of economic activities : for 'it is 
to changes in the forms of efforts and activities that we 
must turn when in search for the keynotes of the history of 
mankind1.' 
When we consider the backward peoples in their role as 
unskilled labour, it is important to ask, not merely why their 
wages have remained low but why they have been frozen into 
their role of cheap undifferentiated labour with little vertical 
mobility into more skilled grades. Here, apart from the mono-
psony power of the employers, various complex factors are at 
work to stereotype their role; out of these we may select three 
as being fairly typical.2 
The first is the very high rate of turnover of indigenous 
labour, partly because the backward peoples are unused to the 
discipline of the mines and plantations, and partly because 
they have one foot in their traditional tribal and village econo-
mies which make them look upon wage labour not as a 
continuous permanent employment but as a temporary or 
periodical expedient to earn a certain sum of money. Given 
1 Marshall, Principles, p. 85. 
2 Cf. Wilbert E. Moore, Industrialization and Labor, ch. v, for a more 
systematic analysis. 
124 Approaches to the Problem of Underdevelopment 
this rapid rate of labour turnover, there is no opportunity to 
acquire the experience and skill for promotion to skilled 
grades. If this were the only cause, one might assume that this 
is a transitional problem which would gradually disappear 
with the breakdown of the traditional social institutions and 
the spread of money economy. But unfortunately there are 
other obstacles. 
This brings us back to the difficulties which we by-passed 
when defining the nature and extent of 'discrimination' 
against backward peoples. Here, with reference to the lack of 
vertical mobility of indigenous labour, we must frankly admit 
that our distinction between 'discrimination' and' disequalizing 
factor' wears very thin in many backward countries. Even 
where there is no official colour bar, unofficial industrial colour 
bar is fairly widespread (for example, say, the Rhodesian 
copper-mines). Even where 'discrimination' has not hardened 
into a 'bar' of any sort, the natural and frequently unconscious 
tendency of the white employers to mark off 'native' or 
'coloured' occupational categories irrespective of individual 
differences in ability and skill can be very damaging to the 
backward peoples ; for the educational effect of apprenticeship 
and promotion to skilled grades in ordinary economic life is 
more far-reaching than huge sums of money spent on 
educational institutions. 
The third factor which has contributed to the fossilization 
of the 'cheap labour' convention is the additional supplies of 
labour which mines and plantation can draw, either from the 
breakdown of tribal societies (e.g. the Ashanti Wars in West 
Africa) or from the human reservoirs of India and China. 
Importation of immigrant labour has been blessed by liberal 
economic policy as contributing to the international mobility 
of labour; and it may be freely admitted that 'economic 
development' and the rapid growth of output of tropical raw 
materials could not have been achieved without it. But as a 
solution to the problem of human backwardness it has been 
somewhat unhappy. It has not appreciably relieved the popula-
tion pressure in the donating countries ; and in the receiving 
countries, apart from the complex social problems it has 
created, it has robbed the indigenous people of the chance to 
acquire vertical mobility in the labour market through the 
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automatic operation of the laws of supply and demand and the 
principle of substitution. 
Let us now tum to the backward peoples in their role as 
peasant producers in relation to the middlemen and the big 
export-import firms. Here we have the familiar disequalizing 
factors, such as the peasants' ignorance of market conditions, 
which are extremely unstable, their lack of economic strength 
to hold out against middlemen and speculators, and their 
need to borrow money at high rates of interest, which have 
reduced the relative share of incomes accruing to the backward 
peoples. It may also be freely admitted that this has been 
helped by their well-known 'extravagance' and lack of thrift 
which are after all the logical consequences of too successful 
a policy of creating economic incentives for the production of 
cash crops. The formal framework which offers perfect equality 
of economic rights offers no protection, and the result of the 
'free play of economic forces' under conditions of fluctuating 
export prices is the well-known story of rural indebtedness, 
land alienation, and agrarian unrest. 1 Here again we should 
go beyond the distribution of incomes to the distribution of 
economic activities. We shall then see that the real damage 
done by the middlemen lies not in their 'exploitation', con-
siderable as it may be in many cases, but in the fact that they 
have put themselves between the backward peoples and the 
outside world and have robbed the latter of the educating 
and stimulating effect of a direct contact. 2 As a consequence, 
even after many decades of rapid 'economic development' 
following the 'opening-up' process, the peoples of many 
backward countries still remain almost as ignorant and unused 
to the ways of modem economic life as they were before. On 
the side of economic activities they remain as backward as 
ever; it is only on the side of wants that they have been 
modernized, and this reduces their propensity to save and 
increases their sense of discontent and inequality.a 
Finally, we may comment briefly on the backward peoples 
in their role as borrowers. Here, when we inquire closely why 
they are obliged to borrow at very high rates of interest from 
1 Cf. Furnivall, op. cit., passim. 
2 Cf. Hancock, op. cit., pp. 225-7· 
3 Cf. Ragnar Nurkse, op. cit., 1952, Third Lecture. 
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the money-lenders, we frequently find that high risks and the 
difficulties of finding suitable outlets for liquid funds may be 
more important than an overall shortage of saving. It is true 
that the rigid sterling exchange standard of some backward 
countries (which works like the gold standard) may have a 
deflationary bias, particularly during periods of rapid extension 
of the money sector. But, in spite of this, it is difficult to 
establish that there is an overall shortage of saving for the 
backward economy as a whole. In the 'advanced' or Western 
sectors at least, big business concerns can raise loans on the 
international market on equal terms with the borrowers from 
the advanced countries and the banks generally tend to have 
a very high liquidity ratio. 
This leads us to the problem which is apt to be obscured by 
the 'under investment' approach which stresses the overall 
shortage of capital supply. It is the problem of organizing the 
distribution of credit as distinct from the problem of increasing 
the total supply of saving. The 'retail distribution' of credit 
among peasant producers is beyond the capacity of the ordinary 
commercial bank and, in spite of the rise of the co-operative 
movement, still remains one of the unsolved problems of the 
backward countries which may have greater long-run signi-
ficance than the more spectacular projects for economic 
development. Further, there is a great need to extend credit 
facilities not only to the peasant producers but also to the 
growing class of small traders and businessmen among the 
backward peoples who would like to enter into the traditional 
preserves of the middlemen. Here many would-be business-
men from the backward groups frequently complain of the 
'discrimination' against them by the commercial banks when 
the truth of the matter is that they are simply caught up in 
a vicious circle of lack of business experj.erlce resulting in a lack 
of credit-worthiness. The banks, far from discriminating, are 
playing strictly according to the 'rules of the game', but 
these rules tend to put the heaviest handicap on the weakest 
players. 
That the real 'bottleneck' may frequently lie in the 
difficulties of organizing the distribution of credit and finding 
suitable outlets for existing savings, rather than in the overall 
shortage of saving, may also be seen from the fact that domestic 
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saving even where it exists in sizeable amounts is normally 
used for money-lending on the basis of land and jewellery 
mortgage since this yields a very much higher rate of return 
to the savers than any other available form of 'productive' 
investment. 
VI 
The idea of economic backwardness put forward in this paper 
may be better appreciated in terms of the deviations, not from 
the static concept of the allocative optimum, but from the 
dynamic presumption concerning the beneficial effects of free 
trade held by the older generation of liberal economists. For 
it will be remembered that the Classical case for free competi-
tion was based, not as much on the purely static considerations 
of allocative efficiency as on dynamic considerations of economic 
expansion. Thus it was believed that the growth of indivi-
dualism and economic freedom would encourage initiative 
and enterprise, thrift, industriousness, and other qualities 
favourable to the dynamic expansion of the economy both 
horizontally, through the international division of labour and 
the extension of the market, and vertically, through capital 
accumulation and technical innovations.1 
This line of thought is worth pursuing. The Classical econo-
mists did not claim that the free play of economic forces would 
necessarily lead to a more equitable distribution of wealth ; 
as a matter of fact, they believed that inequalities of incomes 
(on the basis of equal opportunities) were necessary to provide 
the incentives for economic expansion : thus a redistribution 
of incomes from the rich to the poor might discourage saving, 
and poor relief (whether on a national or an international scale) 
might aggravate the population problem. As a corollary to 
this, they denied that the free play of economic forces would 
set up disequalizing factors which would ultimately inhibit 
the expansion in the total volume of output and economic 
activity. 
As is well-known, this Classical vision of harmonious economic 
growth through free enterprise has been shattered by two 
major factors : the growth of monopoly and imperfect competi-
1 Cf. L. Robbins, The Theory of Economic Policy, p. 16; also H. Myint, 
Theories of Welfare Economics, cb. iv. 
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tion, and the growth of unemployment. These did not, however, 
immediately lead to a reconsideration of the long-run theory 
of economic development on the Classical lines, for many 
economists have been too preoccupied with the purely static 
effects of imperfect competition, as in much of modem welfare 
economics, or with purely. short-run problems, as in much of 
modem Keynesian economics. It is only fairly recently that the 
tide has turned, and the economics of backwardness, apart 
from its practical interest, may now come to occupy an impor-
tant position in its own right as an essential element in the new 
theory of long-run economic development. 
One of the most interesting developments in the long-run 
theory of economic development is Professor Schumpeter's 
well-known argument that the growth of monopoly, which 
from a static view would result in a maldistribution of resources, 
might actually favour technical innovations ind economic 
development.l We have already seen a parallel case of this 
argument when we were led to the conclusion that monopoly 
was an essential element in the 'opening-up' process of the 
backward countries to international trade. The question then 
arises : can the Schumpeter argument be extended to the 
backward countries or. is there a fundamental difference in 
the operation of monopoly in the backward countries as com-
pared with the advanced countries? 
Recently Professor J. K. Galbraith has put forward a theory 
which seems to provide a part of the answer. He maintains that 
the growth of monopoly in the advanced countries, particularly 
in the U.S.A., has been accompanied by a growth of 'counter-
vailing power' on the opposite side of the market, e.g. trade 
unions, retail chain stores, co-operative societies, farmers' 
unions, etc. The growth of monopoly increases the gains from 
building up the countervailing power and induces its growth 
and this provides a new self-regulatory mechanism to the 
economy in a world of monopoly.2 In Professor Galbraith's 
terminology, then, economic backwardness may be described 
as a phenomenon which arises because the process of 'economic 
1 J. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, chs. vii and 
viii. 
2 J. K. Galbraith, American Capitalism: 'The Concept of Counter-
vailing Power'. 
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development' has been too rapid and the initial conditions too 
unfavourable to give rise to an effective' countervailing power' 
to check the 'foreign economic domination' of the backward 
peoples. One remarkable thing about Professor Galbraith's 
argument is that although he is concerned with the economically 
most advanced country in the world, the U.S.A., the sectors 
of the economy which he regards as being particularly in need 
of the countervailing power-agriculture, consumers' goods 
market, and the labour market-are exactly paralleled in the 
backward countries with their export-import monopolies and 
large scale mining and plantation businesses (cf. Galbraith, 
op. cit., chs. x and xi). 
Now if we were merely concerned with the problem of back-
wardness in its subjective aspect as the economics of discontent 
it would be sufficient to show how the working of the disequaliz-
ing factors .set up by the free play of economic forces in the 
absence of countervailing power has resulted in the present 
situation. But we must go on to the other side of the problem 
and investigate the relation between the disequalizing factors 
and economic stagnation or the slow rate of growth in total 
output and economic activity (apart from the unfavourable 
effects of political and social unrests, both on present production 
and future investment). 
Here, as we have noted above, we must be on guard against 
the convenient supposition that the requirements of economic 
equality and economic development always work in the same 
direction. Bearing this in mind, when we consider the typical 
process of 'economic development' of most backward countries 
there seem to be prima facie reasons for thinking that the 
disequalizing factors have affected not merely the distribution 
but also the rate of growth in the total volume of output and 
economic activity. 
The fundamental assumption of liberal economics is that 
the free play of economic forces would lead to the maximum 
development of individual talents and abilities ; whereas in 
practice the free play of economic forces in backward countries 
has resulted, not in a division of labour according to individual 
abilities, but in a division of labour according to stratified 
groups. The accurate selection of the different types and qualities 
of natural resources by the automatic market mechanism 
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contrasts dramatically with its lack of selectivity concern-
ing human resources which has resulted in the 'fossilization' 
of the backward peoples in their conventional roles of un-
differentiated cheap labour and unspecialized peasant 
producers. Thus, unless we are prepared to subscribe to the 
doctrine of inherent racial inferiority of the backward peoples, 
there seems to be a strong presumption that the potential 
development of the backward countries has been inhibited by 
this waste of human resources, leading to a stultification 
of the possible 'growing-points' of the economy. Nor can the 
loss of educational opportunities be adequately remedied by 
'investment in human capital' as is frequently assumed. Mere 
increase of expenditure on technical training and education, 
although it may offer a partial relief, is really too weak and 
unselective to be an active countervailing force to the deep-
seated disequalizing factors. Too great an emphasis on the 
'under-investment in human capital' therefore tends to confuse 
the issues and distract attention from the more potent dis-
equalizing factors. 
Further, the disequalizing factors work not only on the 
supply side but also on the demand side, and unequal distribu-
tion of incomes and of activities combine with each other to 
inhibit economic development. One of the most important 
reasons why. the backward countries have been prevented 
from enjoying the stimulating effect of manufacturing industry 
is not the wickedness of foreign capitalists and their exclusive 
concern with raw material supplies but merely the limitation 
of the domestic market for manufactured articles.1 
When we were discussing the concept of • social productivity' 
towards the end of section II above, we remarked on the 
tendency of economic practice to forestall economic theory. 
So also here, with the concept of 'countervailing power'. 
Long before the economists were aware of the problem, practical 
administrators and economic historians of the backward 
countries were impressed by the fact that the peoples of these 
countries seem to need some sort of countervailing power to 
enable them to stand up against the 'free play of economic 
forces'. Some have sought the countervailing power in the 
t Cf. Ragnar Nurkse, op. cit., First Lecture. 
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preservation of the traditional social institutions and, in ex· 
treme cases, have even toyed with the idea of a retreat into 
the seH-suffi.ciency of the traditional stationary state. Others, 
more forward-looking, have tried to foster countervailing 
power in the form of co-operative societies and, more recently, 
by means of trade unions and marketing boards for the peasant 
produce. Above all this, the disequalizing forces themselves 
have generated a fierce nationalism among the backward 
peoples which is the most powerful source .of countervailing 
power in the present times. So we are already in a position to 
learn a few lessons about the nature and limitations of the 
countervailing power in the backward countries. 
The first lesson is that some sources of countervailing power, 
like the co-operative societies, themselves need a fairly high 
degree of business-like behaviour and 'economic advance' 
and can only be fostered very slowly in the backward countries. 
The second lesson is that it is easier to redistribute existing 
incomes than to redistribute and stimulate economic activity 
by the use of countervailing power. The governments of some 
backward countries are now able to obtain a larger share of 
the income from the exploitation of the natural resources, 
either by striking better bargains with foreign mining concerns 
or by means of marketing boards in the case of peasant pro-
duce ; but they are still faced with the problem of reinvesting 
the money in a directly productive way as distinct from in-
creasing expenditure on general social services. It is difficult 
enough to find outlets for productive investment in backward 
countries ; it is far more difficult to find those outlets which 
will increase the direct participation of the backward peoples 
in the processes of economic activity. It is important to stress 
this point because the governments of the backward countries, 
in their desire to have rapid and spectacular economic develop-
ment, may be tempted to embark on those large-scale projects 
which, even if they were successful as business concerns, 
might not appreciably increase the participation of their 
peoples in the new economic activities.1 Apart from its failure 
as a business concern, the fundamental weakness of the famous 
'Ground Nut Scheme' of the British Overseas Food 
1 In some countries excessive central planning may give r;se to a new 
class of 'middlemen' in the guise of government agents or officials. 
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Corporation was that in an attempt to have rapid results on a 
large scale the Corporation was obliged to minimize the 
African participation in it. 
The final lesson to be learnt is the danger of an excessive use 
of the countervailing power combined with an extreme econo-
mic nationalism. As a counter-measure to the disequalizing 
forces at the international level, discriminatory and protective 
measures to change the existing terms of comparative costs 
and foster the national economies of the backward countries 
have their place. In certain circumstances, they may even have 
a favourable effect on the volume of international trade in the 
long run. But, on the other hand, the dangers of an excessive 
nationalist policy should not be underrated. The loss to the 
backward countries in this case is not merely consumers' 
loss through having to pay a higher price or through having 
to put up with poorer qualities of commodities substituted for 
imports; a far heavier loss may lie in the sphere of economic acti-
vities when cut off from the stimulating contact with the outside 
world. This is also true of trade unions. In some backward 
countries trade unions have the very important function of break-
ing the industrial colour bar; but in others they may become a 
crippling burden on the economy and inhibit economic progress. I 
These considerations should not, however, blind us to the 
genuineness of the disequalizing factors working against the 
backward peoples and their real need for countervailing power. 
From the point of view of these peoples this is where the real 
rub lies. It is, however, precisely on this point that economists, 
both of liberal and of central-planning persuasion, have shown 
the least sympathy and understanding. The liberal economist 
is apt to believe that the disequalizing factors do not exist and 
that all attempts to use the countervailing power are the result 
of 'irrational economic nationalism'. The central planner is 
apt to seek a solution of the essentially distributive and struc-
tural problems of economic backwardness in terms of bigger 
and better aggregative economic development plans. Thus 
the study of the disequalizing factors at work against the 
backward peoples has never really been allowed to emerge from 
the intellectual underworld of extreme economic nationalism. 
1 Cf. Report on Cuba, by the Economic and Technical Mission of the 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, pp. 138-59· 
2. THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT 
UNDERDEVELOPED COUNTRIES AND THE 
PRE-INDUSTRIAL PHASE 
IN THE ADVANCED COUNTRIES 
an Attempt at Comparison * 
by Simon Kuznets 
THIS PAPER WAS PREPARED IN RESPONSE TO A REQUEST TO 
compare I the present situation in underdeveloped countries 
with the earlier situation of the more developed countries, 
with special reference to the factors that seem ... to be 
critical in respect of potentialities of development'. The com-
parison is intended to introduce a series of papers focusing on 
1 conditions relevant to, and case studies of, the interrelation-
ship between population, economic development, and social 
change'. 
The theme is obviously of wide scope, and touches a field 
for which testable observations are hard to find. Part of the 
discussion must be devoted to defining terms, but this in itself 
should help to clarify the difference between the present state 
of the underdeveloped countries and the earlier situation of 
the more developed. It will also indicate the areas in which 
information for drawing more effective comparisons should be 
sought ; and permit the presentation of a few relevant and 
available data. 
We begin by distinguishing three definitions of 'under-
development'. The first associates it with the failure to utilize 
fully the potential economic output warranted by existing 
technological knowledge-this failure being ascribable to 
obstacles inherent in the 'social' institutions, internal or 
external to a country. In this sense, all countries are under-
developed : none utilizes its productive potential to the full. 
Indeed, a mathematical function in which possible additions 
to economic product are the dependent variable and the some-
• Proceedings of the World Population Conference, I954. Papers: 
Volume V. Reprinted by permission of tbe United Nations Organization 
and the author. 
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how measurable 'social' changes are the independent variable 
may well have a much steeper slope for a 'very advanced' 
country than for an underdeveloped one.1 This is obviously 
not the meaning of the term 'underdeveloped' in current 
discussion. Yet one aspect of this definition is directly relevant : 
the attribution to social factors of the failure to utilize the 
technologically feasible potential. If our stock of knowledge 
permits a much greater economic output than is turned out 
and if the difficulties lie in the social institutions, underdevelop-
ment must be viewed as a social problem. Our thinking is 
thus guided into consideration of the social fabric and possible 
changes in it rather than into channels that it would follow 
if the shortages of economic performance were attributed, for 
example, to the inexorable forces of nature or to the irrevocable 
dictates of divine providence. 
The second definition of' underdevelopment' is backwardness 
in level and character of economic performance compared with 
other countries (or units of different type). In this sense, 
underdevelopment is a matter of degree and most countries, 
except the neQessarily few considered the most advanced, are 
underdeveloped. 
This again is not quite the meaning of the term in current 
discussion ; but once more, some elements are relevant to the 
understanding of the current problem. The advanced countries, 
against whose realized performance economic backwardness 
can be gauged, are an incontrovertible demonstration that 
higher economic levels are attainable and not just dimly 
viewed potentials permitted by the stock of knowledge. The 
tension in underdeveloped countries is generated by the 
recognition of achievements elsewhere. In addition to this 
'demonstration' effect, there is another long recognized aspect. 
Under certain conditions, economic attainment bestows power 
1 For example, the large productive potential of the United States 
is one of the major obstacles to an adequate flow of private investment 
funds into economic development outside of the country-for uses not 
directly connected with the raw material or other needs of its economy. 
It need scarcely be added that in an empirical construction of the model 
suggested in the text, social change, the independent variable, would be 
most difficult to measure. Note that since the definition includes extemal 
social factors, attainment of political independence by a colony would 
be classified as a social change. 
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that can be used for aggression, overt or covert. The countries 
that lag behind others in economic attainment may, for that 
reason, be unable to defend themselves against aggression, 
real or fancied, by the more advanced countries. This condition 
adds to the pressure to match the economic attainments of 
other members of the world community. 
The third meaning of 'underdevelopment', basic in most 
current discussion, is the failure to provide acceptable levels 
of living to a large proportion of a country's population, with 
resulting misery and material deprivation. Where an adequate 
standard of living has been attained despite failure to realize 
the technological potential-as in the developed countries-
no serious problem arises. Where the lag behind the advanced 
countries is moderate, as is true of nations just below the top 
of the economic pyramid (or of some regions within the 
advanced countries), the problem is also of tolerable dimen-
sions and neither acute nor urgent. However, in the many 
underdeveloped countries which account for more than half of 
mankind, economic backwardness means material misery for 
most of the population and insecurity for the countries them-
selves. And it is this fact that creates the tension and sharpens 
the acuteness and urgency of the problem. 
The comments just made are directly relevant to finding 
that 'earlier situation of the more developed countries' with 
which the present state of the underdeveloped countries should 
be compared. How do we specify this comparable earlier 
situation chronologically ? 
The question can be discussed more meaningfully if we 
identify the more developed countries of today. If we judge by 
the level of per capita income either in the post World War II 
period or during the period between the two world wars, the 
leading countries are the United States, Canada, Australia, 
New Zealand, the United Kingdom, Switzerland, the Scandi-
navian countries (Sweden, Norway, Denmark), Germany, the 
Netherlands, and at some remove, France and Belgium.1 The 
identity of the underdeveloped countries is well known : in 
1 The following publications can be consulted : {I) National and Per 
Capita Income, Seventy Countries-I949. United Nations, Statistical 
Paper Serie11 E, No. I, October 1950; (2) Point Four, U.S. Department 
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addition to the vast agricultural empires of China and India, 
most of Asia, with the exception of Asiatic U.S.S.R., japan, 
and Israel ; most of Africa with the exception of the Union 
of South Africa ; most of Latin America, with the possible 
exception of Argentina, Uruguay, and more doubtfully Chile. 
The exceptions noted and the whole complex of Southern 
and Eastern Europe are in a middle zone between the two 
extremes. 
We may then ask whether an earlier comparable situation 
of the more developed countries, i.e. essentially of Western 
and Northern Europe and of their offshoots in North America 
and Oceania, means a period when they were underdeveloped, 
i.e. lagged behind the then leading economies ; when their 
backwardness relative to the leaders was as marked as that 
of the underdeveloped countries of today; when their per 
capita incomes were as low and material deprivation and 
misery were as widespread as in the latter. If so and if such 
an earlier situation were found, could we discern the strategic 
factors that produced the economic leadership of today ? 
Posed in this fashion, the question has little meaning for the 
young, relatively 'empty' countries peopled by the Western 
Europeans and their descendants. In the very early history of 
the United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, the 
groups involved were small bands of pioneers, voluntary and 
involuntary; and many of the early settlers may have suffered 
material deprivation comparable with that in the under-
developed countries today. But these troubles were the penalty 
of pioneering, not of economic backwardness ; and the compa-
rison is irrelevant. At no time after these early pioneering days 
had passed and the settled groups had begun to ·be significantly 
large did these countries lag much behind the economic leaders. 
Thus, in the 184os, when the United States had about 17 
million people and the United Kingdom had 25 million, the 
per capita income of the former was only about a quarter 
smaller than that of the latter, the economic leader of the time 
of State Publication 3719, January 1950, pp. 113-14 (income data for 
1939) ; (3) Colin Clark, Conditions of Economic Progress, 2nd edition, 
London, 1951. These sources yield roughly similar results if allowance is 
made for the transitory impact of World War II on some countries, e.g. 
Germany and Japan. 
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(and twice that of Italy, and over three times that of Russia) .I 
There is no comparable earlier situation in the history of the 
economically developed countries of the New World when 
their per capita incomes were so far behind the economic 
leaders or at such low levels as are those of most underdeveloped 
countries today. 
But even for the older developed countries, the search for 
an earlier comparable situation so defined would take us back 
centuries. Western and Northern Europe was well behind the 
Italian cities in economic development from the 9th to the 
rsth centuries and the economic attainment of the latter, in 
the aggregate and through much of the time, lagged behind 
most of the economies of the Near and Far East. As late as 
the early 18th century, people in Western Europe were not 
sure whether any growth in population and economic levels 
had been attained since the days of the Roman Empire; and 
they thought, perhaps correctly, that their political and 
economic organization was inferior to that of China during the 
prosperous phases of its long dynastic cycles. But it would 
take us far afield, both in scope and in time, to look hack to 
the period when the presently developed countries among the 
older units in Europe were so backward (measured, say by 
income per capita) in comparison with others as to be at all 
comparable with the underdeveloped countries of today. We 
would have to step hack at least three centuries; and possibly 
even further back, in some cases (like France) perhaps to the 
early Middle Ages. On these periods neither my competence 
nor, perhaps, the available data can shed much light. More 
important, the whole complex of conditions, while similar in 
degree of backwardness, would be so different in many other 
important ways that its relevance to current problems would 
be doubtful. Rather than commit myself to what would be, 
at best, a superficial review of a vast canvas of distant history, 
I abandoned this particular criterion of comparability. 
1 The figures used here are from Michael G. Mulhall, Industries and 
Wealth of Nations (London, 1896). Mulhall was the Colin Clark of the 
late 19th century. His estimates are naturally crude; but they are 
based on consistent methods for the several countries and on fairly 
full utilization of the then available data, and are acceptable indicators 
of the general order of magnitude. 
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But one important inference should be drawn from this 
glance into the longer past. We know that the long term 
acceleration of population growth occurred within the last two 
to two and a half centuries ; that the economic and techno-
logical revolutions, the acceleration in the rate of growth of 
per capita national product in most countries, including those 
at the top, is even more recent, dating back not more than 
a century and a half. If the' earlier situations' in the presently 
developed countries that could be viewed as examples of 
underdevelopment existed three centuries ago or possibly even 
earlier, it follows that these older units of the European 
community must have had a long period of development and 
rise before the coming of the economic and technological 
revolutions. It also follows that when the recent rapid pulse 
of economic growth began, the countries now in the forefront 
probably were also among the advanced units of that time. 
This inference is corroborated by a general view of the 
earlier history of those parts of Western Europe which, together 
with their offshoots in the New World, are among the economic 
leaders today. It can be argued that, in general, the leadership 
of Western Europe in modem economic development is an 
outcome of a long process of learning from its more advanced 
neighbours in the Near and Far East ; that the intellectual, 
political, and geographical revolutions which occurred between 
the 13th and r6th centuries were important and indispensable 
antecedents to the economic expansion that followed ; and that 
the countries that led in these major complexes of advance 
in knowledge and social organization, and their offshoots in 
the New World, occupy today the top positions on the scale of 
economic development. It is hardly an accident that among 
the few leading countries the older European units are England, 
the Netherlands, the Scandinavian countries, France, and more 
belatedly Germany-most of which participated in the intellec-
tual and religious revolutions and were situated to take advan-
tage of the geographical revolution ; and that England, which 
led in all three revolutions, was also the pioneer in the fields 
of economic and material technology. We should finally note 
that the political independence and initiative of these European 
units were preserved for centuries while the learning that 
preceded these revolutions, and of expansion that followed 
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them, was carried on. Conversely, it is hardly an accident that 
almost all the underdeveloped countries of today were outside 
the orbit of these revolutions and of the growth that preceded 
the economic and technological changes which began in the 
late 18th and continued through the following centuries. 
This suggests an important contrast between the currently 
underdeveloped countries and the situation of the developed 
countries as it was just before the introduction of the major 
technological changes that ushered in the modern industrial 
system-the system whose adoption constitutes much of the 
content of modern economic development. At that time, mid 
or late 18th century, many of the developed countries of today 
were already advanced economically-by contemporary 
standards ; had already experienced fairly sustained growth 
over the earlier centuries, and enjoyed political independence 
in doing so; and were the direct participants in and benefici-
aries of the extension of knowledge and changes in attitudes 
that constituted the three revolutions mentioned. In contrast, 
most underdeveloped countries of today are inheritors of much 
older civ.ilizations which, however economically superior in the 
distant past, include strongly entrenched elements that consti-
tute serious obstacles to the adoption of the modern industrial 
system. They face the problems of development after decades, 
if not centuries, of political subjection which, granted some 
beneficial effects, left a heritage against which the newly 
established independent regimes must struggle. Thus, they 
must approach the task of utilizing the available potential of 
economic knowledge not from the position of near leadership 
and at the end of a cumulative process of preceding growth 
and learning carried on under conditions of political indepen-
dence ; but from the position of laggards by a long distance 
and after a period in which internal organization was distorted 
either by political subjection or by co-existence with the 
aggressive leaders of the economic civilization of the West. 
We may add significant detail to the contrast just suggested 
by reformulating our criterion of comparability to permit the 
use of available quantitative evidence. As indicated, the 
substance of modern economic development lies in the adoption 
of the industrial system-a term denoting widespread 
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application of empirical science to the problems of economic 
production. One corollary that follows is the shift in the distri-
bution of the labour force away from agriculture, first toward 
manufacturing and public utilities, and subsequently toward 
trade and service pursuits. This commonly observed shift is 
due, at bottom, to the structure of human wants, their easy 
long term satiability by products of agriculture-so that 
increasing productivity of labour in the latter releases an 
increasing proportion of labour to other pursuits. The technolo-
gical revolution was not confined to non-agricultural industries : 
if it were, the share of the labour force in agriculture might 
not have declined. Rather, the application of science to social 
and material technology produced both an agricultural and an . 
industrial revolution; and the former, given the structure of 
human wants, permitted a much lower ratio of workers in 
agriculture to either total population or total labour force. 
This in tum led to a whole host of related changes ordinarily 
discussed under urbanization, growth in the average scale of 
the economic plant, changes in character of business firms, 
and the like. 
This brief indication of a complex process may possibly 
permit misleading connotations. But it suffices for our purposes 
to note that, according to available evidence, the proportion 
of the labour force in agriculture in the underdeveloped 
countries today is about six-tenths or more, whereas in the 
developed countries it is ordinarily one-fifth or less.1 We can 
now reformulate the question about the comparable 'earlier 
situation' : what was the situation in that pre-industrial phase 
of the developed countries when the share of their labour force 
engaged in agriculture was about six-tenths or more ? 
In dealing with this question, we can command some evidence 
although it is far from adequate. In the United States, agricul-
ture accounted for over 6o per cent of the labour force through 
1850, and dropped below so per cent only by 1880. For Canada 
the share of the labour force engaged in agriculture was so 
1 These and additional data cited below are from Colin Clark, op. 
cit., supplemented by special studies for a few countries. The evidence 
is summarized in a statistical appendix to a recent paper, 'Toward 
a Theory of Economic Growth', presented at Columbia University 
Bicentennial Conference III, May 1954· 
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per cent in 1871, the earliest figure available to me ; and if 
one may judge by United States experience, the share may have 
been over six-tenths as late as 1850. In England and Wales, 
one would have to go back to the end of the 17th century: 
Gregory King's figures for 1688 suggest that the proportion of 
the labour force in agriculture was close to six-tenths (it was 
down to 23 per cent by 1841). For Sweden, the proportion was 
as high as 64 per cent in 1870 ; but in Norway and Denmark 
the proportions were already 49 per cent in 1875 and 52 per 
cent in 1870 respectively. In France the earliest available 
figure (for 1866) is 43 per cent of the labour force in agriculture ; 
in Germany 34 per cent for 188o. One would be inclined to 
set 'the comparable phase' for the older countries of Western 
Europe in the first quarter of the 19th century, but much 
earlier for England and perhaps the Netherlands ; about the 
middle of the century for the Scandinavian countries and 
North America; and perhaps about the same for Australia and 
New Zealand (the early percentages are 38 in 1870 for the 
former, and 31 in 1874 for the latter). With the exception of 
England and perhaps the Netherlands, the comparable pre-
industrial phase in the distribution of the labour force of the 
developed countries is, therefore, between a century and a 
century and a half ago. 
Having placed the phase chronologically, we can use the 
limited but illuminating evidence provided by the estimates 
of national income in constant prices, total and per capita. 
For eight countries-the United States, United Kingdom (ex. 
Southern Ireland), Canada, France, Germany (pre-World 
War II), Sweden, Denmark, and Italy-all except Italy among 
those with t;he highest per capita income today-we have 
records of national income that extend over three-quarters of 
a century-the periods terminating after World War II for 
those countries whose economies were not deeply affected by 
the war, or up to the end of the 1930s for the others.1 Using 
the per decade rates of growth in per capita national income in 
constant prices we extrapolate back from the present levels and 
derive rough approximations to their per capita income a 
century earlier. These derived figures, which are in current 
1 These data also are summarized in the statistical appendix to the 
Columbia paper referred to in the note on page 142. 
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prices of a recent year, can be compared with the per capita 
incomes in current prices of the underdeveloped countries of 
today. 
This extrapolation was made from the 1949 levels given in 
the United Nations publication cited in the note on page 137; 
and from the 1939 levels given in the U. S. Department of 
State publication mentioned in the same note, with the derived 
estimates shifted to 1949 prices for comparison with more 
recent per capita income levels. The results are as follows. 
For all the countries listed above, except Italy and Sweden, 
the derived per capita income for the decade between 1840 and 
r8so, ranges from roughly $150 to about $300. For Sweden 
it is about $no, and for Italy it is about $go. These are under-
estimates since rates of growth over the recent three-quarters 
of a century, which are more heavily weighted by the high 
rates associated with the industrialization process, are carried 
back a century into a period well before industrialization and 
rapid growth began in some countries (e.g. Sweden). 
Compared with these figures the current incomes, in the 
same prices, in many of the underdeveloped countries of today 
look distressingly low. The United Nations publication referred 
to above shows per capita income under $30 for China and 
Indonesia ; between $30 and $4o for Southern Korea, Thailand, 
Burma, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Ecuador, and Haiti ; between 
$41 and $6o-Philippines, Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, and 
Bolivia. In fact, over three-tenths of the 2 billion people 
covered in the 1949 income estimates, had per capita incomes 
of $50 or less. As they stand, the figures suggest that per capita 
incomes in the underdeveloped countries today are from about 
one-sixth to one-third of the per capita incomes of the developed 
countries a century ago. 
Granted that because of the estimating procedure used, the 
incomes of underdeveloped countries may be understated; 
but the sam~ bias affects time comparisons of national income 
in developed countries, since income in the earlier and less 
developed decades tends to be understated. Granted also that 
some of the developed countries among the eight listed, e.g. 
the United Kingdom and France, had already passed the pre-
industrial phase of development by the mid-rgth century; 
yet what scattered evidence we have concerning even earlier 
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incomes still suggests per capita levels much higher than those 
in the underdeveloped countries today. Despite all these 
qualifications, one must conclude that the pre-industrial level 
in the developed countries was several times that of most 
underdeveloped countries today. 
The implications of this finding, coupled with other evidence, 
can now be briefly summarized. 
First, the national income records indicate continuity and 
consistency over the last century in the relative position of 
countries judged by per capita income. We have rough but 
usable data for eight major countries covering a half century 
from the I84os to the mid-I8gos; and data for 24 countries 
whose relative standing in the mid-r8gos and in I949 can be 
compared (with just a few adjustments for changes in territory). 
While the earlier data come from Mulhall and the later from 
the United Nations studies, the general orders of magnitude 
are fairly acceptable. However, this sample is largely limited 
to the European countries and the European settlements in 
the New World and excludes practically all the underdeveloped 
countries of today. Although the data reveal some changes 
in standing-the United States forges ahead to surpass the 
per capita income of the United Kingdom, the slower growth 
of France causes a recession in its position-by and large, 
countries at the head of the procession in the beginning are at 
the head at the end. This conclusion would emerge much more 
strongiy if the underdeveloped countries of today were included 
in the comparison.l 
Second, not only have the relative differences among the 
developed, less developed, and underdeveloped countries, 
judged by per capita income, persisted over the last century, 
but the disparity has increased. The long term national income 
records, available largely for the more developed countries, 
suggest increases in per capita income (in constant prices) over 
a century to between two-and-a-half and over six times the 
initial value. No such rates of growth in the per capita incomes 
1 In other words, the contrast between the high level of per capita 
incomes of Western Europe and the low levels in Asia and Latin America 
bas certainly persisted through the century. Even for the 24 countries 
for which we have data for both the mid-189os and 1949, the coefficient 
of rank correlation in per capita income is + o • 79· 
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can be assumed for the older of the presently underdeveloped 
countries, or even for those in the New World. Since the present 
low per capita income in most underdeveloped countries is 
close to the margin of subsistence, a level of even three-quarters 
of the present magnitude-let alone a half, a third, or a sixth-
can hardly be imagined : the population could not possibly 
survive it. Hence, during the last century the spread must have 
widened between the underdeveloped countries at one end of the 
range and the few economically advanced countries at the 
other. But interestingly enough, this widening in the relative 
disparity of per capita incomes is found even among the sample 
of largely European countries. For the eight major countries 
that Mulhall covers (all European except for the United 
States) the ratio of the unweighted average deviation to the 
unweighted arithmetic mean is o ·32 in the 1840s and o ·42 
in the mid-189os (if the United States is excluded, the ratios 
are o ·31 and o ·38). For the 24 countries for which we have 
data both in the mid-189os and 1949, the ratio of the average 
deviation to the arithmetic mean is o ·39 at the earlier date 
and o ·52 at the later; if we limit the comparison to European 
countries alone, excluding the five non-European countries, 
the ratios become o ·32 and o ·53 respectively. Other mea-
sures of dispersion, e.g. the relative range, show the widening 
in international disparities in per capita income even more 
conspicuously. 
Third, for most of the older underdeveloped countries 
(China, India, the countries of the Middle East) but with 
important exceptions, the rate of growth of total population 
over the last century to century and a half was appreciably 
lower than that in the more developed countries of today 
(again with some exceptions such as France). Since the rate 
of growth in per capita income in the former was also materially 
lower than in the latter, it follows that the rate of growth in 
total income, the income mass as it were, was also very much 
lower. This is of some importance because the rapidity with 
which the total economy grows is an indication of the ability 
of a society to adjust itself to continuous expansion of the 
absolute scale of operation. A slow growth in total volume of 
economic activity is likely to be accompanied by social insti-
tutions ge'lred to such a low rate, institutions that would 
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require substantial modification if the pace of growth in the 
total were to be accelerated. This suggests problems-which have 
an interesting counterpart in the more advanced countries, when 
the pace of growth slackens and when institutions and patterns 
effective under conditions of rapid growth have to be modified. 
The higher economic level and the different historical 
heritage in the pre-industrial phases of the developed countries 
must have been associated with patterns of population move-
ment different from those characterizing the underdeveloped 
countries of today. With this subject, however, I shall deal 
even more briefly since all firmly established findings should 
be quite familiar to the readers of this paper ; and on any 
more tentative data I do not feel competent to pass judgment. 
The few comments listed are presented as questions or hypo-
theses subject to critical examination by experts. 
I. The developed countries of today, in their pre-industrial 
phases, represented small population groups. At the end of 
the 17th century the population of the United Kingdom was 
about 7 million, and even in 1770, on the eve of the Industrial 
Revolution, that of England and Wales was not much greater. 
In the 1840s the United States had less than 20 million. 
Indeed, none of the countries in this group had appreciably 
more than 30 million before the process of industrialization 
had begun. Yet among the underdeveloped countries today 
there are two with enormous population totals, and others 
whose population is 50 million or more (Brazil, Pakistan, 
Indonesia). It is often overlooked, although not by demogra-
phers, that the large populations of the developed countries 
of today are a consequence, not an antecedent of their rapid 
economic growth ; and that at the crucial earlier stages the 
population grq,ups were small. The implication for the magni-
tude of the problems involved in rapid economic growth is 
obvious ; and this difference in sheer population size between 
the developed countries in their pre-industrial phase and at 
least some of the larger underdeveloped countries today 
(including some half-developed, like Japan and the U.S.S.R.) 
should be added to the others already noted. 
2. For all the developed countries of today the rates of 
growth in total population during a period preceding the 
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initiation of industria.liLation can be measured. While the 
exact dating is in itself a substantial research problem, it 
is sufficient to use here the rough chronology suggested on pp. 
142-3. We can then calculate rates of population growth in 
England and Wales and France for five or seven decades prior 
to 1770, or prior to r8oo ; also the rate of population growth 
during the first half of the 19th century in the Scandinavian 
countries, Germany, Switzerland, the Netherlands, Belgium; 
and, of course, in the Western European settlements in the 
New World. These rates of growth, in percentage terms, are 
naturally very high for the younger, 'emptier' countries like 
the United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand. This is 
to be expected, and it is hardly relevant to the growth of 
presently underdeveloped countries. Few or none of the latter 
are that 'empty' and few hlllve a potential of growth similar 
to that of North America or Oceania in the mid-19th century. 
Far more relevant are the rates of growth for the older 
European countries. These were much lower than for the 
United States, for example, where they ranged about 35 per 
cent per decade in the first half of the 19th century. By and 
large, they were ro per cent per decade or lower-the only 
significant exception is for England and Wales where the rate 
was close to 15 per cent during the first half of the 19th century. 
Furthermore, in many cases the rates accelerated somewhat 
after the process of industrialization and quickened economic 
growth began. Thus the rates for England and Wales were 
higher during the first half of the 19th than during the last 
quarter of the r8th century ; and higher during the second half 
than during the first half of the rgth century for Germany, 
Belgium, Holland, and Denmark. 
Similar data for the underdeveloped countries during the 
first half of the 20th century are not as abung.ant ; and one 
does need records for a substantial period in order to eliminate 
the distorting effects of transient changes. The scanty data 
available suggest that in some of the older and densely settled 
and underdeveloped countries (e.g. India, and presumably 
China, although that is terra incognita) the overall rates of 
growth are not high-certainly not significantly higher than 
those quoted above for the older European countries (with 
some obvious exceptions, e.g. as compared with the low rate 
The Pre-industrial· Phase in Advanced Countries 149 
for France). However, in a number of underdeveloped countries 
the rates of growth during the 2oth century are significantly 
higher than in the older European countries in their pre-
industrial phase (and even more so compared with later 
periods). For example, the Demographic Yearbook of the United 
Nations (1952) shows that in the following underdeveloped 
countries (only those were selected for which population 
exceeded I million in recent years and the period of coverage 
is over 25 years-for most it is close to 50 years) the decade 
rate of growth of population during the first half of the 2oth 
century was above 20 per cent : Formosa, Korea, Philippines, 
Thailand, Federation of Malaya, Cuba, Dominican Republic, 
Honduras, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, and Venezuela. In 
addition, in the following underdeveloped countries it averaged 
between 15 and 20 per cent per decade : Ceylon, Egypt, 
Tunisia, Nicaragua. Granted the need for caution in view of 
the quality of the data for many of these countries. Never-
theless, the impression-and it is important and should be 
checked-is that the population of many underdeveloped 
countries has been growing, in recent decades, at much higher 
rates than the population of the older developed countries in 
their pre-industrial phase. 
3· A view of the crude birth and death rates-and these 
measures are subject to even wider margins of error-proves 
revealing. In general, the crude birth rates in the older of the 
developed countries ranged, during the first half of the 19th 
century, between 30 and 35 per thousand (and the level was 
similar for England and Wales in the r8th century). The only 
exceptions are some of the German states (Prussia, Bavaria, 
Saxony) where the crude birth rates reached 38 and even went 
above 40. The rather spotty data of limited quality for many 
underdeveloped countries suggest much higher levels. Thus the 
Demographic Yearbook of the United Nations (1952) suggests 
rates of 40 or more (for 1941-50) for Egypt, Costa Rica, El 
Salvador, Guatemala, Mexico, Bolivia, and Malaya; and of 
about 38 for Honduras, Venezuela, and Ceylon. Thus one 
possible factor in the higher rate of population growth in many 
underdeveloped countries today, than in the older developed 
countries in their pre-industrial phase, may well be a 
significantly -higher crude birth rate. 
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4· A second factor in the difference may be the crude death 
rates. By and large, these rates in the older European countries, 
even those economically advanced, were more than 20 per 
I,ooo until the last quarter of the 19th century, i.e. during the 
pre-industrial phase (and naturally were particularly high in 
those German states where the crude birth rate was high 
relative to other advanced European countries). This combi-
nation of a birth rate of slightly more than 30 and of a death 
rate of more than 20 yielded rates of natural increase of 10 
or less per I,ooo. In many underdeveloped countries today, 
at least during recent decades, reported crude death rates were 
well below 20. United Nations Demographic Yearbook (1952) 
reports crude death rates for 1940-50 of about 15 or less for 
the following underdeveloped countries : Costa Rica, the 
Dominican Republic, Nicaragua, Jamaica, Puerto Rico, Peru, 
Venezuela, and Thailand. Indeed, of some 20 underdeveloped 
countries for which the death rate can be calculated for the 
recent decade, in only two-Egypt and Guatemala-is it over 
20 per I,ooo. 
5· There is, finally, the international migration variable. 
The older European countries, which entered the phase of 
rapid population growth and industrialization in the 19th 
century, could take advantage of the escape valve provided 
by migration either across the Atlantic (predominantly to the 
United States) or to the British dominions elsewhere, or, not 
infrequently, to some other European country. The inter-
continental migrations were particularly important. The suc-
cession of immigrants to the United States-from the British 
to the Germans, to the Scandinavians, to the Italians, and to 
the Eastern Europeans-traces the path through Europe of 
the introduction of industrialization and of the initiation of 
the painful period of adjustment to the industrial system. That 
emigration helped to smooth the way to the economic develop-
ment of many of these countries can hardly be gainsaid. Nor 
can it be doubted that the loss by migration reduced the 
overall rate of population growth in some of them. No such 
opportunity, at least not in that relative dimension, was 
available through most of the 2oth century to the under-
developed countries of today. This is a third factor that may 
account for part of the difference between the rates of 
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population growth of many underdeveloped countries since xgoo 
and those in the pre-industrial phase of the older developed 
European units. 
6. In concluding, we should note that their higher birth 
rates may be said to reflect the lower economic level of many 
of the currently underdeveloped countries as over against that 
of older European units in their pre-industrial phase. On the 
other hand, their lower death rates may be said to reflect the 
more recent date for which we observe them in the under-
developed countries of today-mortality thus mirroring the 
advantages of the technological advance made since the pre-
industrial phase of the now developed countries. Finally, with 
respect to international migration, the underdeveloped 
countries today are paying the penalty of being late on the 
scene, since expansion into the 'empty' territories of the New 
W odd is no longer politically feasible. Thus, differences in 
economic level and in historical timing between the developed 
countries in their pre-industrial phase and the presently under-
developed countries are reflected in differences in their demo-
graphic patterns when we relate the present situation to the 
earlier 'comparable' one. 
It is hardly necessary to summarize here what is already 
too summary a discussion. And implications for further 
study in the field are perhaps too obvious to merit explicit 
formulation. Yet it may be advisable to list the implications 
bearing upon the possible use of past records of developed 
countries to shed light on the problems of underdeveloped 
countries. 
r. Both the absolute and relative economic position, as well 
as the general cast of the immediately antecedent history, of 
the now developed countries in their pre-industrial phase were 
cardinally different from the economic position and the imme-
diate historical heritage of the underdeveloped countries of 
today. It is, therefore, far from safe to extrapolate economic 
or demographic aspects from the earlier records for the 
developed countries to current and prospective levels for the 
underdeveloped. 
2. There is today a vast gulf between economic levels, 
social framework, and, I assume, demographic patterns of the 
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developed countries at the top and most underdeveloped 
countries. This widespread is in itself an important factor 
determining policy and prospects of economic growth in 
underdeveloped countries. But it should inhibit easy extra-
polation in cross-section analysis. 
3· The experience of countries that have enjoyed satis-
factory growth and have gone through the period of industriali-
zation has varied considerably with their size, their antece-
dents, and particularly in their sequence, the duration of 
their lag behind the pioneer countries and their immediate 
successors. To understand the problems of growth of the 
currently underdeveloped countries, the analysis of successive 
experience of the developed countries-with particular em-
phasis on those whose effective entrance into the process of 
rapid economic growth and industrialization came late-seems 
to me of utmost importance. Examination of similarities and 
differences should be particularly instructive since it would 
suggest the different roles of various factors as the conditions, 
set by the changing world scene and the historical heritage of 
each country, modify the process of adjustment to the industrial 
system. 
4· For many of the late joiners in the circle of the industria-
lized nations. (e.g. Japan and the U.S.S.R.), the process is far 
from complete and the levels of per capita income attained are 
still very much lower than for the older developed countries 
at the top. This experience of the late joiners should be parti-
cularly valuable in analysing the problems of population, 
economic development, and social change in underdeveloped 
countries. There are case-studies of interest to specific groups 
among underdeveloped countries : e.g. the experience of late 
comers in Latin America and the Near East might be parti-
cularly illuminating to underdeveloped countries in those 
areas. 
s. The very width of the gap between developed and under-
developed countries today may also be indicative of the 
wealth and the variety of the economic potential that must 
exist in the underdeveloped areas. The realization of even a 
minor share of this potential might mean striking relative in-
creases in their economic performance. It might also mean rapid 
sustained growth for at least some-once the obstacles have 
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been removed-and at rates even surpassing those in many 
of the now developed countries in their past. This makes it 
all the more important to study the record of the recently 
industrialized countries-including those that may still be 
considered partly undeveloped or even still largely under-
developed-provided that significant steps forward have 
already been taken. 
6. If the emphasis is to be on similarities and differences in 
the basic characteristics of the process of adoption of the 
industrial system-for countries distinguished by their size, 
historical heritage, and the timing of their industrialization 
process-we obviously need a variety of national studies. In 
these, the interplay among economic growth, population 
patterns, and social change must naturally be the main focus 
of interest. Furthermore, the periods covered should be long 
enough for rates of secular change to be established without 
confusion with more transient changes. It is from such long 
period studies, with emphasis on the interconnexion of secular 
trends in population, in economic level and structure, in internal 
political and social institutions, and in the world scene, that 
we can hope to derive testable conclusions that may be useful 
in understanding and dealing with the problems of the economic 
growth of underdeveloped countries. The alternative shortcuts 
prevalent to date-of cross-country comparisons and of 
studies of population, economic, and social change, each in 
isolation-have been helpful as suggesting leads but are far 
from an adequate guide either to testable analytical conclusions 
or to formulation of long-term policy. 
THE TAKE-OFF INTO 
SELF-SUSTAINED GROWTH* 
by W. W. Rostow 
THE PURPOSE OF THIS ARTICLE IS TO EXPLORE THE FOLLOWING 
hypothesis: that the process of economic growth can usefully 
be regarded as centering on a relatively brief time interval of 
two or three decades when the economy and the society of 
which it is a part transform themselves in such ways that 
economic growth is, subsequently, more or less automatic. 
This decisive transformation is here called the take-off.l 
The take-off is defined as the interval during which the rate 
of investment increases in such a way that real output per capita 
rises and this initial increase carries with it radical changes 
in production techniques and the disposition of income flows 
which perpetuate the new scale of investment and perpetuate 
thereby the rising trend in per capita output. Initial changes 
in method require that some group in the society have the will 
and the authority to install and diffuse new production techni-
ques ;2 and a perpetuation of the growth process requires that 
such a leading group expand in authority and that the society 
"' The Economic ] ournal, March 1956. Reprinted by permission of 
the Royal Economic Society and the author. The author wishes to 
acknowledge with thanks the helpful criticisms of an earlier draft by 
G. Baldwin, F. Bator, K. Berrill, A. Enthoven, E. E. Hagen, C. P. 
Kindleberger, L. Lefeber, W. Malenbaum, E. S. Mason and M. F. 
Millikan. 
1 This argument is a development from the line of thought presented 
in The Process of Economic Growth (New York, 1952), Chapter 4· 
especially pp. 102-05. The concept of three stages in the growth process 
centring on the take-off is defined and used for prescriptive purposes 
in An American Policy in Asia (New York, 1955), Chapter 7· 
s We shall set aside in this article the question of how new production 
techniques are generated from pure science and invention, a procedure 
which is legitimate, since we are examining the growth process in 
national (or regional) economies over relatively short periods. We shall 
largely set aside also the question of population pressure and the size and 
quality of the working force, again because of the short period under 
examination; although, evidently, even over short periods, the rate of 
population increase will help determine the level of investment required 
to yield rising output per capita (see below, p. 158, note 2). By and 
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as a whole respond to the impulses set up by the initial changes, 
including the potentialities for external economies. Initial 
changes in the scale and direction of finance flows are likely to 
imply a command over income flows by new groups or institu-
tions ; and a perpetuation of growth requires that a high 
proportion of the increment to real income during the take-off 
period be returned to productive investment. The take-off 
requires, therefore, a society prepared to respond actively to 
new possibilities for productive enterprise ; and it is likely 
to require political, social and institutional changes which will 
both perpetuate an initial increase in the scale of investment 
and result in the regular acceptance and absorption of innova-
tions. 
In short, this article is an effort to clarify the economics of 
industrial revolution when an industrial revolution is conceived 
of narrowly with respect to time and broadly with respect to 
changes in production functions. 
THREE STAGES IN THE GROWTH PROCESS 
The historian examining the story of a particular national 
economy is inevitably impressed by the long-period continuity 
of events. Like other forms of history, economic history is a 
seamless web. The cotton-textile developments in Britain of 
the 178os and 1790s have a history stretching back for a half 
century at least ; the United States of the 1840s and 185os 
had been preparing itself for industrialization since the 1790s, 
at the latest; Russia's remarkable development during the 
two pre-1914 decades goes back to 1861 for its foundations, 
if not to the Napoleonic Wars or to Peter the Great; the re-
markable economic spurt of Meiji Japan is incomprehensible 
outside the context of economic developments in the latter 
half of the Tokugawa era; and so on. It is wholly legitimate 
that the historian's influence should be to extend the story of 
the British industrial revolution back into the seventeenth 
century and forward far into the nineteenth century ; and that 
large, this article is concerned with capital formation at a particular 
stage of economic growth ; and of the array of propensities defined in 
The Process of Economic Growth it deals only with the propensity to 
accept innovations and the propensity to seek material advance, the 
latter in relation to the supply of finance only. 
The Historical Context 
Heckscher should embrace Sweden's transition in a chapter 
entitled, 'The Great Transformation (I8I5-1914) '.1 From the 
perspective of the economic historian the isolation of a take-off 
period is, then, a distinctly arbitrary process. It is to be judged, 
like such other arbitrary exercises as the isolation of business 
cycles and secular trends, on whether it illuminates more of 
the economic process than it conceals ; and ~it should be used, 
if accepted, as a way of giving a rough framework of order to 
the inordinately complicated biological problem of growth 
rather than as an exact model of reality. 
There is difficulty in this set of conceptions for the statistical 
analyst of economic development as well as for the historian. 
At first sight the data mobilized, for example, by Clark, Kuz-
nets, Buchanan and Ellis exhibit a continuum of degrees of 
development both within countries over time and as among 
countries at a given period of time, with no prima facie case 
for a clearly marked watershed in the growth process. 2 In 
part this statistical result arises from the fact that historical 
data on national product and its components are only rarely 
available for an economy until after it has passed into a stage 
of more or less regular growth ; that is, after the take-off. In 
part it arises from the fact that, by and large, these authors 
are more concerned with different levels of per capita output 
(or welfare)-and the structural characteristics that accompany 
them-than with the growth process itself. The data they 
mobilize do not come to grips with the inner determinants of 
growth. The question raised here is not h9w or why levels of 
output per capita have differed but rather how it has come 
about that particular economies have moved from stagnation 
-to slow, piecemeal advance-to a situation where growth 
was the normal economic condition. Our criterion here· is 
1 E. F. Heckscher, An Economic History of Sweden, (Tr.) G .• Ohlin, 
(Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1954), Chapter 6. 
a Colin Clark, The Conditions of Economic Progress (London, 1951, 
second edition) ; Simon Kuznets, 'International Differences in Capital 
Formation and Financing' in C;apital Formation and Economic Growth-
A Report of the National Bureau of Economic Research, New York, 
Princeton University Press, 1955, pp. 19-106 ; Norman Buchanan and 
Howard Ellis, Approaches to Economic Development (Twentieth Century 
Fund, New York, 1955). See also the United Nations data presented as 
a frontispiece to H. F. Williamson and John A. Buttrick, Economic 
Development (New York, 1954). 
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not the absolute level of output per capita but its rate of 
change. 
In this argument the sequence of economic development is 
taken to consist of three periods : a long period (up to a century 
or, conceivably, more) when the preconditions· for take-off 
are e§tabljshed ; the take-off itself, defined withm two or three 
de(;des ; and a lonneriod when growth becomes nor~ and 
relatlvely--a:u.wmaiic. These three divisions would, of course, 
not exclude the possibility of growth giving way to secular 
stagnation or decline in the long term. It would exclude from· 
the concept of a growing economy, however, one which expel'i-
ences a brief spurt of expansion which is not subsequently 
sustained; for example, the United States industrial boom of 
the War of r8r2 or the ill-fated spurts of certain Latin American 
economies in the early stages of their modem history. 
Take-offs have occurred in two quite different types of 
societies ; and, therefore, the process of establishing precondi-
tions for take-off has varied. In the fi!"st an<:l .. most general 
case th~ {!Chiev_~~~.P!~C:~~~itio11s_!Qr __ ~required 
f!1ajor change ~ poli_!ic<!L_~~~ure .and, even, in 
e~ve cult~yalues. In the vocabulary of The Process of 
Ecorcl:ffffic-Growth, important changes in the propensities pre-
ceded the take-off. In the second case take-off was delayed 
not by political, social and cultural obstacles but by the high 
(and even expanding) levels of welfare that could be achieved 
by exploiting land and natural resources. In this second case 
take-off was initiated by a more narrowly economic process, 
as, for example, in the northern United States, Australia and, 
perhaps, Sweden. In the vocabulary of The Process of Economic 
Growth, the take-off was initiated primarily by a change in the 
yields ; although subsequent growth brought with it changes 
in the propensities as well. As one would expect in the essen-
tially biological field of economic growth, history offers mixed 
as well as pure cases. 
In the first case the process of establishing preconditions 
for take-off might be generalized in impressionistic terms as 
follows: 
We start with a reasonably stable and traditional society \. 
containing an economy mainly agricultural, using more or less 
unchanging production methods, saving and investing 
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productively little more than is required to meet depreciation. 
Usually from outside the society, but sometimes out of its own 
dynamics, comes the idea that economic progress is possible ; 
and this idea spreads within the established elite or, more 
usually, in some disadvantaged group whose lack of status 
does not prevent the exercise of some economic initiative. 
More often than not the economic motives for seeking economic 
pr()~ess converge with so~iiOrriic-~tive~ such as the 
desir~~"Chll nower and prestige, natibiial pnde, 
Politicala:iii1Jltfon a~ on. Educa 10n, for so t least, 
Bmaden~s to suit the needs of modern economic 
activity. New enterprising men come forward willing to mobilize 
savings and to take risks in pursuit of profit, notably in com-
merce. The commercial markets for agricultural products, 
domestic handicrafts and consumption-goods imports widen. 
Institutions for mobilizing capital appear ; or they expand 
from primitive levels in the scale, surety and time horizon for 
loans. Basic capital is expanded, notably in transport and 
communications, often to bring to market raw materials in 
which other nations have an economic interest, often financed 
by foreign capital. And, here and there, modern manufacturing 
enterpri~ appears, usually in substitution for imports. 
Since public-health measures are enormously productive in 
their early stages of application and, as innovations go, meet 
relatively low resistance in most cultures, the death rate may 
fall and the population begin to rise, putting pressure on the 
food supply and the institutional structure of agriculture, 
creating thereby an economic depressant or stimulus (or both 
in turn), depending on the society's response.1 
The rate of productive investment may rise up to 5 per cent 
of national income; 11 but this is unlikely to do much more than 
1 Historically, disruptive population pressure haS been generated in 
pretake-off societies not only by the easy spread of highly productive 
measures of public health but also by the easy acceptance of high-
yield new crops. permitting a fragmentation of. land-holdings. earlier 
marriage and a rise in the birth rate; e.g., Ireland and China. 
1 The relation of the investment rate to growth depends, of course, 
on the rate of population rise. With stagnant population or slow rise a 
, 5 per cent investment rate could yield substantial growth in real output 
f per capita, as indeed it did in pre-1914 France. On the other hand, as 
noted below (pp. 170-7I) investment rates much higher than 5 per cent 
~persist in primitive economies whichlackthepreconditionsforgrowth, 
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keep ahead of the population increase. And, in general, all this 
activity proceeds on a limited basis, within an economy and a 
society still mainly characterized by traditional low·produc-
tivity techniques and by old values and institutions which 
developed in conjunction with them. The rural proportion of 
the population is likely to stand at 75 per cent or over. 
In the second case, of natur~ wealthy nations, with a 
highly__ favourable balance ~between population and natural 
resourcesan:a-Wiffia.-populahon deriving by emigration from 
reasonably acquisitive cultures, the story of 1Stablishmg the 
preconditions differs mainly inthat there is no major problem 
of overcoming traditional values• inappropriate to economic 
growth and the inert or resistant institutions which incorporate 
them ; there is less difficulty in developing an elite effective in 
the investment process; and there is no population problem.1 
Technically, much the same slow·moving process of change 
occurs at high (and, perhaps, even expanding) levels of per 
capita output, and with an extensive growth of population and 
output still based on rich land and other natural resources. 
Take·off fails to occur mainly because the comparative advan· 
tage of exploiting productive land and other natural resources 
delays the time when self·reinforcing industrial growth can 
profitably get under way.= 
based on capital imports, without initiating sustained growth. For 
some useful arithmetic on the scale and composition of capital require-
ments in a growing economy with a 1 per cent population increase see A. 
K. Cairncross, Home and Foreign Investment (Cambridge, 1953),Chapter I. 
1 Even in these cases there have often been significant political and so-
cial restraints which had to be reduced or eliminated before take-off could 
occur; for example, in Canada, the Argentine and the American South. 
1 Theoretically, such fortunate societies could continue to grow in 
per capita output until diminishing returns damped down their progress. 
Theoretically, they might even go on as growing non-industrial societies, 
absorbing agricultural innovations which successfully countered 
diminishing returns. Something like this process might describe, for 
example, the rich agricultural regions of the United States. But, in 
general, it seems to be the case that the conditions required to sustain 
a progressive increase in agricultural productivity will also lead on to 
self-reinforcing industrial growth. This result emerges not merely from 
the fact that many agricultural improvements are labour-saving, and that 
industrial employment can be stimulated by the availability of surplus 
labour and is required to draw it off; it also derives from the fact that the 
production and use of materials and devices which raise agricultural 
productivity in themselves stimulate the growth of a self-sustaining 
industrial sector. 
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The beginning of take-off can usually be traced to a particular 
sharp stimulus. The stimulus may take the form of a political 
r~9hl,tjgi1 which affects directly the balan:~wer 
and effective values, the character of economic institutions, 
the distribution of income, the pattern of investment outlays 
and the proportion of potential innovations actually applied ; 
that is, it operates through the propensities. It may come 
about througn a tecnnol~ transport) innovation, 
which sets in motion a chain of secondary expansion in modern 
sectors and has powerful potential external economy effects 
which the society exploits. It may take the form of a newly 
favourable international en•ironment, such as the opening of 
British and French markets to Swedish timber in the r86os 
or a sharp relative rise in export prices and;or large new capital 
imports, as in the case of the United States from the late 184os, 
Canada and Russia from the mid-189os; but it may also come 
as a challenge posed by an unfavourable shift in the inter-
national environment, such as a sharp fall in terms of trade 
(or a war-time blockade of foreign trade) requiring the rapid 
development of manufactured import substitutes, as in the 
case of the Argentine and Australia in the 1930s and during 
the Second World War.1 All these latter cases raise sharply 
the profitability of certain lines of enterprise and can be 
regarded as changes in the yields. 
What is essential here, however, is not the form of stimulus 
but the fact that the prior development of the society and its 
economy result in a positive, sustained, and self-reinforcing, 
response to it : the result is not a once-over change in produc-
tion functions or in the volume of investment, but a higher 
proportion of potential innovations accepted in a more or less 
regular flow, and a higher rate of investment. 
In short, the forces which have yielded marginal bursts of 
activity now expand and become quantitatively significant 
as rapid-moving trends. New industries expand at high rates, 
yielding profits which are substantially reinvested in new 
1 Historically, the imposition of tariffs has played an important role 
in take-offs, e.g., the American Tariffs of 1828 (cotton textiles) and 
1841-2 (rail iron) ; the Russian tariffs of the 189os, etc. Although these 
actions undoubtedly served to assist take-off in leading sectors, they 
usually reflected an energy and purpose among key entrepreneurial 
groups which would, in any case, probably have done the trick. 
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capacity ; and their expansion induces a more general expan-
sion of the modern sectors of the economy where a high rate of 
plough-back prevails. The institutions for mobilizing savings 
(including the fiscal and sometimes the capital-levy activities 
of government) incre'ase in scope and efficiency. New techniques 
spread in agriculture as well as in industry, as increasing 
numbers of persons are prepared to accept them and the deep 
changes they bring to ways of life. A new class of businessmen 
(usually private, sometimes public servants) emerges and 
acquires control over the key decisions determining the use 
of savings. New possibilities for export develop and are 
exploited ; new import requirements emerge. The economy 
exploits hitherto unused backlogs in technique and natural 
resources. Although there are a few notable exceptions, all this 
momentum historically attracted substantial foreign capital. 
f The use of aggregative national-income terms evidently 
reveals little of the process which is occurring. It is nevertheless 
useful to regard as a necessary but not sufficient condition for 
the take-off the fact that the proportion of net investment to 
national income (or net national product) rises from (say) 
5 per cent to over IO per cent, definitely outstripping the likely 
population pressure (since under the assumed take-off cir-
cumstances the capital-output ratio is low),1 and yielding a 
1 The author is aware of the substantial ambiguities which overhang 
the concept of the capital-output ratio and, especially, of the dangers 
of applying an overall aggregate measure. But since the arithmetic of 
economic growth requires some such concept, implicitly or explicitly, 
we had better refine the tool rather than abandon it. In the early stages 
of economic development two contrary forces operate on the capital-
output ratio. On the one hand there is a vast requirement of basic 
overhead capital in transport, power, education, etc. Here, due mainly 
to the long period over which such investment yields its return, the 
apparent (short-run) capital-output ratio is high. On the other hand, 
there are generally large unexploited backlogs of known techniques and 
available natural resources to be put to work; and these backlogs make 
for a low capital-output ratio. We can assume formally a low capital-
output ratio for the take-oft period because we are assuming that the 
preconditions have been created, including a good deal of social over-
head capital. In fact, the aggregate marginal capital-output ratio is 
likely to be kept up during the take-oft by the requirement of continuing 
large outlays for overhead items which yield their return only over long 
periods. Nevertheless, a ratio of 3-1 or 3 ·5-1 on average seems realistic 
as a rough bench-mark until we have learned more about capital-
output ratios on a sectoral basis. 
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distinct rise in real output per capita. Whether real consump-
tion per capita rises depends on the pattern of income distribu-
tion and population pressure, as well as on the magnitude, 
character and productivity of investment itself. 
As indicated in the accompanying table, I believe it possible 
to identify at least tentatively such take-off periods for a 
number of countries which have passed into the stage of growth. 
Some Tentative, Approximate Take-off Dates 
Country Take-off Country Take-off 
Great Britain . . I783-18o2 Russia . . .. 1890-1914 
France .. . . r83o-186o Canada . . . . 18g6-r914 
Belgium .. . . r833-186o Argentine3 1935-United States1 1843-186o . . .. 
Turkey' Germany r85o-r873 . . .. 1937-. . . . 
lndia6 Sweden . . . . 1868-r8go . . .. 1952-
Japan2 . . . . 1878-1900 Chinas . . .. 1952-
1 The American take-off is here viewed as the upshot of two different 
periods of expansion : the first, that of the 184os, marked by railway 
and manufacturing development, mainly confined to the East-this 
occurred while the West and South digested the extensive agricultural 
expansion of the previous decade; the second the great railway push 
into the Middle West during the 185os marked by a heavy inflow of 
foreign capital. By the opening of the Civil War the American economy 
of North and West, with real momentum in its heavy-industry sector, 
is judged to have taken off. 
2 Lacking adequate data, there is some question about the timing 
of the Japanese take-off. Some part of the post-1868 period was certain-
ly, by the present set of definitions, devoted to firming up the pre-
conditions for take-off. By 1914 the Japanese economy had certainly 
taken off. The question is whether the period from about 1878 to the 
Sino-Japanese War in the mid-189os is to be regarded as the completion 
of the preconditions or as take-off. On present evidence, I incline to 
the latter view. 
3 In one sense the Argentine economy began its take-off during the 
First World War. But by and large, down to the pit of the post-1929 
depression, the growth of its modem sector, stimulated during the war, 
tended to slacken; and, like a good part of the Westem World, the 
Argentine sought during the 1920s to retum to a pre-1914 normalcy. 
It was not until the mid-1930s that a sustained take-off was inaugurated, 
which by and large can now be judged to have been successful despite 
the structural vicissitudes of that economy. 
'Against the background of industrialization measures inaugurated 
in the mid-1930s the Turkish economy has exhibited remarkable 
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l The third stage is, of course, the long, fluctuating story of 
~ sustained economic progress. Overall capital per head increases 
as the economy matures. The structure of the economy changes 
increasingly. The initial key industries, which sparked the 
take-off, decelerate as diminishing returns operate on the 
original set of industrial tricks and the original band of pion-
eering entrepreneurs give way to less single-minded industrial 
leaders in those sectors; but the average rate of growth is 
maintained by a succes~ion of new, rapidly growing sectors, 
with a new set of pioneering leaders. The proportion of the 
population in rural pursuits declines. The economy finds its 
(changing) place in the international economy. The society 
makes such terms as it will with the requirements for maximiz-
ing modem and efficient production, balancing off, as it will, 
the new values against those retarding values which persist 
with deeper roots, or adapting the latter in such ways as to 
support rather than retard the growth process. This sociological 
calculus interweaves with basic resource endowments to deter~ 
mine the pace of deceleration. 
It is with the problems and vicissitudes of such growing 
economies of the third stage (and especially with cyclical 
fluctuations and the threat of chronic unemployment) that 
the bulk of modem theoretical economics is concerned, in-
cluding much recent work on the fonnal properties of growth 
models. The student of history and of contemporary under-
developed areas1 is more likely to be concerned with the 
momentum in the past five years founded in the increase in agricultural 
income and productivity. It still remains to be seen whether these two 
surges, conducted under quite different national policies, will constitute 
a transition to self-sustaining growth, and whether Turkey can over-
come its current structural problems. 
5 As noted in the text it is still too soon (for quite different reasons) 
to judge either the Indian or Chinese Communist take-off efforts 
successful. 
1 A number of so-called underdevelopedareasmayhave, in fact,either 
passed through the take-off process or are in the midst of it, e.g., Mexico, 
Brazil, Turkey, the Argentine and India. I would commend for con-
sideration-certainly no more until the concept of take-off is disproved 
or verified-the dropping of the concept of 'underdeveloped areas ' 
and the substitution for it of a quadripartite distinction among econo-
mies: traditional; pretake-off; take-off and growing. Against the back-
ground of this set of distinctions we might then consider systematically 
two separable questions now often confused. First, the stage of growth, 
as among growing economies. It is legitimate to regard Mexico and the 
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economics of the first two stages ; that is the economics of the 
preconditions and the take-off. If we are to have a serious 
theory of economic growth or (more likely) some useful theories 
about economic growth, they must obviously seek to embrace 
these two early stages-and notably the economics of the 
take-off. The balance of this article is designed to mobilize 
tentatively and in a preliminary way what an economic 
historian can contribute to the economics of take-off. 
THE TAKE-OFF DEFINED AND IsoLATED 
There are several problems of choice involved in 1lefining 
the take-off with precision. We might begin with one arbitrary 
definition and consider briefly the two major alternatives. 
For the present purposes the take-off is defined as requiring 
all three of the following related conditions : 
....._ (a) a rise in the rate of productive investment from (say) 
5 per cent or less to over ro per cent of national income (or 
net national product) ; 
-...... (b) the development of one or more substantial manufactur-
ing! sectors, with a high rate of growth ; 
r- (c) the existence or quick emergence of a political, social 
and institutional framework which exploits the impulses to 
expansion in the modem sector and the potential external 
economy effects of the take-off and gives to growth an on-going 
character. 
l.!nited States, Great Britain and Australia,'f"rance and Japan, as grow-
ing economies, although they stand at very different points along their 
national growth curves, where the degree of progress might be measured 
by some kind of index of output (or capital) per head. Second, the 
foreseeable long-run potential of growing economies. Over the long 
pull, even after they are 'fully developed', the per capita output levels 
that different economies are likely to achieve will undoubtedly vary 
greatly, depending notably on resource endowments in relation to 
population. The arraying of levels of output per capita for different 
economies, now conventional, fails to distinguish these three elements ; 
that is, the current rate of growth ; the stage of growth ; and the fore-
seeable horizon for growth. 
l In this context 'manufacturing' is taken t<J include the processing 
of agricultural products or raw materials by modem methods; e.g., 
timber in Sweden ; meat in Australia ; dairy products in Denmark. 
The dual requirement of a' manufacturing' sector is that its processes 
set in motion a chain of further modern sector requirements and that 
its expansion provides the potentiality of external economy effects. 
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The third condition implies a considerable capability to 
mobilize capital from domestic sources. Some take-offs have 
occurred with virtually no capital imports; e.g., Britain and 
Japan. Some take-offs have had a high component of foreign· ;· 
capital; e.g., the United States, Russia and Canada. But somtf I 
countries have imported large quantities of foreign capital for 
long periods, which undoubtedly contributed to creating the 
preconditions for take-off, without actually initiating take-off ; 
e.g., the Argentine before 1914, Venezuela down to recent years, 
the Belgian Congo currently. In short, whatever the role of 
capital imports, the preconditions for take-off include an 
initial ability to mobilize domestic savings productively, as 
well as a structure which subsequently permits a high marginal 
rate of savings. 
This definition is designed to isolate the early stage when 
industrialization takes hold rather than the later stage when 
industrialization becomes a more massive and statistically 
more impressive phenomenon. In Britain, for example, there 
is no doubt that it was between 1815 and 1850 that indus-
trialization fully took hold. If the criterion chosen for take-off 
was the period of most rapid overall industrial growth, or the 
period when large-scale industry matured, all our take-off 
dates would have to be set forward ; Britain, for example, 
to 1819-48 ; the United States to 1868-g3 ; Sweden to 1890-
1920; Japan to 1900-20; Russia to 1928-40. The earlier dating 
is chosen here because it is believed, on present (often inade-
quate) evidence, that the decisive transformations (including 
a decisive shift in the investment rate) occur in the first indus-
trial phases ; and later industrial maturity can be directly 
traced back to foundations laid in these first phases. 
This definition is also designed to rule out from the take-off 
the quite substantial economic progress which can occur in 
an economy before a truly self-reinforcing growth process gets 
under way. British economic expansion between (say) 1750 
and 1783, Russian economic expansion between (say) 1861 
and 1890, Canadian economic expansion between 1867 and the 
mid-189os-such periods-for which there is an equivalent 
in the economic history of almost every growing economy-
were marked by extremely important, even decisive, develop-
ments. The transport network expanded, and with it both --------------· 
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internal and external commerce ; new institutions for mobiliz-
ingSaVlligswere developed; a class of commercial and even 
industrial entrepreneurs began to emerge ; industrial enterprise 
on a limited scale (or in limited sectors) grew. And yet, however 
essential these pretake-off periods were for later development, 
their scale and momentum were insufficient to transform the 
economy radically or, in some cases, to outstrip population 
growth and to yield an increase in per capita output. 
With a sense of the considerable violence done to economic 
history, I am here seeking to isolate a period when the scale 
of productive economic activity reaches a critical level and 
produces changes which lead to a massive and progressive 
structural transformation in economies and the societies of 
which they are a part, better viewed as changes in kind than 
merely in degree. 
EVIDENCE ON INVESTMENT RATES IN THE TAKE-OFF 
The case for the concept of take-off hinges, in part, on quan-
titative evidence on the scale and productivity of investment 
in relation to population growth. Here, as noted earlier, we 
face a difficult problem ; investment data are not now available 
historically for early stages in economic history. Following 
is such case as there is for regarding the shift from a productive 
investment rate of about 5 per cent of Net National Product 
(NNP) to IO per cent or more as central to the process.1 
1 In his important article, 'Economic Development with Unlimited 
Supplies of Labour,' reprinted in the present volume, pp. 400-49, 
W. Arthur Lewis indicates a similar spread as defining the transition 
to economic growth : 
'The central problem in the theory of economic development is to 
understand the process by which a community which was previously 
saving and investing 4 or 5 per cent of its national income or less 
converts itself into an economy where voluntary saving is running at 
about 12-15 per cent of national income or more. This is the central 
problem because the central fact of economic development is rapid 
capital accumulation (including knowledge and skills with capital). 
We cannot explain any 'industrial' revolution (as the economic his-
torians pretend to do) until we can explain why saving increased rela-
tively to national income.' 
Presumably Mr Lewis based this range on empirical observation of 
contemporary' underdeveloped' areas on which some data are presented 
below. As in note 2, pp. 158-9 above, it should be emphasized that the 
choice of investment proportions to symbolize the transition to growth 
hinges on the assumptions made about the rate of population increase. 
The Take-off into Self-sustained Growth 
A Prima Facie Case 
If we take the aggregate marginal capital-output ratio for 
an economy in its early stage of economic development at 
3 ·5-1 and if we assume, as is not abnormal, a population rise 
of I-I· 5 per cent per annum it is clear that something between 
3 · 5 and 5 · 25 per cent of NNP must be regularly invested if 
NNP per capita is to be sustained. An increase of 2 per cent 
per annum in NNP per capita requires, under these assump-
tions, that something between 10 · 5 and 12 · 5 per cent of NNP 
be regularly invested. By definition and assumption, then, a 
transition from relatively stagnant to substantial, regular 
rise in NNP per capita, under typical population conditions, 
requires that the proportion of national product produetively 
invested move from somewhere in the vicinity of 5 per cent to 
something in the vicinity of 10 per cent. 
The Swedish Case 
In the appendix to his paper on international differences 
in capital formation, cited above, Kuznets gives gross and 
net capital formation figures in relation to gross and net 
national product for a substantial group of countries where 
reasonably good statistical data exist. Excepting Sweden, 
these data do not go back clearly to pretake-off stages.l The 
1 The Danish data are on the margin. They begin with the decade 
1870-79, probably the first decade of take-off itself. They show net 
and gross domestic capital formation rates well over 10 per cent. In 
view of the sketch of the Danish economy presented in Kjeld Bjerke's 
• Preliminary Estimates of the Danish National Product from 1870-1950' 
(Preliminary paper mimeographed for 1953 Conference of the Inter-
national Association for Research on Income and Wealth), pp. 32-4, 
it seems likely that further research would identify the years 1830·70 
as a period when the preconditions were actively established, I87o-1900 
as a period of take-off. This view is supported by scattered and highly 
approximate estimates of Danish National Wealth which exhibit a 













Falbe-Hansen, Danmarks statistik, 1885. 
ibid. 
Tax-commission of 1903. 
Jens Warming, Danmarks statistik, 1913. 
Jens Warming, Danmarks erhvervsor sam-
fundsliv, 1930. 
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Swedish data begin in the decade 1861-70; and the Swedish 
take-off is to be dated from the latter years of the decade. 
Kuznets' table of calculations for Sweden follows : 
DGCF1 as DNCF3 as Depreciation 
Decade percentage percentage to DGCF 
of GNP2 ofNNP (percentage) 
------
r861-70 .. . . 5·8 3"5 (42) 
1871-80 . . .. 8·8 5"3 (42) 
1881-go . . .. 10·8 6·6 (42) 
1891-1900 . . .. 13•7 8·1 43"9 
1901-10 . . .. 18·o n·6 40"0 
19n-2o . . .. 20·2 13•5 38·3 
1921-30 . . .. 19·0 II•4 45"2 
Note (Kuznets) : Based on estimates in Eric Lindahl, Einan 
Dahlgren and Karin Kock, National Income of Sweden, 1861-1930 
(London: P. J. Kingston, 1937), Parts One and Two, particularly 
the details in Part Two. 
These underlying totals of capital formation exclude changes in 
inventories. 
While gross totals are directly from the volumes referred to above, 
depreciation for the first three decades was not given. We assumed 
that it formed 42 per cent of gross domestic capital formation. 
The Canadian Case 
The data developed by 0. J. Firestone• for Canada indicates 
a similar transition for net capital formation in its take-off 
1939 
1950 






Economic expert committee of 1943, 
,Pkonomiske efterkrigsproblemer, 1945· 
N. Banke, N. P. Jacobsen og Vedel-
Petersen, Danske erhvervsliv, 1951. 
(Furnished in correspondence by Einar Cohn and Kjeld Bjerke.) It 
should again be emphasized, however, that we are dealing with a hypo-
thesis whose empirical foundations are still fragmentary. 
1 DGCF: domestic gross capital formation. (Ed.) 
1 GNP: gross national product. (Ed.) 
8 DNCF : domestic net capital formation. (Ed.) 
a 0. J. Firestone, Canada's Economic Development, r867-I95Z, with 
Special Reference to Changes in the Country's National Product and 
National Wealth, paper prepared for the International Association for 
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(say, r8g6-1914) ; but the gross investment proportion in the 
period from Confederation to the mid-nineties was higher 
than appears to have marked other periods when the pre-
conditions were established, possibly due to investment in 
the railway net, abnormally large for a nation of Canada's 
population, and to relatively heavy foreign investment, even 
before the great capital import boom of the pre-1914 decade: 
Canada: Gross and Net Investment in Durable Physical Assets as 
Percentage of Gross and Net National Expenditure (for Selected Years) 
GCF NCF Capital consumption 
GNP NNP 
as percentage of gross 
investment 
1870 .. rs·o J•I s6·2 
1900 .. 13•1 4'0 72'5 
1920 .. r6·6 ro·6 41'3 
1929 .. 23'0 12·1 53'3 
1952 .. r6·8 9'3 49'7 
The Pattern of Contemporary Evidence in General1 
In the years after 1945 the number of countries for which 
reasonably respectable national income (or product) data 
exist has grown; and with such data there have developed 
some tolerable savings and investment estimates for countries 
at different stages of the growth process. Within the category 
of nations usually grouped as 'underdeveloped' one can dis-
tinguish four types :ll 
Research in Income and Wealth, 1953. to which Mr Firestone has 
kindly funished me certain revisions. By 1900 Canada already had 
about I8,ooo miles of railway line; but the territory served had been 
developed to a limited degree only. By 1900 Canada already had a 
net balance of foreign indebtedness over $x billion. Although this figure 
was almost quadrupled in the next two decades, capital imports 
represented an important increment to domestic capital sources from 
the period of Confederation down to the prc-1914 Canadian boom, which 
begins in the mid-189os. 
1 I am indebted to Mr Everett Hagen for mobilizing the statistical 
data in this section, except where otherwise indicated. 
2 The percentages given are of net capital formation to net domestic 
product. The latter is the product net of depreciation of the geographic 
area. It includes the value of output produced in the area, regardless 
of whether the income flows abroad. Since indirect business taxes are 
not deducted, it tends to be larger than national income ; hence the 
percentages are lower than if national income was used as the deno-
minator in computing them. 
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/ (a) Pretake-off economies, where the apparent savings and 
investment rates, including limited net capital imports, pro-
bably come to under 5 per cent of net national product. In 
general, data for such countries are not satisfactory, and one's 
judgement that capital formation is low must rest on 
fragmentary data and partially subjective judgement. 
Examples are Ethiopia, Kenya, Thailand, Cambodia, 
Afghanistan and perhaps Indonesia. 1 
"' (b) Economies attempting take-off, where the apparent 
savings and investment rates, including limited net capital 
imports, have risen over 5 per cent of net national product.a 
For example, Mexico (1950) NCF fNDP3 7 · z per cent; Chile 
(rg5o) NCFfNDP 9·5 per cent; Panama (rg5o) NCFfNDP 
7·5 per cent; Philippines (1952) NCFfNDP 6·4 per cent; 
Puerto Rico (1952) NCF(Private) /NDP 7 · 6 per cent; India 
(1953) NCF fNDP, perhaps about 7 per cent. Whether the 
take-off period will, in fact, be successful remains in most of 
these cases still to be seen. 
'· (c) Growing economies, where the apparent savings and 
investment rates, including limited net capital imports, have 
reached ro per cent or over; for example, Colombia (1950) 
NCF fNDP, r6 · 3 per cent. 
· ',). (d) Enclave economies. (r) cases where the apparent savings 
- 'and investment rates, including substantial net capital imports, 
have reached ro per cent or over, but the domestic precondi-
1 The Office of Intelligence Research of the Department of State, 
Washington, D.C., gives the following estimated ratios of investment 
(presumably gross) to GNP in its Report No. 6672 of 25 August 1954, 
p. 3, based on latest data available to that point, for countries which 
would probably fall in the pretake-off category: 
Afghanistan .. 5 per cent Pakistan .. 6 per cent 
Ceylon .. 5 per cent Indonesia . . . . 5 per cent 
• The Department of State estimates (ibid.) for economies which are 
either attempting take-off or which have, perhaps, passed into a stage 
of regular growth inClude : 
Argentine 13 per cent Colombia 14 per cent 
Brazil 14 per cent Philippines 8 per cent 
Chile rr per cent Venezuela 23 per cent 
Venezuela has been for some time an 'enclave economy', with a high 
investment rate concentrated in a modern export sector whose growth 
did not generate general economic momentum in the Venezuelan 
economy; but in the past few years Venezuela may have moved over 
into the category of economies experiencing an authentic take-off. 
1 NCF: net capital forn1ation; NDP: net domestic product. (Ed.). 
The Take-off into Self-sustained Growth IJI 
tions for sustained growth have not been achieved. These 
economies, associated with major export -industries, lack the 
third condition for take-off suggested above (p. 164). They 
include the Belgian Congo (1951) NCF JNDP 21 · 7 per cent ; 
Southern Rhodesia (1950) GCF JGDP1 45 · 5 per cent, (1952) 
GCF JGDP 45 · 4 per cent. (2) Cases where net capital exports 
are large. For example, Burma (1938) NCF JNDP, 7 ·I per cent; 
net capital exportsJNDP, II· 5 per cent; Nigeria (I95G-5I) 
NCFJNDP, 5 ·I percent; net capital exportsjNDP, 5 ·6 per cent. 
The Cases of India and Communist China 
The two outstanding contemporary cases of economies 
attempting purposefully to take-off are India and Communist 
China, both operating under national plans. The Indian First 
Five Year Plan projects the growth process envisaged under 
assumptions similar to those in paragraph I, p. 167, above. The 
Indian Planning Commission estimated investment as 5 per 
cent of NNP in the initial year of the plan, I95G-5I.2 Using a 
3/I marginal capital-output ratio, they envisaged a marginal 
savings rate of 20 per cent for the First Five Year Plan, a so 
per cent rate thereafter, down to 1968-9, when the average 
proportion of income invested would level off at 20 per cent of 
NNP. As one would expect, the sectoral composition of this 
process is not fully worked out in the initial plan ; but the 
Indian effort may well be remembered in economic history as 
the first take-off defined ex ante in national product terms. 
We know less of the Chinese Communist First Five Year 
Plan than we do of the concurrent Indian effort, despite the 
recent publication of production goals for some of the major 
sectors of the Chinese economy.3 Roundly, it would appear 
that, from a (probably) negative investment rate in 1949, the 
Chinese Communist regime had succeeded by 1952 in achieving 
a gross rate of about 12 per cent ; a net rate of about 7 per cent. 
1 GCF : gross capital formation; GDP : gross domestic product. 
(Ed.) 
1 Government of India, Planning Commission, The FiYst Five YeaY 
Plan, 1952, Vol. I, Chapter 1. 
3 These comments are based on the work of Alexander Eckstein and 
the author in The PYospects jOY Communist China (New York and 
London, 1954), Part 5. pp. 222-4. The statistical calculations are the 
work of Mr Eckstein .. 
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On arbitrary assumptions, which have a distinct upward 
bias, these figures can be projected forward for a decade 
yielding rates of about 20 per cent gross, 17 per cent net by 
1962. 
So far as the aggregates are concerned, what we can say is 
that the Indian planned figures fall well within the range of 
prima facie hypothesis and historical experience, if India in 
fact fulfils the full requirements for take-off, notably the 
achievement of industrial momentum. The Chinese Communist 
figures reflect accurately an attempt to force the pace of history, 
evident throughout Peking's domestic policy, whose viability 
is still to be demonstrated. In particular, Peking's agricultural 
policy may fail to produce the minimum structural balance 
required for a successful take-off, requiring radical revision 
of investment allocations and policy objectives at a later stage. 
We have, evidently, much still to learn about the quantitative 
aspects of this problem; and, especially, much further quanti-
tative research and imaginative manipulation of historical 
evidence will be required before the hypothesis tentatively 
advanced here can be regarded as proved or disproved. What 
we can say is that prima facie thought and a scattering of 
historical and contemporary evidence suggests that it is not 
unreasonable to consider the take-off as including as a necessary 
but not sufficient condition a quantitative transition in the 
proportion of income productively invested of the kind 
indicated here. 
THE INNER STRUCTURE OF THE TAKE-OFF 
Whatever the importance and virtue of viewing the take-off 
in aggregative terms-embracing national output, the pro-
portion of output invested, and an aggregate marginal capital-
output ratio-that approach tells us relatively little of what 
actually happens and of the causal processes at work in a 
take-off ; nor is the investment-rate criterion conclusive. 
Following the definition of take-off (pp. 164-6, above), we 
must consider not merely how a rise in the investment rate 
is brought about, from both supply and demand perspectives, 
but how rapidly growing manufacturing sectors emerged and 
imparted their primary and secondary growth impulses to 
the economy. 
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Perhaps the most important thing to be said about the 
behaviour of these variables in historical cases of take-off is 
that they have assumed many different forms. There is no 
single pattern. The rate and productivity of investment can 
rise, and the consequences of this rise can be diffused into a 
self-reinforcing general growth process by many different 
technical and economic routes, under the aegis of many different 
political, social and cultural settings, driven along by a wide 
variety of human motivations. 
The purpose of the following paragraphs is to suggest 
briefly, and by way of illustration only, certain elements of 
both uniformity and variety in the variables whose movement 
has determined the inner structure of the take-off. 
The Supply of Loanable Funds 
By and large, the loanable funds required to finance the 
take-off have come from two types of sources : from shifts in 
the control over income flows, including income-distribution 
changes and capital imports ;1 and from the plough-back of 
profits in rapidly expanding particular sectors. 
The notion of economic development occurring as the result 
of income shifts from those who will spend (hoard2 or lend) 
less productively to those who will spend (or lend) more pro-
ductively is one of the oldest and most fundamental notions 
in economics. It is basic to the Wealth of Nations,3 and it is 
applied by W. Arthur Lewis in his recent elaboration of the 
classical model.' Lewis builds his model in part on an expansion 
1 Mr Everett Hagen has pointed out that the increase in savings may 
well arise from a shift in the propensity to save, as new and exciting 
horizons open up, rather than merely from a shift of income to groups 
with a higher (but static) propensity to save. He may well be right. 
This is, evidently, a matter for further investigation. 
2 Hoarding can, of course, be helpful to the growth process by depres-
sing consumption and freeing resources for investment if, in fact, non-
hoarding persons or institutions acquire the resources and possess the 
will to expand productive investment. A direct transfer of income is, 
evidently, not required. 
3 See, especially, Smith's observations on the 'perversion' of wealth 
by 'prodigality '-that is, unproductive consumption expenditures-
and on the virtues of' parsimony' which transfers income to those who 
will increase 'the fund which is destined for the maintenance of pro-
ductive hands'. Routledge edition, London, I8go, pp. 259-60. 
4 Op. cit. 
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of the capitalist sector, with the bulk of additional savings 
arising from an enlarging pool of capitalist profits. 
Historically, income shifts conducive to ecpnomic develop-
ment have assumed many forms. In Meiji Japan and also in 
Czarist Russia the substitution of government bonds for the 
great landholders' claim on the flow of rent payments lead to 
a highly Smithian redistribution of income into the hands of 
those with higher propensities to seek material advance and 
to accept innovations. In both cases the real value of the 
government bonds exchanged for land depreciated ; and, in 
general, the feudal landlords emerged with a less attractive 
arrangement than had first appeared to be offered. Aside from 
the confiscation effect, two positive impulses arose from land 
reform: the state itself used the flow of payments from pea-
sants, now diverted from landlords' hands, for activity which 
encouraged economic development ; and a certain number 
of the more enterprising former landlords directly invested in 
commerce and industry. In contemporary India and China 
we can observe quite different degrees of income transfer by 
this route. India is relying to only a very limited extent on the 
elimination of large incomes unproductively spent by large 
landlords ; although this element figures in a small way in its 
programme. Communist China has systematically transferred 
all non-governmental pools of capital into the hands of the 
State, in a series of undisguised or barely disguised capital 
levies ; and it is drawing heavily for capital resources on the 
mass of middle and poor peasants who remain.1 
In addition to confiscatory and taxation devices, which can 
operate effectively when the State is spending more produc-
tively than the taxed individuals, inflation has been important 
to several take-offs. In Britain of the late 1790s, the United 
States of the 18sos, Japan of the 187os there is no doubt that 
capital formation was aided by price inflation, which shifted 
resources away from consumption to profits. 
The shift of income flows into more productive hands has, 
of course, been aided historically not only by government 
fiscal measures but also by banks and capital markets. Virtually 
without exception, the take-off periods have been marked by 
1 Prospects for Communist China, Part 4· 
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the extension of banking institutions which expanded the 
supply of working capital ; and in most cases also by an expan-
sion in the range of long-range financing done by a central, 
formally organized, capital market. 
Although these familiar capital-supply functions of the State 
and private institutions have been important to the take-off, 
it is likely to prove the case, on close examination, that a 
necessary condition for take-off was the existence of one or 
more rapidly growing sectors whose entrepreneurs (private 
or public) ploughed back into new capacity a very high pro-
portion of profits. Put another way, the demand side of the 
investment process, rather than the supply of loanable funds, 
may be the decisive element in the take-off, as opposed to 
the period of creating the preconditions, or of sustaining 
growth once it is under way. The distinction is, historically, 
sometimes difficult to make, notably when the State simul-
taneously acts both to mobilize supplies of finance and to 
undertake major entrepreneurial acts. There are, nevertheless, 
periods in economic history when quite substantial improve-
ments in the machinery of capital supply do not, in themselves, 
initiate a take-off, but fall within the period when the pre-
conditions are created: e.g., British banking developments 
in the century before 1783; Russian banking developments 
before 1890, etc. 
One extremely important version of the plough-back process 
has taken place through foreign trade. Developing economies 
have created from their natural resources major export in-
dustries ; and the rapid expansion in exports has been used to 
finance the import of capital equipment and to service the 
foreign debt during the take-off. United States, Russian and 
Canadian grain fulfilled this function, Swedish timber and 
pulp, Japanese silk, etc. Currently Chinese exports to the 
Communist Bloc, wrung at great administrative and human 
cost from the agricultural sector, play this decisive role. It 
should be noted that the development of such export sectors 
has not in itself guaranteed accelerated capital formation. 
Enlarged foreign-exchange proceeds have been used in many 
familiar cases to finance hoards (as in the famous case 
of Indian bullion imports) or unproductive consumption 
outlays. 
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It should be noted that one possible mechanism for inducing 
a high rate of plough-back into productive investment is a 
rapid expansion in the effective demand for domestically 
manufactured consumers' goods, which would direct into the 
hands of vigorous entrepreneurs an increasing proportion of 
income flows rmder circumstances which would lead them to 
expand their own capacity and to increase their requirements 
for industrial raw materials, semi-manufactured products and 
manufactured components. 
A final element in the supply of loanable funds, is, of course, 
capital imports. Foreign capital has played a major role in the 
take-off stage of many economies : e.g., the United States, 
Russia, Sweden, Canada. The cases of Britain and Japan 
indicate, however, that it cannot be regarded as an essential 
condition. Foreign capital was notably useful when the con-
struction of railways or other large overhead capital items 
with a long period of gestation, played an important role in 
the take-off. After all, whatever its strategic role, the propor-
tion of investment required for growth which goes into industry 
is relatively small compared to that required for utilities, 
transport and the housing of enlarged urban populations. 
And foreign capital can be mightily useful in helping carry 
the burden of these overhead items either directly or indirectly. 
What can we say, in general, then, about the supply of 
finance during the take-off period ? First, as a precondition, 
it appears necessary that the community's surplus above the 
mass-consumption level does not flow into the hands of those 
who will sterilize it by hoarding, luxury consumption or low-
productivity investment outlays. Second, as a precondition, 
it appears necessary that institutions be developed which 
provide cheap and adequate working capital. Third, as a 
necessary condition, it appears that one or more sectors of the 
economy must grow rapidly, inducing a more general indus-
trialization process; and that the entrepreneurs in such sectors 
plough back a substantial proportion of their profits in further 
productive investment, one possible and recurrent version of 
the plough-back process being the investment of proceeds 
from a rapidly growing export sector. 
The devices, confiscatory and fiscal, for ensuring the first 
and second preconditions have been historically various. And, 
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as indicated below, the types of leading manufacturing sectors 
which have served to initiate the take-off have varied greatly. 
Finally, foreign capital flows have, in significant cases, proved 
extremely important to the take-off, notably when lumpy 
overhead capital construction of long gestation period was 
required ; but take-offs have also occurred based almost wholly 
on domestic sources of finance. 
Tke Sources of Entrepreneurship 
It is evident that the take-off requires the existence and the 
successful activity of some group in the society which accepts 
borrowers' risk, when such risk is so defined as to include the 
propensity to accept innovations. As noted above, the problem 
of entrepreneurship in the take-off has not been profound in 
a limited group of wealthy agricultural nations whose popula· 
tions derived by emigration mainly from north-western Europe. 
There the problem of take-off was primarily economic; and 
when economic incentives for industrialization emerged com-
mercial and banking groups moved over easily into industrial 
entrepreneurship. In many other countries, however, the 
development of adequate entrepreneurship was a more search-
ing social process. 
Under some human motivation or other, a group must come 
to perceive it to be both possible and good to undertake acts 
of capital investment ; and, for their efforts to be tolerably 
successful, they must act with approximate rationality in 
selecting the directions toward which their enterprise is 
directed. They must not only produce growth but tolerably 
balanced growth. We cannot quite say that it is necessary 
for them to act as if they were trying to maximize profit ; 
for the criteria for private profit maximization do not neces-
sarily converge with the criteria for an optimum rate and 
pattern of growth in various sectors.1 But in a growing economy, 
1 For a brief discussion of this point see the author's • Trends in the 
Allocation of Resources in Secular Growth', Chapter 15, Economic 
Progress, ed. Leon H. Dupriez. with the assistance of Douglas C. Hague 
(Louvain, 1955), pp. 378-9. For a more complete discussion see W. 
Fellner, 'Individual Investment Projects in Growing Economies' 
(mimeographed), paper presented to the Center for International 
Studies Social Science Research Council Conference on Economic 
Growth, October 1954. Cambridge, Massachusetts. 
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over periods longer than the business cycle, economic history 
is reasonably tolerant of deviations from rationality, in the 
sense that excess capacity is finally put to productive use. 
Leaving aside the question of ultimate human motivation, 
and assuming that the major overhead items are generated, 
if necessary, by some form of state initiative (including sub-
sidy), we can say as a first approximation that some group 
must successfully emerge which behaves as if it were moved 
by the profit motive, in a dynamic economy with changing 
production functions ; although risk being the slippery variable, 
it is under such assumptions Keynes' dictum should be borne 
in mind : 'If human nature felt no temptation to take a chance, 
no satisfaction (profit apart) in constructing a factory, a railway, 
a mine or a farm, there might not be much investment merely 
as a result of cold calculation. '1 
In this connexion it is increasingly conventional for econo-
mists to pay their respects to the Protestant ethic.2 The histo-
rian should not be ungrateful for this light on the grey horizon 
of formal growth models. But the known cases of economic 
growth which theory must seek to explain take us beyond the 
orbit of Protestantism. In a world where Samurai, Parsees, 
Jews, North Italians, Turkish, Russian, and Chinese Civil 
Servants (as well as Huguenots, Scotsmen and British North-
countrymen) have played the role of a leading elite in economic 
growth John Calvin should not be made to bear quite this 
weight. More fundamentally, allusion to a positive scale of 
religious or other values conducive to profit-maximizing 
activities is an insufficient sociological basis for this important 
phenomenon. What appears to be required for the emergence 
of such elites is not merely an appropriate value system but 
two further conditions : first, the new ilite must feel itself 
denied the conventional routes to prestige and power by the 
traditional less acquisitive society ()f which it is a part ; second, 
the traditional society must be sufficiently flexible (or 
weak) to permit its members to seek material advance 
(or political power) as a route upwards alternative to 
conformity. 
1 General The&y, p. 150. 
2 See, for example, N. Kaldor, 'Economic Growth and Cyclical 
Fluctuations', The Economic journal, March 1954, p. 67. 
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Although an elite entrepreneurial class appears to be required I" 
for take-off, with significant power over aggregate incom~ 
flows and industrial investment decisions, most take-off 
h~e been ~ceded or accompa~d by radical thange m agri= 
cultural techmques and market orgamzatron. By and large 
tneagriculttifar entrepreneur has been the individual land-
owning farmer. A requirement for take-off is, therefore, a 
class of farmers willing and able to respond to the possibilities 
opened up for them by new techniques, land-holding arrange-
ments, transport facilities, and forms of market and credit 
organization. 'A small purposeful elite can go a long way in 
initiating economic growth; but, especially in agriculture 
(and to some extent in the industrial working force), a wider-
based revolution in outlook must come about. 1 
Whatever further empirical research may reveal about the 
motives which have led men to undertake the constructive 
entrepreneurial acts of the take-off period, this much appears 
sure : these motives have varied greatly, from one society to 
another; and they have rarely, if ever, been motives of an 
unmixed material character. 
Leading Sectors in the Take-off 
The author has presented elsewhere the notion that the 
overall rate of growth of an economy must be regarded in the 
first instance as the consequence of differing growth rates in 
particular sectors of the economy, such sectoral growth rates 
being in part derived from certain overall demand parameters 
1 Like the population question, agriculture is mainly excluded from 
this analysis, which considers the take-off rather than the whole develop-
ment process. Nevertheless, it should be noted that, as a matter of 
history, agricultural revolutions have generally preceded or accom-
panied the take-off. In theory we can envisage a take-off which did not 
require a radical improvement in agricultural productivity ;. if, for 
example, the growth and productivity of the industrial sector permitted 
a withering away of traditional agriculture and a substitution for it 
of imports. In fact, agricultural revolutions have been required to 
permit rapidly growing (and urbanizing) populations to be fed without 
exhausting foreign exchange resources in food imports or creating 
excessive hunger in the rural sector; and as noted at several points in 
this argument, agricultural revolutions have in fact played an essential 
and positive role, not merely by both releasing workers to the cities, 
and feeding them, but also by earning foreign exchange for general 
capital-formation purposes. 
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(e.g., population, consumers' income, tastes, etc.), in part from 
the primary and secondary effects of changing supply factors, 
when these are effectively exploited.I 
On this view the sectors of an economy may be grouped in 
three categories : 
(a) Primary growth sectors, where possibilities for innova-
tion or for the exploitation of newly profitable or hitherto 
unexplored resources yield a high growth rate and set in motion 
expansionary forces elsewhere in the economy. 
(b) Supplementary growth sectors, where rapid advance 
occurs in direct response to--or as a requirement of-advance 
in the primary growth sectors; e.g., coal, iron and engineering 
in relation to railroads. These sectors may have to be tracked 
many stages back into the economy, as the Leontief input-
output models would suggest. 
(c) Derived growth sectors, where advance occurs in some 
fairly steady relation to the growth of total real income, popu-
lation, industrial production or some other overall, modestly 
increasing parameter. Food output in relation to population, 
housing in relation to family formation are classic derived 
relations of this order. 
Very roughly speaking, primary and supplementary growth 
sectors derive their high momentum essentially from the 
introduction and diffusion of changes in the cost-supply 
environment (in turn, of course, partially influenced by demand 
changes); while the derived-growth sectors are linked essen-
tially to changes in demand (while subject also to continuing 
changes in production functions of a less dramatic character). 
At any period of time it appears to be true even in a mature 
and growing economy that forward momentum is maintained 
as the result of rapid expansion in a limited number of primary 
sectors, whose expansion has significant external economy 
and bther secondary effects. From this perspective the 
behaviour of sectors during the take-off is merely a special 
version of the growth process in general; or, put another way, 
growth proceeds by repeating endlessly, in different patterns, 
with different leading sectors, the experience of the take-off. 
1 Process of Economic Growth, Chapter 4, especially pp. 97-102 ; 
and, in greater detail, 'Trends in the Allocation of Resources in Secular 
Growth', see above, p. 177, n. I. 
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Like the take-off, long-term growth requires that the society 
not only generate vast quantities of capital for depreciation 
and maintenance, for housing and for a balanced complement 
of utilities and other overheads, but also a sequence of highly 
productive primary sectors, growing rapidly, based on new 
production functions. Only thus has the aggregate marginal 
capital-output ratio been kept low. 
Once again history is full of variety: a considerable array 
of sectors appears to have played this key role in the take-off 
process. 
The development of a cotton-textile industry sufficient to 
meet domestic requirements has not generally imparted a 
sufficient impulse in itself to launch a self-sustaining growth 
process. The development of modern cotton-textile industries 
in substitution for imports has, more typically, marked the 
pretake-off period, as for example in India, China and Mexico. 
There is, however, the famous exception of Britain's 
industrial revolution. Baines' table on raw-cotton imports and 
his comment on it are worth quoting, covering as they do 
the original leading sector in the first take-off :1 
Rate of Increase in the Import of Cotton-wool, in Periods of 
Ten Years from 1741 to 1831 
I per cent per cent 
IJ4I-IJ5I . . 8r 1791-r8or .. 67! 
IJ5I-I76I . . .. zrt r8or-r8u . . 39t 
I761-1771 .. . . 25t r8n-r8zr . . 93 
1771-I781 . . . . 75! r8zr-r831 .. 85 
IJ8I-I79I .. . . 3I9t 
From r6g7 to 1741, the increase was trifling: between 1741 and 
1751 the manufacture, though still insignificant in extent, made a 
considerable spring : during the next twenty years, the increase 
was moderate: from 1771 to 1781, owing to the invention of the 
jenny and the water-frame, a rapid increase took place : in the ten 
years from 1781 to 1791, being those which immediately followed 
the invention of the mule and the expiration of Arkwrights's patent, 
the rate of advancement was prodigiously accelerated, being nearly 
320 per cent : and from that time to the present, and especially since 
1 E. Baines, History of the Cotton Manufacture (London, 1835), p. 348. 
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the close of the war, the increase, though considerably moderated, 
has been rapid and steady far beyond all precedent in any other 
manufacture. 
Why did the development of a modem factory system in 
cotton textiles lead on in Britain to a self-sustaining growth 
process, whereas it failed to do so in other cases ? Part of the 
answer lies in the fact that, by the late eighteenth century, 
the preconditions for take-off in Britain were very fully deve-
loped. Progress in textiles, coal, iron and even steam power 
had been considerable through the eighteenth century ; and 
the social and institutional environment was propitious. But 
two further technical elements helped determine the upshot. 
First, the British cotton-textile industry was large in relation 
to the total size of the economy. From its modern beginnings, 
but notably from the 178os forward, a very high proportion 
of total cotton-textile output was directed abroad, reaching 
6o per cent by the 182os.1 The evolution of this industry was 
a more massive fact, with wider secondary repercussions, 
than if it were simply supplying the domestic market. Industrial 
enterprise on this scale had secondary reactions on the develop-
ment of urban areas, the demand for coal, iron and machinery, 
the demand for working capital and ultimately the demand 
for cheap transport, which powerfully stimulated industrial 
development in other directions. a 
Second, a source of effective demand for rapid expansion 
in British cotton textiles was supplied, in the first instance, 
by the sharp reduction in real costs and prices which accom-
panied the technological developments in manufacture and 
the cheapening real cost of raw cotton induced by the cotton 
gin. In this Britain had an advantage not enjoyed by those 
who came later ; for they merely substituted domestic for 
foreign-manufactured cotton textiles. The substitution 
1 The volume (official value) of British cotton goods exports rose 
from £355,o6o in 1780 to £7,624,505 in r8oz (Baines, op. cit., p. 350). 
See also the calculation of R. C. 0. Matthews, A Study in Trade Cycle 
History (Cambridge, 1954), pp. 127-9. 
1 If we are prepared to treat New England of the first half of the 
nineteenth century as a separable economy, its take-off into sustained 
growth can be allocated to the period, roughly, 1820-50 and, again, a 
disproportionately large cotton-textile industry based substantially 
on exports (that is, from New England to the rest of the United States) 
is the regional foundation for sustained growth. 
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undoubtedly had important secondary effects by introducing a 
modem industrial sector and releasing in net a pool of foreign 
exchange for other purposes ; but there was no sharp fall in 
the real cost of acquiring cotton textiles and no equivalent 
lift in real income. 
The introduction of the railroad has been historically the 
most powerful single initiator of take-offs.l It was decisive 
in the United States, Germany and Russia; it has played an 
extremely important part in the Swedish, Japanese and other 
cases. The railroad has had three major kinds of impact on 
economic growth during the take-off period. First, it has 
lowered internal transport costs, brought new areas and 
products into commercial markets and, in general, performed 
the Smithian function of widening the market. Second, it has 
been a prerequisite in many cases to the development of a 
major new and rapidly enlarging export sector which, in tum, 
has served to generate capital for internal development ; as, 
for example, the American railroads of the r8sos, the Russian 
and Canadian railways before 1914. Third, and perhaps most 
important for the take-off itself, the development of railways 
has led on to the development of modem coal, iron and engin-
eering industries. In many countries the growth of modem 
basic industrial sectors can be traced in the most direct way 
to the requirements for building and, especially, for maintain-
ing substantial railway systems. When a society has developed 
deeper institutional, social and political prerequisites for take-
off, the rapid growth of a railway system with these powerful 
triple effects has often served to lift it into self-sustaining 
growth. Where the prerequisities have not existed, however, 
very substantial railway building has failed to initiate a take-
off, as, for example, in India, China, pre-1895 Canada, pre-1914 
Argentine, etc. 
It is clear that an enlargement and modernization of Armed 
Forces could play the role of a leading sector in take-off. It 
was a factor in the Russian, Japanese and German take-offs; 
and it figures heavily in current Chinese Communist plans. 
1 For a detailed analysis of the routes of impact of the railroad on 
economic development see Paul H. Cootner, Transport Innovation and 
Economic Development : The Case of the U.S. Railroads, 1953, un-
published doctoral thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology. 
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But historically the role of modern armaments has been 
ancillary rather than central to the take-off. 
Quite aside froin their role in supplying foreign exchange 
for general capital-formation purposes, raw materials and 
foodstuffs can play the role of leading sectors in the take-off 
if they involve the application of modern processing techniques. 
The timber industry, built on the steam saw, fulfilled this 
function in the first phase of Sweden's take-off, to be followed 
shortly by the pulp industry. Similarly, the shift of Denmark 
to meat and dairy products, after 1873, appears to have re-
inforced the development of a manufacturing sector in the 
economy, as well as providing a major source of foreign 
exchange. And as Lockwood notes, even the export of Japanese 
silk thread had important secondary effects which developed 
modern production techniques.1 
'To satisfy the demands of American weaving and hosiery mills 
for uniform, high-grade yarn, however, it was necessary to improve 
the quality of the product, from the silkworm egg on through to 
the bale of silk. In sericulture this meant the introduction of scienti-
fic methods of breeding and disease control ; in reeling it stimulated 
the shift to large filatures equipped with machinery ; in marketing 
it led to large-scale organization in the collection and sale of cocoons 
and raw silk ... it exerted steady pressure in favour of the applica-
tion of science, machinery, and modern business enterprise.' 
The role of leading sector has been assumed, finally, by the 
accelerated development of domestic manufacture of consump-
tion goods over a wide range in substitution for imports, as, 
for example, in Australia, the Argentine and perhaps in con-
temporary Turkey. 
What can we say, then, in general about these leading 
sectors? Historically, they have ranged from cotton textiles, 
through heavy-industry complexes based on railroads and 
military-end products, to timber, pulp, dairy products and 
finally a wide· variety of consumers' goods. There is, clearly, 
no one sectoral sequence for take-off, no single sector which 
constitutes the magic key. There· is no need for a growing society 
to recapitulate the structural sequence and pattern of Britain, 
the United States or Russia. Four basic factors must be present: 
l W. W. Lockwood, The Economic Development of Japan (Princeton, 
I95'l), pp. 338-g. 
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I. There must be enlarged effective demand for the product 
or products of sectors which yield a foundation for a rapid rate 
of growth in output. Historically this has been brought about 
initially by the transfer of income from consumption or hoard-
ing to productive investment ; by capital imports ; by a sharp 
increase in the productivity of current investment inputs, 
yielding an increase in consumers' real income expended on 
domestic manufactures ; or by a combination of these routes. 
2. There must be an introduction into these sectors of new 
production functions as well as an expansion of capacity. 
3· The society must be capable of generating capital initially 
required to detonate the take-off in these key sectors ; and 
especially, there must be a high rate of plough-back by the 
(private or state) entrepreneurs controlling capacity and techni-
que in these sectors and in the supplementary growth sectors 
they stimulated to expand. 
4· Finally, the leading sector or sectors must be such that 
their expansion and technical transformation induce a chain 
of Leontief input-output requirements for increased capacity 
and the potentiality for new production functions in other 
sectors, to which the society, in fact, progressively responds. 
CONCLUSION 
This hypothesis is, then, a return to a rather old-fashioned 
way of looking at economic development. The take-off is 
defined as an industrial revolution, tied directly to radical 
changes in methods of production, having their decisive con-
sequence over a relatively short period of time. 
This view would not deny the role of longer, slower changes 
in the whole process of economic growth. On the contrary, 
take-off requires a massive set of preconditions going to the 
heart of a society's economic organization and its effective 
scale of values. Moreover, for the take-off to be successful, it 
must lead on progressively to sustained growth ; and this 
implies further deep and often slow-moving changes in the 
economy and the society as a whole. 
What this argument does assert is that the rapid growth of 
one or more new manufacturing sectors is a powerful and 
essential engine of economic transformation. Its power derives 
from the multiplicity of its forms of impact, when a society 
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is prepared to respond positively to this impact. Growth in 
such sectors, with new production functions of high producti-
vity, in itself tends 'to raise output per head; it places incomes 
in the hands of men who will not merely save a high proportion 
of an expanding income but who will plough it into highly 
productive investment ; it sets up a chain of effective demand 
for other manufactured products ; it sets up a requirement 
for enlarged urban areas, whose capital costs may be high, 
but whose population and market organization help to make 
industrialization an on-going process ; and, finally, it opens 
up a range of external economy effects which, in the end, 
help to produce new leading sectors when the initial impulse 
of the take-off's leading sectors begins to wane. 
We can observe in history and in the contemporary world 
important changes in production functions in non-manufactur-
ing sectors which have powerful effects on whole societies. 
If natural resources are rich enough or the new agricultural 
tricks are productive enough such changes can even outstrip 
population growth and yield a rise in real output per head. 
Moreover, they may be a necessary prior condition for take-off 
or a necessary concomitant for take-off. Nothing in this analysis 
should be read as deprecating the importance of productivity 
changes in agriculture to the whole process of economic growth. 
But in the end take-off requires that a society find a way to 
apply effectively to its own peculiar resources what D. H. 
Robertson once called the tricks of manufacture ; and con-
tinued growth requires that it so organize itself as to continue 
to apply them in an unending flow, of changing composition. 
Only thus, as we have all been correctly taught, can that old 
demon, diminishing returns, be held at bay. 
3. THE THEORETICAL CONTEXT 
SOME NOTES TOWARDS A THEORY 
OF DERIVED DEVELOPMENT* 
by Henry C. Wallich 
THE SUBJECT OF THE PRESENT PAPER IS LARGELY THEORETICAL. 
As Dr Prebisch has said in the introduction to Theoretical and 
Practical Problems of Economic Growth, a proper theoretical 
basis is essential if effective policies are to be established. 
There is available, of course, a large amount of theoretical 
work based on the experience of the more developed countries. 
But for the less developed countries, this material has the 
disadvantage that it is written from a very different point of 
view. In fact, one is compelled to admit that it is distinctly 
lacking in sympathy for the problems of these countries. 
Granted that theory must be objective, I nevertheless believe 
that it will be difficult to do really fruitful thinking about the 
problems of these countries unless the thinker identifies him-
self with their point of view. The economic theorist who limits 
himself to thinking in terms of comparative advantage, of 
textbook notions of monetary stability and free trade, is likely 
to discover all kinds of obstacles and reasons why under-
developed countries cannot develop, and in particular cannot 
or should not industrialize. This negative kind of theorizing 
is interesting, but not particularly helpful. The purpose of a 
positive theory must be, not to find difficulties, but to solve 
them. 
Two representative approaches have been followed in the 
work done by economists in the more developed countries. 
One has been to bring to bear upon the various aspects of 
development, the body of doctrine that has been generated on 
these subjects. Thus, upon population questions there is brought 
to bear a theory of population, upon capital formation, a 
theory of saving and investment, and so forth. This approach 
is essential if we want to take full advantage of the tools of 
• A paper presented at the Third Meeting of Central Bank Technicians 
of the American Continent, Havana, 1952. Published with the author's 
permission. 
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analysis that already exist. It is not a very satisfying one, 
however, because it lacks organic unity. 
The alternative is to bring to bear upon these problems 
a single unifying theory of development. Schumpeter's sweep-
ing view of the economic process is probably the most out-
standing intellectual performance of this kind. The quality 
that makes this theory so widely admired is, I believe, its 
internal unity. From a few basic premises it proceeds to 
conclusions that embrace a large part of the economic scene. 
Numerous difficult problems suddenly come into focus and find 
an explanation when illuminated from the vantage point of 
Schumpeter's theory. The great current interest in questions 
of economic growth has brought renewed and widespread 
interest in the Schumpeterian doctrine. 
But in applying this doctrine to the less developed countries 
of our day, we find that it does not fit. In Schumpeter's model, 
the generating force is provided by the entrepreneur, the 
process is innovation, the goal is the establishment of a position 
of wealth and power for the entrepreneur. If we were to attach 
a general label to these concepts, one might say that they all 
belong to the sphere of production and supply. Popular living 
standards are not the goal, although they are likely to be the 
result. Factors of consumption and demand thus play a 
secondary role. 
That Schumpeter's theory does not satisfy the case of the 
less developed countries is fairly obvious. The entrepreneur 
is not the main driving force, innovation is not the most 
characteristic process, and private enrichment is not the 
dominant goal. But the three cornerstones of Schumpeter's 
edifice-motive force, process, and goal-are such as may 
serve as basis to any other theory of development. It seems 
possible to feel one's way in the direction of such a theory 
by contrasting, step by step, the known facts with the 
postulates of Schumpeter's theory. 
A SKETCH OF THE THEORY 
The Motive Force 
To suggest that the entrepreneur is not the main propelling 
force in the development of less advanced countries is not to 
deny, of course, that he plays a role. But it is a secondary 
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role. One of the reasons why some countries remained static 
while others advanced was, very probably, a difference in the 
national endowment with entrepreneurial qualities. For many 
years, opportunity has been open to entrepreneurs in these 
countries, but it has not been seized. It may be taken for 
granted, of course, that other circumstances have contributed 
to this stagnation. There is no reason to think, however, that 
these obstacles have been greater than those overcome else-
where by vigorous initiative. 
The human traits that have kept capitalists in the less 
developed countries from becoming entrepreneurs are well 
known. Real estate mindedness, mistrust of industrial ventures, 
remnants of a feudal past, have all contributed. Every 'survey 
report' of missions sent out by international agencies and 
others comments on this point. No doubt the role of the 
entrepreneur in less developed countries will expand as the 
countries progress. If it should anywhere become a dominant 
role, it will make the development process of that country 
much more like that envisaged by Schumpeter. However, once 
a development process has begun without the entrepreneur in 
the vanguard, his chances of achieving leadership seem slim. 
Socially, politically, and economically the cards seem to be 
stacked against him almost everywhere. No longer is he the 
hero of the piece, admired by economists, and, more important, 
by his compatriots. The law does not aid and abet him and 
his property interests on all sides, as it did during the heyday 
of capitalism. He seems to be regarded as a by-product of 
economic development, to be tolerated because of his usefulness 
but to be watched and curbed because of his selfish propen-
sities. If in most of the less developed countries his wealth 
escapes heavy taxation, it is mainly due to administrative 
inadequacies. 
Who, then, are the protagonists in the process of develop-
ment ? In most of the less developed countries, the develop-
ment process today seems to be predominantly a social, 
national, and also a nationalistic one. To a greater or lesser 
degree, the government is its most conspicuous and active 
agent. But in many cases, the government is in turn the 
spokesman for intensely felt popular demands. A widespread 
desire for higher living standards lies behind these demands. 
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For the first time, such desires, which must always have 
existed, are made into a real force by the dawning realization 
that progress is possible. Government action and mass impulses 
today seem to be the most characteristic motive forces of 
economic development. 
The Process 
What brings these government policies and mass impulses 
into being, and how do they function? If they are the main 
motive forces, an analysis of their origin and functioning 
should lead us to an understanding of the characteristic 
processes of development. It goes without saying that there 
are wide differences among countries and that the analysis will 
be applicable in different degrees to each one of them. What 
we are looking for is a theory that brings out the most character-
istic features from a broad variety of phenomena. 
It is probably advisable to distinguish two aspects of the 
development process. The first has to do with how the process 
is started. The question to be asked is : what are the stimuli 
that cause an economy to break out of a mould of stagnation, 
or to accelerate from a very slow rate of growth ? The second 
aspect relates to the character of the continuing development 
process-how does it keep going? For Latin American countries 
the first aspect is of no great importance, but it is for Asia 
and Africa. 
Most of the factors likely to produce development can be 
classified under the headings of pressure or opportunity. 
Neither pressure nor opportunity evidently are enough, 
however, since both have been present for most countries 
during many years without producing visible results. The 
pressure of extreme need has caused starvation rather than 
advancement. The challenge of opportunity has not been 
picked up. 
The 'break out' or acceleration seems to have been accom-
plished mainly through what one may describe as a widening 
of horizons aided by the pressure of need. What apparently 
happens is that the objective fact of opportunity is translated 
into a subjective realization of its presence. The' demonstration 
effect' investigated by Duesenberry and Nurkse, brought into 
action by better communication and transportation, seems to 
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have something to do with this widening of horizons. So no 
doubt does the exhilaration flowing from the end of colonial 
rule in some countries. These factors seem to have been of 
particular importance in Asia and Africa. 
Latin American countries have faced a somewhat different 
set of problems. Here it was less a question of initiating a rise 
in per capita income than of accelerating it. The demonstration 
effect, however, seems to have had its share in stimulating 
popular demand for economic development. Governments, too, 
seem to have been exposed to an effect of this kind. Many of 
them have been awakened, by the power of example, to wide 
possibilities of positive action towards development. In 
addition, Latin American governments have been moved to 
action by the pressure of events and expectations. The fear 
of deteriorating terms of trade has been a strong motive 
of industrial development. The danger of being cut off from 
foreign supplies, through depression and consequent loss of 
export markets, or through war, has worked in the same 
direction. 
In general, therefore, it seems to have been a combination 
of pressure and widening of horizons that has started off or 
accelerated the development drive. Perhaps one is not saying 
a great deal when one tries to separate the multiplicity of 
forces into two such categories. Obviously, there is a different 
set of specific causal factors behind the development of each 
country. The important thing is not to classify them, but to 
understand them. But if the classification is sensible, one may 
perhaps hope that it will contribute to understanding. 
So far, the mechanism described is not very far removed 
from the Schumpeterian model. The ' widening of horizons' 
leads, after all, to something resembling 'innovation'. But the 
continuation of the process, once started, is another matter. 
One can hardly say that in less developed countries' innovation' 
is its most characteristic feature. The process is better described 
perhaps as one of assimilation. No one would deny, of course, 
that to organize a new industry in a less developed country is 
an art of entrepreneurial initiative. But it is evidently very 
different from the original process of innovation. 
Incidentally, one may suspect that the process of assimi-
lation, being easier and quicker, engages less of the vital forces 
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of the people and provides less of an outlet for creative energy. 
This would in tum be reflected in the lesser position awarded 
in society to the entrepreneur. 
In other respects, too, present day development differs from 
that envisaged by Schumpeter. He, as well as Robertson and 
many continental economists, view innovations as an important 
or even as the main cause of business fluctuations. This is 
much less true of the process of assimilation. In the first place, 
there is less danger of temporary lulls in the- flow of investment 
opportunities, as long as foreign technology remains to be 
caught up with. In the second place, the cycle of most of the 
less developed economies is generated mainly in their inter-
national sectors, through changes in exports. It is much less 
a function of domestic investment. We shall encounter the 
implications of this and other differences between develop-
ment through assimilation, and development through 
innovation, in the later parts of this paper. 
Goals 
If the entrepreneur does not play the first fiddle in derived 
development, neither can his profit rank first among the 
goals of this process. Even in a Schumpeterian economy, 
entrepreneurial profit is not of course the national objective, 
as formulated by the government or the people. But in 
Schumpeter's framework, neither the government nor the 
people are prime movers. In the less developed countries, 
higher living standards seem to be the characteristic goal-
except in some totalitarian countries to which we shall revert 
later. That is the natural consequence of the fact that the 
locus of leadership lies, not in the entrepreneurial but, in the 
governmental and popular sphere. Governments--even when 
they have no ambition of power politics-might perhaps prefer 
to hold back consumption and postpone the rise in living 
standards in the interests of higher investment. But under 
present day conditions, their strength often depends on their 
ability to assume and carry out commitments to the 
electorate for rapid social improvement. It is not easy 
for them to go slow deliberately. The force of the develop-
ment drive is almost inevitably directed toward higher 
consumption. 
A Theory of Derived Development 
Consumption-oriented Development 
We started out by saying that one of the characteristics 
of Schumpeterian development is its orientation towards 
production. It draws its motive power from the sphere of 
supply. Of the other development process, one can say that it 
is predominantly oriented towards consumption. Its most 
characteristic elements belong to the sphere of demand. These 
characteristics are the result-not an inevitaqle one-of the 
fact that the process is based, not on innovation but on the 
assimilation of existing innovations. It is this feature that 
suggests the general concept of derived development-derived 
from innovations made elsewhere. 1 
The implications of the consumption- and demand-oriented 
character of derived development are far reaching. Like the 
imprint which is given to the Schumpeterian development 
process by its orientation towards the sphere of production 
and supply, the influence of orientation towards consumption 
is traceable in many phases of development. We shall find it 
reflected in the paucity of savings, in the secular tendency 
towards inflation, in the failure of the market process to be 
fully effective in distributing resources, and in the greater 
consequent importance of the political process. We shall also 
observe its impact upon the direction that development takes, 
and upon the speed with which development progresses. The 
orientation towards consumption and demand is, I believe, 
the most important and distinctive feature of the develop-
ment of the less developed countries. 
It goes without saying that the distinction here drawn rests 
upon emphasis and not upon some absolute. Consumption has 
its place in the Schumpeterian model and production has its 
in the theory of derived development. Moreover, the Schum-
peterian model does not seek to describe the totality of an 
advanced 19th century economy. It deals only with the most 
characteristic features. Thus, the development of the British 
economy had many aspects in which consumption and demand 
1 The term 'derived development' is not meant to suggest of course 
a colonial process of development resulting passively from the growth 
of other countries. This is the type of development that Dr Prebisch 
has called the 'development of the past'. Cf., Theoretical and Practical 
Problems of Economic Growth, p. 5 (United Nations Economic Com-
mission for Latin America, 1950}. 
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played an important role. The growth of the United States 
and of Germany had, at first, some of the marks of derived 
development. The governments of these countries in particular 
have been development-conscious almost from the very begin-
ning. But the characteristic spirit of the laissez-jaire days is 
well portrayed by the Schumpeterian thesis. The emphasis 
upon production in Adam Smith's economics corroborates our 
view of the basic orientation that prevailed. 
Likewise, the de-emphasis of the role of the entrepreneur in 
the theory of derived development does not imply that the 
entrepreneur does not fulfil a vital function. His role may well 
grow as countries progress. Production-consciousness exists 
and is increasing. These are all aspects of reality which it 
would be absurd to deny. What cannot be argued, however, 
is that they are dominant or characteristic aspects. 
Neither is the distinction between a supply-oriented and a 
demand-oriented economy a statistical proposition. Supply and 
demand always balance ex post-the amount sold is the same 
as the amount bought. Nevertheless, a persistent inflationary 
or deflationary bias is significant. Nor can much be proved by 
measuring the propensity to save, although a comparison of 
savings ratios at given per capita income levels would be 
instructive. 
The distinction made depends basically upon the spirit that 
animates the economy. It is social values that count-the 
approval bestowed respectively upon thrift, profit, and business 
success, or upon welfare, social security, and equality of 
income. It is obvious that even in the more advanced countries, 
which started out as production-oriented economies, these 
values have been shifting enormously. In many of the less 
developed countries, however, a consumption-oriented scale of 
values prevails from the very beginning. 
No value judgement is implied in labelling some economies 
as oriented towards production, others towards consumption. 
The Schumpeterian economy has a certain romantic appeal, 
but its laissez-faire implications would be hard to swallow for 
most people today. The social values of a consumption economy 
are in many respects much more attractive. This appraisal by 
our contemporary civilization is implied in the current trend 
towards the welfare state, in which demand and consumption 
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play a leading role. If one looks for some 'ideal' economy, it 
would probably be one that combined the individual virtues 
of the Schumpeterian with the social values of a consumption 
economy. 
No judgement likewise is implied regarding the relative 
efficiency of either type of economy in achieving the goal of 
rapid development. The possible 'loaded' character of the 
terms 'production' and 'consumption' is unintended and must 
not be allowed to mislead in this connexion. In its ability to 
draw on innovations and savings generated abroad, derived 
development obviously has an advantage of a very high order. 
There can be no doubt in fact that derived development is 
capable of making much faster strides than innovating develop-
ment ever did. In analysing the process in detail we shall find 
other facets of strength as well as of weakness that· distinguish 
it from innovating development. It is not the purpose of the 
distinction to point to virtues on one side and vices on the 
other. The purpose is to isolate some of the factors that are 
most characteristic for advancement of less developed 
countries. In this way, a few steps can perhaps be taken 
towards an integrated theory of their development. 
THE IMPLICATIONS OF DERIVED DEVELOPMENT 
A theory is useful in so far as it explains things or predicts 
them. We shall now try to work out the implications of the 
concept of Derived Development and shall apply them to the 
phenomena of the development process. To the extent that 
this attempt is successful, it should provide both a better 
understanding of the process and a confirmation of the theory. 
In that event, some policy conclusions should also become 
possible.1 
The Direction of Development 
What does the theory sketched in the preceding pages 
suggest as to the probable direction of the development of an 
economy oriented toward the sphere of consumption and 
1 The author is compelled to offer his apologies for the inadequate 
treatment of many of the topics that will suggest themselves to the 
reader under the present heading. In part he may attribute it to the 
pressure of time under which the paper had to he prepared. 
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demand ? Perhaps the chief alternatives can be summarized 
under the headings of specialization, respectively, in primary 
production and industry. It seems clear that a process of 
derived development of the kind here analysed predisposes an 
economy toward industrialization. One reason is that the 
demonstration effect is heavily biased in the direction of urban 
forms of living and that it intensifies particularly the demand 
for manufactured goods. This is likely to lead to an identifi-
cation of progress with urbanization and industrial production. 
A second reason is that the assimilation of foreign methods 
of production tends to be particularly dynamic in the fields 
of manufacturing. It is the spectacle of large industrial installa-
tions more than the contemplation of improved agricultural 
methods that is likely to capture the imagination. The reader 
will have no difficulty to find examples in his own experience. 
The fact that governments are becoming increasingly skilled 
in applying the protective devices and stimuli needed to over-
come the initial high cost of new manufacturing ventures works 
in the same direction. 
This 'pedagogical' aspect of industrial activity is perhaps 
the strongest argument in favour of a policy of deliberate 
industrialization. I believe that we are all agreed that an 
increase in industrial activity is one of the most important 
components of development. We need as solid an intellectual 
base as possible for a policy of this kind, and a contribution 
can perhaps be made within the framework of the theory here 
presented. 
This contribution may be derived from a variant of the 
demonstration effect, applied to production instead of con-
sumption. It has often been observed that industrial work 
seems to be more effective in communicating new skills and in 
thus making labour more productive, than is agricultural 
work. This tendency seems to be particularly strong in coun-
tries where agricultural labour is tied to ancient traditions 
that are hard to break, or where such work leads into deadening 
routines, such as Dr Ramiro Guerra has pointed out in the 
case of cane sugar production.I This view of the proliferating 
pedagogical advantages of industry gives us a basis for 
1 Ramiro Guerra y Sanchez, Az'llcat< y Poblaciqn en las Antillas. 
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industrialization that justifies new manufacturing ventures even 
where productivity initially is no higher or, even somewhat 
lower, than in primary production. The justification lies in the 
reasonable expectation that industrial work will raise the 
quality of the labour force and will thus eventually lead to 
a level of productivity higher than would prevail in primary 
production. This approach seems to be broader and more 
defensible than the familiar 'young industries' argument. The 
latter refers to the productivity of a particular industry, while 
the approach here presented rests upon the improvement in 
the labour force in general, which would provide a source of 
external economies to all industries. 
To sum up on the direction of derived development: The 
theory suggests that the natural course of this type of develop-
ment is toward industrialization. It gives us a basis for a 
policy of deliberate industrialization that stresses productivity 
and is not shaken by temporary fluctuations in the terms of 
trade. Finally it warns us against the bias, inherent in develop-
ment by assimilation, toward overambitious industrial projects, 
and reminds us of the danger of going too fast and too far 
in that direction. 
Supply of Productive Factors 
We may next ask ourselves what the effect of derived 
development is likely to be upon the supply of productive 
factors, chiefly savings and labour. Here it seems to be necessary 
to distinguish two stages. One stage is that of the primitive 
economy, with a largely non-monetary character, where simple 
wants are filled with a minimum of capital and in some cases 
also of a minimum of labour effort. Here the introduction of 
new possibilities of consumption is likely to stimulate produc-
tive effort. The idea of 'incentive goods' is a familiar one. The 
result is likely to be an increase in the supply of labour, and 
perhaps also some stimulation of savings, if originally these 
were close to zero. 
The second stage is more interesting from our point of view, 
and here the effects are likely to be different. The demand 
for advanced types of consumer goods almost certainly tends 
to reduce the supply of savings. The demonstration effect is 
hostile to saving-it was from this point of view that the concept 
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was originally evolved. The inflationary environment which is 
likely to accompa!ly a process of derived development in tum 
discourages the growth of thrift. Efforts to reduce the in-
equality of income, in so far as they are successful, probably 
work in the same direction. 
The supply of labour may conceivably benefit from the 
greater desire for the blessings of civilization even in a fairly 
advanced economy. But this effect may be more than offset 
by another circumstance. There may be a tendency for the 
popular drive for higher living standards to become associated 
with demands for shorter working hours, limitations upon 
productivity, early retirement, and the like. Examples will 
readily come to mind. In one sense this is no more than would 
have to be expected under any circumstances, for when income 
rises, so does the demand for leisure. But there is probably 
more than just this to the tendency to limit the supply of 
effort, particularly since attempts in that direction often seem 
to be made when there has been no significant increase in 
living standards. Underemployment no doubt shares in the 
responsibility. But one may suspect that attempts to limit 
labour effort also reflect a prevailing social psychology, which 
leads an individual to view himself more as a beneficiary of a 
social process of development, to which his personal effort can 
contribute little, than as one who benefits primarily from his 
own productive work. 
The net conclusion seems to be that derived development, 
in its advanced stages, is less favourable to the supply of 
productive factors, and particularly to saving, than originating 
development. Among the important goals of economic policy 
must be, therefore, measures to stimulate saving and to 
create an environment favourable to greater productivity-
consciousness. 
The Role of the Government 
It is evident that in a process of derived development, the 
role of the government is very different from that assigned 
to it in originating development. The essence of the latter is 
that development is carried forward by the entrepreneur. The 
government's role is secondary or passive. This at any rate is 
the implication of the Schumpeterian theory. As a matter of 
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historical record, we know that while the British government 
seems to have hampered rather than aided development during 
its early stages, the governments of the United States and 
Germany, for example, as well as of other countries, often 
took active steps to promote development. This, as said 
before, suggests that the development of these countries had 
in it something non-Schumpeterian, partaking of the nature of 
derived development. 
In the less developed countries, where private enterprise is 
weak, development is not likely to go forward rapidly if the 
government likewise remains passive. Thus, derived develop-
ment calls for some measure of government intervention. 
A second reason why one must expect more government 
action in a derived development process is that much of the 
popular demand for higher living standards, which is one of the 
charaGteristics of the process, takes the form of political 
pressure. In so far as the government is sensitive to such pres-
sure, it must act to give expression to them. A third reason 
for more government action is that in a development process 
carried forward by broad popular demand, a considerable part 
of total investment is likely to be in 'social overhead'. These 
are investments that only a government can undertake. A 
fourth reason lies in the prospect that savings will. be low 
owing to the orientation of the process toward consumption. 
This suggests that the government will have to use the tax 
power in order to increase investment. 
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, one may argue that 
intervention in the process of derived development is perhaps 
more suited to the abilities of government than intervention 
in originating development. Originating development is a 
process of experimentation, requiring imagination and the 
willingness to take chances, and a capacity for correcting 
mistakes. These are not the things at which governments 
excel. The strength of government is organization, and it may 
be suggested that derived development is a process predomi-
nantly of organization. Innovation is not required, for the 
techniques are well known through examples abroad. The 
primary task is to organize their application. 
This does not mean that the government should undertake 
all new economic activity. But the government is in a good 
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position to orient the development of the economy through 
the familiar means, direct and indirect, of economic planning. 
The unfortunate counterpart to this is the threat to political 
liberties implicit in increased government activity. 
Again, perhaps, there is nothing new in saying that in the 
process of derived development the government must have 
a substantial role. Certainly it is nothing new to economists 
in the less developed countries. But for economists in the more 
advanced countries, some of whom would like to see develop-
ment to proceed with a minimum of government interference, 
it may be useful to be reminded of the very deep-seated nature 
of the causes that force the government into action. 
The Inflationary Bias of Derived Development 
The inflationary bias evident in present-day development 
has often been commented upon. Inflationary impulses as an 
accompaniment of development are nothing new. In Sebum-
peter's system, they form an integral part of the process. 
The entrepreneur, according to Schumpeter, resorts to bank 
credit to finance his innovation. Rising prices and forced saving 
follow, until a peak in the movement is reached and deflation 
sets in ; eventually the cycle repeats itself. 
The essential feature of this Schumpeterian process, is that 
it involves no secular inflation. The long term price level 
remains approximately stable. Both premises-cyclical inflation 
and long term stability-are confirmed by the history of the 
major countries during the 19th century. Their experience 
confirms what one would expect a priori of an economy oriented 
toward production and supply and aiming at the accumulation 
of private property. Secular inflation would not be consonant 
with the recurrent tendency toward oversupply, nor with the 
savings and property instincts of the ruling groups. 
The essentfal part of the mechanism is that bank credit is 
limited and that the bulk of investment must therefore be 
financed out of voluntary saving. There exists thus a nexus 
between saving and investment: those interested in invest-
ment must themselves save or be able to borrow the savings 
of others. Thus the lure of profits stimulates the accumulation 
of savings, and the availability of the latter limits-although 
not completely-the amount of investment. 
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This nexus between the inducement to save and to invest is 
weakened when development is propelled by popular desire 
for higher living standards. What was briefly mentioned in 
connexion with the supply of savings seems worth developing 
here. 
In a consumption economy, saving is not as important 
a means for improving one's lot, as it is in a production-
oriented economy. It is more rational to expect one's lot to be 
improved by outside events-by the government, by the labour 
union, or by the growth of the economy in general. To this 
growth, the savings of the beneficiary can contribute very 
little. The government can build just as many roads or health 
centres, entrepreneurs as many movies or restaurants, whether 
any one person saves or not. The would-be beneficiary of 
development is in the position of an atomistic competitor, 
whose actions do not affect those of others in a manner to 
produce repercussions upon himself. 
Of course it is still true that a person can save and invest 
and benefit thereby. But this is no longer the typical way of 
looking at the benefits from economic progress. In a production-
oriented society, the logical way of looking at this is to 
visualize the benefits coming from one's productive effort. In 
a consumption-oriented society, the tendency is to look at 
personal progress as something in which one shares as a result 
of overall progress. Thus, the typical case is that of a man 
who expects to benefit from investment and saving, not as 
the owner, but as the user and consumer of what that invest-
ment produces. In that capacity, a man's interest is still in an 
increase in the total volume of saving and investment, but he 
has no direct interest in himself adding to it. 
The weakening of the nexus between saving and investment 
is likely to have adverse effects upon the pro~pects for a stable 
price level. Savings tend to be less, while there is growing 
pressure to increase investment, in order to satisfy desires for 
higher living standards. But the disequilibrium goes beyond 
an imbalance between saving and investment. When the 
implications of a demand-oriented economy are viewed in 
their broadest sense, the inflationary forces appear even more 
powerful. Social demand, working through political and labour 
union channels, seeks to extract from the economy more than 
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what, through domestic production and international trade, it 
can be made to yield. It is not only development and the 
associated investment that are responsible for inflationary 
tendencies, but the entire social climate of a demand-oriented 
economy. We must be aware of the deep roots of these forces 
when we talk about whether and how to control inflation. 
INVESTMENT, INCOME AND 
THE MULTIPLIER IN AN 
UNDERDEVELOPED ECONOMY* 
by V. K. R. V. Rao 
IT IS CONVENIENT TO BEGIN BY SUMMARIZING THE MAIN CONTENT 
of the Keynesian theory on the subject, which, incidentally, 
makes no attempt to give a separate treatment to under-
developed economies. The volume of employment and of 
income is determined by the level at which aggregate demand 
price is equal to aggregate supply price. The propensity to 
consume is such that when Y"' increases, C.. increases but 
not to the same extent. The gap has to be made up by I,. 
or investment. The nature of the propensity to consume is 
such that marginal propensity to consume declines with 
increasing income and unless investment increases sufficiently, 
aggregate demand price will fall short of aggregate supply 
price, so that inco~e and employment will decline till equality 
is attained between the two. Savings and investment are 
always equal, but this equality is brought about because of 
appropriate changes in the volume of income and employment. 
Saving is a residual, while it is investment which is the crucial 
factor. Increase in investment results in increase in income and 
the increase in income leads to an increase in saving. The 
marginal propensity to com;ume determines the relation 
between an increment of investment and the appropriate 
increment of income such as will induce the increment of saving 
necessary to maintain the equality of saving and investment. 
This relationship between increment of investment and that 
of income is determined by k or what is called the multiplier, 
the formula being 6. Y w k 6. I,., where I ~ is equal to the 
marginal propensity to consume. As the marginal propen-
sity to consume declines with increasing income, increasingly 
larger increments of investment become necessary for securing 
• The Indian Economic Review, February 1952. Reprinted by 
permission of The Indian Economic Review and the author. 
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given increments of income at increasing levels of income. 
As the marginal propensity to consume is likely to be not far 
short of unity in the case of poor communities, the multiplier 
has a high value in their case with the result that compara-
tively small increments of investment are likely to bring about 
full employment. At the same time, as their average propensity 
to consume is also high, investment accounts for a smaller 
portion of the value of their aggregate output which is the 
same thing as the volume of their income ; fluctuations in 
investment, therefore, account for smaller fluctuations in total 
employment than they do in the case of richer communities 
whose average propensity to consume is less and in whose case, 
therefore, investment accounts for a larger share of the value 
of the aggregate output. The paradoxical situation, therefore, 
arises that the poorer the community the greater the ease of 
obtaining for it a condition of full employment and the smaller 
the fluctuations in its employment caused by changes in its 
net investment; while the richer the community the more 
difficult it is to secure full employment, while the greater are 
the fluctuations in its total employment due to fluctuations 
in its net investment. Add to this the fact that fluctuations in 
net investment are more likely in a richer community, the 
conclusion seems to follow that instability in employment is 
a characteristic of increasing national income, and with it 
there is an increasing tendency towards the growth of in-
voluntary unemployment unless offset by an increased invest-
ment that is possible only with the abandonment of both 
laissez faire and balanced budgeting. Keynes is mainly con-
cerned with the problem of involuntary unemployment in the 
richer communities, and his whole thesis relates to the question 
of how to secure full employment in the case of these countries. 
The remedies he puts forward, viz. cheap money, deficit 
financing, redistributive taxation, and public investment have 
all become current coin in national economic policies, with full 
employment as the major objective. Unfortunately Keynes 
did not formulate the economic problem of underdeveloped 
countries, nor did he discuss the relevance to these countries 
of either the objective or the policy that he proposed for 
the more developed, i.e. the industrialized countries. The result 
has been a rather unintelligent application-not on Keynes's 
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part-of what may be called Keynesian economics to the 
problems of the underdeveloped countries. Thus it is common 
ground with most writers on the economics of underdeveloped 
countries that what was required for their economic develop-
ment was an increase in the purchasing power of the people. 
Deficit financing and created money have figured in practically 
all the plans, both official and unofficial, that have been put 
forward, e.g. for the economic development of India : while 
cheap money seems to have become as much an article of 
financial faith in the underdeveloped countries as in the 
industrialized economies. It is, therefore, of some importance 
to examine the problem of investment, income and the multi-
plier in the special context of underdeveloped economies with 
a view to finding out how far Keynesian ideas on economic 
policy are relevant and applicable to the problems of economic 
development. I shall deal with this question with special 
reference to my own country, viz. India. 
Take first the question of full employment. Everyone is agreed 
that full employment is a major desired goal of economic policy. 
According to Keynes, in a poor country where the marginal 
propensity to consume is high and the multiplier, therefore, 
also high, comparatively small increments of investment are 
sufficient to secure full employment. It must be pointed out 
that according to Keynes an increase in employment is 
identical with an increase in real income whether measured in 
terms of wage units or of output. Full employment, therefore, 
involves the maximization of output that is possible with the 
elimination of involuntary unemployment and the full utili-
zation of existing capacity and technical knowledge. Once this 
stage is reached, any attempt to increase investment sets up 
a tendency in money prices to rise without limit or leads to 
the emergence of a state of true inflation, where rising prices 
will no longer be associated with an increasing aggregate real 
income. Progress beyond this stage is not discussed in Keynes, 
the implicit assumption being that there is a unique level of 
full employment and when that is reached the desired objective 
has been attained. Even when subsequent writers have dis-
cussed the next step by linking up the multiplier principle 
with that of acceleration, what is visualized is a change in 
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the nature of employment, with a larger proportion now 
going into investment industries, rather than an increase in 
total employment. Let me now examine these concepts in the 
context of an underdeveloped economy like India. 
To begin with, we have here a predominantly agricultural 
country, where capital equipment is low and the standard of 
technical knowledge applied to production vastly inferior to 
that in the west. Moreover, the number of employees or 
workers employed on a wage is comparatively small, the vast 
majority of earners falling under the category of self-employees 
or household enterprises. Added to this is the fact that a 
significant proportion of the national output is not produced 
for the market but is intended for self-consumption. under 
these circumstances, the multiplier principle does not work in 
the simple fashion visualized by Keynes primarily for the 
industrialized economies. An increase in investment leads to an 
increase in income and in employment. The next increase 
ought to come from a secondary increase in income, employ-
ment and output in the consumption-goods industries, to be 
followed by a tertiary increase and so on, till income, output 
and employment have increased by k times the initial increase 
in investment., and saving has increased by an amount equal 
to the additional investment. I am aware that the investment 
multiplier and the employment multiplier are not identical, 
and that increase in output cannot be proportional either to 
the increase in money income, or to that in employment, but 
for purposes of argument, it is convenient to ignore these 
differences at this stage. Now in the case of a country like India 
the secondary, tertiary and other increases in income output 
and employment visualized by the multiplier principle do not 
follow, even though the marginal propensity to consume is 
very high and the multiplier should, therefore, function in 
a vigorous fashion. This is because the consumption-goods 
industries to which the increased demand is directed are not 
in a position to expand output and offer effective additional 
employment. The most important reason for this is the technical 
nature of the chief consumption industry to which the addi-
tional demand would presumably be directed, viz. food. This 
means in most underdeveloped countries primarily the agricul-
tural industry. Now, agriculture all over the world is notoriously 
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an industry where the supply curve is steeply inelastic 
in the short period. Further, variations in agricultural output 
in a country like India, where irrigation accounts for less than 
20 per cent of the cultivated area, are largely dominated by 
the vagaries of nature, and response to price increases is less 
effective in terms of aggregate output than in those of individual 
crops. Moreover, the belief is widely held, and not without 
justification, that the supply curve of agricultural industry as 
a whole is not only inelastic but also tends to be backward-
rising, so that an increase in the value of output need not 
necessarily lead to a subsequent increase in the volume of 
output. The primary increase in income following on a given 
increment of investment does get spent to a large extent on 
the output of agriculture, and leads, therefore, to an appro-
priate increase in the income of the agricultural producers. 
But it is not followed up by these producers increasing their own 
output and thus adding to both employment and real income. 
Apart from the reasons mentioned above, the agricultural 
producer is rather reluctant to act in the way postulated for 
entrepreneurs by classical economists or even by Keynes him-
self in response to increase in profits. The presence of price 
control and governmental procurement both act as psycholo-
gical disincentives, while uncertainty regarding the duration of 
high prices and their future also has the effect of dampening 
immediate response to price stimuli. Moreover, even to the 
extent to which agricultural producers want to increase output, 
they do not get the facilities necessary either by way of tech-
nique or of supplies to carry out their intentions. One may call 
all this either bottlenecks or shortages or inelasticity in the 
supply curves of the factors of production ; the net result is 
the same, viz. that it is not possible significantly to increase 
output in the short period in spite of willingness to expend 
money on doing so. This means that while income increases, 
output does not increase in anything like the same measure in 
the agricultural sector. In other words, the income multiplier 
is much higher in money terms than in real terms, and to that 
extent prices rise much faster than an increase in aggregate 
real income. 
The same conclusion also applies when we consider the 
behaviour of agriculturists as consumers in response to the 
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increase in their money income resulting from the initial 
investment. Marginal propensity to consume being high, the 
larger proportion of the increased income will be sought to be 
spent on consumption goods. As the agriculturists are them-
selves producers of food, the increase that follows in their 
consumption of foodgrains-the increase in consumption may 
take the form of either increasing the quantity consumed or 
substitution of better quality grains for coarse grains-leads 
to a reduction in the marketable surplus of foodgrains. This 
means in tum that the non-agricultural sector of the economy 
now has to pay still higher prices for its foodgrains without an 
appropriate response on the part of production in the agricul-
tural sector. The tendency, therefore, for prices to rise without 
a rise in aggregate real income is further strengthened by the 
working of the marginal propensity to consume on the part of 
the receivers of additional agricultural incomes. One may 
perhaps expect that the position would be different in respect 
of the increased consumption of non-agricultural goods on the 
part of the agriculturist consumers. But, even here, the position 
is not far different in the case of a country like India. This is 
due to many reasons such as the absence of effective excess 
capacity in industries, difficulty of obtaining raw materials 
and other ingredients for additional production, inelastic supply 
of skilled workers, and various bottlenecks arising out of con-
trols and the general environment of a shortage-dominated 
economy. To the extent, therefore, that agriculturist consumers 
do spend a part of their additional income on non-agricultural 
goods, the tertiary increase in money income does take place, 
but not a corresponding or even a noticeable increase in either 
output or employment. To the extent that agriculturists find 
that they are unable to effect an increase in their real income in 
terms of non-agricultural goods in spite of expending a larger 
money income, the effect is to decrease the marginal utility of 
the additional income with the result that in terms of Keynes' 
second proposition presented in Chapter II of his General 
Theory, identity between utility of the wage-in this case the 
cultivator's income-and the marginal disutility of that 
amount of employment-in this case the cultivator's own 
labour-is reached at the existing level of the volume of 
labour in the agricultural industry, in spite of an increase in 
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the money value of the output of that labour, and may even 
be reached at lower levels of the volume of labour expended in 
the agricultural industry. Thus the primary increase in invest-
ment and, therefore, increase in income and employment leads 
to a secondary and a tertiary increase in income, but not to 
any noticeable increase in either output or employment in 
either the agricultural or the non-agricultural sector. The 
multiplier principle, therefore, works with reference to money 
income but not with reference either to real income or employ-
ment. To the extent that the increases in money income do 
not get absorbed by a rise in prices and leave a margin of 
additional real income in certain sections of the community 
such as agricultural producers and industrial producers, they 
are dissipated either by an increase in food consumption on 
the part of the former or by an increase in imports or in cash 
balances on the part of the latter ; in neither case do they 
lead to an increase either in real income or in employment for 
the community as a whole. 
The position may be summed up as under. In the Keynesian 
scheme of things the supply curve of output as a whole is 
comparatively elastic in the short period under conditions of 
involuntary unemployment. Therefore there.is a relation, if 
not of identity, of at least comparative identity in value 
between the multipliers relating increment of money invest-
ment to increment of money income, of increment of money 
investment in terms of wage units to increment of money 
income in terms ..of wage units, of increment in investment 
output to increment in total output and of increment of employ-
ment in investment industries to increment in total employ-
ment. It is only on these assumptions that an increment of 
investment, operating on the basis of the multiplier principle, 
helps to increase output, real income, and employment, and 
leads to what may be called an automatic self-financing of the 
increased investment.l 
1 'An increment of investment in terms of wage-units cannot occur 
unless the public are prepared to increase their savings in terms of 
wage-units. Ordinarily speaking, the public will not do this unless 
their aggregate income in terms of wage-units is increasing. Thus their 
effort to consume a part of their increased incomes will stimulate output 
until the new level (and distribution) of incomes provides a margin of 
saving sufficient to correspond to the increased investment. The 
212 The Theoretical Context 
Undoubtedly the multipliers k and k' would be smaller than 
the multiplier linking up increment in money investment to 
increment in money income, for the supply curve of output is 
not perfectly elastic but is, on the other hand, inelastic, though 
the inelasticity becomes marked and increasing only as one 
approaches full employment. But there is no doubt that all 
the multipliers mentioned above must be positive and moving 
in the same direction if the Keynesian thesis is to apply in 
practice. This implies in turn that for the multiplier principle 
to work, there must exist the following : 
(a) Involuntary unemployment. 
(b) An industrialized economy where the supply "t:urve of 
output slopes upwards towards the right but does not become 
vertical till after a substantial interval. 
(c) Excess capacity iP. the consumption-goods industries. 
(d) Comparatively elastic supply of the working capital 
required for increased output. 
These assumptions do not hold in the case of an under-
developed economy. Involuntary unemployment of the Key-
nesian type is necessarily associated with a free-enterprise 
wage economy where the majority of earners work for wages 
and where production is much more for exchange than for 
self-consumption~ But this type of economy is of comparatively 
recent origin, which also explains the fact that over the whole 
range of human history unemployment in the modern sense is, 
comparatively speaking, a rare and local phenomenon. Mrs 
Robinson has pointed out that in a society in which there is 
no regular system of unemployment benefit, and in which poor 
relief is either non-existent or 'less eligible' than almost any 
alternative short of suicide, a man who is thrown out of work 
multiplier tells us by how much their employment has to be increased 
to yield an increase in real income sufficient to induce them to do the 
necessary extra saving, and is a function of their psychological pro-
pensities. If saving is the pill and consumption is the jam, the extra 
jam has to be proportioned to the size of the additional pill. Unless 
the psychological propensities of the public are different from what we 
are supposing, we have here established the la~ that increased employ-
ment for investment must necessarily stimulate the industries produc-
ing for consumption and thus lead to a total increase of employment 
which is a multiple of the primary employment required by the invest-
ment itself.' Keynes, The General Theory of Employment, Interest, 
and Money, pp. II7-18. 
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must scratch up a living somehow or other by means of his own 
efforts : Mrs Robinson goes on to point out that such persons 
do not figure in the list of unemployed but take up some other 
work, subject however to the proviso that their productivity 
is less than in the occupations they have left. She continues: 
'Thus a decline in demand for product of the general run of 
industries leads to a diversion of labour from occupations in 
which productivity is higher to others where it is lower. The 
cause of this diversion, a decline in effective demand, is exactly 
the same as the cause of unemployment in the ordinary sense, 
and it is natural to describe the adoption of inferior occupations 
by dismissed workers disguised unemployment. '1 Mrs Robinson 
has pointed out further that the existence of disguised unem-
ployment introduces a complication into the formal scheme of 
the General Theory of Employment, the function relating total 
investment ceasing to be unique, since a given rate of invest-
ment will be accompanied by a greater rate of consumption 
the more unemployment is disguised. Underdeveloped econo-
mies are conspicuous for the extent to which they contain 
disguised unemployment. Only the kind of disguised unem-
ployment they have is not of the type visualized by Mrs 
Robinson, where it results from a decline in effective demand 
and can exist in an industrialized economy only provided there 
is no unemployment dole or other not disagreeable social 
means for enabling the unemployed to exist. In an under-
developed and agrarian economy with little capital equipment 
and a somewhat low state of technical knowledge like India, 
on the other hand, disguised unemployment is a normal feature 
of the economy. The term is not applied, as Mrs Robinson applies 
it, to wage labour taking to less productive work on account 
of unemployment. It is applied in the case of India to persons 
who are employed in the sense that they are engaged in house-
hold enterprise but who are really in a state of disguised 
unemployment in the sense that no difference will be made to 
output by their withdrawal from the occupations concerned. 
As is pointed out in the recent report of the U.N. Committee 
of Experts on Measures for the Economic Development of Under-
developed Countries, 'the disguised unemployed are those 
1 Joan Robinson, Essays in the Theory of Employment, p. 84. 
214 The Theoretical Context 
persons who work on their own account and who are so numer-
ous, relatively to the resources with which they work, that if a 
number of them were withdrawn for work in other sectors of 
the economy the total output of the sector from which they 
were withdrawn would not be diminished even though no 
significant reorganization occurred in this sector, and no signi-
ficant substitution of capital'l. This kind of disguised unem-
ployment makes a significant difference to the working of the 
theory of the multiplier. If unemployment in underdeveloped 
economies takes the form of disguised unemployment rather 
than that of involuntary unemployment, then the secondary, 
tertiary and other effects of the initial primary employment 
created by the initial increment of investment do not follow, 
apart from other reasons, for this reason that there is no labour 
force willing to accept employment at the current wage, and 
involuntarily unemployed because of lack of employment 
opportunities. By definition, involuntary unemployment 
implies an elastic supply of labour at the current wage level. 
Those who are suffering from disguised unemployment do not 
fall under this category. They are, first of all, not aware that 
they are unemployed and are not, therefore, on the look-out 
for employment. Secondly, they are already in receipt of a 
real income which presumably gives them at least the same 
satisfaction as they would get by taking up employment at 
the current wage level. In actual fact, a wage considerably 
higher than the income they are receiving in their existing 
occupations would be necessary in order to induce them to 
offer themselves for employment. In other words, they are 
not really involuntarily unemployed in the Keynesian sense ; 
and yet they are unemployed in clearly economic sense in 
which we have defined disguised unemployment. The particular 
form which unemployment takes in the underdeveloped 
countries, viz. that of disguised unemployment, makes the 
economy for Keynesian purposes practically analogous with 
one of full employment ; and to that extent prevents the 
multiplier from working in the direction of an increase in either 
output or employment. The presence of disguised unemploy-
ment thus prevents the working of the Keynesian law that 
1 p. 7 of the Report. 
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'increased employment for investment must necessarily stimu-
late the industries producing for consumption and thus lead 
to a total increase of employment which is a multiple of the 
primary employment required by the investment itself'. 
Apart from the difficulties caused by the presence of dis-
guised unemployment, the agrarian nature of the economy 
makes for a supply curve that, at best, is much more inelastic 
than that of an industrialized economy such as Keynes pri-
marily had in mind when formulating his theory of employment. 
This, in tum, tends to widen the difference between the mul-
tiplier linking up increments of money investment with incre-
ments of money income from that linking up increments of 
investment output with increments of total output, with the 
result that money incomes and prices rise much faster than 
real incomes and output. Savings, therefore, fail to rise to 
equality with investment ; and with deficit financing, the 
inflationary process sets in earlier and proceeds faster in an 
agrarian or underdeveloped economy as compared with an 
industrialized or developed economy. The case for investment 
supported by deficit-financing for the purpose of inducing a 
given increase in output is, therefore, much weaker in an under-
developed economy as compared with that in a developed 
economy. 
This conclusion gets further reinforcement when we look at 
the organizational nature of an underdeveloped economy. 
In an industrialized economy the community consists of a 
small number of employers and a large number of employees, 
production for market is the rule, and consumers purchase the 
goods and services they require, with the result that when 
there is an increase in income, the marginal propensity to 
consume leads to an increase in the market demand for con-
sumption goods and thereby to an increase in output and 
employment in the consumption-goods industries. In the case 
of an underdeveloped economy, however, household enter-
prises predominate, and production is much more for self-con-
sumption than for the market with the result that when there 
is an increase in income the marginal propensity to consume 
leads to an increase in the demand for self-consumption rather 
than for purchases in the market. While this increased demand 
may partly be met by increased output on the part of the 
2!6 The Theoretical Context 
consumers themselves, at least a portion, if not actually the bulk, 
of the increased demand will be met by a diversion of output 
from the market to their self-consumption. Thus a reduction 
in the marketable surplus rather than an increase in output 
makes available the extra quantity of consumption goods 
required by this class following an increase in their income, 
and to this extent the extra employment induced by their 
increased consumption is less than what it would have been 
if their increased consumption had been purchased in the 
market. In Keynesian terms, the effect of this is to reduce the 
value of the multiplier below the level calculable from the 
~arginal propensity to consume. Such a conclusion would 
appear to undermine the theory of the multiplier, the whole 
basis of which is the marginal propensity to consume, and yet 
that seems inevitable in an underdeveloped economy dominated 
by household enterprises and production for self-consumption. 
It is, of course, possible to preserve the formal structure of 
the multiplier theory by regarding an increment of self-con-
sumption as a leakage analogous to the leakage that takes place 
when the increased consumption resulting from increased 
income takes the form of increased imports. It may perhaps 
be added that the former type of leakage is more likely in 
underdeveloped economies while the latter is more likely in 
industrialized economies. 
Another factor preventing the appropriate increase in the 
output of consumption-goods industries and the employment 
therein following an increase in income, arises from the absence 
of excess capacity in consumption-goods industries, coupled 
with a comparatively inelastic supply of the working capital 
needed for increasing production, which is characteristic of 
an underdeveloped economy. In effect, this is but analogous 
to the conditions that obtain in an industrialized economy as 
it approaches. conditions of full employment ; but there is this 
difference, viz. that it begins to operate much earlier and is 
quite consistent with the existence of disguised unemployment 
in the underdeveloped economy. 
My conclusion, therefore, is that the multipller principle as 
enunciated by Keynes does not operate in regard to the problem 
of diminishing unemployment and increasing output in an 
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underdeveloped economy, an increment of investment based 
on deficit financing tending to lead more to an inflationary 
rise in prices than to an increase in output and employment. 
It would, however, be possible to give formal validity to the 
Keynesian law even in the case of underdeveloped economies 
by treating them as economies in a state of full employment 
or near-full employment. Full employment, however, is identi-
fied in the public mind with an optimum economic condition 
and carries with it the implication that it is accompanied by 
the maximum utilization of labour, capital and natural 
resources in the economy. That is why it is regarded as the 
major objective of present-day national and international 
economic policy and figures so prominently in the aims and 
objects of the U.N.O. and its specialized agencies. To describe 
underdeveloped economies as being in a state of full or near-
full employment, therefore, is to do violence to the accepted 
connotation of that phrase even though it may satisfy the formal 
requirement of the Keynesian concept of full employment. 
Under the circumstances, I would prefer to say that the 
economic policy of deficit financing and disregard for thrift 
advocated by Keynes for securing full employment does not 
apply in the case of an underdeveloped economy. The policy 
that holds good for an underdeveloped economy is more on 
the lines formulated by the classical economists ; and if the 
Keynesians would say that this is because of the existence of 
full employment in the underdeveloped economies, there can 
be no formal objection to their statement. In any case it would 
follow that the economic policy that would be advocated for 
underdeveloped economies for increasing incomes, output, and 
employment would be radically different from that so univer-
sally associated with Keynes and formulated by him primarily 
for application to the developed or industrialized economies. 
In that sense, the multiplier principle with its accepted relation-
ship between increments of investment and increments of 
incomes, output, and employment does not hold for an under-
developed economy like India. 
The further conclusion also seems to follow that the existence 
of disguised unemployment, household enterprise, production 
for self-consumption, dominance of agriculture, and deficiency 
of capital equipment and of technical knowledge-all 
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characteristic of an underdeveloped economy--create conditions 
analogous to those of the full employment visualized by Keynes, 
when in actual fact there is no full employment in the economic, 
or even the popularly accepted, sense of the term. The formal 
effect of this on the General Theory of Employment still 
remains to be undertaken; but I have the feeling that the 
answer lies in giving up the assumption that there is one 
unique level of full employment. Apart from the level of full 
employment visualized by Keynes, there are as many levels 
of full employment as there are different stages of economic 
development. Indeed it is the transition from the level of full 
employment appropriate to a lower stage to another appro-
priate to a higher stage which constitutes the process of econo-
mic development. The economic process consists of two distinct 
categories, one where given the level of economic development, 
you move from low employment to full employment, and 
the other where you move from full employment at a given 
level of econon;,tic development to full employment at the next 
level of economic development. The Keynesian thesis applies 
only to one of these categories, viz. where, given the level of 
economic development, you move from low employment to 
full employment ; it is the classical thesis which is operative 
for the other category where you move from one level of econo-
mic development to a higher level of economic development. 
The mixing up of these two categories and a consequent blind 
application of the Keynesian formulre to the problems of 
economic development has inflicted considerable injury on 
the economies of underdeveloped countries and added to the 
forces of inflation that are currently afflicting the whole world. 
The old-fashioned prescription of 'work harder and save more' 
still seems to hold good as the medicine for economic progress, 
at any rate as far as the underdeveloped countries are 
concerned. 
GROWTH MODELS AND 
UNDERDEVELOPED ECONOMIES* 
by Henry J. Bruton 
THE POST-WAR LITERATURE ON GROWTH ECONOMICS HAS TENDED 
to distinguish the growth process in a relatively highly devel-
oped country from that in a so-called 'underdeveloped' area. 
In the former case the analyses have been characterized by 
severe rigour, with consequent imposition of restrictive assump-
tions setting definite and specific boundaries to the problems. 
To a large extent, work in this area is an extension of the 
savings-investment analysis of Keynes into more dynamic 
formulations. In discussions of the developmental process of 
underdeveloped countries, however, there is the exactly oppo-
site approach ; the problem is usually very generally defined, 
rigour is frequently completely absent, and the variables con-
sidered inevitably spill over into areas which economists have 
long treated as beyond the scope of the discipline (for example, 
population, and technological change). In the absence of a 
general framework-a model-within which to examine the 
problems of the underdeveloped country, much of the discus-
sion has taken place in a virtual theoretical vacuum and 
consequently is often unsatisfactory both logically and 
practically. 
The purpose of this paper is to examine a modified version 
of the growth theory developed by Domar, Harrod, Fellner,1 
and others in the light of the more commonly known 
• The journal of Political Economy, August 1955. Reprinted with the 
permission of the University of Chicago Press, the publishers of this 
journal, and of the author. Copyright (1955) by the University of 
Chicago. 
1 See R. F. Harrod's Towards a Dynamic Economics (London: 
Macmillan & Co., Ltd, 1952) ; Evsey D. Domar, 'Capital Expansion, 
Rate of Growth, and Employment', Econometrica, Vol. XIV (April 
1946) ; William Fellner, • The Capital-Output Ratio in Dynamic 
Economics', in Money, Trade, and Economic Growth (New York: 
Macmillan Co., 1951). There are many other articles, of course; 
Professor Fellner's paper has a short bibliography on the subject. 
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characteristics of the underdeveloped country and to attempt 
to make a more systematic and rigorous statement than has 
hitherto been made of the developmental process and 
problems in these countries. The procedure is as follows : 
I shall examine the assumptions made in existing growth 
models and the conditions necessary to make these assumptions 
(or alternative ones) valid. Then, on the basis of readily avail-
able data for the United States and the United Kingdom, 
I suggest hypotheses about the conditions that have actually 
obtained in the economic growth of these countries. These 
hypotheses are then transplanted to the underdeveloped 
country, and their implications are examined for an economic 
system v.ith the general features of the modern underdeveloped 
country. 
It seems necessary to digress a moment in order to state 
explicitly what the 'general features of the modern under-
developed country' are and to indicate the form of the growth 
theory that I shall use. Of course, no two underdeveloped 
countries are exactly alike ; but the descriptive literaturet 
on such countries suggests enough similarity that we may 
confidently describe a' representative underdeveloped country', 
which, although not an exact replica of any one country, is a 
reasonably accurate description of all. Of course, low per capita 
income and consequently low savings are the chief criteria of 
underdevelopment, but there are other characteristics equally 
significant. There is a significant amount of disguised un-
employment ; some workers, though nominally employed, 
contribute nothing to total output. Further, the country has a 
narrow range of output, chiefly raw materials and agricultural 
products. The level of technology is low relative to that known 
elsewhere, and a corollary of this is a relative shortage of entre-
preneurial and management capacity. Finally, although this 
is less clear-cut than the other characteristics, an under-
developed country trades chiefly with the more highly 
developed countries and very little with its fellow under-
1 Such literature is turned out chiefly by the United Nations (see 
especially the Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East's annual 
issues of Economic Survey of Asia and the Far East and the Economic 
Commission for Latin America's annual issues of Economic Suroey 
of Latin America). 
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developed countries. Other peculiarities might be mentioned,l 
but this list will suffice for the purposes of this paper. For the 
sake .of brevity, I shall call the representative underdeveloped 
country 'Country U'. 
For the 'representative highly developed country' I shall 
refer simply to the United States and the United Kingdom ; 
it is unnecessary to describe these countries. I shall speak of 
the representative developed country as 'Country D'. The 
discussion will be in terms of only two countries, U and D, but 
this is mere convenience of exposition and not analytically 
significant. 
The central proposition of the Harrod-Domar theory arises 
from introducing the rather obvious assumption that invest-
ment is capacity-creating as well as income-generating. Thus, 
if the new capacity is to be utilized, the equivalent new 
demand must be generated. Given a constant ratio between 
saving and income---eall it s-and a constant capital-output 
ratio---eall it k-it is evident that capacity will increase by 
sfk Y (where Y is income). Then the increase in income must 
equal the increase in capacity : Ll Y ~ Y , and, dividing 
L\Y s 
through by Y, we get y k; that is, income demand must 
grow at a constant percentage rate, sjk, in order to assure no 
idle capacity of capital equipment. 2 Now sjk may be looked 
at from two points of view: on the one hand, it may be thought 
of as the rate of growth of income required to use the newly 
created capacity. On the other hand, it may be thought of as 
the maximum allowable rate of growth possible without infla-
tion. The two are the same, of course ; but this terminology is 
useful in suggesting the deflationary bias of the mature econo-
mies and the inflationary bias inherent in almost all the under-
developed-immature--economies. 
1 Population problems vary markedly among countries. Some discus-
sion of the rate of population growth in economic development occurs 
in the text. 
2 The equation in an ex post form is, of course, a tautology; to make 
it an equilibrium condition, the rate of growth must be that which is 
consistent with the propensity to save and the capital-output ratio 
which keeps the stock at the intended level in relation to output (see 
Harrod, op. cit.; and Fellner, op. cit.) 
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The rate of growth derived here applies to capital capacity. 
We may also approach the growth problem from the point of 
view of labour.l Thus if the labour force grows at a constant 
percentage rate, l, and productivity increases by a constant 
percentage rate, p, then, in order for labour to be fully 
employed, income must grow at a rate equal to l + p + lp. 
Once more we may speak of the 'required' rate and the 
'allowable' rate ; the growing labour force must be matched 
by increasing income, but the labour force also imposes a limit 
above which demand may not go without causing inflation. 
The deflationary-biased economies could experience un-
employment as a consequence of the inability of the system to 
invest the savings that would be forthcoming at the required 
rate of growth. For the capital-shortage countries, unemploy-
ment could result from the insufficiency of the supply of capital 
to employ the growing labour force. These difficulties are a 
consequence of the assumption of constant coefficients of 
production. 
Under the assumptions usually made,2 we have two inde-
pendent rates of growth, which must be equal to each other 
and to the percentage rate of growth of income, or the system 
will stumble. I proceed now to look more closely at the im-
plications of this set of ideas for the underdeveloped countries 
in the light of their characteristics and the historical experi-
ence of the United States and the United Kingdom. 
One further point may be made here. The growth models, 
virtually without exception, are in real terms, and the effects 
of price changes are not analysed. The literature on under-
developed areas, virtually without exception, is dominated 
by reference to changing terms of trade. Since my analysis is 
carried out within the framework of the growth models, I 
assume no price changes and hence constant terms of trade. 
In this respect, if in no other, this paper is virtually unique in 
the literature on underdeveloped countries. 
1 See D. Hamberg, 'Full Capacity vs. Full Employment Growth', 
Quarterly journal of Economics, Vol. LXVI (August 1952). 
1 Harold Pilvin has worked out an analysis in which the assumption 
of constant input coefficients has been dropped and the two independent 
rates become tied to each other (see his 'Full Capacity vs. Full Employ-
ment Growth', Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. LXVII (November 
1953).) 
Growth Models and Underdeveloped Economies 223 
As indicated earlier, the assumption of a constant k is 
strat*Wfic to the model. When the theory was first formulated, 
little attention was paid to the empirical validity of this 
assumption; however, data are now available which suggest 
that for both the United States and the United Kingdom there 
have been virtually no significant changes in the capital-
output ratio which cannot be accounted for by cyclical changes 
in output or by wartime activity.1 
If we accept a constant k as empirically valid, it becomes 
necessary to explain the factors responsible for this stability. 
In principle, four such factors must be considered: (1) the 
behaviour through time of the interest rate; (2) the nature 
of the production function with respect to returns to scale ; 
(3) the nature of technological innovations ; and (4) the nature 
of changes in the composition of output. 
Harrod2 has recently deprecated the role of changes in the 
interest rate in changes in capital intensity. For short-run 
analyses this seems reasonable, but in the determination of 
the input-mix over long periods the relative prices of the 
inputs surely are important. If this were not the case, it would 
be exceedingly difficult to account for much of international 
trade and for the fact that in different countries different 
input-mixes are used to produce the same product.s 
1 Data supporting this position are readily available and need not 
be reproduced here. See Simon Kuznets, National Product since I869 
(New York: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1946); B. Weber 
and S. J. Handfteld Jones, 'Variations in the Rate of Economic Growth 
in the United States of America, 1869-1939', Oxford Economic Papers, 
Vol. VI, N.S. (June 1954); E. H. Phelps Brown and S. J. Handfteld 
Jones, 'The Climacteric of the 1890's', Oxford Economic Papers, Vol. IV, 
N.S. (October 1952) ; E. H. Phelps Brown and B. Weber, 'Accumula-
tion, Productivity, and Distribution in the British Economy, 187o-1938 ', 
The Economic journal, Vol. LXIII (June 1953); and R. W. Goldsmith, 
'The Growth of Reproducible Wealth of the United States of America 
from 1805 to 1950 ', in Income and Wealth Series, Vol. II (1952} of the 
International Association for Research in Income and Wealth. 
1 See his comments appended to the Pilvin paper (op. cit.). In his book, 
however, he attaches considerable importance to the rate of interest. 
a A bit of empirical evidence is provided by the study of Daniel 
Creamer, Capital and Output Trends in Manufacturing Industries, 
z88o-I948 (Occasional Papers, No. 41 [New York: National Bureau of 
Econonlic Research, 1954]). His data show the major rise in the ratio 
of fixed capital to output in manufacturing industries as occurring from 
188o to 1910; for most of this period interest rates were falling and/or 
very low. 
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It is no simple matter to measure changes in the interest 
rate ; but in both the United States and the United Kilf.dom 
the available evidence suggests that all interest rates have 
fallen absolutely (and in relation to real wage rates) over the 
last seventy or eighty years.1 Accepting this evidence, we 
would expect the behaviour of the interest rate to contribute 
to a secular upward tendency in the capital-output ratio. 
As for returns to scale, there are no data to contradict the 
classical assumption of diminishing returns. This is especially 
true for that part of the economy which makes significant use 
of natural resources. As the availability of such natural re-
sources as coal and iron ore is reduced (a reduction in their 
availability has, of course, occurred in the United States and 
the United Kingdom), the effectiveness of labour and capital 
applied to them is lowered and K JO should tend to increase. 
Similar reasoning is applicable, although less strikingly so, 
to agriculture. Surely, there should be no quarrel with the 
assumption of the general appropriateness of diminishing 
returns, more or less a major factor, depending on the extent 
to which the economy is raw-material- and agriculture-oriented. 2 
If we accept the conclusions about the declining rate of 
interest and diminishing returns, then we are left to explain 
the constancy of the capital-output ratio in terms of innova-
tions andfor shifts in the composition of output. 
1 Here, too, I shall simply refer to readily available data. See Phelps 
Brown and Weber, op. cit., appendix; E. H. Phelps Brown and S. V. 
Hopkins, 'The Course of Real Wages in Five Countries', Oxford 
Economic Papers, Vol. II, N.S. (June 1950) ; Weber and Handfield 
Jones, op. cit.; Historical Statistics of the United States, I789-I945 
(Washington : U.S. Department of Commerce, 1949), sees. D and N. 
2 Diminishing returns are represented in a production function of 
the type 0 = A K a, L a• by a
1 
+ a, < I. But if all factors were included 
in the equation rather than merely capital and labour (K and L), 
then surely the sum of exponents would be at least unity; that is, 
diminishing returns could not obtain. Diminishing returns to scale then 
means diminishing returns to capital and labour combined, with some-
thing else-for example, natural resources-held constant. Similarly, 
when it is said that innovations oounteract diminishing returns, this 
must mean that 'innovations' have been omitted from the production 
function and the productivity of capital and labour then appear to 
increase (or not to decrease) ; more accurately, perhaps, we should say 
that innovations are substituted for capital and labour, in which case 
there would be no diminishing returns for the complete production 
function-one including innovations. 
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Although the concept of innovations is almost always used 
to refer to any kind of alteration in the productive technique, 
there is a persistent tendency to imply such major changes as 
the assembly line and the Bessemer process. Consequently, 
there is also the presumption that innovations are capital-
using; that is, they tend to increase the capital-output ratio.1 
Much of cycle history is frequently explained in terms of such 
innovations, all requiring large investment outlays; all requir-
ing a prolonged increase in demand, to be profitable ; and all 
producing major structural changes in the system. But there 
seems little reason to assume that this is the only kind of 
innovation or even the most common kind. In particular, it 
appears that two kinds of technological change increase the 
efficiency with which capital is utilized. 
First, there are those changes which reduce the capital tied 
up in goods in the pipeline.2 Major improvements in trans-
portation and distribution have reduced significantly the time 
needed to move finished goods from producer to user. Second, 
the alterations and changes generally classified as organiza-
tional changes have resulted in a more efficient use of capital 
and hence have worked to reduce KfO. 
However, the most important factor working to increase 
the productiveness of capital appears to be the growth of 
general, social overhead facilities. Any given investment outlay 
now produces a larger increase in capacity than it would have, 
had these facilities not been in existence. Especially important 
in this respect is the extent of education and the consequent 
availability of a skilled labour force. But also important are 
transportation and power facilities, which create external 
economies for new enterprises as compared to ones undertaken 
earlier. 3 Not only do such general facilities contribute to the 
1 A neutral innovation is one that leaves the capital-output ratio 
unchanged, and capital-using and capital-saving innovations are 
defined correspondingly; this is Harrod's definition in Towa1'ds a 
Dynami~; Economics (p. 22). 
1 Joan Robinson, The Rate of Inte1'est (London: Macmillan & Co., 
Ltd, 1952), pp. 42·3· 
3 Compare John H. Adler, 'The Fiscal and Monetary Implementation 
of Development Programs', Ame1'ican Economic Assodation Papel's 
and Proceedings, Vol. XLII (May 1952); Tibor Scitovsky, 'Two 
Concepts of External Economies', reprinted in the present volume, 
pp. 295-308; J. E. Meade, 'External Economies and Diseconomies in 
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increasing productiveness of specific investments, but there is 
also evidence that such projects as utilities and transportation 
systems build ahead of the market. This means that, as in-
creased use is made of their facilities, their capital-output ratio 
declines. 
It is argued here that the following sequence is generally 
characteristic of technological progress: first, major changes 
are made in productive technique, which require capital 
deepening. Such major innovations occur sporadically and are 
made only in anticipation of long-range increases in demand. 
Once these methods are in general use, however, numerous 
routine changes occur, representing more effective use of exist-
ing capital equipment. In many cases the simple replacement 
of worn-out equipment results in more effective use of a given 
stock of capital.l These organizational, routine innovations 
require little initial outlay and consequently can be made with 
virtually no significant commitment. I suggest that it is this 
kind of technological innovation that produces the year-in, 
year-out increases in the effectiveness with which the United 
States and the United Kingdom exploit their available 
resources. 2 
My hypothesis, then, is that day-to-day routine innovations 
are of the capital-saving variety and that these, together with 
particular external economies, provide the necessary counter-
acting force to a declining rate of interest and diminishing 
a Competitive Situation', The Economic Journal, Vol. LXII (March 
1952); and P. N. Rosenstein-Rodan, 'Problems of Industrialization of 
Eastern and South-eastern Europe·. reprinted in the present volume, 
PP· 245-55. 
1 Phelps Brown and Ha.ndfield Jones, op. cit.; Phelps Brown and 
Weber, op. cit. 
2 This is a difficult position to support with quantitative evidence. 
In addition to the argument in the.text, perhaps the best support that 
can be given· it now is to observe that it is consistent with most theo-
retical discussions of the. innovational process, discussions which, in 
general, are not concerned with the problem raised here. See especially 
Schumpeter's Business Cycles (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 
1939), chaps. i-v ; B. S. Keirstead, The Theory of Economic Change 
(Toronto : Macmillan Co., 1948), chap. viii; W. W. Rostow, The Process 
of Economic Growth (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1952). chap. iv; 
Moses Abramovitz, 'Economics of Growth', in Bernard F. Haley (ed.), 
A Survey of Contemporary Economics, Vol. II (Homewood, Ill.: Richard 
D. Irwin, Inc., 1952) ; and A. P. Usher, History of Mechanical Inventions 
(New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1929), passim. 
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returns, thus producing a constant capital-output ratio. I 
further hypothesize that such innovations-and evidently 
such external economies--occur only after the major capital-
using innovations have already become effective and generally 
acceptable throughout the system. 
As for the effects of shifts in the composition of output on 
the capital-output ratio, there appears to be no a priori reason 
to expect them to be other than neutral. Changes in the com-
position of output presumably reflect changes in final demand, 
and there is nothing to suggest that demand changes in such a 
way that the overall capital-output ratio is consistently 
pushed in one direction. The only readily available data on 
this are contained in Creamer's study cited earlier. He finds 
that only about one-sixth of the change in the capital-output 
ratio between r88o and rgrg can be explained by a change in 
the composition of manufacturing output ; after 1919 the 
capital-output ratio (in total manufacturing) declined, in spite 
of the altered composition of output. This evidence, though 
slight, added to the absence of any theoretical reason to expect 
otherwise, justifies the assumption that changes in the com-
position of output act randomly on the overall capital-output 
ratio. 1 
Now what is the relevance of all this for the underdeveloped 
countries? Since their output is very low relative to that of 
the more highly developed countries, their chief objective is 
to increase the capacity output of their economies as rapidly 
as possible. To do this, it is evidently desirable to have capital 
as productive as possible-that is, KfO as low as possible. 
To the extent that the rate of interest reflects the shortage of 
capital relative to labour, the low KfO will obtain. But this 
means low productivity per worker and hence low real per 
1 This may be the appropriate point at which to note that Creamer's 
findings show a clear-cut increase in the capital-output ratio for manu-
facturing industries from 188o to 1920 and a sharp decline thereafter. 
William Fellner (Monetary Policies and Full Employment [Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1947]. p. So) shows about the same thing 
for capital and output as a whole. Creamer's data are convincing, but 
the evidence that KJO for output as a whole behaved in the same way 
is not yet clear. Further disaggregating may show that it has behaved 
similarly. Even if this is the case, the burden of the argument in the 
text will not be affect~d. and my hypothesis about the sequence of 
innovations will still be valid. 
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capita income. Therefore, to increase per capita income, we 
must increase the proportion of capital in the input-mix; we 
must move around the equal-product curve, using more capital 
and less labour to achieve the same output. This process is, 
by definition, capital-deepening and can be accomplished only 
by increasing the supply of capital relative to that of labour. 
This would release labour, and, assuming that the released 
labour will be employed-more on this in a moment-total 
output and per capita output would increase. 
However, there is also evidence that the isoquant map itself 
is not the same for Country U as it is for Country D. This 
evidence suggests that, even with the same relative quantities 
of labour and capital, output is likely to be less in the former 
country than in the latter. This means simply that the level of 
technology in U is lower than that in D. Two requirements are 
then evident for the underdeveloped country. On the one 
hand, it must seek to increase its available supply of capital 
relative to that of labour ; this will result in increased labour 
productivity and, under certain assumptions (to be discussed), 
increased per capita income. But in order to achieve a rate of 
productivity and a rate of productivity increase comparable 
to that in the developed countries, there must also be a sub-
stantial raising of the technological level in the underdeveloped 
country.1 I have argued earlier that the major innovations in 
the United States and the United Kingdom-those resulting 
in the most pronounced increase in output-were capital-using ; 
that is, they resulted in an increase in the capital-output ratio. 
These major, capital-using innovations were necessary before 
the minor, routine, capital-saving innovations could be made. 
To the extent that Country U imports its improved technology, 
it would appear necessary for it to go through the same 
sequence. 
If this is true, then it means that the initial innovations3 
in U must run counter to the dictates of the relative factor-
supply situation ; where the capital-labour ratio calls for labour-
1 Conceivably, of course, technology could do the job alone ; what 
is meant here is that technological level achieved by the more highly 
developed countries. 
1 For Country U, 'innovation' refers to the importation of new 
techniques not now used in U, from Country D. 
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using, capital-saving innovations, modem technology calls 
for a series of innovations which are the exact opposite before 
the capital-saving innovations are possible. Also, it is a much 
simpler matter to import major new processes than it is to 
import changes which are associated with organization and 
which seem to be chiefly a function of the experience, initiative, 
and enthusiasm of management. Thus in the earlier stages of 
the reorganizatio 1 of the economy of an underdeveloped 
country, such a country will have a high K JO at the time it 
can very least afford it. As the new methods become more 
firmly and widely understood and as the external economies 
become effective, K JO will begin to decrease. This creates a 
rather severe problem : because of the abruptness with which 
low-income countries are attempting to reorganize their general 
economic system, they are forced-by modem technology-to 
introduce methods of production that their factor-supply 
situation will not justify.1 
And this leads to another problem. There is, in general, not 
enough capital for a complete reorganization of the economy 
of the underdeveloped country.2 A (relatively) small amount 
of capital, if introduced so as to achieve maximum productivity, 
will be insufficient to employ all labour in the most effective 
way. Indeed, increased unemployment may result, for the 
introduction of technological changes that substitute capital 
for labour releases some of the latter resource. Unless more 
capital is available to employ the released workers, unemploy-
ment is the consequence. A somewhat paradoxical situation 
develops in which output and unemployment are both 
increasing. 
The unemployment is caused by a shortage of investment, 
but the shortage of investment is caused not by a deficiency 
of aggregate demand but simply by a shortage of capital.a 
1 This argument is discussed in the Economic Commission for Latin 
America's Theoretical and Practical Problems of Economic Growth (1950). 
1 Someone has estimated that it would require one trillion dollars 
of investment to provide China and India with enough capital to 
achieve the capital-worker ratio that obtains in the United States. 
One cannot be sure exactly how much a trillion dollars really is, but 
one can be sure that it is much more than is available. 
a This kind of unemployment is usually referred to as 'Marxian • ; 
Ricardo was also worried about it (see Hamberg, op. cit.). 
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Not only must capital be available for the existing labour 
force, but evidently in many underdeveloped countries l + p 
+ lp > sfk, and the situation is growing secularly more severe. 
In the case of the developed countries, the threat of unem-
ployment loomed imposing because of the inability of demand 
to grow with the capacity generated by investment. For Coun-
try U, unemployment looms imposing because of the in-
sufficiency of savings; there is too little capital to employ all 
labour at the maximum productivity allowed by modern 
technology. 
I turn now to the savings function. Here, too, the assumption 
usually made is that the average propensity to save (and hence 
the marginal propensity) is constant. It seems impossible, 
however, to state the necessary and sufficient conditions for 
constancy and work through them as we just did for the capital-
output ratio. Present data are insufficient to test in any reason-
ably satisfactory way all the many hypotheses that could be 
used to explain the relationship between S and Y over long 
periods.! Until we know more about the behaviour of the 
saving-income relation through time in the highly developed 
countries, it seems futile to speculate on its behaviour in an 
underdeveloped country. Perhaps a safe generalization-and 
one that will enable me to pass on to matters that I am able 
to talk about-would be that there is no convincing historical 
evidence that SfY adjusts itself so as to alleviate (or even to 
tend to alleviate) inflationary or deflationary situations or so 
as to affect the level of employment. Such hypotheses can be 
made, of course, but there is little reason to accept any one over 
any other. 
There are, however, two frequently encountered arguments 
about the savings-income ratio to which a brief reference 
should be made. Professor Ragnar Nurkse2 has suggested that 
'when people come into contact with superior goods or superior 
1 The findings of Raymond W. Goldsmith, A Study of Saving in the 
United States (Princeton, N.J. : Princeton University Press, 1955), 
may shed light on this question. Volumes I and II of this work appeared 
after this paper was prepared. 
• Problems of Capital Formation in Underdeveloped Countries (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1953). 
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patterns of consumption, with new articles or new ways of 
meeting old wants they are apt to feel after a while a certain 
restlessness and dissatisfaction. Their knowledge is extended, 
their imagination stimulated; new desires are aroused, the 
propensity to consume is shifted upwards. '1 If such a 'demon-
stration effect' were operative, it would mean that SfY was 
maintained at a lower value in U than in D as long as the 
former country had relatively low incomes, that is, as long as 
it was underdeveloped. This, of course, would add to the 
difficulties for the underdeveloped country outlined in the 
previous section (and to those to be discussed in the next 
section). However, one might equally well assume that the 
inequality of income among nations resulted in the lower-
income countries having a larger S fY because they were aware 
that this was the best way to catch up with high-income coun-
tries. A priori, each behaviouristic assumption is equally plausi-
ble, and we must await more empirical data before attempting 
to settle on specific assumptions. 
The second argument has to do with the effect of inequality 
in the distribution of income on the propensity to save out 
of a given level of income. Available data show that income is 
less equally distributed in a representative underdeveloped 
country than in a highly developed economy. and this fact 
should tend to makeS fY higher for Country U than for Country 
D. However, there is one difficulty with this potential advan-
tage. The highest individual incomes in underdeveloped coun-
tries are largely received from land and house rents. Inequality 
in such countries arising out of relatively high rental incomes 
does not favour the accumulation of productive capital equip-
ment but rather has led to such things as speculative·housing 
projects-frequently of a luxury type-or conspicuous con-
sumption. Thus inequality alone is not sufficient to assure 
productive capital accumulation; the inequality must favour 
those who know how to and are willing to invest their surplus 
income productively. Landowners in underdeveloped countries 
are certainly not in this category. Therefore, it is possible that 
a more equal distribution of income in Country U would result 
in a more rapid rate of capital accumulation if this greater 
1 ibid., pp. 58-g. 
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equality was achieved at the expense of rents and in favour of 
larger returns to owners of productive capital equipment.I 
International trade has been introduced into the growth 
models only in a perfunctory way ;2 but when these models 
are applied to an underdeveloped country, considerably more 
attention to it is required. Formally, foreign trade may be 
introduced into the growth equation easily enough, simply as 
the foreign account counterpart of savings. We write M for all 
debit items on current account and X for all credit items, then 
take the ratio of M- X to income, call this b, and write the 
growth equation as 
.6.Y s+b 
-y=-k-
It is evident that if b is negative, that is, if X /Y > M fY, the 
percentage rate of growth of income required to utilize all 
the increasing domestic capacity is less than it would b6 in 
the absence of trade. Similarly, if b is positive, then the allow-
able rate of growth of income is higher than it could be in the 
absence of trade. The problem then is to attempt to establish 
the time path of the relationship between imports and exports. 
The traditional approach is to set up a sequence somewhat 







Increasing import surplus 
Constant import surplus 
Decreasing import st1rplus 
Increasing export surplus 
Constant export surplus 
1 On this point, see the interesting article by W. A. Lewis, 'Economic 
Development :with Unlimited Supplies of Labour', reprinted in the 
present volume, pp. 400-49. 
1 See Harry G. Johnson, 'Equilibrium Growth in an International 
Economy', Canadian journal of Economics and Political Science, 
Vol. XIX (November 1953). He provides the most complete analysis 
of the role of international trade. R. F. Harrod also has something to 
say on the subject in his Towards a Dynamic Economics, pp. IOI-15. 
8 Professor Charles P. Kindleberger makes use of this approach in 
some detail (see his International Economics [Homewood, Ill.: Richard 
D. Irwin, Inc., 1953], chaps. xix-xx). It can also be found as far back 
as J. E. Cairnes, Some Leading Principles of Political Economy (New 
York, 1900), pp. 36o-62. 
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Receiving creditor Decreasing export surplus 
Mature creditor Import surplus 
Progression through this sequence is also the progression 
from low income to higher income and from inflationary-biased 
economies to deflationary-biased ones. Therefore, if all countries 
followed this sequence, the foreigu-trade sector would tend 
to make the attainment of a higher allowable rate of growth 
possible when this is the desired situation, and then to make 
the required rate lower when that is desirable, namely, when 
deflation threatens. In the early phases of development a 
positive b is made possible by capital imports from those mature 
economies that need an export surplus to counter savings that 
cannot be matched by domestic investment. Hence the allowable 
rate of growth of the underdeveloped country is increased, and 
the required rate of growth of the mature economies is decreased. 
But this simplified reasoning rests on certain assumptions 
which require examination before they can be realistically 
incorporated into the analysis. The sequence rests on the argu-
ment that the rate of return on capital invested domestically 
falls through time relative to the rate obtainable abroad. As a 
country provides more and more savings, its investors seek 
to send those savings to areas where there is less capital in 
relation to other resources and hence the return per unit of 
capital is higher. The sequence then appears to rest on the 
generally acceptable notion of variable proportions and so to 
have a rather firm base. However, some problems may be 
indicated which complicate matters. 
We are interested in the ratios M fY and X fY and their 
behaviour through time. The sequence of developments 
described in the first paragraphs of this section follows a well-
defined path ; defining this path requires further assumptions 
about the changes that occur in the structure of the system 
with respect to international trade. These structural adjust-
ments create the complicating problems previously referred to. 
Consider, first, the question of imports. The simplest assump-
tion to make is, of course, that the average propensity to 
import-and hence the marginal propensity-is constant. 
We may ask the same question about M fY that we asked 
about K jO ; namely, what are the necessary conditions for 
constancy (assuming S jY constant) ? 
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It is fairly legitimate procedure to consider the equations 
determining KJO as essentially, if not purely, technological in 
nature.1 In like manner the savings function may be considered a 
behaviouristic equation. The import function, however, requires 
consideration of both a technological and a behaviouristic kind. 
From the standpoint of Country D, on the technological 
side, imports of raw materials are an essential input of the 
productive process and so are to be treated like any other 
input. It is necessary, then, to consider the time path of the 
ratio between imports of raw materials, M,, and output of 
manufactured products, 0 m· Decreasing values of this ratio 
could be accounted for in one of two ways: first, by innovations 
whose consequences were that imported raw materials would 
be used in a more and more efficient manner and, second, by 
changes in the composition of manufactured output that would 
produce changes in M,/Om. Such changes could result from 
changes in tastes or from governmental policy, which, by 
artificially restricting imports, forced manufacturing output 
into areas that required smaller amounts of imports. Increasing 
values of the M,/Om ratio could be accounted for by the same 
phenomena acting in the opposite direction. The assumption 
of a constant M,/Om then either requires that there be no 
technological change-a completely impossible assumption 
in any kind of growth analysis-and no change, or only random 
changes, in the composition of manufactured output, or it 
requires that if such changes occur, they cancel out. 
Available data are consistent with the hypothesis that for 
the United States and the United Kingdom M,/Om has a 
downward trend over time. 2 There seems to be no reason to 
1 An opposing point of view can be found in Trygve Haavelmo, 
Contribution to (he Theory of Economic Evolution (Oslo: Universitetets 
Social-<j>konomiske Institutt, 1951), pp. 43-4. 
1 See A. K. Caimcross and J. Faaland, 'Long-Term Trends in Europe's 
Trade', The Economic journal, Vol. LXII (March 1952); Economic Com-
mission for Latin America, Economic Survey of Latin America, I949 
(New York, 1951) ; and the same group's A Study of Trade between 
Latin America and Europe (Geneva, 1953) ; John H. Adler, Eugene 
R. Schlesinger, and Evelyn van Westerborg, The Pattern of United 
States Import Trade since I923 (New York: Federal Reserve Bank of 
New York, 1952) ; and Hans Neisser al).d Franco Modigliani, National 
Income and International Trade: A Quantitative Analysis (Urbana: 
University of Illinois Press, 1953), chap. xii. 
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assume that changes in the composition of output due to 
changes in tastes in either of these countries were other than 
random in their effect on import content. To the extent that 
tariff and exchange policy had an effect, they undoubtedly 
worked to reduce imports. However, such policies were largely 
aimed not at raw-material importsl but at imports of finished 
goods and agricultural commodities. Therefore, I conclude 
that the falling M,/0,. is the result of import-saving techno-
logical changes.2 There is much evidence to support this 
conclusion : the development of synthetics, the Increasingly 
effective use of by-products, and the general overall increasing 
efficiency with which all inputs are used, which is commonly 
accepted as a feature of the economic history of the United 
States and the United Kingdom. 
On the behaviouristic side, the problem is to find hypotheses 
to explain the pattern of consumption through time as income 
increases. There seems little reason to assume that consumers 
prefer imported products to domestic ones merely because 
they are imported. There may be some increase in imports of 
consumer goods because of conspicuous or ostentatious con-
sumption behaviour. Probably a portion of the purchases of 
such imported goods as perfumes and wines would fall in this 
category, as would some foreign tourism, but in an aggregative 
model of the United States or the United Kingdom this is 
insignificant enough to be ignored. 
Similarly, there is no evidence to justify the assumption 
that, as per capita income increases and as a country exploits 
its resources in more and more effective ways, an increasing 
proportion of consumer products-as opposed to services-
are domestically produced. This is probably the case in the 
United States, but here it is to be explained in terms of our 
competitive strength in consumer durables, which attract an 
increasing portion of incremental expenditures of consumers. 
Therefore, the imports of consumer products of a country 
whose competitive strength lay elsewhere than in consumer 
1 The emphasis on national defence nowadays requires that this 
statement be qualified to some extent. 
2 The effect of import-saving innovations in highly developed coun-
tries has been discussed in the Economic Commission for Latin America 
publication cited in note 1 on p. 229. 
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durables would tend to increase as per capita income increased. 
These remarks suggest that no hypothesis about the importa-
tion of consumer products would be generally applicable ; 
the nature of resource endowments must be specified. 
More important is the hypothesis that, as consumption rises, 
an increasing percentage of the increment will be in the form 
of consumption of services as opposed to products. If this is 
true-and the data suggest that it is1-then the behaviour of 
the ratio of total imported consumer goods, M,, to total con-
sumption, 0,, depends chiefly on the division of expenditures 
on services between domestic services and foreign. It seems 
probable that much the greater part of the increment in the 
consumption of services will be of domestic services. Increased 
expenditures on health, education, entertainment, domestic 
travel, and financial and legal services are clearly a positive 
function of real per capita income and require virtually no 
expenditure in foreign currencies. 
The hypothesis then suggests itself that the ratio of expendi-
tures on imported consumer products to total consumption, 
M,p/0,, behaves randomly over time so far as all countries 
are concerned-it would not for one country-while the ratio 
of expenditures on imported consumer services to total con-
sumption expenditure, M,,/0,, decreases. And if we further 
accept the proposition that expenditures on consumer services 
become an increasing proportion of total consumer spending-
certainly after a given level of per capita income has been 
reached-then the ratio of total spending on consumer imports 
of goods and services to total consumption, M,/0,, must fall 
through time. 
Now if we combine the technological side and the behaviour-
istic side of the import equation, we can see the necessary 
conditions for stability of M fY through time. Both the M,/0,. 
ratio and the M,/0, ratio must remain constant, or the two 
ratios must move in such a way as to cancel each other out. 
For the country whose nonconsumption imports are chiefly 
raw materials, the presumption is strong that M,/0,. will 
decrease through time. On the consumption side, the reasoning 
and evidence are less conclusive ; though we can be confident 
1 Kuznets, op. cit., Part III. 
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about the falling import content of services, imported con-
sumer products may rise relative to consumer spending (and 
income), and this could counter the technological effect. But 
such cancellation appears unlikely, and the most reasonable 
hypothesis seems to be that M JY will fall. For both the United 
States and the United Kingdom, M JY has been falling,1 and 
probably both technological and behaviouristic factors have 
been working in the same direction. Also it has been falling 
faster and more consistently in the United States than in the 
United Kingdom, and this is what we expect, since technological 
change has occurred more steadily and per capita income has 
increased more in the United States than in the United King-
dom over the last seventy or eighty years. 
Assuming the availability of foreign exchange, the under-
developed country in the early stages of its development is, 
as noted, in the borrowing-debtor stage. This requires M fY. 
to be increasing relative to X fY. That imports would increase 
if possible is readily acceptable, for both the technological 
and the behaviouristic aspects of the import function would 
work in this direction. Technologically, Country U needs 
capital equipment to increase the productivity of its labour 
force. Whereas for the developed countries the technological 
aspect of the import equation was discussed in terms of the 
raw-material input of these countries' production, for the 
underdeveloped country the situation is somewhat reversed. 
As development gets under way, imports of capital equipment 
will increase because of the relationship between capital input 
and the output of Country U. Thus, where the developed 
countries must import raw materials to go with their capital, 
the underdeveloped countries must import capital to go with 
their raw materials and labour. 
I have argued earlier that innovations have historically been 
of an import-saving kind, which for the developed countries 
meant essentially raw-material saving. These same innovations 
would appear to be import-using from the standpoint of 
Country U. But I have also argued that organizational and 
management innovations play a significant role in the process 
of innovation ; these changes require little or no increase in 
1 See the sources Gited in note 2 on p. 234· 
The Theoretical Context 
imports and are surely a requisite for increasing output in the 
underdeveloped country. On the basis of this reasoning-there 
are no data, of course-we may conclude only that it is very 
unlikely that, for technological reasons, M JY will decrease as 
income increases through time but that such increases should 
work to raise this ratio or leave it approximately constant. 
On the behaviouristic side, imports should increase also. 
At the levels of income characteristic of most modern under-
developed countries, expenditures on services seems to con-
stitute a relatively small part of the increment of consumption 
expenditures. This may be explained by the fact that many 
underdeveloped countries have considerable resources-chiefly 
labour-in service activities.1 And it is not until per capita 
income has increased substantially that existing service facili-
ties will become inadequate. As income increases, therefore, 
expenditures will be directed largely toward purchases of 
consumer products, as opposed to services. The range of output 
in U is limited to a few primary products ; increments of 
consumer spending will therefore be, to a very large extent, 
directed toward products that are not domestically produced, 
with prevailing rates of productivity. 
If these are the factors determining M JY, there appears to 
be no reason to assume that this ratio will decrease as the 
country develops. Indeed, the analysis of the preceding two 
paragraphs suggests that, if M JY changes at all, it will increase. 
If this is true-if imports grow at least at the same percentage 
rate as income-then the availability of foreign exchange 
imposes a definite ceiling on the rate of growth of income.2 
There is no reason under my assumptions for the rate of growth 
of income allowed by the import function to be equal to the 
rate of growth of income required to maintain the labour force 
fully employed in such a way that its productivity is maxi-
mized or even that its marginal productivity is positive. 
Earlier, in the analysis of s and k, I argued that, because of 
the shortage of capital and the specified behaviour of k, 
1 Richard Holton, 'Marketing Structure and Economic Develop-
ment', Qua1'te1'ly Journal of Economics, Vol. LXVII (August 1953). 
2 Here, perhaps, the two-country assumption is misleading, since 
shortage of specific exchange may cause trouble. Elaboration of this 
problem cannot be undertaken here. 
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unemployment threatened ass f k < l + p + lp. Here it is argued 
that the percentage rate of growth of imports also imposes an 
upper limit on the percentage rate of growth of income. The 
rate of growth of import-earning power is simply the rate of 
growth of exports and capital inflow, x + c. Thus, if x + c 
<l + p + lp, there will be unemployment-indeed, increas-
ing unemployment-due to the inability of import-earning 
power to reach the rate of growth, which, if attained by 
income, would result in all labour being employed pro-
ductively. 
In examining the time path of M fY for the developed 
countries, I also implied something about the time path of 
the exports of Country U. If exports are the sole source of 
exchange-earning power for U, the percentage rate of growth 
of income for this country must be less than that for the deve-
loped countries. I have argued that D.M,/M,. = D.Y,./Y,. 
and D.M4fM4 < D.Y4 /Yd, and, since D.M4 fM4 = llX,./X,., 
then D.X..fX .. < D.Y4fY4• (The subscripts u and d refer to 
underdeveloped and developed countries, respectively.) Since 
the rate of growth of income in U has a ceiling set by the rate 
of growth of foreign exchange and since this rate of growth is 
less than the rate of growth of income of the developed coun-
tries, U's income must necessarily grow at a lower rate than 
that of the developed countries.! Without capital imports, 
therefore, the underdeveloped country not only will be unable 
to achieve the rate of growth of income of the developed 
countries but may suffer unemployment as well. A rapid growth 
of income in the developed country is necessary to keep the 
percentage rate of growth of U's exports from declining; but 
this means that the absolute difference between the incomes 
of D and U will increase and the underdeveloped country will 
fall further and further behind. 
Evidently, capital imports would alleviate the situation, 
but-and this is the key point-they would be permanently 
necessary. A constant rate of capital inflow into U would raise 
the allowable rate of growth.(possibly as high as for the devel-
oped countries); but, given the technological and behaviouristic 
1 It should be remembered that I have assumed constant prices all 
around ; changes in the terms of trade would introduce a new variable 
here, which might alter the conclusion in the text. 
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patterns described here, such capital imports would have 
to continue indefinitely. Once they stopped or slowed down, 
U would fall back again. It is to be emphasized that a rising 
income in U resulting in more savings is not a sufficient condi-
tion to overcome this problem. Even if the underdeveloped 
country reaches the point at which it has excess domestic 
savings and can lend abroad, the nature of the demand for 
its exports prevents this from occurring. The developed 
countries are able to earn all their imports ; Country U will 
still be limited by its capacity to import. In order to follow 
the development sequence described earlier, not only must 
the modern underdeveloped country experience an increase 
in per capita income, but there must also be an alteration in 
the technological and behaviouristic conditions I have out-
lined ; otherwise the underdeveloped country will remain 
dependent upon capital inflow. A constant percentage rate of 
net capital inflow is not conceptually impossible,1 but it surely 
is unlikely, and it certainly is not an assumption upon which a 
realistic development programme can be built. 
I can now summarize briefly. In the literature on economic 
development and in public statements by leaders of under-
developed countries, emphasis is always placed on the need 
for more and more capital. This is surely correct and was never 
a secret. It would appear, however, that, though more capital 
is a necessary condition for speeding up the rate of development, 
it is not a sufficient condition. In particular, the preceding 
analysis has revealed the fundamental role of the nature and 
pattern of technological change. Liquid capital is perfectly 
adaptable and can be directed in whatever way is appropriate ; 
the same is not true of modern technology. Modern technology 
was developed and is being advanced in a few countries with 
particular and highly local characteristics, and the technological 
developments reflect these characteristics. There is no reason 
at all to assume that the technology thus developed can be 
bodily transferred to other countr.ies with other characteristics 
1 Evsey D. Domar has shown that permanent outflow of capital, 
that is, a permanent export surplus, is not impossible (see his 'The 
Effect of Foreign Investments on the Balance of Payments', The 
American Economic Review, Vol. XL [December 1950]). 
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and there perform in the way it has performed in the area to 
which it is indigenous. Indeed, as we have seen, it may perform 
in a way that is actually harmful to development. 
In the international secto1 similar reasoning is applicable. 
The argument for the industrialization of the underdeveloped 
countries usually involves the hypothesis that the terms of 
trade show a secular tendency to improve for the industrialized 
countries at the expense of the unindustrialized.1 This hypo-
thesis, even if it is correct, has surely been asked to support a 
heavier argument than it can bear.2 But it does appear that 
there must be some major change in the technological and 
behaviouristic parameters of the import equation if the rate 
of growth of the underdeveloped countries is to approach that 
of the more highly developed countries. This means essentially 
that the ceiling imposed on the rate of growth of income by 
the availability of foreign exchange must be raised above that 
imposed by the limited rate of savings. Technologically the 
requirement appears once more to be the development of an 
improving technology consistent with the resource endowment 
of the given country. 'Behaviouristically' the way is not very 
clear. Controls that reduce consumer imports may be necessary 
to change the pattern of consumption or to gain time until 
domestic output can be increased and its composition changed 
so that an increased proportion of consumption can be met by 
domestic production. But this may involve a non-optimum 
allocation of resources and will itself serve to limit the rate of 
growth of output. 
As for removing the difficulties through international capital 
movements, I have shown that unless there are the technolo-
gical and behaviouristic changes, the import of capital does 
not solve the problem but merely relieves its immediacy. 
Further, the countries where capital is scarce, for reasons 
indicated, may not always offer capital its most productive 
employment. But foreign capital, even if available, cannot 
solve the technological problem ; this must be a purely domestic 
achievement of the underdeveloped country. 
1 See almost any publication of the Economic Commission for Latin 
America. 
1 Jacob Viner, International Trade and Economic Development 
(Free Press, Glencoe, Ill., U.S.A., 1952). 
4. EXTERNAL ECONOMIES 
AND BALANCED GROWTH 
PROBLEMS OF INDUSTRIALIZATION OF 
EASTERN AND SOUTH-EASTERN EUROPE* 
by P. N. Rosenstein-Rodan 
'I SHOULD LIKE TO BUY AN EGG, !'LEASE,' SHE SAID TIMIDLY. 'HOW 
do you sell them ? ' 'Fivepence farthing for one-twopence for two,' 
the Sheep replied. 'Then two are cheaper than one ? ' Alice said in a 
surprised tone, taking out her purse. 'Only you must eat them both, 
if you buy two,' said the Sheep. 'Then I'll have one, please,' said 
Alice as she put the money down on the counter. For she thought to 
herself, 'They mightn't be at all nice, you know.' (Lewis Carroll, 
Through the Looking-Glass.) 
It is generally agreed that industrialization1 of 'international 
depressed areas' like Eastern and South-Eastern Europe (or 
the Far East) is in the general interest not only of those coun-
tries, but of the world as a whole. It is the way of achieving a 
more equal distribution of income between different areas of 
the world by raising incomes in depressed areas at a higher 
rate than in the rich areas. The assumptions in the case under 
discussion are : that there exists an • agrarian excess popula-
tion' in Eastern and South-Eastern Europe amounting to 
20-25 million people out of the total population of IOO-IIO 
million, i.e., that about 25 per cent of the population is either 
totally or partially ('disguised unemployment') unemployed. 
The waste of labour is by no means confined to rich industrial 
countries. It is considerably greater in poor agrarian countries. 
If the principles of international division of labour are to be 
applied,. labour must either be transported towards capital 
(emigration), or capital must be transported towards labour 
(industrialization). From the point of view of maximizing the 
* The Economic journal, June-September 1943· Reprinted by permis-
sion of the Royal Economic Society and the author. This article is 
included in the report of the Economic Group of the Committee on 
Reconstruction, Royal Institute of International Affairs. 
1 One might consider the industrialization of these countries as one 
chapter of agrarian reconstruction, or one might treat the improvement 
of agrarian production as one chapter of industrialization. What matters 
is to remember that the two tasks are interconnected parts of one 
problem. 
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world income, the difference between these two ways is one 
of transport costs only, and may be assumed to be negligible. 
Emigration and resettlement would, however, present so many 
difficulties in immigration areas (and in emigration areas) that 
it cannot be considered feasible on a large scale. A very 
considerable part of the task will have to be solved by 
industrialization. 
In order to reach an 'optimum size' of the industrial enter-
prises, the area of industrialization must be sufficiently large. 
This fact, as well as the possibility of lowering the marginal 
risk of investment, make it imperative to aim at an economic 
unit comprising the whole area between Germany, Russia and 
Italy. Though large in terms of square miles or population, it 
is not large in terms of output. The total national income of this 
economic unit amounts to £2,ooo million-i.e., 40 per cent of 
the income of Great Britain. 
There are two fundamentally different ways of industrial-
ization of that area : 
(i) That Eastern and South-Eastern Europe should in-
dustrialize on xts own, on the • Russian model' (by which we 
do not mean communism), aiming at self-sufficiency, without 
international investment. That would imply the construction 
of all stages of industry, heavy industry, machine industry, 
as well as light industry, with the final result of a national 
economy built like a vertical industrial concern. This way 
presents several grave disadvantages: (a) It can only proceed 
slowly, because capital must be supplied internally at the 
expense of a standard of life and consumption which are already 
at a very low leveL It implies, therefore, a heavy and, in our 
opinion, unnecessary sacrifice. (b) It will lead finally, since 
there are appropriate natural resources in the area, to an 
independent unit in the world economy implying a reduction 
in the international division of labour; i.e., the output of the 
world as a whole would be less than it might be, the world 
would be poorer in material goods. (c) The difference in world 
economic structure is most clearly seen in the case of heavy 
industries. Building up heavy industries in Eastern and South-
Eastern Europe at a gTeat sacrifice would only add to the world 
excess capacity of heavy industry, and would constitute from 
the world's point of view largely a waste of resources. 
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(ii) The alternative way of industrialization would fit 
Eastern and South-Eastern Europe into the world economy, 
which would preserve the advantages of an international 
division of labour, and would therefore in the end produce 
more wealth for everybody. It would be based on substantial 
international investment or capital lending. This way presents 
several advantages: (a) It could proceed more quickly and 
at a small sacrifice of consumption of this area. From the point 
of view of international political stability there may be all the 
difference in the world if so per cent of the agrarian excess 
population in Eastern and South-Eastern Europe were profita-
bly employed within ten years after the war instead of, say, 
20 per cent. (b) The sound principles of international division 
of labour postulate labour-intensive-i.e., light industries in 
overpopulated areas. (c) Even for the purposes of an expand-
ing world economy, the existing heavy industries in the U.S.A., 
Great Britain, Germany, France and Switzerland could cer-
tainly supply all the needs of the international depressed areas. 
Clearly this way of industrialization is preferable to the 
autarkic one. It is a tremendous task, almost without historical 
precedent. There is no analogy to the process of industrializa-
tion in the early nineteenth century for a number of reasons 
which may be mentioned briefly before being examined in 
more detail. (a) International investment in the nineteenth 
century was largely self-liquidating, based on exchange of 
agrarian and industrial products. Nowadays liquidation can 
no longer be assumed to be 'automatic', although the problem 
can be solved if it is properly planned. (b) Existing institutions 
of international investment (floating of shares and loans) are 
inappropriate to the task of industrialization of a whole area. 
They deal with too small units and do not take advantage of 
external economies. Capital mostly goes to individual enter-
prises. There has never been a scheme of planned industrializa-
tion comprising a simultaneous planning of several comple-
mentary industries, which is part of our plan for Eastern and 
South-Eastern Europe (pages 249-51). (c) Technical progress 
was the main driving-force in the nineteenth century. Indus-
trialization in international depressed areas, on the other hand, 
implies the application of given technical knowledge. (d) The 
increase in overhead costs and fixed capital since the nineteenth 
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century has raised the risk of loss of capital and lowered the 
mobility of resources and the flexibility of the economic system. 
It has vastly increased the average size of the firm. (e) Political 
risks of international investment are very much greater today 
than in the nineteenth century, when it was assumed that 
certain things were 'not done'. State supervision and guaran-
tees can, therefore, substantially lower risks, and for that 
reason constitute the conditio sine qua non of international 
investment on a large enough scale. Active participation of 
the State in economic life is a new factor which must be taken 
into account as a new datum. (f) People (even Eastern Euro-
peans!) are not as tough today as they used to be. Social 
conscience would not stand for as much misery in peace-time 
as was taken for granted in the Darwinist nineteenth century. 
Milder methods must be used. 
An institutional framework different from the present one is 
clearly necessary for the successful carrying out of industrializa-
tion in international depressed areas. In what follows argu-
ments are submitted tending to show why the whole of the 
industry to be created is to be treated and planned like one 
huge firm or trust. 
The first task of industrialization is to provide for training 
and 'skilling' of labour which is to transform Eastern European 
peasants into full-time or part-time industrial workers. The 
automatism of laissez1aire never worked properly in that field. 
It broke down because it is not profitable for a private entre-
preneur to invest in training labour. There are no mortgages on 
workers-an entrepreneur who invests in training workers may 
lose capital if these workers contract with another firm. 
Although not a good investment for a private firm, it is the best 
investment for the State. It is also a good investment for the 
bulk of industries to be created when taken as a whole, although 
it may represent irrecoverable costs for a smaller unit. It 
constitutes an important instance of the Pigovian divergence 
between 'private and social marginal net product ' where the 
latter is greater than the former. Training facilities (including 
transport and housing) of one million workers per annum would 
involve costs of certainly more than £xoo million per annum 
-a sum which may be too great to be borne by the State 
(or the Eastern European national economy) if taken apart 
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from the costs of the 50 per cent participation in its own 'Eas-
tern European Industrial Trust '1 that we shall propose. It 
should be counted as capital investment in the Eastern Euro-
pean Industrial Trust (E.E.I.T.). 
That is not, however, the most important reason in favour of 
such a large investment unit. 
Complementarity of different industries provides the most 
important set of arguments in favour of a large-scale planned 
industrialization. In order to illustrate the issues involved, let 
us adopt the somewhat roundabout method of analysing two 
examples. Let us assume that zo,ooo unemployed workers in 
Eastern and South-Eastern Europe are taken from the land 
and put into a large shoe factory. They receive wages substan-
tially higher than their previous meagre income in natura. 
It would be impossible to put them into industry at their 
previous income standard, because they need more foodstuffs 
than they had in their agrarian semi-unemployed existence, 
because these foodstuffs have to be transported to towns, and 
because the workers have to pay for housing accommodation. 
If the!je workers spent all their wages on shoes, a market for 
the products of their enterprise would arise representing an 
expansion which does not disturb. the pre-existing market, 
and 90 per cent of the problem (assuming ro per cent profit) 
would be solved. The trouble is that the workers will not spend 
all their wages on shoes. If, instead, one million unemployed 
workers were taken from the land and put, not into one indus-
try, but into a whole series of industries which produce the 
bulk of the goods on which the workers would spend their 
wages, what was not true in the case of one shoe factory would 
become true in the case of a whole system of industries : it 
would create its own additional market, thus realizing an expan-
sion of world output with the minimum disturbance of the 
world markets. The industries producing the bulk of the wage 
goods can therefore be said to be complementary. The planned 
creation of such a complementary system reduces the risk of 
not being able to sell, and, since risk can be considered as cost, 
1 The name is provisional for want of a better one. It will have to be 
changed because of the unpleasant associations connected with the term 
'trust'. Eastern European Industrial Corporation, Board-or Holding 
Company might be considered. 
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it reduces costs. It is in this sense a special case of 'external 
economies'. 
It may be added that, while in the highly developed and 
rich countries with their more variegated needs it is difficult 
to assess the prospective demand of the population, it is not 
as difficult to foresee on what the formerly unemployed workers 
would spend their wages in regions where a low standard of 
living obtains. 
Two other types of 'external economies' will arise when 
a system of different industries is created. First, the strictly 
Marshallian economies external to a firm within a growing 
irldustry. The same applies, however (secondly), to economies 
external to one industry due to the growth of other industries. 
It is usually tacitly assumed that the divergence between the 
'private and social marginal net product' is not very considera-
ble. This assumption may be too optimistic even in the case 
of a crystallized mature competitive economy. It is certainly 
not true in the case of fundamental structural changes in the 
international depressed areas. External economies may there 
be of the same order of magnitude as profits which appear on 
the profit and loss account of the enterprise. 
The existing institutions of international and national 
investment do not take advantage of external economies. 
There is no incentive within their framework for many invest-
ments which are profitable in terms of 'social marginal net 
product', but do not appear profitable in terms of 'private 
marginal net product'. The main driving-force of investment 
is the profit expectation of an individual entrepreneur which is 
based on experience of the past. Experience of the past is partly 
irrelevant, however, where the whole economic structure of a 
region is to be changed. An individual entrepreneur's knowledge 
of the market is bound to be insufficient in this case because 
he cannot have all the data that would be available to the 
planning board of an E.E.I.T. His subjective risk estimate 
is bound to be considerably higher than the objective risk. 
If the industrialization of international depressed areas were 
to rely entirely on the normal incentive of private entrepre-
neurs, the process would not only be very much slower, the 
rate of investment smaller and (consequently) the national 
income lower, but the whole economic structure of the region 
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would be different. Investment would be distributed in different 
proportions between different industries, the final equilibrium 
would be below the optimum which a large E.E.I.T. could 
achieve. In the international capital market the existing 
institutions are mostly used to invest in, or to grant credit 
to, single enterprises. It might easily happen that any one 
enterprise would not be profitable enough to guarantee pay-
ment of sufficient interest or dividend out of its own profits. 
But the creation of such an enterprise, e.g., production of 
electric power, may create new investment opportunities and 
profits elswhere, e.g., in an electrical equipment industry. 
If we create a sufficiently large investment unit by including 
all the new industries of the region, external economies will 
become internal profits out of which dividends may be paid 
easily. 
Professor Allyn Young's celebrated example elucidates 
our problem. He assumed that a Tube line was to be built in a 
district and that an accurate estimate was made of costs and 
receipts. It was found that the rate of profit would be below 
the usual rate of yield on investments obtainable elsewhere. 
The project was found not profitable and was abandoned. 
Another enterprising company bought up the land and houses 
along the proposed Tube line and was then able to build the 
line. Although the receipts from the passenger traffic would 
not pay a sufficient rate of profit, the capital appreciation on 
the houses and land more than made up the deficiency. Thus 
the project was realized, the Tube line was built. The problem 
is: Is it desirable-i.e., does it lend to an optimum allocation 
of resources and maximization of national income-that this 
form of capital gain (external economy) be included as an item 
in the calculus of profitability, or is it not? Allyn Young hints 
that it is not desirable because the capital appreciation of 
houses and land along the Tube line due to an influx of people 
from other districts has an uncompensated counterpart in a 
capital depreciation of houses and land in districts out of which 
people moved into the Tube;..line district. Agricultural land in 
Eastern and South-Eastern Europe will, however, not depre-
ciate when the agrarian excess of population moves out. In 
this case external economies should be included in the calculus 
of profitability. 
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External economies are often invoked as an argument in 
favour of a different programme of industrialization. National 
and international investment should concentrate at the start 
on building of 'basic industries' and public utilities which give 
rise to new investment opportunities. 'Let us build railways, 
roads, canals, hydro-electric power-stations, the rest will follow 
automatically.' Where the lack of transport facilities is a 
flagrant obstacle to economic progress, as, for instance, in China 
and parts of Latin America, that may indeed. be the best start 
of development investment. The situation is different, however, 
in Eastern and South-Eastern Europe. There is no comparable 
deficiency in railroads there. Rail mileage per £ million of 
national income is very much higher than in the Far East. 
A general vision of the future economic structure is necessary 
in order to know where to build communications, how much 
of them, and what for. The quality of 'basic' industries is not 
confined, moreover, to some public utilities. We have seen how 
complementarity makes to some extent all industries 'basic'. 
If sufficient capital (national and international) is available 
for investment in 'basic industries' the normal multiplier 
effect will 'naturally' lead to further industrialization accord-
ing to the advocates of this programme. The argument assumes, 
however, a smooth working of the equilibrium mechanism of 
balance of payments and capital movements which is not likely 
to obtain in the structural disequilibrium situation after the 
war. Industrialization of international depressed areas, once 
it is accomplished, may create an equilibrium, from which 
onwards normal private incentives may operate successfully. 
But it seems hopeless to rely on them before that point is 
reached. 'Most of the countries of the world are undertaking 
national development or will undertake it after the war on the 
basis of imported capital equipment-locomotives, steel, 
tractors, steam shovels, cement mixers, turbines. In some 
instances they have foreign assets which can be used to pur-
chase this equipment. In the majority of cases, however, they 
will be able to acquire it only by cutting down imports of 
consumer goods and pushing exports, to develop an export 
surplus, or by borrowing. Private investors ... after the experi-
ence of the last twenty years, will probably not be willing to 
lend monies in sufficiently large amounts or low rates of interest 
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to enable national development in debtor areas to get off to 
a good start. The alternative is for governments in creditor 
countries to guarantee the loans, or to lend the funds them-
selves .... The availability of foreign funds, foreign technical 
assistance and foreign machinery, however, will transform 
the process of national development from one which would 
threaten to disrupt international economic relations and trade 
into one which can make a key contribution to the expansion 
of world income and the reorganisation of world trade. '1 
Governments in creditor countries will not guarantee the 
loans or shares unless they see how interest or dividend service 
is assured. If they have sufficient control on the board of 
E.E.I.T. they will be able to give the guarantee at no cost or risk 
to themselves, since the real risks of the whole enterprise is 
very much lower than the risks relating to parts of the whole 
would be. But while the investment 'pays' in Eastern and 
South-Eastern Europe, it is not necessarily self-liquidating. 
Liquidation will have to be planned-i.e., one part of the 
industries 'created in Eastern and South-Eastern Europe will 
have to be export industries. The flow of their exports will 
have to be sold in creditor countries. These exports will rep-
resent the main part of the rich countries' share in the world 
expansion. The placing of these exports has to be foreseen 
and planned in such a way as to minimize the burden of neces-
sary adjustment of economic resources in the creditor countries. 
Eastern and South-Eastern Europe will most probably cease 
to be an exporter of cereals. It will export processed foods 
and light industrial articles. 
International trade in the nineteenth century functioned 
more or less smoothly because all countries had a high income 
elasticity of demand for imports. On the higher standard of 
living in the rich countries of the twentieth century the income 
elasticity of demand for imports may be lower. There may be 
only one good for which the income elasticity of demand is 
high : leisure which does not require imports of material goods. 
Accordingly, the rich countries may have to accept a part of 
their share in economic expansion in the form of more leisure. 
1 International Development Loans, Planning Pamphlets, National 
Planning Association, No. 15, p. q. (New York, 1942.) 
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They may have a 40- or 35-hour week, while Eastern Europe 
maintains a 48-hour week. 
Attention is confined here to what ought to be done rather 
than how it is to be done. The institutional implementation 
of this programme must be left over to another occasion. Its 
main outlines are : At least 50 per cent of the capital required 
must be supplied internally. 'Creditor' and 'debtor' countries 
acquire each 50 per cent shares of a trust formed of all the 
industries to be created in the region. They will plan and 
proceed as business partners with Government representatives 
on the board. The creditors acquire shares in the trust which 
are redeemable after twenty years at 10 per cent above 
parity if an average dividend service of 4! per cent at 
least has been maintained in the past. An average divi-
dend service of 3 per cent is guaranteed by Governments 
on the shares subscribed in their countries. Private in-
vestments in Eastern and South~Eastern Europe requiring 
foreign credits are licensed. Shares may be acquired by 
contributions in natura : for instance, the establishment of 
branch factories. Guarantees of non-discrimination in the 
internal taxation policy will be obtained from Eastern Euro-
pean authorities. 
The aim of industrialization in international depressed 
areas is to produce a structural equilibrium in the world 
economy by creating productive employment for the agrarian 
excess population. It may be assumed that creditor countries 
will not be willing to enter into commitments for more than 
ten years. How much can be achieved in that period, and what 
is the rough order of magnitude of the capital required ? 
Industrial employment has to be found for {a) 20 million of 
the agrarian excess population + (b) 7-8 million = 40-50 per 
cent of the increase in popuiation during the next decade 
(assuming that so-6o per cent will be absorbed by agriculture) 
= 28 million people = 9 million active men and 3 million active 
women 12 million workers. Up to 2 million workers can be 
employed in idle capacity. Capital has to be found for IO million 
workers. Since the available capital is scarce, labour-intensive 
-i.e., light industries-will prevail. According to such statistics 
as are available, the following classification of industries is 
proposed: (1) light industries-capital equipment per head 
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£roo-£4oo ; (z) medium industries-capital equipment per head 
£4oo-£8oo ; (3) heavy industries-capital equipment per head 
£8oo-£r,soo. Since some heavy industries cannot be avoided, 
let us assume that £3oo-£350 per head will be required, includ-
ing housing, communications and public utilities. That amounts 
to £3,000 million, to which has to be added £r,8oo million on 
maintenance of old and new capital in ten years, giving a total 
of £4,8oo million. Eastern Europe would have to supply at 
least 50 per cent-i.e., £2.400 million. Another £r,zoo million of 
capital will be necessary for the improvement of agriculture, of 
which we assume that the bulk would have to be provided inter-
nally,1 so that Eastern and South-Eastern Europe would have 
to supply £3,600 million capital internally between, say, 1946 
and 1956.2 Since its total income is £z,ooo million per annum, 
that would represent a rate of investment of r8 per cent (equal 
to that of Russia). Even if we take account of the gradually 
rising national income, rates of savings beginning with 8 per 
cent and leading at the end of a ten-year period to rs per cent 
would seem to represent the maximum one can plan for. 
Assuming a national income rising annually by 4 per cent, 
and an average rate of investment of rz per cent, the internal 
capital supply would only amount to £3,000 million. It appears, 
therefore, that even a bold and rather optimistic programme 
of industrialization cannot abolish the whole of the surplus 
population in the next decade. At best 70-80 per cent of the 
unemployed workers could be employed. It follows that emigra-
tion will still have to supplement industrialization. Besides 
that, however, German reparations in the form of capital 
equipment might provide one part of the capital of the E.E.I.T. 
Reparations in money to the rich Western countries created a 
problem of the last war. There is no difficulty with reparations 
in natura to poor countries. Germany can increase her consump-
tion above the war-time standard, and transfer reparations 
in natura representing 25-50 per cent of what she used to spend 
on armaments. 
1 A small part of it may be borrowed from abroad, but in this case in 
the form of bond credit. 
1 The immediate transition period of the first two years after the war 
is not included in these calculations, so that de facto it is a twelve-years 
plan, not a ten-years plan. 
SOME INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS 
OF THE PROBLEM OF 
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT* 
by Ragnar Nurkse 
'A COUNTRY IS POOR BECAUSE IT IS POOR.' THIS SEEMS A TRITE 
proposition but it does express the circular relationships 
that afflict both the demand and the supply side of the prob-
lem of capital formation in economically backward areas. 
This paper will discuss some international aspects of the 
difficulties on both sides. It will take up only a few points 
and cannot even attempt to give anything like a balanced 
picture. 
The inducement to invest is limited by the size of the market. 
That is essentially what Allyn Y oung1 brought out in his 
reinterpretation of Adam Smith's famous thesis. What deter-
mines the size of the market? Not simply money demand, nor 
mere numbers of people, nor physical area. Transport facilities, 
which Adam Smith singled out for special emphasis, are import-
ant; reductions in transport costs (artificial as well as natural) 
do enlarge the market in the economic as well as the geogra-
phical sense. But reductions in any cost of production tend to 
have that effect. So the size of the market is determined by the 
general level of productivity. Capacity to buy means capacity 
to produce. In its turn, the level of productivity depends-
not entirely by any means, but largely-on the use of capital 
in production. But the use of capital is inhibited, to start with, 
by the small size of the market. 
Where is the way out of this circle? How can the market 
be enlarged? Although in backward areas Say's Law may be 
valid in the sense that there is generally no deflationary gap, 
it never is valid in the sense that the output of any single 
* The American Economic Review, May 1952. Reprinted by permission of 
the American Economic Association and the author's widow. 
1 'Increasing Returns and Economic Progress', The Economic Journal, 
December 1928. 
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industry, newly set up with capital equipment, can create its 
own demand. Human wants being various, the people engaged 
in the new industry will not wish to spend all their income on 
their own products.1 Suppose it is a shoe industry. If in the 
rest of the economy nothing happens to increase productivity 
and hence buying power, the market for the new shoe output 
is likely to prove deficient. People in the rest of the economy 
will not give up other things in order to buy, say, a pair of 
shoes every year, if they do not have enough food, clothing, 
and shelter. They cannot let go the little they have of these 
elementary necessities. If they were willing to give up some 
of their present consumption in exchange for an annual pair 
of new shoes, these things would be available for the shoe 
workers to make up the balance in their own consumption 
needs. As it is, the new industry is likely to be a 
failure. 
The difficulty is not due fundamentally to discontinuities in 
the technical forms of capital equipment, though these may 
accentuate it. It is due above all to the inevitable inelasticity 
of demands at low real-income levels. It is in this way that 
lack of buying power cramps the inducement to invest in any 
individual industry. 
The difficulty is not present, however, in the case of a more 
or less synchronized application of capital to a wide range of 
different industries. Here the result is an overall enlargement 
of the market and hence an escape from the deadlock. People 
working with more and better tools in a number of complemen-
tary projects become each other's customers. Most industries 
catering for mass consumption are complementary in the 
sense that they provide a market for, and thus support, each 
other. This basic complementarity stems, of course, from the 
diversity of human wants. The case for 'balanced growth' 
rests ultimately on the need for a 'balanced diet'. 
The notion of balance is inherent in Say1s Law. Take Mill's 
formulation of it : 'Every increase of production, if distributed 
without miscalculation among all kinds of pn;>duce in the pro-
portion which private interest would dictate, creates, or rather 
1 See Paul N. Rosenstein-Rodan, 'Problems of Industrialization of 
Eastern and South-Eastern Europe', reprinted in the present volume, 
pp. 249-50. 
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constitutes, its own demand. '1 Here, in a nutshell, is the case 
for balanced growth. An increase in the production of shoes 
alone does not create its own demand. An increase in production 
over a wide range of consumables, so balanced as to correspond 
with the pattern of consumers' preferences, does create its 
own demand. 
How do we get balanced growth ? Ordinary price incentives 
may bring it about by small degrees, though here the technical 
discontinuities can be a serious hindrance ; besides, slow growth 
is just not good enough where population pressure exists. 
In the evolution of Western industrial capitalism, rapid growth 
was achieved, in Schumpeter's view, through the action of 
creative entrepreneurs producing spurts of industrial progress. 
Even though innovations originated each time in a particular 
industry, the monetary effects and other circumstances were 
such as to promote each time a wave of new applications of 
capital over a whole range of industries. It is easy to see how a 
frontal attack of this sort can succeed while yet any sizable 
investment in any particular industry may be discouraged by 
the limits of the existing market. 
Other types of society may feel a need for some degree of 
central direction to produce the desired effect-at any rate 
initially. But whether balanced growth is enforced by govern-
ment planning or achieved spontaneously by private enterprise 
is, in a sense, a question of method. Whichever method is 
adopted, the nature of the solution aimed at may be the same, 
though the 'miscalculation' Mill warned against seems hard 
to avoid in either case. 
On the international plane, these general considerations 
apply first of all to the problem of international investment. 
Why is it that private business investment abroad has tended 
in the past-in the last few years as well as in the nineteenth 
century-to shy away from industries working for the domestic 
market in underdeveloped areas and to concentrate instead 
on primary production for export to the advanced industrial 
centres? The facts do not support the view that the so-called 
'colonial' type of investment-in mines and plantations 
1 J. S. Mill, Essays in Some Unsettled Questions of Political Economy 
(London School of Economics reprint, 1948), p. 73· 
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producing for export to the industrial creditor countries-was 
typical of nineteenth century foreign investment as a whole. 
They do suggest, however, that it was, and still is, fairly typical 
of private business investment in backward areas. American 
direct investments abroad definitely conform to this pattern. 
In underdeveloped countries, they work mostly in extractive 
industries--oil-fields, mines, and plantations--producing for 
export markets; only in advanced areas (Canada and Western 
Europe) do they, significantly, show any great interest in 
manufacturing for local consumption.1 
The reluctance of private business capital to go to work for 
domestic markets in underdeveloped countries, in contrast 
with its eagerness in the past to work there for export to the 
industrial nations, reflects no sinister conspiracy or deliberate 
policy. There is the obvious economic explanation : on the one 
hand, the poverty of the local consumers in the backward 
countries; on the other, the large and, in the nineteenth 
century, vigorously expanding markets for primary products 
in the world's industrial centres. In these circumstances it was 
natural for foreign business investment to form mere outposts 
of the industrial creditor countries, to whose needs these out-
posts catered. 
Incidentally, the weakness of the market incentive for 
private investment in the domestic economy of a low-income 
area can affect domestic as well as foreign capital. It may help 
in some degree to account for the common observation that 
such domestic saving as does take place in underdeveloped 
countries tends to be used unproductively : hoarded, exported, 
or put into real estate. 
Private investment generally is governed by the pull of 
market demand, and private international investment is no 
exception to this. A particular instance of the relation between 
investment incentives and market demand appears in our old 
friend the acceleration principle. The relation holds, albeit 
in a different way, in space as well as in the time dimension. 
The conventional theory of factor proportions and capital 
movements is that in countries where there is little capital in 
relation to land and labour, the marginal productivity and 
1 See H. J. Dernburg, 'Prospects for Long-Term Foreign Invest-
ment', Harvard Business Review, July 1950, p. 42. 
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hence the yield of capital will be high, and that, if it were not 
for extraneous impediments, capital would move to these 
countries from the areas where it is relatively abundant. This 
view is subject to the qualification that the high potential 
yield of capital in capital-poor areas may be capable of realiza-
tion only through investment undertaken simultaneously in 
a number of complementary industries (or in public overhead 
facilities that serve to raise productivity in a number of differ-
ent lines). A balanced increase in production generates external 
economies by enlarging the size of the market for each firm or 
industry. There is on this account as well as for other possible 
reasons, a discrepancy between the private and the social 
marginal productivity of capital. Even if we abstract from 
political and other risk factors, there is no guarantee that the 
motives that animate individual businessmen will automatically 
induce a flow of funds from the rich to the poor countries. 
The marginal productivity of capital in the latter compared 
with the former may be high indeed, but not necessarily in 
private business terms. 
While the doctrine of balanced growth leaves plenty of room 
for international investment, it does reveal limits to the role 
of direct business investment. An individual foreign investor 
may not have the power, even if he had the will, to break the 
deadlock caused by low productivity, lack of real buying 
power, and deficient investment incentives in the domestic 
economy of a backward area. Even in the heyday of private 
foreign investment, however, capital outlays carried on by 
public authorities by means of private foreign loans were an 
important form of international investment. Loans to govern-
ments accounted for 30 per cent of Britain's total overseas 
investments outstanding in rgr4, with another 40 per cent in 
railway securities and 5 per cent in public utilities.1 Clearly 
this does not leave any major proportion for the strictly colonial 
type of investments-in mines and plantations producing for 
the creditor countries. 
Investment by public authorities financed from privat~-or 
public-foreign funds is a form of 'autonomous' investment, 
since it does not depend closely, if at all, on the current state 
1 H. Feis, Europe, the World's Banker, I870-I9I4 (Yale University 
Press, 1930), p. 27. 
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of market demand. By contrast, direct business investment 
must be classed as a form of 'induced' investment since it 
generally has to be induced by tangible market demand, already 
existing or visibly coming into existence. Thus the general 
distinction between autonomous and induced investment is 
applicable in a certain sense to international investment as well. 
International investment on private business account is 
attracted by markets, and for the poorer countries the big 
markets in the past were the markets for export to the great 
industrial centres. Investment was induced by the investing 
countries' own demand. Foreign investment in extractive 
industries working for ex.port is not to be despised, since it 
usually carries with it various direct and indirect benefits to 
the country where it is made. Why is even this type of invest· 
ment now flowing out in only a small trickle ? Aside, again, 
from the obvious political impediments, perhaps· the answer 
is that the export markets for primary commodities have not 
been enjoying anything like the same rate of secular expansion 
as that which came about in the nineteenth century from the 
extraordinary growth of population as well as productivity 
in the Western industrial countries, and also from Britain's 
willingness to sacrifice her own agriculture to the requirements 
of international specialization. In recent decades, synthetic 
substitutes have affected unfavourably the demand for a 
number of staple products. The present raw-material boom 
is widely regarded as being due to special circumstances which 
may not last. In any case, it may take more than a boom-it 
may take something like a secular expansion of demand-to 
induce private foreign investment in underdeveloped areas 
for the production of primary commodities for export. 
Reliance on direct business investment for the capital needed 
for economic development is therefore liable to a double dis· 
appointment. Not only is there little or no incentive for private 
business capital to go to work for the expansion of the domestic 
economies of low-income countries ; even for the expansion 
of raw-material supplies for export, private business funds 
may not want to move out in any steady or sizable flow. But 
this, I repeat, applies to induced investment. It does not, or 
need not, affect international investment of the autonomous 
sort. 
External Economies and Balanced Growth 
The case which the underdeveloped countries advance in 
favour of their 'balanced growth' and 'diversification' is not 
always well received. Does it not mean turning away from the 
principle of comparative advantage? Why do these countries 
not push their exports of primary products according to the 
rules of international specialization, and import the goods they 
need for a balanced diet ? The answer is : because the notion 
of balance applies on the global scale as well. For fairly obvious 
reasons, expansion of primary production for export is apt 
to encounter adverse price conditions on the world market, 
unless the industrial countries' demand is steadily expanding, 
as it was in the nineteenth century. To push exports in the 
face of an inelastic and more or less stationary demand would 
not be a promising line of development. If it is reasonable to 
assume a generally less than unitary price elasticity of demand 
for crude foodstuffs and materials, it seems reasonable also to 
contend that, under the conditions indicated before, economic 
growth in underdeveloped countries must largely take the 
form of an increase in production for the domestic market. 
These are some of the considerations that explain the desire 
for balanced growth and provide some economic justification 
for it. They do not constitute a case for autarky. As productivity 
increases and the domestic market expands, while the com-
position of imports and exports is bound to change, the volume 
of external trade is more likely to rise than to fall. But even if 
it remains the same there is not necessarily any harm in 
balanced growth on the domestic front. Take a country like 
Venezuela: petroleum accounts for about go per cent of its 
exports but employs only about 2 per cent of its labour force ; 
the majority of the people work in the interior for a precarious 
subsistence in agriculture. If through the application of capital 
and increased productivity the domestic economy were to 
grow so that people working formerly on the land alone would 
now supply each other with clothing, footwear, houses and 
house furnishings as well as food products, while all the time 
petroleum exports remained the same and imports likewise 
constant in total volume, nothing but gain would result to the 
inhabitants without any loss to the outside world. No doubt 
there would be a fall in the proportion of foreign trade to 
national income. But could it not be that this proportion, in the 
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many peripheral countries of this type, has been kept unduly 
high in the past simply by the poverty of the domestic economy? 
World income is a more basic criterion of world prosperity 
than the volume of international trade. 
The characteristically important role which international 
trade played in the world economy of the nineteenth century 
was partly due to the fact that there was a periphery-and a 
vacuum beyond. The trade pattern of the nineteenth century 
was not merely a device for the optimum allocation of a given 
volume of resources ; it was, as D. H. Robertson put it, 'above 
all an engine of growth' ,1 but of growth originating in and 
radiating from the early industrial centres. Even in this country 
we have been so accustomed to regard the early nineteenth 
century pattern as normal that we seldom stop to notice that 
the economic development of the United States itself has been 
a spectacular departure from it. 
With the spread of industrialization, we have, however, 
noticed that the major currents of international trade pass by 
the economically backward areas and flow rather among the 
advanced industrial countries. Balanced growth is a good 
foundatiol! for international trade, as well as a way of filling 
the vacuum at the periphery. 
Let us tum now to the supply side of the problem of capital 
formation for economic development. Here the circular rela-
tionship runs from the low-income level to the small capacity 
to save, hence to a lack of capital, and so to low productivity. 
It seems to be a common view that the capacity for domestic 
saving in underdeveloped countries depends on an initial 
increase in productivity and real income, because the existing 
level is too low to permit any significant margin of saving, 
and that some form of outside help-say, foreign investment-
is required to bring about this initial improvement and so 
break the vicious circle. 
This theory begins to look a bit shaky as soon as we realize 
that it is not only the absolute but also the relative level of 
real income that determines the capacity to save. Although 
the absolute level of even the poorest countries has risen, it 
1 'The Future of International Trade •, The Economic journal, March 
1938. p. 5· 
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is doubtful whether saving has become any easier ; on the 
contrary, it may have become more difficult for them, because 
there has occurred at the same time a decline in their relative 
income levels in comparison with those of the economically 
advanced countries. The hypothesis seems to me plausible 
and, at any rate, worth considering. The great and growing 
gaps between the income levels of different countries, com-
bined with increasing awareness of these gaps, may tend to 
push up the general propensity to consume of the poorer 
nations, reduce their capacity to save, and incidentally strain 
their balance of payments. 
As we have seen from J. S. Duesenberry's recent book, 
Income, Saving and the Theory of Consumer Behavior, the 
hypothesis that individuals' consumption functions are inter-
related rather than independent helps to account for certain 
facts that have seemed puzzling. The interdependence of 
consumers' preferences can affect, in particular, the choice 
between consumption and saving. The reason, for instance, 
why 75 per cent of families in the United States save virtually 
nothing (see page 39) is not necessarily that they are too poor 
to save or do not want to save; the main reason is that they 
live in an environment that makes them want new consump-
tion goods even more. The reason is largely what Duesenberry 
calls the 'demonstration effect' (page 27) of the consumption 
standards kept up by the top 25 per cent of the people. When 
individuals come into contact with superior goods or spending 
patterns, they are apt to feel a certain tension and restlessness : 
their propensity to consume is increased. 
These forces, it seems to me, affect human behaviour to a 
certain extent in international relations as well. The consump-
tion functions of different countries are in some degree inter-
related in a similar way. On the international plane, also, 
knowledge of or contact with superior consumption patterns 
extends the imagination and creates new wants. 
The leading instance of this effect is at present the wide-
spread imitation of American consumption patterns. The 
American standard of living enjoys considerable prestige in 
the world. And it is always easier to adopt superior consump-
tion habits than improved production methods. True, American 
production methods are also widely imitated ; sometimes, 
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indeed, too closely. But generally this requires investible 
funds. The temptation to copy American consumption patterns 
tends to limit the supply of investible funds. 
The intensity of the attraction exercised by the consumption 
standards of the economically advanced countries depends 
on two factors. One is the size of the gaps in real income and 
consumption levels. The other is the extent of people's aware-
ness of them. Even though the poorer countries have probably 
all increased their per capita income over the last hundred 
years, the gaps have tended to widen. The position we have 
now reached is that two-thirds of the world's income goes to 
less than a fifth of the world's population in the most advanced 
countries, while at the bottom of the scale two-thirds of the 
world's population receives less than a sixth of the world's 
income; and that the average per capita income of the former 
group is about seventeen times as high as that of the latter.1 
The estimates on which these calculations are based are in 
many cases extremely crude, but probably not grossly mis-
leading. They do not, of course, take account of voluntary 
leisure, which is one way in which the advanced nations have 
taken out their gains. 
The gaps are great, but equally important is the fact that 
contact and communication are closer than ever before, so 
that knowledge of these gaps has increased. Think of such recent 
inventions as the radio, aviation, and the American movies. 
Communication in the modern world-in the free world at 
any rate-is close, and so the attraction of advanced consump-
tion standards can exert itself fairly widely, although unevenly, 
in the poorer parts of the world. 
This attraction is a handicap for the late-comers in economic 
development. It affects not only voluntary personal saving 
but also makes it politically more difficult to use taxation as a 
means of compulsory saving and to resist demands for govern-
ment spending on current account. Some of the backward 
countries have large masses of disguised unemployment on 
the land, which could be mobilized for real capital formation, 
but not without strict curbs on any immediate rise in consump-
tion. Others may hope to introduce improvements in agricultural 
1 National and Per.Capita Incomes in 70 Countries, IQ49 (Statistical 
Office of the United Nations, 1950). 
External Economies and Balanced Growth 
techniques so as to release labour from primitive subsist-
ence farming and make it available for capital works, but again 
not without restraints to prevent the increment from being 
immediately consumed. The use of potential domestic sources 
of capital can be seriously hampered by the dissatisfaction 
and impatience which the demonstration effect tends to 
produce. 
The traditional view of international economic relations 
generally implies that a high level of productivity and real 
income in one country cannot hurt other countries and that, 
on the contrary, prosperity tends to spread. Of course there 
are many ways in which a country's prosperity will help its 
neighbours. But the particular effect now discussed is 
unfavourable. It puts an extra pressure on countries with a 
relatively low income to spend a high proportion of it. (This 
is quite apart from and in addition to the fact that some nations 
suffer from a cultural aversion to saving, due to the presence 
of traditional forms of conspicuous consumption. However, 
the 'demonstration effect' imposes no additional strain on 
saving capacity when it leads merely to a switch from native 
to imported forms of consumption.) 
A very poor society might find it extremely hard to do any 
saving even if it knew nothing about higher living standards 
in the outside world. The vicious circle that tends to keep 
down the volume of saving in low-income countries is bad 
enough by itself. The point is that it is made even worse by the 
stresses that arise from relative as distinct from absolute 
poverty. 
The poorer nations, in contact with the richer, feel con-
tinually impelled to keep their money incomes and outlays 
above what is warranted by their own capacity to produce. 
The result is an inflationary bias at home and a persistent 
tendency towards disequilibrium in the balance of payments. 
The doctrine of comparative advantage is, in my opinion, an 
effective answer to the simpler forms of the productivity theory 
of the dollar shortage. Yet here we seem to have reached, by 
the back door as it were, a theory of balance-of-payments 
disequilibrium based similarly upon differences in general 
levels of productivity. However, the comparative cost principle 
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is fully respected. Disequilibrium results, not becaus~ producti-
vity determines a country's export costs and competitive 
strength in the world market, not because the most productive 
country necessarily undersells all the others in all lines ; dis-
equilibrium results because a country's productivity determines 
its real income and consumption level and because differences 
in levels of living, when they are very large and widely known, 
exert an upwards pressure on the consumption propensity of 
the poorer countries. In the classical view, a lack of balance 
in international trade can persist only because some countries 
try to 'live beyond their means'. We have now a simple 
explanation of why some countries do, in fact, persist in trying 
to live beyond their means. 
The inflationary pressures and balance-of-payments difficul-
ties are not, as such, the basic trouble. They could conceivably 
come from increased capital outlays and not from consumer 
spending. The trouble is that the demonstration effect leads 
directly to increased consumption, or attempts at increasing 
consumption, rather than investment. At least it makes an 
increase in saving peculiarly difficult as and when incomes 
and investment increase. It is for this reason that international 
income disparities may have to be treated not merely as a 
source of strain in the balance of payments but actually as an 
impediment to capital formation in the poorer countries. 
The almost universal countermove of the underdeveloped 
countries both to suppress the disequilibrium in their balance 
of payments and, what is more important, to offset the attrac-
tion of superior consumption patterns is the restriction of 
imports and especially of imports of a so-called 'luxury' or 
'semi-luxury' character. There is a widespread notion that a 
country, by cutting down imports of consumption goods 
through direct controls or prohibitive duties, can make more 
real capital available for its economic development in the form 
of imports of capital goods. Governments seem convinced that 
they are promoting the formation of capital whenever, in their 
commercial policy, they banish consumable imports in favour 
of imports of machinery and equipment. 
This simple idea that more capital can be got merely by 
pinching and twisting the foreign trade sector of the economy 
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seems to me to be an instance of the fallacy of misplaced con-
creteness. The foreign trade sector of the economy enters into 
the circular flow of income. Every piece of capital equipment 
imported represents an act of investment which, in the absence 
of external financing, presupposes and necessitates a corres-
ponding act of saving at home. If this act of saving is not 
forthcoming, the capital equipment imported may be offset 
by reduced investment or by disinvestment in the domestic 
economy, if the expenditure of money previously spent on 
consumable imports now draws away domestic factors from 
capital construction or maintenance, Only if this money 
is left unspent is the requisite saving generated quasi-auto-
matically; this is possible but quite improbable. It is more 
likely that any net investment that may result from the in-
creased imports of capital goods will be financed by the forced 
saving of inflation, as long as inflation has not yet passed the 
point where it ceases to be effective as an instrument of forced 
saving. It is possible, therefore, although not certain, that 
'luxury import restrictions' will lead to some increase in the 
rate of capital formation in an underdeveloped country. 
Besides the quantity of investment, however, there is also a 
question of quality. Import restrictions unaccompanied by 
corresponding domestic restrictions will set up a special induce-
ment to invest in domestic industries producing the goods-
or substitutes for the goods-that can no longer be imported. 
If the domestic market is considered at all sufficient to warrant 
the establishment of such industries, the inducement may 
prove effective. But since it applies to the luxury and semi-
luxury type of goods, whose imports are restricted, the result 
will be that the country's capital supplies, scarce as they are, 
and painfully brought into existence, will be sucked into 
relatively unessential uses. 
The luxury import restrictions of the underdeveloped coun-
tries in the world today seem to represent, in the last analysis, 
a desperate effort to offset the handicap which the demonstra-
tion effect imposes on the poorer nations-an effort to isolate 
the local consumption pattern from that of the advanced 
countries and so to make possible more domestic saving and 
capital formation. This effort deserves our sympathy. But it 
attacks only the surface of the problem. It attacks only that 
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part of the propensity to consume which directly involves 
expenditure on imported goods. The demonstration effect 
tends, however, to operate through an upward shift in the 
general consumption function and not in the import consump-
tion function alone. Luxury import restrictionism does not 
st~ this pervasive indirect influence of international discre-
pancies in consumption levels. A more basic attack would be 
compulsory saving through public finance, although this is 
precisely one of the things that is made politically more difficult 
in the poorer countries by the great discrepancies in living 
standards. 
Far more radical forms of isolation than luxury import 
restrictions have played a part in the development of two 
important countries. It is well known that Japan, in the early 
course of her industrialization, imitated the Western World 
in everything except consumption patterns. She had kept 
herself in a state of isolation for centuries, and it was compara-
tively easy for her to maintain this isolation in regard to con-
sumption patterns. There is no doubt that this was part of the 
secret of her success in domestic capital formation. 
The other instance of radical isolation is Soviet Russia's 
iron curtain (which of course is not merely a result of the present 
tension but was well established before World War II). While 
it certainly has other reasons for its existence, I am inclined 
to attach significance also to its economic function ; that is, 
to the possible 'materialist interpretation' of the iron curtain. 
Anyway, it illustrates the possibility that isolation may help 
to solve the economic problem of capital formation, in a world 
of great discrepancies in national living standards, by severing 
contact and communication among nations. Without com-
munication, the discrepancies, however great, may become of 
little.~r no consequence and the 'demonstration effect' may 
lose at least some of its potency. 
That this might be a possible and perhaps a necessary solu-
tion is a disquieting thought, and one naturally turns in search 
of an alternative. 
Could it be that the alternative lies in unilateral income 
transfers or, in plain English, gifts from rich to poor countries? 
The foreign aid programmes of the United States have certainly 
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departed from traditional practices, and it may be that we 
have seen the beginnings of a system of international income 
transfers, comparable to the transfers that take place within a 
country as an automatic result of taxation proportional to 
income or, still more, of progressive taxation. A system of 
international grants-in-aid does not stem from any economic 
mechanism of the market-place; nor does the principle of 
progressive taxation. Both are based on political value judge-
ments, and both arise from pressures having to do with the 
coexistence and increasingly close association of people at 
widely different levels of material welfare. 
Suppose we have a model, then, where on the one hand 
international income disparities open up gaps in the balance of 
payments and on the other unilateral income transfers come in 
to fill these gaps. Is this a sufficient and satisfactory solution 
to the problem of capital formation in the poorer countries ? 
Clearly it is not. If nature is left to take its course, the income 
transfers coming in will be used in these countries for the 
satisfaction of the higher propensity to consume that is brought 
about by the disparity in real-income levels. No permanent 
basis will be created within the country for higher living stand-
ards in the future. It is nearly always possible to some extent 
to substitute foreign aid for domestic saving so that consump-
tion is increased and no net contribution is made to the rate 
of total capital formation. It can happen even if the foreign 
resources are tied to specific productive projects. The point is 
not, of course, that this is bad, but that it fails to contribute to 
the foundations of economic development. The attraction of 
advanced living standards can thus interfere, not only with 
the harnessing of domestic saving potentials, but also with the 
effective use of external resources for economic development. 
It makes it more than ever necessary for an underdev~oped 
country to keep a tight rein on the national propensity to 
consume. 
This applies obviously to autonomous international invest-
ment and, perhaps less obviously, also to improvements in the 
terms of trade. An improvement in the terms of trade puts at 
the country's disposal additional outside resources that can be 
used to promote economic development. By itself, however, 
it means simply an increment in the country's current income, 
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derived from foreign trade. Without the corresponding domestic 
saving, this increment cannot lead to any net increase in the 
rate of investment. Here again the real task is not to extract 
more capital goods from foreign trade but to extract more 
saving from the national income. 
The upshot is that external resources, even if they become 
available in the most desirable forms, are not enough. They 
do not automatically provide a solution to the problem of 
capital accumulation in underdeveloped areas. No solution is 
possible without strenuous domestic efforts, particularly in the 
field of public finance. 
EXTERNAL ECONOMIES AND 
THE DOCTRINE OF BALANCED GROWTH* 
by J. Marcus Fleming 
THE OBJECT OF THIS PAPER IS TO EXAMINE AN ARGUMENT 
advanced by some of the most distinguished writers on the 
theory of economic development, to consider to what extent 
and under what conditions it is valid, and to point to some of 
its implications. 
The argument in question runs roughly as follows. In under-
developed countries there is little incentive to invest capital 
in the introduction of modern efficient methods of large-scale 
production in individual industries producing goods for domes-
tic consumption because the markets for the respective indus-
tries are too small. Since, however, the adoption of such 
methods in any one such industry would increase the demand 
for the products of the other industries, the incentive would 
be much greater if investments in a wide range of consumer-
goods industries were undertaken, or at least considered, in 
conjunction. The adoption of investment projects which, 
though unprofitable individually, would be profitable collec-
tively would, it is implied, be a good thing. This argument 
is frequently referred to as the 'doctrine of balanced 
growth'. 
Certain elements in the doctrine are adumbrated in Allyn 
Young's celebrated article on 'Increasing Returns and Econo-
mic Progress' .1 The doctrine itself is set forth briefly in Pro-
fessor Rosenstein-Rodan's 'Problems of Industrialization of 
Eastern and South-Eastern Europe '2 and more fully in Chapter I 
of Professor R. Nurkse's Problems of Capital Formation in 
Underdeveloped Countries. The argument as presented in the 
present paper, however, does not purport to reproduce exactly 
the views of any of these writers. In the first place they differ 
• The Economic Journal, June 1955. Reprinted by permission of 
the Royal Economic Society and the author. 
1 The Economic Journal, December 1928. 
~ibid., June-September 1943 (reprinted here, pp. 245-55). 
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to some extent among themselves, and secondly, my presenta-
tion is either, as outlined above, too rough and ready, or else, 
as expounded below, too pedantically precise, to mirror faith-
fully the explicit thought of any one of them. What I have tried 
to do is to reconstruct the logical presuppositions of a doctrine 
which, with certain variations noted below, is common to 
Rosenstein-Rodan and to Nurkse. 
We must now attempt to analyse the argument under 
discussion into its explicit and implicit elements. These are 
as follows: 
(a) The installation in any one of a wide range of horne 
market industries in an underdeveloped country or region of a 
new plant capable of operating at a unit cost lower than that 
of existing production in the industry might be financially 
unprofitable because of the smallness and inelasticity of the 
market for the industry within the country or region in 
question ;t 
(b) if demand for the product of such an industry were 
increased the installation of the new plant would become more 
profitable or less unprofitable ; 
(c) any increase in output, involving a reduction in unit 
cost of production, in a typical consumer-goods industry will 
tend to increase real income and hence real demand for the 
products of most other consumer-goods industries and thus to 
increase the profitability of installing more efficient plants in 
the latter provided, however, that interest rates do not rise 
too much ; 2 3 ' 
1 ' .•. the small size of a country's market can discourage or even 
prohibit the profitable application of modern capital equipment by 
any individual entrepreneur in any particular industry' (Nurkse, 
op. cit., p. 7). 
2 'Although the initial displacement. may be considerable and the 
repercussions upon particular industries unfavoarable, the enlarging 
of the market for any one commodity produced under conditions of 
increasing returns generally has the net effect ... of enlarging the 
market for other commodities' (Allyn Young, op. cit., p. 537). 'The 
industries producing wage goods can thus be said to be complementary' 
(Rosenstein-Rodan, present volume, p. 249). 
3 'Where any single enterprise might appear quite inauspicious and 
impracticable a wide range of projects in different industries may 
succeed because they will all support each other in the sense that the 
people engaged in each project now working with more real capital 
per head and with greater efficiency in terms of output per man hour 
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(d) it follows that the installation of more efficient plants 
of the type described in each of a wide range of consumer-
goods industries, though unprofitable if undertaken separately, 
might be profitable if undertaken jointly. 
Moreover: 
(e) The joint installation of such plants, if profitable, would 
be desirable (i.e., would tend to increase real national income); 
and 
(/) because of its effects on the incentive to install efficient 
new plants in other industries the installation of a single plant, 
though unprofitable, might tend to raise real national income. 
The rather odd-sounding proviso about interest. rates at the 
end of step (c) in the argument has to be introduced into my 
scheme to take account of the fact that Rosenstein-Rodan and 
Nurkse usually describe the inter-industry relationships dealt 
with under (c) and (d) above as affecting not the profitability-
net of interest-of installing efficient new plants but the 
'inducement to invest' or 'marginal efficiency of investment', 
i.e., the return on the capital invested in such new plants, 
including interest as well as profits. Now anything which 
enhances the rate of return on a new plant will enhance its 
profitability also, provided that the relevant interest rate 
does not rise 'too much', i.e., provided that the supply of 
capital is not 'too inelastic'. 
Let us now consider various steps in the argument in greater 
detail. Step (a) is clearly valid. In a country of low per capita 
income and/or scattered population and/or poor communica-
tions the demand in a given region for the output of even a 
generally consumed manufactured product may be so small 
that the output (at minimum unit cost) of a single modem 
plant whose installation is under consideration would exceed 
the total previous output of the product in that region. The 
particular demand curye for the output of the projected new 
plant, though elastic over the range of output for which it is 
displacing previous production, might be highly inelastic and 
will provide an enlarged market for the products of the new enterprise 
in the other industries' (Nurkse, op. cit., p. IJ). 
' Our authors would not confine the scope of this interaction to 
consumer-goods industries. They do, however, emphasize its appli-
cability as between such industries, and it is on this, as we shall see, 
particularly vulnerable application that I wish to focus my criticism. 
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steeply downward sloping for higher outputs. The unit cost 
curve of the new plant, even though it lies, for larger outputs, 
below the unit cost of pre-existing production, may lie, for 
smaller outputs, above that unit cost, and for all outputs may 
lie above the demand curve for the plant. Under these condi-
tions it would not be profitable to install the new plant. 
Step (b) in the argument is likewise a valid one. If the parti-
cular demand curve for such a plant ·as has been described 
should be raised, while cost conditions remain unchanged, the 
effect would obviously be to reduce the loss associated with its 
operation, possibly to turn the loss into a profit. 
The qualification is, however, all-important. If the .raising 
of the demand curve were to be accompanied by a raising of 
the unit-cost curve the outcome might well be different. For a 
rise in the cost curve, taken by itself, would tend to reduce the 
profits, or increase the losses, of operating the plant, would 
reduce the scale of the plant's output if it were in operation 
and might make it unprofitable to install the plant at all. 
We come now to the central question, with which step (c) 
in the argument is concerned, as to the circumstances in which 
the installation of a low unit-cost plant in one industry will 
increase the profitability of a similar installation in another 
industry. 
In a closed economy any increase in the supply of any con-
sumer goods A, the supply of other such goods remaining un-
changed, will tend to increase the prices of each of the latter 
products relative to that of A, though in the case of close sub-
stitutes the increase will be small. The increase in real income 
associated with the expansion in output of A will normally 
lead to some increases in the demand for non-A commodities 
as well as for A, and, in order that the increase in demand 
should be confined to A, the price of non-A commodities must 
rise relative to that of A, i.e., there will be an increase in the 
real price of the average non-A commodity.1 
This increase in the real price of non-A commodities, provided 
that it is associated with no change in real factor prices, will 
tend to cause the output of non-A commodities, taken as a 
group, to expand even under existing methods of production, 
1 i.e., an increase in the average price of non-A commodities relative 
to the average price of all commodities including A. 
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and may make it profitable to install new large-scale plants. 
The extent to which this will occur will be greater: (a) the 
lower the income elasticity of demand for A, (b) the less the 
elasticity of substitution between A and non-A, and (c) the 
greater the elasticity of supply in non-A. But there will always 
be some positive reaction so long as the income elasticity of 
demand for A is less than unity, and the elasticity of substitu-
tion between A and B l'ess than infinite, and so long as there is a 
positive elasticity of supply for non-A. 
Step (d) in the argument follows directly from the previous 
steps. 
Steps (e) and (/) are of a different character from the others 
in that they entail welfare-economic considerations. It is 
convenient to consider them in terms of a conceptual scheme 
which distinguishes in the case of any change in the output of a 
plant, between : (r) the increment in profits (IP), net of return 
on capital, (2) the increment in direct (social) net product 
(IDNP), and (3) the increment in real national income (IRNI). 
The IP corresponds to the Pigovian marginal (or additional) 
private net product and the IRNI to the Pigovian marginal 
social net product. The IDNP consists of the sum of the IP 
and the net benefits in the form of real income transferred 
from the firm operating the plant to its consumers, workers, 
suppliers, etc., as a result of the price changes resulting from 
the change in production. The IDNP is measured by the value 
of the additional output less the value of additional factor 
input, output and input being valued at the average prices 
prevailing over the relevant intervals of the corresponding 
product-demand and factor-supply curves. That the IDNP 
should be positive is the well-known Dupuit test of desirability 
of a finite change in production. The IRNI exceeds the IDNP 
to the extent that the change in production gives rise to econo-
mies outside the plant in question. An analysis of such external 
economies, given in the Appendix, shows them to include such 
items as changes in net product in other plants, changes 
in factor supply and changes in the national terms of 
trade. 
Returning to point (e) in the argument, the introduction 
of large-scale plants in a variety of increasing return industries 
will tend to reduce product prices {without reducing factor 
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prices) in those industries, and will therefore confer transfer 
benefits on the rest of the community. If the net profit of the 
new plants is positive, therefore, the increment in direct net 
product resulting from their introduction will be still more 
positive. Unless, as is improbable, the new plants reduce 
aggregate factor supplies, bring about a deterioration in terms 
of trade or otherwise give rise to diseconomies outside the 
industries in question, their introduction is bound to enhance 
national real income. 
As regards point (/), for reasons analogous to those just 
discussed, not only any introduction of new plants but also 
any increased output in existing plants which is profitable 
under imperfect competition is likely to have a positive direct 
net product and make a positive contribution to national 
income. Consequently if expansion in industry A renders 
profitable the expansion of imperfectly competitive industry B 
the total contribution to national income of the former expan-
sion will include, not only the transfer benefits which it itself 
confers, but also the economies to which it gives rise in industry 
B. Even if the expansion at A is unprofitable, its total contribu-
tion may be positive, thanks to these transfer benefits and 
external economies. 
A further point, which our authors might have made, but 
did not, is that the expansion of demand for an industry will 
increase not only the profit but also the direct net product 
involved in introducing a new plant there. Consequently, if 
conditions are such that the joint introduction of plants in a 
variety of industries may be profitable though the plants are 
individually unprofitable they will also be such that the plants 
would jointly yield a positive net product, even though 
individually none of them would do so. 
As we have seen, the validity of step (c) depends on the 
assumption that real factor prices will not be affected when 
the supply of A is increased and that of non-A goods remains 
unchanged. This, however, could happen only in a limiting 
case. Normally real factor prices will be raised or lowered, or 
some raised and others lowered. There is, therefore, a possibility 
that the real prices of the factors entering into the operation 
of modern plants in non-A industries may rise to such an extent 
as to outweigh the rise in the real prices of non-A products, 
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and thus to induce a contraction rather than an expansion in 
output and investment in non-A industries. 
In what follows, we shall assume, in conformity with what 
appears to be the intention of the balanced-growth doctrine, 
that the influence exercised by an increase in the supply of A 
on the real demand for other products is randomly distributed 
among non-A industries with respect to the possibilities for 
obtaining economies from increased output and investment in 
such industries. In other words those industries which are of a 
critical size in this respect are not, on the average, either specially 
complementary to or specially competitive with, industry A. 
Suppose, now, there is only one stage of production and only 
one homogeneous factor of production, 'labour', which is 
available in fixed supply. Under these conditions the installa-
tion of the new plant! at A will increase the incentive to install 
efficient new plants in non-A industries provided that the 
wage-rate does not rise so far as to prevent an expansion of 
output in the average non-A industry. And output in the 
average non-A industry will expand only if labour-input in 
non-A industries as a whole expands. Since the supply of labour 
is fixed, this can happen only if the input of labour at A con-
tracts, i.e., if the employment of labour at the new plant is 
less than the amount of labour released from the other produc-
tion units in the industry. 
Clearly the employment of labour at !). cannot contract if 
A is a completely new industry at which there has been no 
previous production. Even, however, if there has been some 
previous production, it is probable in an underdeveloped 
country that this will be carried on in small units under condi-
tions of constant (long-term) real unit cost. In this case if the 
new plant is unprofitable it is impossible that the employment 
of labour in the industry should decline. 
For since the pre-existing production units operate at con-
stant labour cost, the price of the product in terms of wage 
units will remain constant so long as any of the pre-existing 
units continue to operate. Aggregate demand for the product 
will also remain constant, so that the output of the new plant 
1 A 'plant', in this model, maybe conceived as & group of workers 
co-operating in some process that requires a minimum number of 
workers to achieve any output at all. 
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will at first merely replace output of pre-existing units. If, at 
the point at which the new plant is itself producing practically 
the entire previous output of the industry, it is still not profit-
able, though the product price in terms of wage units is almost 
at the level which made pre-existing production units profitable, 
the aggregate labour-cost-and employment--of the new plant 
must be higher than that of the entire industry prior to its 
installation. If the output of the new plant is further increased, 
though its average labour cost may fall, its aggregate employ-
ment of labour must be still further increased. 
It would appear therefore that where there is a single factor 
of production in fixed supply the installation of an unprofitable 
new plant in industry A, even though its unit cost, at the least 
unprofitable output, is below that of pre-existing production, 
is likely1 to induce contraction rather than expansion in other 
consumer-goods industries, to yield external diseconomies 
rather than external economies. The installation, over a wide 
range of such industries, of a set of unprofitable large-scale 
plants would render them not less but more unprofitable than 
if they had been installed singly. It would, moreover, tend to 
reduce the real national product. At first sight, this might 
appear to be contrary to common sense, since the new plants 
were described as being more efficient and working at lower 
unit cost than pre-existing production in their respective 
industries. But this is only true of plants which are installed 
singly. If all the plants are installed together the rise in wages 
will force the typical new plant to operate at a level which 
keeps the labour requirement of its industry approximately 
what it was under pre-existing methods of production, and at 
this level, as we have seen, the unit costs of the new plants will 
be greater than those of pre-existing production. 
The situation might be roughly expressed by saying that, 
whereas the balanced-growth doctrine assumes that the rela-
tionship between industries is for the most part complemen-
tary, the limitation of factor supply ensures that that relation-
ship is for the most part competitive. 
1 This conclusion would be certain but for the possibility that this 
output from pre-existing production units might operate under con-
ditions of diminishing returns. This, however, is more likely to occur 
where several factors of production exist, and is considered below. 
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Taking account of the multiplicity of factors of production 
introduces certain complications and qualifications into the 
argument without greatly altering its conclusions. Each 
industry and method of production is likely to have factors 
which are more or less specific to it. Thus when the new plant 
is introduced at A there is likely to be some fall in the price of 
factors specific to the old-fashioned methods of production 
in the industry. As output in the old sector of the industry is 
curtailed there will be a decline in product price, and a corres-
ponding decline in marginal cost in the form of non-specific 
fq.ctors released to other industries, so that the aggregate 
receipts of the new plant will fall short of the value of factors 
released from the older sector of the industry and the plant 
may be unprofitable even though it employs fewer resources 
than those released from the older sector. This creates a possibi-
lity, though by no means a certainty, that an unprofitable 
plant, with a positive direct net product, may effect a net release 
of factors from the industry and thus create external economies.l 
Another probable consequence of the multiplicity of factors 
of production is that the weighting or 'mix' of factors used in 
runnii\g the new modern plant at A may resemble more closely 
the factor-mix employed in running actual or potential modern 
plants in other industries than the combination of factors 
employed in production outside A taken as a whole. In this 
case it is possible that even if the plant installation at A on 
balance increases the supply of factors to non-A industries it 
will so raise the prices of those factors which are particularly 
in demand for the running of modern plants that the net effect 
on the installation of such plants will be discouraging. 
It would appear therefore that, so long as factors of produc-
tion are in fixed supply, the introduction of large-scale produc-
tion units in consumer industries is likely to give rise not to 
1 If the direct net product is negative, the new plant cannot possibly 
create external economies. For the direct net product of the new plant 
is measured by its price integral less its marginal-cost integral. And 
the net release of resources from the industry is measured by that part 
of its output which is curtailed, less the marginal cost integral of the 
new plant. And the price integral of the new plant cannot possibly fall 
short of the marginal-cost integral on the curtailed output of the older 
sector of the industry. So that the direct net product of the new plant 
must always exceed the net release of resources from the industry. 
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economies but to diseconomies in other industries competing 
for the consumer market unless the former industries are 
already big enough for the introduction of the new plant to 
make possible a net reduction in the resources employed there : 
that this is unlikely to occur where the new unit is unprofitable, 
and cannot occur unless it passes the Dupuit test of the desira-
bility of a 'large' investment, i.e., unless it has a positive 
direct net product. 
It is noteworthy that the introduction of more efficient 
production methods in a large competitive industry such as 
agriculture is not only certain to be profitable but likely to 
release factors to other industries so long as the elasticity of 
demand for the industry as a whole is less than unity. This 
suggests that if umlerdeveloped countries were to press ahead 
with improvements of a financially profitable character in 
agriculture they might do more to make profitable large-scale 
efficient production in other industries, such as manufacturing, 
which are in a phase of increasing returns, than by trying to 
develop simultaneously a wide range of such manufacturing 
industries. 
Thus far we have assumed a closed economy. The introduc-
tion of foreign trade makes little difference to the argument. 
Indirectly, through the various mechanisms whereby external 
equilibrium is maintained, the demand for exports varies with 
the demand for imports. If the scope for economies of scale 
is equal in export and in home-market industries it makes no 
difference which gains at the expense of the other. It will still 
be true that the expansion of industry A will create a balance 
of economies or diseconomies elsewhere, according as A absorbs 
less or more factors than before. It is, however, sometimes 
argued that in underdeveloped countries the export trades sell 
on more perfect markets than do the domestic trades, so that 
fewer unexploited opportunities for economies of scale remain 
in the former. If so the expansion at A will be more likely to 
generate external economies of scale than the previous argu-
ment would imply if, as is often the case, the industry A 
happens to be one which is more competitive in product markets 
with imports, and/or more competitive in factor markets with 
exports, than it is, in the respective markets, with purely 
domestic industries. 
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In order really to salvage the doctrine of external economies 
under examination, however, it is necessary to drop the assump-
tion that the supply of factors of production is fixed in favour 
of the assumption that the supply varies positively with real 
factor prices. For then, in order that an expansion in A should 
increase the profitability of additional output and the installa-
tion of new plants in industries producing other consumer 
goods, thus geperating economies, it is no longer necessary 
that the employment of factors in A should actually decline 
as output increases, but merely that factor employment there 
should not rise more than the increased factor supply evoked 
by the rise in real factor prices. As we have seen, of our authors, 
only Rosenstein-Rodan explicitly assumes an elastic supply 
of labour in his illustration of the doctrine, though Nurkse, 
in arguing in terms of the inducement to invest, is in effect 
assuming some elasticity in the supply of capital. 
It should be noted that the possibility of expanding the 
supply of labour at a given money wage by increasing the level 
of money demand would not constitute factor elasticity in the 
sense relevant here, since the whole argument is concerned 
with 'real' demand, and full employment is assumed from the 
start. There are, however, a number of prima facie reasons 
why the supply of factors in an underdeveloped country or 
region may show a measure of elasticity of a sort relevant to 
the present argument. Not all of them, however, are very 
conclusive. For example: 
(1) The supply of labour from individual workers may 
increase when real wages increase, because the workers are 
better able and more willing to work. But the opposite result 
is at least as likely to happen because the worker wishes to 
take out part of his real income in leisure, and 'absenteeism'. 
(2) Higher real wages may attract workers on the margin 
of the labour· force into employment, and higher rents may 
make it profitable to bring poorer qualities of land into cultiva-
tion. On the other hand, higher family incomes may lead to a 
withdrawal of marginal women, children and older workers 
from the labour force. 
(3) Higher real rewards may tempt workers and capitalists 
to migrate into the country or region in question, thus increas-
ing the supply of factors there. Economies facilitated by this 
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means in the area of immigration, however, may be balanced 
by diseconomies in the area of emigration. 
(4) Higher real wages in a country at an early stage of 
demographic development may bring about an expansion of 
population which will entail an expansion in the labour force a 
couple of decades later. At a later stage of demographic evolu-
tion, however, higher real wages may have a zero or a negative 
effect on population growth. 
For the purpose in hand the main potential sources of 
elasticity in the supply of factors of production are the three 
listed below, which will be discussed at greater length. 
(5) In so far as factors of production are themselves pro-
ducts of an earlier stage of production-and here we depart 
from the assumption that there is only one stage of production 
-an increase in the real prices of those product-factors may 
bring about an increase in their supply and in the aggregate 
amount of factors supplied to subsequent stages of production. 
(6) A rise in the demand for factory labour may attract 
workers from employments, such as agriculture, where their 
productivity is very low, and thus give rise to a virtual increase 
in the supply of labour or at least an increase in its supply to 
that sector of industry in which economies of large-scale 
operation are to be obtained. 
(7) Higher interest rates may increase the supply of capital, 
especially from abroad. 
First, let us take account of the 'vertical disintegration' 
of production-the fact that industries buy the products of 
other industries, as well as original factors of production, and 
that some industries are predominantly suppliers of other 
industries rather than of final consumers. Thus far we have 
considered industries as acting on each other 'horizontally', 
through the interrelated markets which they serve or the 
interrelated factors which they buy. But industries also affect 
each oth.er in greater or lesser degree in a more direct manner, 
i.e., 'vertically' as suppliers or customers. We are concerned 
with the effect of this 'vertical' connexion on the 'horizontal' 
one, to which the balanced-growth doctrine, as expounded by 
Rosenstein-Rodan and Nurkse, primarily refers. 
The introduction, in industries serving final consumers, of 
more efficient large-scale methods of production may encourage 
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increased output in factor-producing industries if it tends 
to raise the prices of produced factors {intermediate products) 
more, or reduce them less, than the prices of the original factors 
of production used by the latter group of industries. Now, 
as a matter of fact, the type of technical changes associated 
with the substitution of large-scale for smaller-scale production 
not only tend to raise the demand for capital relative to labour 
but also to raise the demand for intermediate products as 
compared with original factors as a whole. 
We may assume that, in an underdeveloped country, the 
industries producing factors of production-especially those 
producing power, transportation, minerals and capital goods-
will, like the consumer-goods industries, frequently operate 
under conditions of imperf-=ct competition, where efficient 
production is hampered by the smallness of the market. The 
stimulus given by the installation of large-scale production in 
consumer-goods industries to profitability, production and 
investment in the supplying industries will therefore give rise 
to an increase in the net product of the latter. This means that 
the increased use, if any, of original factors in expanding the 
factor-producing industries will permit a more than equivalent 
increase in the supply of produced factors, so that the industries 
producing for final consumption will secure a net increase in 
the supply of the two sorts of factors taken together. It follows 
from this that the installation of modern large-scale production 
in one consumer-goods industry, even though it involves an 
increased use of factors of production-in both kinds--may 
nevertheless, in the manner described, leave other consumer-
goods industries better supplied with factors than before, thus 
giving rise to economies there. 
It is noteworthy that the chances that the introduction of 
more efficient large-scale operation in one consumer-goods 
industry will generate economies in another such industry are 
here increased only by reason of economies generat~~ at an 
earlier stage of production. The latter, or 'vertical', type of 
external economies will, of course, enhance real national income 
just as surely as the former or 'horizontal' type, and in magni-
tude are likely to be the more important of the two. Moreover, 
the 'vertical' generation of economies operates not only from 
later to earlier stages of production, but also with even greater 
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probability, from earlier to later stages. Thus the expansion 
of output in a producer-goods industry, provided that it in~ 
valves an increase in net product, will tend to increase the 
profitability of other industries in general, and will encourage 
economies in such of those industries as are operating under 
increasing returns. 
There can be little doubt but that the conditions for a 
'vertical' transmission of external economies-whether for-
ward from supplying industry to using industry, or backward 
from using industry to supplying industry-are much more 
favourable than for a 'horizontal' transmission between in-
dustries at the same stage. There is, therefore, a much stronger 
case for joint planning of the development of industries at 
earlier and later stages of the same 'line' of production than 
of industries at the final stage of different 'lines'. The fact that 
our authors, other than Allyn Young, seem to lay more em-
phasis on the 'horizontal' rather than the 'vertical' variant 
of the balanced-growth doctrine is probably due to the fact 
that the external economies underlying the former are less 
frequently discussed in the literature than those underlying 
the latter. But the 'horizontal' transmission of economies may 
have been neglected by Marshall and his commentators precisely 
because, where it exists at all, it is relatively unimportant. 
Let us now turn to the possibility, listed at (6) above, that 
the enhanced real demand for labour arising in various branches 
of secondary industry as a result of the expansion and moderni-
zation of one such industry may be satisfied by drawing labour 
away from an overcrowded agriculture where its marginal 
productivity is negligible or relatively low. As already men-
tioned, Rosenstein-Rodan, in expounding his version of the 
'horizontal' variant of the balanced-growth doctrine, explicitly 
assumes that the labour supply for industrial expansion is drawn 
from agriculture where it would otherwise be underemployed. 
There can be no doubt of the fact, attested by many 
observers, that underemployment, in the sense specified above, 
exists in the agriculture of many underdeveloped countries. 
There can also be little doubt but that an expansion in the 
real demand for labour in any particular industrial branch 
would attract some of the underemployed agricultural labour 
to secondary industry, and to that extent would improve the 
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prospect of reaping economies of scale in the industrial sector 
as a whole. The crucial question, however, so far as the creation 
of external economies is concerned, is whether the expansion 
of industrial branch A would lead to a transference of labour 
from agriculture to industry sufficient to permit an expansion 
of branches of industry other than A. 
It is by no means clear how this question should be answered. 
Much will depend on the reasons for the prior existence of 
the agricultural underemployment. It is assumed that this 
is no mere case of inadequacy of monetary demand combined 
with rigidity of money wages in secondary industry. There 
remain two possible lines of explanation. One is that the under-
employment is voluntary in the sense that real rewards for 
unskilled labour in industry are insufficiently in excess of those 
in agriculture to attract sufficient labour to equalize marginal 
productivity in the two sectors. Even though the marginal 
product of labour in agriculture be far below that in industry, 
labour may stay on the land partly because of a family system 
under which the individual worker is paid according to the 
average product of peasant labour rather than its marginal 
product, and partly because of inertia, and lack of enterprise. 
In this event, however, it seems unlikely that more workers 
would be attracted from agriculture than are absorbed by 
the initial expansion in industry A. For expansion in A, output 
remaining constant elsewhere, is likely to increase the demand-
price for food at least as much as for the products of other 
secondary industries. In so far as this expansion entails an 
increase in real income, it will no doubt tend to raise demand 
for manufactures in higher proportion than for food; but the 
increased output of A is likely to be more competitive with 
other manufactures than with food, and the probable trans-
ference of income from taxpayers-or whoever bears the 
losses of the expansion at A-to peasants and workers will 
tend to raise demand for food rather than manufactures. For 
these and other reasons1 the real demand-schedule for labour 
l Though any influences transmitted • vertically • to basic industries, 
or any repercussions on other industries of the economies generated in 
basic industries, are more likely to favour secondary production than 
agriculture, on the other hand, the latter is less likely to be affected 
by scarcity of capital or intermediate products resulting from the initial 
expansion at A. 
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in secondary production outside A appears more likely to fall 
than to rise relative to the schedule of real per capita income 
in agriculture. If the demand for labour A is sufficiently strong 
to draw labour from agriculture it will be sufficiently strong 
to draw it from other secondary industries also. The availability 
of underemployed agricultural labour may enable A's labour 
force to expand without that of other secondary industries 
having to contract as much as it otherwise would : it will not 
permit the latter to expand as well. 
A second line of explanation for the initial f'tate of under-
employment in agriculture is that workers, while desirous of 
moving from agriculture to secondary industry, are unable to 
obtain employment there owing to the artificially high level of 
industrial wages maintained by labour unions, etc. In this 
event much depends on how these wages are determined. It is 
assumed that as the demand for labour expands in industry 
A industrial money wages will rise at least as fast as prices in 
general : otherwise the agricultural unemployment would be 
of a type curable by mere monetary expansion-a hypothesis 
which we have excluded. If, as might well happen, the unions 
were to take advantage of the increased demand for labour in 
industry A to prevent any whittling away of the original 
disparity between industrial wages and agricultural incomes, 
this would entail a decline in secondary industries other than 
A unless the prices of non-A manufactures were to rise faster 
than those of agricultural products, which, as we have seen, is 
unlikely. Even if the unions were to confine themselves to 
preventing a decline in industrial real wages, it is quite possible, 
for the reasons discussed in the foregoing paragraph, that the 
rise in agricultural prices would so far outstrip the rise in prices 
of non-A manufactures as to entail a decline in the real demand-
schedule for the latter, and hence a decline rather than an 
expansion of employment in non-A industries. 
In all probability some tendency for industrial wages to be 
artificially maintained in relation to agricultural incomes is 
fairly general in underdeyeloped countries. It is obvious that 
real wages are not in practice raised so fast in response to a 
rise in the real demand for industrial labour as to prevent all 
movement from country to town. This, however, does not 
prove that wages do not rise fast enough to nullify the benefits 
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which the several industries would otherwise derive from each 
other's expansion. 
Even if secondary industries other than A do not succeed 
in adding to or retaining their labour force, they may still 
expand if other factors of production become more plentiful. 
But the mere fact that agricultural labour is seriously under-
employed provides no guarantee that an expansion in A which 
absorbs more factors than are created by associated economies 
in basic industries will draw sufficient labour out of agriculture 
to permit an increase in output, profits and net product in 
secondary industries other than A. 
Let us now tum to the third main possibility of factor elasti-
city, mentioned at (7) above, namely that the supply of capital 
is to some extent elastic with respect to the rate of interest. 
This assumption, as we have seen, has from the start been, in 
effect, woven into the balanced-growth doctrine by Rosenstein-
Rodan and by Nurkse in so far as they express that doctrine in 
terms of the inducement to invest (see pp. 273-4 above). 
An elastic supply of capital would undoubtedly facilitate 
the creation of external economies of scale. If capital were in 
infinitely elastic supply, so that additional capital requirements 
in any industry had no effect on the cost or availability of 
capital for the use of other industries, and if all requirements 
could be met from domestic saving, then any expansion in 
industry A which did not involve an increased use of factors 
of production other than capital would be fairly certain to 
generate expansion, and the economies associated therewith, 
in other industries. 
A distinction must be drawn, however, between capital 
obtained from foreign and from domestic sources respectively. 
When development is financed by foreign capital additional 
interest or dividends will have to be paid to capitalists resident 
abroad. In order to transfer the sums the country in which 
the development occurs will have to generate an export surplus 
partly by reducing imports and partly by increasing exports. 
So long as export industries offer the same sort of opportunities 
for economies of scale as those proaucing for the domestic 
market, the increase in exports will have no ill effect. If, on 
the other hand, no economies of scale are possible in export 
industries only that part of the addition to the national factor 
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supply which accrues to home-market industries will generate 
such economies.1 
How elastic is the supply of capital in fact likely to be in an 
underdeveloped country or region ? This is a question which 
cannot be satisfactorily answered, or even formulated, in terms 
of the comparative static analysis used in this paper-at least 
so far as capital of domestic origin is concerned. Any increase 
in real income associated with the expansion of capital and 
output at A would tend to raise the domestic supply of saving 
and gradually and cumulatively the domestic supply of capital. 
In the very long run the expansion at A might evoke an addi-
tional supply of domestic capital large enough to meet its own 
requirements and leave some over for other industries. Within 
the sort of time period which is of interest for the purposes of 
economic policy, however, capital-expansion in one industry is 
likely to be at the expense of capital-expansion in other indus-
tries, unless additional capital is available from abroad in 
highly elastic supply. 
The transfer of capital from abroad, unlike the increase in 
supply from home saving, is responsive to the increase of 
interest rates or profit opportunities rather than to that of 
real income in the developing country. Though the two types 
of responsiveness in capital supply resemble each other in 
operating only over time, the bulk of any additional supply 
forthcoming from foreign sources in response to the higher 
interest rates, etc., is likely to appear much sooner than the 
bulk of any additional supply accumulated from new domestic 
savings. 
It is impossible to generalize about the elasticity of supply 
of capital from abroad. In certain cases the supply curve may 
even be downward-sloping, as when the fact that some foreign 
capital is willing to venture into an underdeveloped country 
encourages additional supplies at even lower interest rates 
and lower profit expectations. Or the curve may be highly 
elastic for moderate amounts and inelastic for large amounts 
1 The net addition, if any, to the factor supply of home-market 
industries will be the larger the greater the share of import saving in the 
aggregate improvement in the real trade balance, and the smaller the 
proportion of that improvement which is required to offset deterioration 
in the terms of trade. 
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(if the capital is drawn from somewhat restricted circles of 
investors abroad). Or it may be elastic for some industries and 
inelastic for others. (Frequently the industries for which foreign 
capital supply is inelastic will be precisely the home-market 
industries where the economies of scale are most to be expected.) 
Or, in the case of countries having forfeited the confidence of 
investors, the supply of foreign capital may be highly inelastic 
all round. 
Inelasticity in the supply of capital from abroad tends to 
render the doctrine of balanced growth not so much invalid 
as inapplicable. Even where a diversified investment programme 
would yield a higher return on capital invested than would 
the projects taken individually, the higher cost of capital 
might make the large-scale programme as unprofitable as the 
piecemeal approach. More fundamental is the criticism already 
noted that even where capital is available in elastic supply the 
mere fact that it is obtained from abroad reduces the extent 
to which it can be used to exploit economies of scale in home-
market industries and reduces the chances that the combined 
investment programme will in fact yield a higher return to 
capital than would the projects taken one by one. 
CONCLUSION 
This paper has examined the basic assumptions underlying 
a modern variant of the balanced-growth doctrine, namely 
that the introduction of lower (unit) cost methods of production 
involving expansion in the output of an industry even if itself 
unprofitable, will enhance the profitability of other industries 
not specially related to it as customers or suppliers, and, if 
these industries are operating under imperfect competition, 
will promote economies of larger-scale production there. 
We have concluded that the argument, as usually presented, 
overemphasises the repercussions on the demand for, and 
ignores repercussions on the costs of, the other industries, and 
that, in an economy where factors of production are in fixed 
supply, the introduction of unprofitable though efficient large-
scale production in one industry is more likely to reduce than 
to increase the profitability of other industries. 
We have seen, however, that the chances are much better 
for a 'vertical' propagation of external economies, from 
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customer industry to supplying industry, and especially from 
supplying industry to customer industry, and that develop-
ments in industries at different stages in the same 'line' of 
production are more likely to afford each other mutual support 
than those in different lines of production. 
Moreover, the chances that expansion in one industry will 
generate economies in other industries not 'vertically' related 
to it will be increased if economies are generated 'vertically' 
in factor-producing industries. This has the effect of introdu-
cing a measure of elasticity into the supply of factors of produc-
tion which is in general favourable to the creation of external 
economies. 
Conditions of elastic supply of labour or capital likewise tend 
to favour the applicability of the balanced-growth doctrine. 
The overall elasticity of the labour supply is, however, likely 
to be low, and the ease with which labour can be transferred 
from agriculture to non-agricultural industry, where the 
opportunities for economies of scale are greater, has frequently 
been exaggerated. 
As to capital, the domestic supply is likely to be practically 
inelastic within any short period of years. Access to imported 
capital, on the other hand, varies very much from country to 
country and from time to time; and, in any case, foreign capital 
is less effective than domestic capital in widening the market 
and promoting economies of scale. 
The chances that diversified development in a variety of 
industries will play a mutually supporting, mutually validating 
role, as.required by the balanced-growth doctrine, are greatest 
when the necessary additional capital is obtainable on easy 
terms, when unions can be prevented from pushing up real 
wages in industry, when reserves of underemployed agricultural 
labour are eagerly waiting to obtain industrial employment, 
when there are opportunities for economies of scale in the basic, 
factor-producing industries, and when, taken singly, the in-
vestments in question are only just not profitable. When too 
many of these conditions are absent the combined installation 
over a variety of industries of unprofitable though efficient 
undertakings may have the effect of rendering each of these 
undertakings still more unprofitable than if it had been set up 
by itself. 
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APPENDIX 
A NoTE ON ExTERNAL EcoNOMIES 
The term 'external economies', since it was introduced by 
Marshall, has been employed in a variety of senses, often con-
fusing and misleading. The usa.ge which I consider to be most 
convenient for the purpose of welfare economics, and which 
represents a development of that introduced by Professor 
Kahn in 'Some Notes on Ideal Output '1, is the following: 
Let us adopt the following definitions : 
(I) The increment in direct net product of a firm is the sum 
of any net increase in the volume of its sales, less any net 
increase in the volume of its purchases (including purchases of 
labour and other original factors of production), plus any net 
increase in its real stock of physical assets. This is a sum of 
physical increments valued at current prices.2 (The fact that 
output is netted not only of purchases from other firms but 
also of purchases from factor-owners makes this a different 
concept from that of an increase in real 'value added'.) 
(2) The increment in net factor supply of a factor-owner 
(worker, capitalist, landowner) is the sum of any increases less 
any reductions in the supply of his factors to different uses. 
(A transfer of labour to a better-paid use would constitute such 
an increase, but not, of course, an increase in remuneration for 
labour in a given use.) 
(3) The increment in tax quantum associated with any type 
of transaction is the increase in the volume of transactions of 
this type times the current tax rate. Subsidies are counted as 
negative taxes. 
(4) The increment in government services consists in the 
money equivalent of any net increase in government services 
provided without charge, other than those provided to firms. 
(5) The increment in net psychic income of any individual is 
the money equivalent of all additional advantages less additional 
disadvantages accruing to him, other than those arising through 
1 The Economic Journal, March 1935· 
1 Where adjustments large enough to alter prices are in question the 
price of each increment will be the average price over the corresponding 
interval of variation on the relevant product-demand or factor-supply 
curve. This average price will be a function of the 'path' of variation 
and thus of the convention whereby that path is determined. 
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changes in his money income, or in the nominal purchasing 
power of that income. This is something of a hold-all residual 
item, containing, for example, not only all changes in satisfac-
tion associated with a change in occupation as such, but also 
those associated with changes in the availability of consumer 
goods at unchanged prices. 
Now the sum of all increments of the first three types will 
together constitute that part of the increment of the real 
national product which is marketed and is statistically measu-
rable.1 Inclusion of the increments of types (4) and (5) will 
add the non-marketed and the intangible elements in the real 
national product. In a closed economy this sum will also repre-
sent the increment in the real national income. In an economy 
with foreign trade, however, we must add : 
{6) The increment, resulting from change in the terms of 
trade, in the import equivalent of the existing volume of 
exports. 
Now, any increment in one of the above-mentioned categories 
may be termed, if positive, an 'economy' and, if negative, a 
'diseconomy ', and any economy or diseconomy which is 
brought about by the actions of a particular firm, other than a 
change in its own direct net product, I shall refer to as an 
'external' economy or diseconomy, respectively, generated by 
the operations of that firm. 
External economies affecting direct net product, factor 
supply, tax quantum or psychic income can be cross-classified 
into two main categories : 
A. economies which affect production and enjoyment 
functions in such a way as to increase the outputs of affected 
firms for given inputs or to increase the satisfaction deriv-
ed by persons from given employment and consumption 
patterns; 
B. economies arising out of production adjustments, em-
ployment adjustments or consumption adjustments, under-
taken by the affected firms, workers or consumers in response 
1 Summation of the first two types of increments alone would have 
given us a measure of the increment in real national product in which 
individual products are weighted according to their factor cost-a. 
faulty weighting from a welfare-economic standpoint. Inclusion of 
type (3) increments alters the basis of weighting to that of market price. 
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to changes m the market situation resulting from the initial 
operation. 
Where perfect competition is pervasive only external econo-
mies of Category A can occur.1 Economies of Category B can 
occur only in connexion with firms, workers or consumers 
operating under imperfect competition or price-fixing or subject 
to indirect taxation. Such economies can accompany infinit-
esimal adjustments only where production (or employment or 
consumption as the case may be) has previously been unecono-
mically organi~ed. Thus a small expansion of input and output 
in a firm resulting from an expansion in product demand can 
lead to an increase in direct net product only when, for reasons 
of profit-maximization or force majMere, product price has 
previously been in excess of marginal cost. Where large individual 
adjustments are concerned, however, such as installation of 
new plant, a change in market conditions can make economic 
an adjustment yielding an increase in direct net product, even 
though such adjustment was previously uneconomic. 
l Cf. J. E. Meade, 'External Economies and Diseconomies in a 
Competitive Situation', The Economic journal, March 1952. 
TWO CONCEPTS OF EXTERNAL ECONOMIES* 
by Tibor Scitovsky 
THE CONCEPT OF EXTERNAL ECONOMIES IS ONE OF THE MOST 
elusive in economic literature. Our understanding of it has 
been greatly enhanced by the active controversy of the twenties 
over the nature of the 'empty economic boxes' ; but full clarity 
has never been achieved. Definitions of external economies are 
few and unsatisfactory. It is agreed that they mean services 
(and dis-services) rendered free (without compensation) by 
one producer to another; but there is no agreement on the 
nature and form of these services or on the reasons for their 
being free. It is also agreed that external economies are a cause 
for divergency between private profit and social benefit and 
thus for the failure of perfect competition to lead to an optimum 
situation ; but for this there are many reasons, and it is nowhere 
made clear how many and which of these reasons are subsumed 
under the heading of 'external economies'. Nor do examples 
help to clarify the concept. The literature contains many 
examples of external economies ; but they are as varied and 
dissimilar as are discussions of the subject. Some give the 
impression that external economies are exceptional and un-
important ; others suggest that they are important and ubiquit-
ous. Indeed, one might be tempted to explain this strange 
dichotomy by ideological differences between the different 
authors ; but such an explanation would be both unwarranted 
and unnecessary. For, with the increasing rigour of economic 
thinking and separation of the different branches of economic 
theory, it is becoming increasingly clear that the concept of 
external economies does duty in two entirely different contexts. 
One of these is equilibrium theory, the other is the theory of 
industrialization in underdeveloped countries. It is customary 
to discuss these two subjects at different levels of abstraction 
and on the basis of very different sets of assumptions: no 
* The J ou,.nal of Political Economy, April I 954· Reprinted by permission 
of the University of Chicago Press and the author. Copyright (1954) 
by the University of Chicago. The author is indebted to Professor 
Bernard Haley and Mr Ralph Turvey for many helpful suggestions. 
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wonder that 'external economies' stand for very different 
things in the two contexts. Indeed, I shall argue that there are 
two entirely different definitions of external economies, one 
much wider than the other ; and that external economies as 
defined in the theory of industrialization include, but go far 
beyond, the external economies of equilibrium theory. The 
latter have been discussed and rigorously defined in Professor 
Meade's 'External Economies and Diseconomies in a Competi-
tive Situation ';1 but, since they form part of external economies 
as defined in the theory of industrialization, we shall deal with 
them briefly here. 
Equilibrium theory, in both its general and its partial form, 
is a static theory, concerned with the characteristics of the 
economic system when it is in equilibrium. Most of its con-
clusions are based on the assumptions of (I) perfect competition 
on both sides of every market and (2) perfect divisibility of 
all resources and products. These assumptions underlie the 
main conclusion of general equilibrium theory, viz., that the 
market economy leads to a situation of economic optimum 
(in Pareto's sense), provided that every economic influence of 
one person's (or firm's) behaviour on another person's well-
being (or firm's profit) is transmitted through its impact on 
market prices. Expressed differently, equilibrium in a perfectly 
competitive economy is a situation of Paretian optimum, 
except when there is interdependence among the members 
of the economy that is direct, in the sense that it does not 
operate through the market mechanism. In general equilibrium 
theory, then, direct interdependence is the villain of the piece 
and the cause for conflict between private profit and social 
benefit. 
One can distinguish four types of direct (i.e., non-market) 
interdependence (and one of these-the last one in the following 
enumeration-is known as 'external economies') : (I) The 
individual person's satisfaction may depend not only on the 
quantities of products he consumes and services he renders but 
also on the satisfaction of other persons. In particular, the high 
income or consumption of others may give a person pain or 
1 The Economic journal, Vol. LXII (1952), pp. 54-67. 
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pleasure; and so may his knowledge that some others are less 
well off than he is. This is known as the 'interdependence of 
consumers' satisfaction'. (2) A person's satisfaction may be 
influenced by the activities of producers not only through their 
demand for his services and supply of the products he buys 
but also in ways that do not operate through the market 
mechanism. These may be called the producer's 'direct' (i e., 
non-market) influence on personal satisfaction and are best 
known by the example of the factory that inconveniences the 
neighbourhood with the fumes or noise that emanate from it. 
(3) The producer's output may be influenced by the action of 
persons more directly and in other ways than through their 
offer of services used and demand for products produced by 
the firm. This is a counterpart of the previous case, and its 
main instance is inventions that facilitate production and 
become available to producers without charge. (4) The output 
of the individual producer may depend not only on his input 
of productive resources but also on the activities of other firms. 
This is a counterpart of case I and may be called 'direct inter-
dependence among producers' but is better known under the 
name of 'external economies and diseconomies' .1 
Of these four cases of direct interdependence, the first, 
interdependence among consumers, is undoubtedly important. 
It is (together with the case mentioned in the footnote) among 
the main reasons for the current controversy in welfa1·e econo-
mics and the reluctance of economists to make any welfare 
statements concerning the consumer. Nowadays, welfare 
statements are usually confined to the field of production, 
where the main conclusion of general equilibrium theory seems 
to stand on firmer ground, primarily because the remaining 
three cases of direct interdependence (all of which involve the 
producer) seem exceptional and unimportant. The second 
case seems exceptional, because most instances of it can be 
and usually are eliminated by zoning ordinances and industrial 
regulation concerned with public health and safety. The third 
case is unimportant, because patent laws have eliminated the 
1 A fifth and important case, which, however, does not quite tit 
into the above classification, is that where society provides social 
services through communal action and makes them available free of 
charge to all persons and firms. 
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main instance of this form of direct interdependence and 
transformed it into a case of interdependence through the 
market mechanism.! The fourth case seems unimportant, 
simply because examples of it seem to be few and exceptional. 
The last statement appears at first to be contradicted by 
the many examples of external economies and diseconomies 
quoted in the literature ; but most of these are not examples 
of direct interdependence among producers, which is the only 
meaning that can be attributed to the term 'external econo-
mies' within the context of equilibrium theory. It will be useful 
iu this connexion to have a rigorous definition of direct inter-
dependence among producers. Meade gave such a definition 
when he defined external economies ; and I can do no better 
than to reproduce it. According to him, external economies 
exist whenever the output (x1) of a firm depends not only on 
the factors of production (ll' c1, ••• ) utilized by this firm but 
also on the output (x2) and factor utilization (l2, c2, ••• ) of 
another firm or group of firms. 2 In symbols, x1 = F (ll' cl' ... ; 
x
2
, l2 •• • ), where the existence of external economies is indicated 
by the presence of the variables to the right of the semicolon. 
Since F(*) is a production function, external economies as here 
defined are a peculiarity of the production function. For this 
reason it is convenient to call them 'technological external 
economies'. 3 While this will distinguish them from another 
category of external economies to be introduced presently, 
we must bear in mind that technological external economies 
are the only external economies that can arise, because of 
direct interdependence among producers and within the 
framework of general equilibrium theory. 
The examples of external economies given by Meade are 
somewhat bucolic in nature, having to do with bees, orchards, 
and woods. This, however, is no accident : it is not easy to 
1 i.e., patent laws have created a market and a market price for the 
inventor's services, which in the absence of such laws would often be 
free goods. The case where the results of govemment-sponsored research 
into indttstrial and agricultural methods are made gratuitously available 
to industrialists and farmers belongs in the category mentioned in 
the note on p. 297· 
1 Op. cit. 
3 The term is used in Jacob Viner's ··cost Curves and Supply Curves', 
Zeitsch-rijt jil1' Nationalokonomie, III (1931), pp. 23-46. 
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find examples from industry. Going through the many examples 
of external economies quoted in the literature, I found only 
two that fit the above definition : the case in which a firm 
benefits from the labour market created by the establishment 
of other firms and that in which several firms use a resource 
which is free but limited in supply.l For a more detailed dis-
cussion the reader is referred to Meade's article, which will, 
I think, convince him of the scarcity of technological external 
economies. 
The other field in which the concept of external economies 
occurs frequently is the theory of industrialization of under-
developed countries, where the concept is used in connexion 
with the special problem of allocating savings among alternative 
investment opportunities. This last is one of"the many practical 
problems to which economists are wont to apply the conclusions 
of general equilibrium theory. Most of them realize, of course, 
that general equilibrium theory is limited in its assumptions 
and applicability ; but the only limitation taken seriously by 
most economists is that imposed by the assumption of perfect 
competition ; and this-as is well known-is not always a 
necessary condition for the conclusions of equilibrium theory to 
hold good. In particular, many economists regard a uniform 
degree of monopoly as all that is necessary for market forces to 
bring about an optimum allocation of investment funds ; 
and this weaker condition is held to be more nearly fulfilled 
in our society. Whether for this reason or for some other, the 
private profitability of investment is usually considered a good 
index of its social desirability, at least as a general rule. 
To this rule, however, the exception~ are too great and obvi-
ous to be ignored, especially in underdeveloped countries ; 
and it is customary to impute most of them to external econo-
mies. While the nature of these external economies is often 
discussed, I have been unable to find a definition of the concept 
in the literature dealing with underdeveloped countries. It is 
1 Instances of this are the oil well whose output depends on the 
number and operation of other wells on the same oil field ; the fisherman 
whose catch depends on the operations of other fishermen in the same 
waters; and the firm that uses a public road (or other publicly owned 
utility) and is partly crowded out of it by other firms using the same 
road. 
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possible, however, to infer a definition from the many examples, 
discussions, and obiter dicta. It seems that external economies 
are invoked whenever the profits of one producer are affected 
by the actions of other producers. To facilitate comparison 
with Meade's definition, we can express this in symbols by the 
function P 1 = G (xl' ll' c1 ••• ; x2, 12, c2, ••• ), which shows 
that the profits of the firm depend not only on its own output 
and factor inputs but also on the output and factor inputs 
of other firms ; and we shall say that in the context of under-
developed countries external economies are said to exist when-
ever the variables to the right of the semicolon are present. 
This definition of external economies obviously includes 
direct or non-market interdependence among producers, as 
discussed above and defined by Meade. It is much broader, 
however, than his definition, because, in addition to direct 
interdependence among producers, it also includes inter-
dependence among producers through the market mechanism. 
This latter type of interdependence may be called 'pecuniary 
external economies' to distinguish it from the technological 
external economies of direct interdependence.1 
Interdependence through the market mechanism is all-
pervading, and this explains the contrast between the excep-
tional and often awkward examples of external economies 
cited in discussions of equilibrium theory and the impression 
one gains from the literature on underdeveloped countries that 
the entrepreneur creates external economies and diseconomies 
with his every move. 
What is puzzling, however, is that interdependence through 
the market mechanism should be held to account for the failure 
of the market economy to lead to the socially desirable opti-
mum, when equilibrium theory comes to the opposite con-
clusion and relies on market interdependence to bring about 
an optimum situation. Pecuniary external economies dearly 
have no place in equilibrium theory. The question is whether 
the concept is meaningful elsewhere. To answer this question 
we must first investigate the nature of the pecuniary external 
economies, to which interdependence through the market 
mechanism gives rise~ 
1 Cf. Viner, op. cit. 
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Investment in an industry leads to an expansion of its 
capacity and may thus lower the prices of its products and raise 
the prices of the factors used by it. The lowering of product 
prices benefits the users of these products ; the raising of factor 
prices benefits the suppliers of the factors. When these benefits 
accrue to firms, in the form of profits, they are pecuniary exter-
nal economies-Marshall called, or would have called, them 
(together with the benefits accruing to persons) consumers' 
and producers' surplus, respectively. According to the theory 
of industrialization, these benefits, being genuine benefits, 
should be explicitly taken into account when investment 
decisions are made ; and it is usually suggested that this should 
be done by taking as the maximand not profits alone but the 
sum of the profits yielded and the pecuniary external economies 
created by the investment. 
This prescription seems to be in direct conflict with the 
results of equilibrium theory. For, according to the latter and 
subject to its usual assumptions and limitations, market inter-
dependence in the competitive system insures that the maxi-
mization of profit by each firm and of satisfaction by each 
person brings about an optimum situation, which, as is well 
known, is sometimes described as a situation in which con-
sumers' and producers' surpluses are maximized. In other 
words, equilibrium theory tells us that in equilibrium the sum 
of consumers' and producers' surpluses will be maximized, 
although they do not enter explicitly, as part of the maximand, 
the economic decisions of any producer.t Assuming that these 
conflicting views are both right, the conflict can be resolved 
only if we should find that the limitations of general equilibrium 
theory render it inapplicable to the problems of investment. 
This, indeed, must often be so ; but in the following we shall 
single out three special cases, which seem especially important 
and in which the above conflict is resolved. 
(a) One reason why the conclusions of general equilibrium 
theory may be inapplicable to the practical problem of 
1 Cf. J. R. Hicks, 'The Rehabilitation of Consumers' Surplus', 
Review of Economic Studies, Vol. VIII (1941), pp. 108-16. \Ve need not 
enter here the debate on the usefulness of this terminology. Nor is it 
necessary to stress that this way of stating the results of perfect 
competition is characteristic of partial equilibrium analysis. 
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investment is that the former's assumption of perfect divisibility 
is not always fulfilled. Perfect competition leads to a position of 
economic optimum, because under perfect competition the 
marginal conditions of economic optimum are contained (in 
the absence of direct interdependence) in the marginal condi-
tions of profit maximization by producers and satisfaction 
maximization by householders. Indivisibilities, however, may 
prevent the producer from fulfilling these marginal conditions. 
For example, he may find himself unable to equate marginal 
costs to price and, instead, face the choice of producing either 
less or more than the output that would equate these two 
quantities. In such a case one of the available alternatives will 
still yield him a higher profit than all others; but this need no 
longer be the one that is also the best from society's point of 
view. Hence the need, in such cases, to take society's point of 
view explicitly into consideration. 
This fact was recognized as early as 1844 by Dupuit.1 He 
was looking for a criterion of the social desirability of invest-
ment in such public utilities as canals, roads, bridges, and 
railways-the typical examples of indivisibilities in economics 
-and he found this criterion not in the actual profitability of 
such investments but in what their profitability would be in 
the hypothetical case in which the operator of the utility prac-
tised price discrimination and thus appropriated to himself 
the consumers' surplus that would normally (i.e., in the absence 
of price discrimination) accrue to the users of the public utility. 
In other words, Dupuit's test of social desirability is whether 
the sum of profit and consumers' surplus is positive. 2 Dupuit's 
test and his use of the consumers' surplus concept underlying 
it were vindicated by Professor Hicks ;3 but neither Hicks nor 
Dupuit makes clear the role of indivisibilities in rendering the 
above test necessary. For this last point, as well as for an 
excellent statement of the entire argument, the reader should 
1 Cf. Jules Dupuit, 'De la mesure de l'utilite des travaux publics', 
Annates des pants et chaussies. 2nd ser., Vo[ VIII (1844); reprinted in 
International Economic Papers, No. 2 (1952), pp. 83-110. 
s This is so whether the consumer's surplus accrues to persons or 
represents external economies accruing to firms. 
3 Cf. J. R. Hicks, 'L'Economie de bien-etre et la tMorie des surplus 
du consommateur', and' Quelques applications de la theorie des surplus 
du consommateur', both in Economie appliquee, No.4 (1948), pp. 432-57. 
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consult chapter xvi of Professor Lerner's Economics of 
Control.l 
(b) The second reason for the inapplicability of general 
equilibrium theory to the problems of investment is that the 
former is a static or equilibrium theory, whereas the allocation 
of investment funds is not a static problem at all. According to 
equilibrium theory, the producer's profit-maximizing behaviour 
brings about a socially desirable situation when the system is in 
equilibrium; or, to give this result a more dynamic, if not 
entirely correct, interpretation, profit-maximizing behaviour 
brings closer the socially desirable optimum if it also brings 
closer equilibrium. Investment, however, need not bring the 
system closer to equilibrium; and, when it does not, the results 
of equilibrium theory may not apply. 
Profits are a sign of disequilibrium ; and the magnitude of 
profits, under free competition, may be regarded as a rough 
index of the degree of disequilibrium. 2 Profits in a freely com-
petitive industry lead to investment in tbat industry ; and 
the investment, in turn, tends to eliminate the profits that 
have called it forth. This far, then, investment tends to bring 
equilibrium nearer. The same investment, however, may raise 
or give rise to profits in other industries ; and to this extent 
it leads away from equilibrium. For example, investment in 
industry A will cheapen its product ; and if this is used as a 
factor in industry B, the latter's profits will rise. This, then, is 
a case where the price reduction creates, not a consumers' 
surplus proper, accruing to persons, but pecuniary external 
economies, benefiting firms. Is this difference sufficient to render 
the conclusions of general equilibrium theory inapplicable ? 
To answer this question, we must pursue the argument a 
little further. The profits of industry B, created by the lower 
price of factor A, call for investment and expansion in industry 
B, one result of which will be an increase in industry B's 
1 A. P. Lerner, Economics of Control (New York: Macmillan Co., 
I9·Hl· Lerner's solution is slightly different and, I believe, more correct 
than Dupuit's, in that he takes account also of producers' surplus. It 
might be added in passing that the type of indivisibility considered by 
Dupuit establishes a relation among the users of the public utility that 
is similar in all essentials to direct interdependence among consumers. 
2 However, the absence of profits is not a sufficient condition of 
equilibrium. 
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demand for industry A's product. This in its turn will give 
rise to profits and call for further investment and expansion 
in industry A ; and equilibrium is reached only when successive 
doses of investment and expansion in the two industries have 
led to the simultaneous elimination of profits in both. It is 
only at this stage, where equilibrium has been established, 
that the conclusions of equilibrium theory become applicable 
and we can say (on the usual assumptions and in the absence 
of direct interdependence) that the amount of investment 
profitable in industry A is also the socially desirable amount. 
This amount is clearly greater than that which is profitable at 
the first stage, before industry B has made adjustment. We 
can conclude, therefore, that when an investment gives rise 
to pecuniary external economies, its private profitability 
understates its social desirability. 
Unfortunately, however, the test of social desirability appli-
cable in the previous case is not applicable here, although it 
would probably give a better result than a simple calculation 
of profitability. This can easily be seen by comparing the 
situation under consideration with that which would obtain 
if industries A and B were integrated (although in such a way 
as to preserve the free competition assumed so far). In this case 
the pecuniary external economies created by investment in 
industry A would become 'internal' and part of the profits 
of the investors themselves. Investment in A would be more 
profitable and pushed further than in the absence of integra-
tion; but, without investment and expansion also in industry B, 
it would not be pushed far enough. For what inhibits invest-
ment in A is the limitation on the demand for industry A's 
product imposed by tJle limited capacity of industry B, the 
consumer of this product ; just as investment in industry B is 
inhibited by the limited capacity of industry A, the supplier 
of one of industry B:s factors of production. These limitations 
can be fully removed only by a simultaneous expansion of 
both industries. We conclude, therefore, that only if expansion 
in the two industries were integrated and planned together 
would the profitability of investment in each one of them be a 
reliable index of its social desirability. 
It hardly needs adding that the relation between industries 
A and B discussed above illustrates only one of the many 
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possible instances of pecuniary external economies that belong 
in this category. Expansion in industry A may also give rise 
to profits (i) in an industry that produces a factor used in 
industry A, (ii) in an industry whose product is complementary 
in use to the product of industry A, (iii) in an industry whose 
product is a substitute for a faetor used in industry A, or (iv) 
in an industry whose product is consumed by persons whose 
incomes are raised by the expansion of industry A-and this 
list does not include the cases in which the expansion causes 
external diseconomies. It is apparent from this list that vertical 
integration alone would not be enough and that complete 
integration of all industries would be necessary to eliminate 
all divergence between private profit and public benefit. This 
was fully realized by Dr Rosenstein-Rodan, who, in dealing 
with the 'Problems of Industrialization of Eastern and South-
Eastern Europe', 1 considered most instances of pecuniary exter-
nal economies listed above and advocated that 'the whole of the 
industry to be created is to be treated and planned like one 
huge firm or trust' .2 To put this conclusion differently, profits 
in a market economy are a bad guide to economic optimum as 
far as investment and industrial expansion are concerned ; 
and they are worse, the more decentralized and differentiated 
the economy. 
This entire argument can be restated in somewhat different 
terms. In an economy in which economic decisions are decen-
tralized, a system of communications is needed to enable each 
person who makes economic decisions to learn about the 
economic decisions of others and co-ordinate his decisions with 
theirs. In the market economy, prices are the signalling device 
that informs each person of other people's economic decisions; 
and the merit of perfect competition is that it would cause 
prices to transmit information reliably and people to respond 
to this information properly. Market prices, however, reflect 
the economic situation as it is and not as it will be. For this 
reason, they are more useful for co-ordinating current produc-
tion decisions, which are immediately effective and guided by 
short-run considerations, than they are for co-ordinating invest-
ment decisions, which have a delayed effect and-looking 
1 Reprinted in the present volume, pp. 245-55. 
I p. 248• 
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ahead to a long future period-should be governed not by 
what the present economic situation is but by what the future 
economic situation is expected to be. The proper co-ordination 
of investment decisions, therefore, would require a signalling 
device to transmit information about present plans and future 
conditions as they are determined by present plans ; and the 
pricing system fails to provide this.l Hence the belief that 
there is need either for centralized investment planning or for 
some additional communication system to supplement the 
pricing system as a signalling device. 
It must be added that the argument of this section applies 
with especial force to underdeveloped countries. The plant 
capacity most economical to build and operate is not very 
different in different countries ; but, as a percentage of an 
industry's total capacity, it is very much greater in under-
developed than in fully industrialized economies. In under-
developed countries, therefore, investment is likely to have a 
greater impact on prices, give rise to greater pecuniary external 
economies, and thus cause a greater divergence between private 
profit and social benefit. 
(c) I propose to consider yet another reason for divergence 
between the profitability of an investment and its desirability 
from the community's point of view ; but this is very different 
from those discussed in the last two sections and has to do with 
the difference between the national and international points 
of view. In appraising the social desirability of an economic 
action from the international point of view, all repercussions 
of that action must be fully taken into account, whereas, from 
the national point of view, the welfare of domestic nationals 
alone is relevant and the losses suffered and benefits gained by 
foreigners are ignored. The two points of view need not neces-
sarily lead to different appraisals ; but they usually do when 
the economic action considered is the allocation of investment 
funds among purely domestic, import-competing, and export 
industries. From the mternational point of view, all external 
economies and diseconomies must be taken into consideration ; 
from the national point of view, one must count only the 
t Professor Kenneth Arrow pointed out to me, however, that, in a 
formal sense, futures markets and futures prices could provide exactly 
such a signalling device. 
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external economies and diseconomies that accrue to domestic 
nationals and leave out of account the pecuniary external 
economies accruing to foreign buyers from the expansion of 
export industries and the diseconomies inflicted on foreign 
competitors by the expansion of import-competing industries. 
Accordingly, investment in export industries is always less, 
and that in import-competing industries is always more, 
desirable from the national, than from the international, point 
of view. 
In discussions on investment policy this difference between 
the national and international points of view usually appears 
in the guise of a difference between the criteria of social benefit 
and private profit. For social benefit, when considered 
explicitly, is usually identified with national benefit in our 
society, whereas private profit, although an imperfect index 
of social desirability, accounts or fails to account for external 
economies and diseconomies without national bias and there-
fore probably comes closer to registering the social welfare of 
the world as a whole than that of a single nation. Hence invest-
ment tends to be more profitable in export industries and less 
profitable in import-competing industries than would be 
desirable from a narrow nationalistic point of view. 
It is worth noting that this argument is in some respects the 
reverse of the argument found in (b) above. There it was the 
failure of profit calculations to take into account pecuniary 
external economies that caused the divergence between private 
profit and social benefit ; here the divergence is caused by the 
entry into the profit criterion of pecuniary external economies 
and diseconomies that accrue to foreigners and should therefore 
be excluded from social accounting concerned with national, 
rather than world, welfare. The argument is well known as the 
'terms-of-trade argument' and has been used to explain the 
failure of foreign investments in colonial areas to benefit fully 
the borrowing countries.1 The divergence between national 
welfare and private profit depends on the foreigners' import-
demand and export-supply elasticities ; and it can be offset 
by an appropriate set of import and export duties. This has 
1 Cf. H. W. Singer, 'The Distribution of Gains between Investing 
and Borrowing Countries', The American Economic Review (Proceedings), 
Vol. XL (1950), pp. 473-85. 
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been shown by Mr J. ce V. Graaff, in his 'Optimum Tariff 
Structures' .1 De Graaff presents his optimum tariff structure 
as one that will bring about that flow of goods and services 
which optimizes2 the nation's welfare ; but the same tariff 
structure will also bring about the allocation of investment 
funds that is optimal from the national point of view. 
1 Review of Economic Studies, Vol. XVII (1949-50). pp. 47-59. 
s In Pareto's sense. 
CAPITAL FORMATION 
AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT* 
by Celso Furtado 
THE SIX LECTURES DELIVERED IN BRAZIL BY 'RAGNAR NURKSE 
on Problems of Capital Formation in Underdeveloped Countries 
may be regarded as one of the most serious attempts on the 
part of economists of 'developed' countries to understand the 
problems with which underdeveloped economies are at present 
faced. The extremely encouraging results of that study afford 
ample grounds for optimism concerning the application of 
modern instruments of analysis to the problem of the develop-
ment of backward areas today. 
The absence of basic information and the resultant ignorance 
of the real economic facts have given rise, among economists in 
the underdeveloped countries, to the habit of reasoning by 
analogy, in the mistaken belief that, up to a cer~ain point, 
economic phenomena are the same everywhere. Unfortunately, 
it is not always possible to draw conclusions applicable to 
concrete situations from theories which, although logically 
sound, are largely abstract constructions. It is to be hoped, 
however, that the huge statistical research effort at present 
being made in many underdeveloped countries may contribute 
• International Economic Papers, No.4· 1954· Reprinted by permission of 
the International Economic Association and the author. Translated by J. 
Cairn cross. 'Forma.yao de Capital e Desenvolvimento Econ6mico ', Reuista 
Brasileira de Economia, Vol. 6, No. 3. Sept. 1952. This paper is a com-
ment on six lectures delivered by Professor Ragnar Nurkse, of Columbia 
University, at the Brazilian Institute of Economics in July and August 
1951. These were published in Portuguese in Revista Brasileira de 
Economia, Dec. 1951 :a revised version of them has since been published 
in Ragnar Nurkse, Problems of Capital Formation in Underdeveloped 
CountYies, Oxford, 1953. For the convenience of English-speaking 
readers, references in this article to the Portuguese version of 
the lectures have throughout been replaced by references to that 
book. 
A rejoinder by Professor Nurkse was published in Revista Brasileira 
de Economia, March 1953. In substance this is a re-statement of some 
points stressed in the above-mentioned book ; it corrects certain mis-
leading impressions about Professor Nurkse's views which the readex-
might gain from this Paper. 
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to the transformation of economic thought in those countries 
into as powerful an instrument for the analysis of social reality 
as it is in other parts of the world. 
Many of the points raised by Professor Nurkse in his lectures 
are extremely topical and deserve fuller treatment. In the 
present study we will deal with three of these points-the 
theory of economic development, the relation between the 
propensity to consume and the rate of development and the 
effects of investment on the balance of payments. 
THE THEORY oF EcoNOMIC DEVELOP::IfENT 
One of the most interesting problems dealt with by Professor 
Nurkse, right at the outset, is that of the theory of economic 
development. He draws attention to the fact that, in developed 
countries, economists have always taken the phenomenon of 
economic growth for granted, which explains why it has seldom 
been subjected to systematic analysis. 
A scientific theory presupposes the existence of one or more 
problems which some social group is anxious to solve. It is 
indispensable, therefore, to recognize the existence of a problem 
if the search for its solution is to stimulate enquiry. It is 
practically only in our own days that economic development 
has become a 'problem' in this sense. The price mechanism 
was taken to ensure that the most rational possible use was 
made of the community's productive resources, and, besides, 
it was common ground that the spirit of enterprise, stimulated 
by the dynamism of a liberal form of society, offered sound 
guarantees for economic progress. 
Government action in the whole of the economic sphere 
began to be acceptable when the need for counter-cyclical 
policy was recognized. And it was as a by-product of cyclical 
theories that ideas about the process of economic development 
made their appearance.l Since the economic process takes on 
a cyclical form in a free enterprise economy, it would be un-
realistic to reason in terms of an ascending linear movement. 
Moreover, while it is true that the mere observation of a number 
1 Historians, social philosophers and sociologists in the field of social 
dynamics had previously devoted a good deal of attention to economic 
development: cf., for example, the magnificent work of Max Weber, 
Henri Pirenne, H. See and others, on the origins of capitalism. 
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of consecutive cycles gave rise to the formulation of secular 
trend theories, it proved extremely difficult to tackle the 
problem of growth without first understanding the mechanism 
of the cycle. As a clearer insight into that mechanism was 
obtained, counter-cyclical policy grew from elementary 
measures of a monetary nature into co-ordinated action on the 
dynamic elements of the economic system. Thus, one part of 
counter-cyclical policy now consists in deciding what targets 
are to be achieved in a given time in specific sectors of the 
economy, which are regarded as having a dynamic part to play. 
In a given situation of full employment one may, for example, 
decide that, in order to maintain the level of activity, or, more 
exactly, the optimum use of the factors of production, it i~ 
necessary that the gross social product increase by x per cent 
over a period of six years. Once that objective has been laid 
down and the amount of consumer expenditure-which is a 
function of that objective-is known, it is possible to work 
out the appropriate total of public and private investment to 
be carried out by the economy. Counter-cyclical policy will, 
in that case, consist of a series of measures aimed at the realiza-
tion of that amount of investment. 
In proceeding from a price stabilization policy to the co-
ordination and planning of investment, the proponents of 
counter-cyclical measures were brought up against the need 
for a theory which would not only analyse the causes of fluc-
tuations in the level of employment but would explain the 
general process of economic development. This explains the 
present widespread interest in studies of capital accumulation 
and of the relation between the amount of investment and 
national income, and also the fresh efforts to measure national 
wealth which are particularly marked in the United States. 
Similarly, it is not surprising that input-output studies are 
attracting great attention since they allow a much clearer 
insight into the interdependence of the economic system. The 
same is true of the recent studies on economic dynamics by 
Harrod, Domar and other economists. 
Professor Nurkse's approach to the theory of economic 
development is based, broadly speaking, on Schumpeter's 
analysis. His version of that theory, however, is an extremely 
personal one. We will therefore consider his contribution 
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separately and only incidentally offer certain observations on 
Schumpeter's own theory. 
The central point of Nurkse's interpretation is the small 
size of a country's market as a factor limiting economic develop-
ment. 'In the exchange economy of the real world,' he says, 
'it is not difficult to find illustrations of the way in which the 
small size of a country's market can discourage, or even 
prohibit, the profitable application of modern capital equip-
ment. ... Many articles that are in common use in the United 
States can be sold in a low-income country in quantities so 
limited that a machine working only a few days or weeks can 
produce enough for a whole year's consumption. '1 
The basic problem of underdeveloped countries, on that 
reasoning, is not a shortage of saving but rather the lack of 
investment incentives due to the limited size of the market. 
However interesting this problem may be, Professor Nurkse 
exaggerates its importance. If underdeveloped countries had 
the chance of investing with an eye to the external market, 
there would be no problem. The fundamental question, there-
fore, is the absence of an expanding external market. We 
should, then, distinguish between development when foreign 
trade is expanding and when it is stationary or contracting. 
That is a fundamental problem and we will address ourselves 
to it when we come to the connexion between disequilibrium 
in the balance of payments and the direction investment takes. 
There is a further and more serious reason which leads us to 
dissent from the way Professor Nurkse regards the small size of 
the market as an obstacle to development. A market is small 
only in relation to something. And, in the case in question, 
the market of underdeveloped countries is small in relation 
to the type of equipment used by developed countries. This 
is not a fundamental difficulty in the process of economic 
development, but is merely fortuitous. In the development of 
countries which are today highly industrialized, technical 
innovations were adopted when they were economically 
justified. The factor of production labour was replaced by the 
factor of production capital, wherever this was justified by a 
reduction of costs. But the introduction of automatic boot-
1 Op. cit., p. 7· 
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making machinery into a primitive community would certainly 
mean not a reduction, but a considerable increase in costs, 
just as it would have raised costs in the countries \vhich are 
today industrialized, if it had been introduced a hundred years 
ago. Moreover, it is not necessary to introduce the most modern 
equipment in order to achieve a marked increase in productivity 
in an underdeveloped country. In many parts of Brazil the 
mere introduction of the wheel would spell a notable advance. 
Even the laying of a road can bring about a considerable 
increase in productivity in an agricultural area. 
The aim of economic development must be to increase the 
physical productivity of labour. In an underdeveloped economy 
the introduction of automatic boot-making machinery will 
not mean an improvement in the physical productivity of 
labour for the community as a whole if the workmen who pre-
viously produced boots are left without any work. Moreover, 
the entrepreneur who introduces this kind of machinery will 
suffer too, since it will have to stay idle five days in the week. 
But the entrepreneur who introduces improvements in the 
tools used for the production of boots by hand, thereby making 
possible an increase in productivity, will turn out more boots 
with the same number of man-hours without a disproportionate 
increase in other costs. 
But let us return to Professor Nurkse's argument. 'The 
enlargement of the market through the rise in productivity 
that would result from increased capital-intensity of production 
is inhibited by the initial smallness of the market. ' Professor 
Nurkse then states: 'We perceive a constellation of circum-
stances tending to preserve any backward economy in a 
stationary condition. . . . Economic progress is not a 
spontaneous or automatic affair. 'I In conclusion, he equates 
this 'automatic stagnation' with Schum peter's 'circular 
flow'. 
It is interesting to note that in this way Professor Nurkse 
gives a historical content to Schumpeter's circular-flow economy 
which seems to exist in that author's mind as a mere abstrac-
tion. The great methodological weakness of Schumpeter's 
theory consists precisely in that, having created that 
1 Op. cit., p. IO. 
External Economies and Balanced Growth 
abstraction, he then, in contrast to it, worked out a model 
which is intended to represent concrete situations. 
According to Schumpeter the central figure in the process of 
economic development is the creative entrepreneur, who 
introduces 'new combinations' and whose action gives rise to 
'spontaneous and discontinuous changes in the channels of the 
circular flow'. 
The difficulty about this theory of economic development, 
as considered at the present time, derives from the fact that 
Schumpeter formulated it before the first world war, in cir-
cumstances which were entirely different from those of our 
own days. He claimed to explain why economic reality was a 
constantly changing and not merely a repetitive process. He 
did not directly concern himself with the possibility of increas-
ing capital intensity or real income, but with the 'dynamics' 
of the economic process. 'Development in our sense,' he says, 
'is a distinct phenomenon, entirely foreign to what may be 
observed in the circular flow or in the tendency towards 
equilibrium. It is spontaneous and discontinuous change in the 
channels of the flow, disturbance of equilibrium, which forever 
alters and displaces the equilibrium state previously existing. 
Our theory of development is nothing but a treatment of this 
phenomenon and the processes incident to it. '1 
How can we identify the entrepreneur, that dynamic 
element which disturbs equilibrium? He introduces 'innova-
tions'. Schumpeter lists five types of innovation which may be 
defined as new goods, new methods of production, new markets, 
new sources of raw material, and new forms oi organization. 
But in reality the distinctive characteristic of the entrepreneur 
is the creation of profit. In the circular-flow economy profit 
does not exist, the entrepreneur is a mere administrator. If 
those ideas are to be at all valid, we must assume a perfect 
market, in which profit would only exist as a result of a tem-
porary semi-monopolistic situation, created by any innovation 
whatsoever. 
The essence of Schumpeter's theory of economic develop-
ment may therefore, be summed up as follows : The economic 
process in our society is not circular because there is a class 
1 The Theory of Economic Development (Harvard, 1951), p. 64. 
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with a dynamic outlook-the entrepreneurs-which, by means 
of innovations, constantly tends to disturb the equilibrium. 
Shcmld we not ask : And what factors make for the existence 
of such a class in our society ? Why do certain individuals have 
that social function ? Indeed, the problem of economic develop-
ment is but one aspect of the general problem of social change 
in our society, and cannot be fully understood unless we give 
it a historical content. We should have to consider the whole 
cultural pattern which grew up in Europe with its rational 
mode of thinking, its social mobility, its scale of social values 
reflecting, to a large extent, the scale of personal wealth, in 
order to explain the dynamics of the capitalist economic pro-
cess. Schumpeter's simplification makes us lose sight of the 
real economic problem of development and is, moreover, of 
little use as a general explanation of the phenomenon. 
Nurkse diverges from Schumpeter's theory of development 
and seeks to explain the passage from a state of equilibrium 
to one of development by certain concepts (the so-called' waves 
of investment') in that author's cyclical theory. 'Where any 
single enterprise might appear quite inauspicious and imprac-
ticable, a wide range of projects in different industries may 
succeed .... '1 That phenomenon can only be understood within 
the framework of the cyclical process in developed economies, 
because, at certain stages of the cycle, when there are many 
idle factors, it is essential that the movement should begin 
simultaneously on a broad front so that some sectors create a 
market for the others. To use this theory as an explanation of 
the initiation of a process of growth in an underdeveloped 
economy seems very wide of the mark. For an underdeveloped 
economy to start a process of development with its own re-
sources and by the spontaneous action of its entrepreneurs is, 
to use a current expression, like raising oneself by one's own 
bootstraps. It is true that process of development, once it is 
launched, can gather momentum from its own forces, as we shall 
show when dealing with the high propensity to consume of 
underdeveloped economies today. But that is no justification 
for claiming that such a development can start off the 
process. 
1 Op. cit., p. 13. 
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The concept of innovations is certainly Schumpeter's most 
interesting theoretical contribution. But his manner of defining 
them is too vague-for, if, as he maintains, innovations tend 
to upset the circular flow or the equilibrium of the system, 
we are practically back where we started, since the circular 
flow is a mere abstraction. It is possible to conceive of an 
economy coming within Schumpeter's categories in which 
the action of a group of entrepreneurs constantly disrupts the 
equilibrium by the introduction of new products, without 
necessarily increasing productivity. The new products may 
simply displace others and the new entrepreneurs' profits may 
be offset by the losses sustained by others. 
THE PROCESS OF DEVELOPMENT 
The theory of economic development in its general form 
does not fall within the categories of economic analysis. This 
is a point of view fairly widely accepted nowadays, and it 
should hardly be necessary to refer to the Seminar on Economic 
Development held at the University of Chicago in 1951, at 
which sociologists, anthropologists and historians sat side by 
side with economists. Economic analysis cannot say why any 
society starts developing and to what social agents this process 
is due. Nevertheless it can describe the mechanism of economic 
development and it is this description which we now propose 
to discuss. 
At bottom the process of development consists of a series of 
changes in the manner and proportions in which the factors of 
production are combined. We will not dwell on the analysis of 
the social reasons for these changes, since that would take us 
too far. Through those changes people try to work out more 
rational combinations of the factors of production subject to 
the limitations of current technology, with the aim of increasing 
the productivity of labour. The aim of the theory of economic 
development, then, is not to explain why an economy is con-
stantly changing, but why in that economy the productivity 
of labour goes on increasing. 
Developed and Underdeveloped Countries 
The process of development involves either new combina-
tions of existing factors at the current technical level, or the 
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introduction of technical innovations. If we may simplify the 
problem, those regions may be termed fully developed in which, 
at a given moment, none of the factors are unemployed and 
it is possible to increase productivity (real per capita income) 
only by introducing new techniques. Further, areas the pro-
ductivity of which is increasing or could be increased by the 
simple introduction of techniques which are already known 
should be considered as suffering from a different degree of 
underdevelopment. The growth of a developed economy, then, is 
mainly a problem of accumulation of new scientific knowledge 
and progress in the application of that knowledge. The growth 
of underdeveloped economies is above all a process of assimila-
tion of the techniques existing at the time. 
In an underdeveloped region there is always underemploy-
ment of the factors of production within the limits of known 
techniques. Such underemployment, however, does not neces-
sarily spring from a faulty combination of existing factors but 
usually from scarcity of capital. One factor-labour-is squand-
ered because another-capital-is deficient. But capital, as is 
well known, is nothing else but work carried out in the past, 
the product of which was not consumed. We are therefore led 
to conclude that work is badly utilized today because all the 
product of former work has been consumed. That vicious 
circle, as we shall subsequently explain, is in the most back-
ward countries almost always broken by the action of external 
factors. 
Productivity and Capital Accumulation 
Economic development consists of the introduction of new 
combinations of factors of production which tend to increase 
the productivity of labour. Modern technique is the sum of 
procedures, the application of which makes such an increase 
in productivity possible. As productivity grows-provided 
certain factors which will be examined later do not intervene-
there is an increase in real national income, that is, in the 
quantity of goods and services available. Moreover, the increase 
in remuneration resulting from a rise in real income leads to a 
change in the structure of consumer demand. By a process of 
action and reaction, then, the increase in productivity leads 
to a rise in real income, and the resulting increase in demand 
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leads to a change in the structure of production. In the study 
of economic development it is essential, therefore, to know how 
productivity increases and how demand reacts to an increase 
in the level of real income. 
As we noted earlier on, the increase in the physical produc-
tivity of labour is, in the main, the fruit of capital accumula-
tion.1 However, the relations between those two phenomena-
increased productivity and capital accumulation-must be 
studied very closely if we are to understand the difficulties to 
be overcome in the initial stages of the process of development. 
When productivity is very low, the satisfaction of elementary 
needs absorbs a high proportion of productive capacity. In very 
backward economies, for example, 8o per cent or more of the 
active population has to work in order to satisfy the com-
munity's needs for food and clothing. When productivity is 
at such a low level, it is difficult to start a process of capital 
accumulation within the economy. Let us see why. In all human 
communities, the demand for non-agricultural products tends 
to increase with the income available for consumption. In the 
most advanced communities, this demand absorbs up to 8o 
per cent of the society's productive capacity. In the most 
backward communities the inequality in the distribution of 
wealth results in certain social groups having a relatively high 
demand for non-agricultural goods and services. Let us consider 
for example the community referred to above, in which 8o 
per cent of the labour force works in agriculture, and let us 
assume that all its members are employed, that they all have 
the same productivity and that there is no foreign trade. Let 
us assume further that 5 per cent of the members of that 
community are in receipt of incomes markedly above the 
average : let us say that they have 20 per cent of the total 
income and that they devote 50 per cent of their income to 
the purchase of farm produce. The low income group (95 per 
cent of the population) will have to devote 87·5 per cent of 
its income to the satisfaction of its needs (the purchase of agri-
cultural products) in order that it may m"!-ke available produc-
1 A simple technological innovation may increase the physical 
productivity of labour. It should be remembered, however, that the 
most important ·nnovations are incorporated in new equipment, thus 
requiring some net investment. 
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tive resources which will enable the high income group to 
spend 50 per cent of its income on the purchase of non-agricul-
tural goods and services. There would thus be no net invest-
ment, and, unless the population were stationary, this economy 
would not even be able to maintain its level of real per capita 
income. 
The main obstacles in the path of development, therefore, 
are encountered at the lowest levels of productivity. Once the 
process of growth has been launched, the movement's own 
dynamics ensure that part of the increase in income is set aside 
for capital investment. A backward community has a very 
great tendency to remain stagnant without being able, on its 
own, to set the process of development in motion. The initial 
impulse to overcome those difficulties has always come from 
sources outside the community.t 
The creation of a flow of foreign trade enables an economy 
with low level of productivity to get development under way 
without previous capital accumulation. As we observed above, 
the increase in productivity, which is the essence of economic 
development, derives in the last analysis from the introduction 
of more productive combinations of the factors of production. 
These new combinations normally call for an increase in the 
supply of the scarce factor (i.e. available capital). But, in 
certain circumstances, it is possible to introduce more produc-
tive combinations without increasing the amount of capital 
available, provided it is possible to integrate the economy in 
question into a wider market. The opening up of foreign trade 
will allow that economy to make a fuller and more rational use 
of those factors which are available to it in relative abundance, 
i.e. land and labour. By obtaining larger quantities of goods 
1 This is true not only in the case of those peoples which are under-
developed at the present time. In Europe, at the end of the Middle 
Ages, the transition from an economy composed almost entirely of closed 
and static units, to a progressing economy, was due largely to the trade 
which the Levantine peoples-particularly the Byzantines after the 
Arab invasion-brought to the coastal populations of Italy and the 
South of France. Once under way, the process spread along the great 
rivers to the whole continent, creating growing opportunities for the 
division of labour, increases in productivity and capital accumulation. 
See Henri Pirenne, La Civilisation Occidentale au Moyen Age, Vol. VIII 
of the collection Histoire Gt!nerale, edited by Glatz, Presse Universitaire, 
Paris. 
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than would be possible if production were only for the home 
market, the economy will have increased its productivity. 
The increase in real income thus obtained will provide the 
necessary margin to enable the process of capital accumulation 
to begin. This simple outline of the problem brings out the 
great importance for underdeveloped countries of the expansion 
of world trade. Consider, for example, the great upheavals 
forced upon the underdeveloped countries' economies by the 
persistent contraction of world trade which followed the great 
depression. Many of the countries with the lowest level of 
development, which, under the stimulus of foreign trade, had 
started expanding before the depression, have in the last two 
decades, as a result of population pressure, lost part of the 
increase in productivity which they had achieved. 
Initially, the impulse from outside benefits those sectors 
directly linked with foreign trade, mainly through the increase 
in remuneration other than wages. If the impulse is sustained, 
it will act as an incentive to increase production by means of 
the investment of the additional profits created by the trade. 
At this point a series of familiar developments is set in motion 
by which the accumulation of capital and improved technical 
methods first set free labour and land and then absorb them, 
with a resultant increase in the average social productivity. 
If the impulse from abroad stops when the average level of 
productivity is still very low, the process of development will 
probably be nipped in the bud. But once the economy has 
succeeded in reaching levels of productivity which permit a 
considerable amount of capital formation, the relative import-
ance of external stimuli on the process of growth will tend to 
diminish. As productivity increases, real income grows and 
demand becomes more diverse, so new opportunities of invest-
ment are opened up, as we shall see later. 
Growth of Income and I)iversi.fication of Demand 
As average social productivity grows owing to the accumula-
tion of capital, the community's real income increases. How-
ever, although there is a very close positive correlation between 
those two phenomena, we must stress certain factors operating 
in the opposite direction. We must bear in mind the specific 
characteristics of a free enterprise economy where the 
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phenomena of growth assume a cyclical form which gives rise to 
periodical. unemployment of the factors of production. More-
over, there are certain phenomena over which we have no 
control and which interfere with the productivity of labour, 
e.g. weather conditions in the case of agriculture. Lastly, 
mention should be made of the market mechanism, which can 
completely wipe out the effects on income of an increase in the 
physical productivity of labour. Depending on the elasticity of 
demand for exports and on the position of the country con-
cerned in the international market, the whole of the benefit of 
the increase in the physical productivity of labour in the export 
sector may be transferred abroad by a fall in prices. But, with 
the exception of special cases such as these, we may assume 
that real income closely follows the movement of the average 
physical productivity of labour. 
The increase in productivity, then, confers an increase in 
income on the sector affected. In the early stages of develop-
ment, as we have seen, that increase is almost entirely absorbed 
by profits, which make possible the accumulation of capital 
necessary to raise production. This takes place under the con-
stant stimulus of growing foreign demand. Once the process of 
growth is consolidated and the demand for labour increases, 
real wages will tend to rise. In consequence, the increase in 
real income will tend to be distributed between consumption 
and investment. The additional consumer demand will affect 
prices in certain sectors and will ensure that new investment 
will be channelled towards them, thus absorbing the additional 
saving created. The new investment will call forth increases in 
productivity in other sectors and the previous chain reaction 
will be repeated. 
The way demand develops, therefore, is a basic factor govern-
ing the direction of the new investment. The development of de-
mand by virtue of the growth of national income is in its turn 
largely determined by institutional factors. If the increases in 
income are concentrated in the hands of small closed groups, the 
process of development started by external pressure will not 
create reactions within the economy tending to speed up that 
process. This phenomenon may be observed in certain under-
developed economies with a large labour surplus where the 
stimulus from outside is relatively weak. All the benefits from 
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foreign trade accrue to small groups who buy abroad a large 
part of the goods they consume. Where foreign demand is 
not intense, the incentive to new investment is small and real 
wages remain stationary. The benefits from foreign trade 
merely allow certain social groups to enjoy more sophisticated 
forms of consumption copied from highly developed countries. 
We will not stop to indulge in an historical analysis of the way 
people disposed of institutional factors which impeded the 
fanning out of the process of development. But, on the basis of 
economic analysis in the strict sense of the term, we may say 
that the moment the demand for labour in the export sector 
allows higher wages to be paid there than in the economy in 
general, development tends to expand. 
Experience shows that demand tends to become more varied 
as real average wages in an economy rise. Surveys of the most 
divergent social groups confirm this tendency towards diver-
sification of demand. Thus, the demand for food increases 
sharply in the early stages of development, but the pace 
slackens once a certain level of real per capita income is reached. 
The demand for manufactured consumer goods shoots up when 
the rate of growth of food consumption begins to decline. 
Durable consumer goods follow a specific pattern of their own. 
The evolution of demand and the increase in productivity 
are independent variables in the process of development. 
With the increase in productivity, the productive capacity of 
the economy increases. But, unless demand becomes diversified 
once the basic needs of the population are satisfied, a growing 
part of that capacity would tend to remain idle. At a certain 
level of per capita income, the only result of development would 
be the creation of more .Jeisure for the whole or part of the 
population. 
New investment is carried out largely with an eye O'l future 
demand. As that demand becomes more varied, the structure of 
production tends to be. modified with the increase in real income. 
However open an economy may be, there is always a great 
quantity of goods and services which cannot be imported. 
This is why even those economies which have evolved towards 
more and more complete integration into international trade 
have constantly branched out into the production of new 
goods. 
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THE PROPENSITY TO CONSUME AND INTENSITY OF GROWTH 
Another very interesting problem discussed by Professor 
Nurkse is that of modern underdeveloped countries' high 
propensity to consume. This phenomenon was stressed in a 
number of studies by the Economic Commission for Latin 
America and gives food for thought to all concerned with the 
policy of economic development. Professor Nurkse's contribu-
tion in this field is important as his approach is broader than 
is usually the case and as he fits it into a general theory of 
consumer behaviour. This theory is based on a thorough 
analysis of consumer behaviour in the United States and 
statistical research subsequent to its formulation has not 
impaired its validity. It is interesting to note that this theory, 
which claims to explain the great stability of the consumption 
function in the United States, is now used to explain its in-
stability in backward countries. With the growth of real per 
capita income in the United States, the consumption: national~ 
in(;Qme ratio has not noticeably changed, for the simple reason 
that medium and low income groups were increasing their 
propensity to consume. The theory which was worked out to 
explain this phenomenon is used by Nurkse to explain the 
proven fact that a country which today has a real per capita 
income of $zoo tends to save a smaller part of it than a country 
which had the same real income thirty to fifty years ago. 
Just as the low-income social groups tend to copy the con-
sumption patterns of people at the top of the social scale, poor 
countries tend to imitate their rich neighbours' way of life. 
If real per capita income increases more rapidly in rich countries 
than in poor ones, the latters' propensity to consume is thereby 
increased. With the consequent decline in the poor countries' 
propensity to save, their rate of growth is also diminished, 
which tends to accentuate the disparity between the real 
incomes of the two groups of countries. 
This observation is important because it brings out the fact 
that, in the present state of affairs, the process of development 
cannot spontaneously reach its optimum rate in underdeveloped 
countries. The tendency of the propensity to consume to in-
crease arising as it does from inequality of real income between 
nations, involves a progressive reduction in the spontaneous rate 
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of growth of those countries which lag oehind in the process of 
development. This observation leads to certain further 
considerations concerning the mechanism of economic 
development. 
The intensity of growth of an economy is a function of two 
ratios: (a) investment to national income, and (b) reproducible 
wealth employed in the productive process to national income. 
The second of these ratios refers to the average productivity 
of capital in a given period of production, that is, to the return 
obtained per unit of reproducible capital employed in the 
economy as a whole. This ratio depends to a great extent on 
the development potentialities of the relevant region's economy. 
To understand this point, we need only consider the limiting 
case of a desert area, where the possibilities of development 
are practically nil. Even if the inhabitants of the desert were 
to make a great effort of capital investment and were to receive 
considerable sums from abroad for that purpose, the capital 
so employed could not possibly have a high productivity. On 
the other hand, a country with large stretches of fertile but not 
yet cultivated land will be able, by means of relatively small 
investments, to achieve large increase in its national income. 
In the latter country, the average productivity of the capital 
employed is bound to be high. 
These observations deserve attention because real per capita 
income does not necessarily indicate the degree of capital 
accumulation achieved by an economy, that is, the effort 
already made to develop the area in question. A particular 
area can make a great effort to develop its resources and reach 
a high degree of capital intensity thanks to a spirit of enter-
prise, without its per capita income on that account reaching 
the level of other areas still at much more rudimentary stages 
of development. This difference emerges clearly from a com-
parison between Japan and Argentina. The former country 
has a much higher average capital intensity than the second, 
but its per capita income is markedly lower. The abundance 
of fertile land in Argentina is conducive. to a very high average 
productivity of capital employed, while overpopulation in 
Japan forces it to use even its less fertile land and its most 
inferior natural resources~ thereby heavily reducing the average 
productivity of capital. 
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Calculations made for the North American economy1 show 
a relatively high a,verage productivity for capital invested 
there and, at the same time, a high degree of stability in the 
ratio-making corrections for the cyclical unemployment of 
the factors of production. Each unit of real investment effected 
in the United States produces an annual yield varying approxi-
mately from o ·35 too ·70 according to the degree of utilization 
of factors during the cycle. We may take a ratio of approxi-
mately o ·65 as characteristic of the North American economy 
in conditions of full employment. This is certainly a very high 
rate of capital productivity and reflects the excellence of North 
America's natural resources and the relative sparseness of her 
population. A calculation made by us for Chile's economy 
gives a ratio of approximately o •45 and a preliminary calcu-
lation for Brazil one of o ·so for 1949. The higher productivity 
of capital invested in Brazil, as compared with Chile, is possibly 
due to the greater difficulties faced by agriculture in Chile, 
where costly irrigation works are often unavoidable. 
The other factor which determines the rate of an economy's 
growth is the ratio of investment to national income, that is, 
the proportion of the previous period's national income which 
is invested. From the available statistics this ratio can be 
established in the form of a percentage of gross investment to 
gross national product, or of net investment to net national 
product. In our analysis we will consider the second ratio. 
Let us now see how these two factors combine to give the rate 
of an economy's growth. If the productivity of capital can be 
expressed by o ·s, that is, if it is necessary to invest 2 in order 
to obtain I at the end of the first productive process, it follows 
that, if this economy invests 10 per cent of its net national 
product, its annual rate of growth will be 5 per cent. 
As the coefficient of the productivity of capital is known to be 
relatively stable in any economy, since it reflects the whole of 
that economy's potentialities,2 we may assume that the rate of 
1 Cf. Raymond W. Goldsmith, The Growth of Reproducible Wealth 
of the United States of America from r8o5 to I950. Study submitted for 
discussion to the 1951 meeting of the International Association for 
Research in Income and Wealth. 
1 Separate consideration must evidently be given to the possibility 
of an economy increasing the average productivity of capital by means 
of a growing foreign trade. If figures comparable with those for the 
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annual growth is mainly determined by the ratio of investment 
to national income, which we will term the coefficient of 
investment. 
In the process of development, the behaviour of the co-
efficient of investment is strongly influenced by institutional 
and other factors having an effect on the propensity to consume. 
This problem was to some extent understood by sociologists 
like Max Weber, who went into the question of the influence 
of certain forms of the religious spirit, more especially of 
Puritanism, on the habits of consumers at the early stages of 
capitalism, and also by Veblen, that great critic of neo-classical 
economics, who displays certain points of affinity with the 
thesis of Duesenberryl used by Nurkse. 
The Keynesian approach nttaches great importance to the 
fact that the psychological motives of the saver are different 
from those of the investor. But, if we switch our attention 
from the problem of cyclical fluctuations in the level of employ-
ment to the problem of growth of productive capacity, it will 
be clear that it is quite as important to distinguish between 
the psychological motives of the investor and the consumer. 
When a process of development is started in a free enterprise 
economy, the investor receives a greater incentive than the 
consumer. The rate of growth is closely connected with this 
initial disparity between the intensity of the incentives to 
invest and to consume. A concrete example will help to make 
the point clear. Let us take the case of an economy where the 
average productivity of capital is, as in the previous case, 
o ·s and in which, for some reason or other/a a process of growth 
United States were available for England or Japan, it would no doubt 
be seen that the ratio of reproducible capital to national income does 
not always have secular stability. It is fairly obvious that England, 
but for the high degree of international division of labour enjoyed by 
it, particularly within the British Commonwealth, could not have 
achieved its high average productivity of capital. But, even in such 
cases, it would be necessary to observe the phenomenon over a number 
of years in order to note substantial changes in the coefficient of the 
productivity of capital. 
1 James S. Duesenberry, Income, Saving and the Theory of Consumer 
Behavior (Harvard University Press, 1949). Cf. in particular Chapter 
III where he expounds the theory of the 'demonstration effect'. 
1 In primitive economies, as we said before, the process of develop-
ment is generally started by the action of external factors : infiow 
of capital and techniques, influence of external demand, substantial 
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is initiated, that is, net investment increases to a point where 
productive capacity grows more rapidly than the working 
population. Sticking to the previous example, let us suppose 
that investment absorbs ro per cent of the net national product, 
i.e. that the coefficient of investment increases to o ·r. When 
investment rises to that level, the economy in question will 
start growing at an annual rate of 5 per cent. 
There are good grounds for believing that during the first 
production periods consumption will not be stimulated as 
strongly as production. It Will therefore be possible for the rate 
of growth of production to increase. This was the process 
referred to in the previous section, when we asserted that, 
once launched, development could continue by its own 
momentum. Let us suppose that, in the first years of develop-
ment, consumption grows by only 2 · 5 per cent annually. In 
that case the growth of the net national product will be speeded 
up as follows : 
Net Consump- Invest- Coefficient 
National tion ment of invest-
Product ment 
(a) (b) (c) (cfa) 
--
rst Year .. IOO·O 90·0 ro·o o·ro 
2nd Year .. I05·0 92"25 12•75 O·I2I 
3rd Year .. III·4 94•56 r6·48 O·I48 
4th Year .. II9·6 96·92 22·68 0·190 
5th Year .. 130"9 99"34 31·56 0•241 
It will be seen that net investment rose from ro to 32, 
thereby increasing the coefficient of investment from o ·I to 
improvement in the terms of trade, etc. In countries which have already 
effected considerable capital accumulation and whose economies are 
temporarily s~gnant, the process of development may be traced back 
to the action of internal factors : intensification of the growth of 
population, technological innovations, discovery of richer natural 
resources, etc. 
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o · 24 in the fifth year. This increase allowed the rate of annual 
growth of the net national product to rise from 5 per cent to 
9 · 4 per cent. If consumption had grown at the same rate as 
net product, the latter's rate of growth would have remained 
at the level reached in the first year, as is shown below : 
Net Consump- Invest- Coefficient 
National tion ment of invest-
Product ment 
(a) (b) (c) (cfa) 
-----
Ist Year .. IOO·O 90·0 IO·O O·I 
2nd Year .. 105·0 94"5 I0·5 O·I 
3rd Year .. II0·25 99"25 II·O O·I 
4th Year· .. II5•76 
I 
104·16 n·6 O·I 
5th Year .. 121·55 109"35 !2•2 
I 
O·I 
As we pointed out earlier, the historical process of develop-
ment of the capitalist economy is a vast problem which trans-
cends economic analysis. Nevertheless, it is more or less 
common ground that the process originated in the cultural 
contacts resulting from the currents of trade which, coming 
from without, created in Western Europe an entrepreneur 
class. That class was profit-minded and formed a dynamic 
social element which came into collision with the feudal 
communities. Consumer habits, still under the influence of 
religious and social traditions, changed more slowly. 
Nowadays the process is practically the other way round. 
Thanks to the enormous power of propaganda media and means 
of communications, the cart comes before the horse and con-
sumer habits are the first to change. There are grounds, 
therefore, for believing that the spontaneous development of 
countries at present undeveloped is proceeding at a much 
slower rate than their economic potentialities and the level of 
technical progress would lead one to expect. There is no doubt 
that one of the most vital problems facing economists in our 
time is how to overcome those difficult ~es. 
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INVESTMENT CRITERIA AND THE BALANCE OF PAYMENTS 
Much more could be said on the question discussed in the 
previous section. We could enquire, for example, what is the 
effect on the balance of payments of underdeveloped countries 
of their high propensity to consume. That leads us to consider 
an assertion by Professor Nurkse in his sixth lecture on the 
problem of how to use foreign investments: ' ... when addi-
tional capital becomes available to a country, the country will 
want, or should be urged, to invest it in the form that yields 
the highest possible return, taking into account any external 
economies created by the project as well as the direct com-
mercial yield. On the other hand, the particular goods through 
which the interest is transferred abroad are determined by the 
scale of comparative costs in international trade (though this 
scale need not be regarded as fixed and may well change as a 
result of the investment itself). No particular relation is 
required between the marginal-productivity-of-capital schedule 
and the comparative-cost schedule. So long as the two condi-
tions stated above are met, there is no inherent difficulty in 
the servicing problem from the debtor's end.' 1 
This passage raises two questions of considerable interest. 
The first concerns the basic criterion to be adopted in deter-
mining the direction of investment. According to Nurkse, 
this criterion should be that of marginal social productivity. 
This is an extremely important affirmation which we notice is 
made by increasing numbers of economists of repute.2 The 
micro-analytical criterion of marginal productivity, in which 
the productivity of the last unit of investment in each sector 
is considered from the point of view of the profitability of the 
firm, is being abandoned in favour of the social criterion, 
related to national income as a whole, of the productivity of 
the last unit of investment. 
This criterion had already been suggested in the theory 
of external economies, but has only now been worked out as 
fully as it deserves. It is of the greatest importance, if we 
remember that the proportions of the factors of production 
1 Op. cit., pp. 136-7. 
1 Cf. Allred E. Kahn, 'Investment Criteria in Development Pro-
grams', The Quarterly ]ou1'nal of Economics, Feb. 1951. 
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vary from one country to another. Thus, in an economy like 
our own, in which labour is not the limiting factor and in 
which industry pays higher wages than the other sectors 
employing labour, it may be said that an industry which pays 
higher wages per unit of net product (i.e. income produced by 
that industry) has a higher social productivity. But, as labour 
cannot be regarded as completely elastic, the most generally 
applicable criterion is the ratio of the volume of investment 
to the industry's added value (i.e. income produced). To obtain 
the social productivity, we should also take into account the 
effects of the investment on the other sectors of the economy. 
These effects may take the form of substantial reductions of 
costs, particularly when the investment is in a key sector, 
such as transport or the production of energy. 
The adoption of this criterion leads us to the conclusion 
that the mechanism of market prices does not of itself make 
possible the optimum use of resources. Or rather, it might, in 
special cases, make it possible, but it is not sufficient to ensure 
such use. Here we come to a fundamental point of the theory 
of economic development. In a highly developed economy, 
where the natural resources are more or less all known, marginal 
productivity is approximately the same in all sectors and hence 
wages for the same levels of skill and degrees of effort are also 
approximately equal ; in an economy of this type the social 
productivity of an investment should approximate to its 
productivity from the point of view of the fitm, that is, of the 
return on the capital. In that case, the price mech;:~.nism alone 
may be regarded as a safe guide to investment. This does not 
apply to an economy in its early stages of development. There 
we find a marked disparity in the degree of utilization of the 
factors of production as between one sector and another. The 
mere transfer of factors of production or the introduction of 
new combinations thereof may bring about a substantial 
increase in social productivity. This increase, however, need 
not necessarily be reflected in the profitability of the firm. 
There are, then, strong grounds for believing that the rate of 
development may be speeded up if the inadequacies of the 
market as the governing mechanism of economic progress are 
eliminated and· if investments are effected according to a 
co-ordinated comprehensive plan. 
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The other problem dealt with by Professor N urkse in the 
paragraph in question is the repercussion o( foreign investment 
on the balance of payments. This may be direct, via the 
servicing of dividends, or indirect, via the income effects, that 
is, the increase in imports in consequence of the rise in real 
income. This is a much wider problem than might be assumed 
from the passage from Nurkse we have just quoted and should 
not be restricted to foreign investments since the income effect, 
which is the heart of the matter and to which we will confine 
ourselves, operates in the case of the investment of domestic 
capital as well. This problem was discussed admirably by 
Kahn1 and his arguments may be summed up as follows: 
(r) The increase in real income resulting from the investment in 
question need not bring about an increase in money income. 
That is so, for example, in the case of an improvement in food 
production where the inqease is completely absorbed by the 
producers themselves and does not lead to an increase in the 
volume of commercial transactions. Indeed, as a second 
hypothesis, an increase in production might be accompanied 
by a reduction in the price level. (2) Money income may increase 
in the same proportion as real income. Once the investment 
has been made and the new activity started, the income of the 
factors of production employed-which we shall call F-
depends on the sales of the new products (added value) to other 
recipients of incomes-we shall call them G. In any case, 
provided G do not buy the new products by inflationary 
means (by reducing their usual rate of savings, by raising a 
loan or by mobilizing idle balances), the new money income 
available to F will be offset by a corresponding absorption of 
G's purchasing power, who have been forced to reduce their 
expenditure on other goods by an equivalent amount. It is an 
open question whether the net effect ofF's additional purchases 
(imported goods or other goods produced in the country) and 
of the change in the direction of G's purchases (switch to F's 
production from imported goods or other goods produced in 
the country) will be an increase or decrease in imports. 
We have devoted special attention to this issue in view of 
the fact that the Economic Commission for Latin America 
1 Op. cit. 
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in a number of studies has asserted that the process of develop-
ment of Latin American countries in the last two decades 
has been accompanied by a chronic tendency to unbalance 
in foreign payments. As we have contended, this tendency is 
inherent in the process of spontaneous development in certain 
conditions of world economic development. It is evident that 
(as was the case in the last century and in the first three 
decades of the present one) given a strong flow of capital to 
countries in the early stages of development, or, even in the 
absence of such a flow, given a steadily expanding international 
market capable of absorbing products available in increasing 
quantities from those countries, the problem of external 
disequilibrium would not arise or would be a problem of world 
market conditions only. But the real situation in the last two 
decades was completely different ; the volume or world trade 
declined steadily and has continued to drop in even recent 
years, more specifically from 1947 to 1949· 
An analysis of this problem in purely abstract terms might 
be logically coherent but would be of very little practical use. 
Thus, Kahn's analysis stands or falls on the soundness of 
certain premises which are, as we shall see, implicit in it. 
The first case referred to by Kahn is one in which real 
income increases without a corresponding increase in money 
income. It is of very limited interest. We may conceive of a 
case in which the discovery of a new process of seed hybridi-
zation improves output per hectare in the production of, say, 
millet, which in certain communities is entirely consumed by 
the producers. The income accruing to the farmers would be 
increased and hence real income as well, without money income 
being affected. But how, in that case, can the increase in real 
income be attributed to a new ' investment ' ? And if there 
is in reality no new investment, how does this case fit into a 
discussion of criteria for the direction of new investment ? 
This case is in fact of only academic interest. 
As to the second hypothesis, in which, owing to a fall in 
prices, there is an increase in real, but not in money income, 
there are a number of suppositions implicit in it as regards the 
elasticity of demand for the products the output of which has 
increased. Let us suppose, for example, that some astute 
investment in agriculture leads to an increase in productivity 
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and that the farmers decide to transfer the benefit of this 
improvement to the consumers by cutting prices and increasing 
supplies. Let us suppose that they offer three oranges for one 
cruzeiro instead of two, without any change in profitability. 
If demand adjusted itself automatically to supply and every-
body increased his demand for oranges by so per cent there 
would, by definition, be no pressure on the balance of payments. 
But, as it is, this ideal of automatic adjustment, which may be 
postulated in an abstract model, bears little relation to actual 
fact, particularly in countries in the early stages of 
development. 
The next case, which is of greater interest to us, may help 
to clear up both the basic concepts and the limitations of Kahn's 
argument as defended by Professor Nurkse. This is the case 
where it is assumed that the increase in real income is accom-
panied by an increase in money income of the same proportion. 
An inflationary increase in the means of payment is therefore 
ruled out. Let us suppose that investment is effected in a 
specific sector of industry-say, textiles-and that this 
results in an additional production of roo. Consumers will try 
to acquire those roo units of textiles and will simultaneously 
cease buying goods to an equivalent value in various other 
sectors. Now those goods will be available to people who 
have had their incomes increased by the sale of the additional 
roo units of textiles. The reasoning is similar to the previous 
argument and will conform to the facts if we assume income 
elasticity of demand to correspond exactly to the increases in 
supply resulting from the new investment. But even at this 
level of abstraction, the reasoning is still open to criticism. 
In reality, it is implicity assumed that the income created by 
the production of the roo units of textiles will be completely 
transformed into income consumed. The people who stop 
buying other consumer goods in order to acquire the roo units 
of textiles create a supply of consumer goods equal in value 
to the sales price of the roo units of textiles. If, in order to 
simplify matters, we disregard the incidence of taxes, expendi-
ture on raw materials and depreciation, it must still be supposed 
that, of the new incomes created by the new production, 
some part will be saved. Therefore, the balance available for 
expenditure on consumption must be lower than the roo of 
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the supply of consumer goods created by the introduction 
into the market of the 100 from the new textile production. 
The rest of the income created (and saved) will be directed to 
the capital-goods sector, where there is no corresponding 
reduction in demand. The real position will be, therefore, that 
there will be an excess supply in the consumer-goods sector 
and an excess demand of the same magnitude in the capital-
goods sector. Whether this disequilibrium is resolved by an 
increase in the export of consumer goods and in imports of 
capital goods, or whether by a fall in the prices in the consumer-
goods sector and the reduction of investment, is another 
problem which we do not propose to discuss. All we are 
concerned to show is that Kahn's theoretical model appears 
logically sound only on the surface. 
This argument has taken us some distance from the central 
aspect of the idea we intended to criticize, i.e. the repercussion 
of investment on the balance of payments. The heart of Kahn's 
a1gument is that the group of consumers who buy the 100 new 
units of textiles cease buying an equal amount of articles 
produced in the country or imported from abroad ; while the 
group of consumers whose incomes are increased by the pro-
duction of new textiles, will start buying additional home or 
foreign goods. The amount of goods imported resulting from 
the algebraical sum of the two quantities of demand may be 
greater or smaller and should not be arrived at by a priori 
methods. The marginal propensity to import may be positive 
or negative, according to whether that propensity is greater in 
the group buying the 100 new units of textiles or in the group 
whose incomes were increased with the rise in textile 
production. 
This is a field in which theoretical reasoning does not get us 
very far and it is essential, therefore, to stick to observable 
facts. Experience shows that in highly developed economies 
the marginal propensity to import may just as well be negative 
as positive. It is well known that the coefficients of income 
elasticity of demand vary as between different groups of con-
sumer goods. There are certain goods, tlie demand for which 
grows more than proportionately to the increase in income, 
others for which demand grows less than proportionately 
and others for which demand even diminishes. If the goods 
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imported by a country belong to those for which demand 
increases only slightly or falls with the increase in national 
income, it is possible for the amount of imports to remain 
unchanged or even to decline without any alteration in the 
price level. In that case we could safely endorse Nurkse's 
affirmation that 'no particular relation is required between 
the marginal-productivity-of-capital schedule and the compa-
rative-cost schedule '. 
Experience shows, however, that in countries in the early 
stages of development the course of events is different. The 
demand for consumer goods imported by these countries has a 
high income elasticity. This is so in the case of manufactured 
items in general and of durable consumer goods in particular. 
It may be observed, for example, that demand for the latter 
type of goods increases by a coefficient of 2 to 4 as real income 
rises. Nor is this all. Countries in the early stages of develop-
ment depend to a great extent on imports for the acquisition 
of capital goods. As we have already seen, demand for those 
goods tends to increase more rapidly than national income 
when the rate of economic development is rapid. Why, faced 
with those facts, should we allow ourselves to be paralysed by 
doubts as to whether the marginal propensity to import is 
negative or positive ? This is an error of perspective typical 
of economists who try to draw conclusions of universal validity 
from the kind of economy about which they are accustomed to 
think. 
How can we reconcile a country's tendency to increase 
imports, which is inherent in its development, with its inability 
to increase its capacity to import ? For this was in effect the 
situation familiar to us from 1930 until quite recently. Some 
economists, who are expert in turning economic problems into 
questions of semantics, argue that the unbalance in question 
results from an inflationary situation. Now, when imports 
exceed the capacity to import, it may be asserted that invest-
ment exceeds saving and therefore that an inflationary situation 
has arisen. As imports will have to be reduced somehow or 
other in order to put the balance of payments right, that step 
and the unbalance which led to it may be said to flow from an 
inflationary situation. But this reasoning disregards the basic 
aspect of the problem, which is that supply cannot increase 
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and change its composition automatically with the expansion 
of and in sympathy with the change in the composition of 
demand. As long as exports {considered as a constant in relation 
of foreign trade) do not increase pari passu with the demand 
for imports, the process of growth will create disequilibria 
which take the form of an excessive internal production and 
of an unfavourable balance of payments. The correction of 
those disequilibria is a slow and almost always a painful 
process. And this makes . a policy of stabilization difficult 
and tends to make inflation inseparable from the process of 
development. 
At bottom, therefore, the inflation which accompanies 
economic development in our country is not a monetary 
problem. The basic cause of the unbalance is the disparity 
between the growth in income and the capacity to import. 
It is therefore indispensable, if this unbalance is to be rectified, 
to modify the structure of production so as to increase exports 
or to find substitutes for imports. 
A reduction in investments-which is the remedy usually 
proposed-if applied indiscriminately by means of credit 
restriction, will not necessarily rectify the unbalance and will 
certainly not put the other troubles right. In order to avoid 
the emergence of such maladjustments, certain steps must be 
taken in advance to direct investments. If it is possible to foresee 
these disequilibria up to a certain point, it should also be 
possible to avoid them. Once again, therefore, we are led to 
conclude that, given the present conditions of the world 
economy, underdeveloped countries cannot spontaneously 
achieve a degree of growth consonant with their potentialities 
and with the technical level at their disposal. Co-ordinated 
action is indispensable and this is implicitly recognized by 
Professor Nurkse when he attributes the leading role in 
economic development today to fiscal policy. 
Indeed, Professor Nurkse's most important contribution 
in his lectures is perhaps the way he relates fiscal policy to 
saving in underdeveloped countries. Although this is the 
central problem of economic development today, it is generally 
misunderstood. What our economy lacks is not incentives to 
invest but incentives to save. The problem goes much deeper 
than the mere organization of the capital market. In view of the 
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powerful stimuli to consume exercised by more advanced 
economies, which Professor Nurkse explains so lucidly, it is 
extremely difficult for our economy, at its present stage of 
development, spontaneously to reach a high level of saving. 
If we wish to achieve a greater and more balanced degree of 
development, we must give high priority to the problem of 
saving. A country like Brazil has a large potential margin of 
savings waiting to be tapped by some form of compulsory 
saving. It is completely unrealistic to think that we can re-
create in Brazil the forms of spontaneous saving typical of the 
nineteenth century. Professor Nurkse does not fall into that 
error and it is certainly the best lesson he has to teach us. 
5. UNDEREMPLOYMENT 
AND FACTOR-DI SEQU ILl BRI UM 
UNDEREMPLOYMENT IN 
U ND ERD EVE LOPED ECONOMIES* 
by Alfredo Navarrete Jr and lfigenia M. de Navarrete 
THIS PAPER TREATS OF SOME PROBLEMS OF UNDEREMPLOYMENT 
which arise mostly in underdeveloped economies, as a conse-
quence of insufficiencies, not in effective demand, but in the 
supply of means of production. 
We shall not analyse cyclical unemployment, which is 
characteristic of industrialized countries and which is due 
to lack of effective demand, nor shall we deal with other types 
of visible unemployment arising from structural changes in 
taste and technology. We shall also leave aside frictional un-
employment, which is relatively small where effective demand 
is high.1 
If we take the size of the labour force as given, under-
employment may be described as a situation in which the 
withdrawal of a certain quantity of the factor labour to other 
uses, will not appreciably diminish the total output of the 
sector from which it is withdrawn. This is as much as to say 
that the marginal productivity of these units of the factor 
labour in their original employment is zero, or very close to 
• International Economic Papers, No. 3. 1953. Reprinted by permis-
sion of the International Economic Association and the authors. 
Translated by Elizabeth Henderson from • La Subocupaci6n en las 
Economias Poco Desarrolladas', El Trimestre Econ6mico, Vol. 
XVIII, No. 4. October/December 1951, Fondo de Cultura 
Economica, Mexico (a paper presented to the Mexican Scientific 
Congress, Economic Section, Mexico, D.F., September 1951). 
This work puts forward the authors' personal points of view, 
which must in no way be associated with those of the Internat-
ional Monetary Fund and the Organization of American States, 
respectively. 
1 This does not mean that these types of unemployment do 
not exist in underdeveloped countries, but simply that, in 
those countries, the overriding problem is the more efiective use 
of existing human resources and the elimination, as far as 
possible, of the latter's unproductive application. For the 
definition of the various types of visible unemployment, cf. 
W. H. Beveridge, Full Employment in a Free Society (London, I944), 
pp. 408--Io. 
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zero. It is characteristic of backward economies in process of 
development that a more or less considerable part of their 
labour force is always ready to increase its productive activity, 
at existing nominal wage rates (though at decreasing real 
wages), if jobs are available.1 
For the purposes of our discussion we shall distinguish 
between cyclical (disguised) underemployment, structural 
(hidden) underemployment, and the underemployment of 
expansion. 
In academic circles, interest in disguised underemployment 
stems from Joan Robinson's use of the term disguised un-
employment, which she defined as follows : 'It is natural to 
describe the adoption of inferior occupations by dismissed 
workers as disguised unemployment'. 2 
In this case it . is assumed that the productive equipment 
(both capital and technical means) is given. This type of cyclical 
underemployment also occurs in countries exporting primary 
products, when external demand falls. Its magnitude is a 
direct function of the importance of foreign trade in any parti-
cular country, as well as of the relation between foreign trade 
and the country's domestic economy. Disguised underemploy-
ment will be the greater, the more important is the subsistence 
sector, which generally absorbs the excess labour and which 
serves as shock-absorber for the cyclical fluctuations of external 
demand. Visible unemployment will be greater, on the other 
hand, the less important is the subsistence sector of the 
economy. 
The other two types of underemployment, which are much 
more important in underdeveloped economies, are mainly 
due to lack of productive equipment. Structural underemploy-
ment, or, as it is generally called, hidden underemployment, 
is a chronic feature in the primary producing sectors of such 
backward economies. Paradoxically, it becomes more acute 
1 For example, in Mexico, although real wages in specific branches 
of production have fallen, the. average income, in real terms, of wage-
earners seems to have risen owing to the shift from less productive to 
more pwductive occupations. Cf. D. LOpez Rosado and J. F. Noyola 
V6.zquez, 'Los salarios reales en Mexico, 1939-1950 ', El Trimestf'e 
Econf>mico, Vol. XVIII, April/June 1951. 
1 Essays in the Theory of Employment, 2nd edition, London, 1947, 
p. 62. 
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with the introduction of new techniques in primary 
production, when the other sectors of the economy fail 
to keep step and expansion is uneven. This type of 
underemployment is reflected in a desire to work, at 
existing wage rates, on the part of thousands of-mostly 
agricultural-workers and of housewives, who lack regular 
employment during the greater part of the year's normal 
working time. This constitutes a serious loss of human 
resources.1 
The remaining type of underemployment which occurs in 
primary economies in process of development, is one which 
we shall call underemployment of expansion, because it arises 
in times not of depression, but of economic growth. It is due 
to the failure of capital and of most complementary means of 
production to increase at the same rate as the supply of labour 
in secondary and tertiary activities. This type of underemploy-
ment is accentuated by deficit financing of development 
programmes and the resulting inflation, which intensifies the 
cityward migration of agricultural workers and thereby unduly 
swells the supply of labour in face of a limited supply of other 
complementary means of production. These workers then 
find themselves under the necessity to engage in activities of 
very low productivity. They become, for instance, pedlars of 
all kinds of goods and services requiring little or no capital 
outfit, such as vendors of fruit, chickle and cigars, lottery 
tickets, newspapers, or else car washers, bootblacks, porters, 
waiters, and shop assistants. The remarkable feature of this 
type of underemployment is that it is continuously nourish-
ed by the vast reserves of hidden underemployment in 
rural areas. Underemployment of expansion is much less 
in evidence in the modem cities of the great industrial 
countries, though it increases even there in periods of rapid 
growth. 
1 Professor Moises T. de la Peiia was oPe of the first economists to 
draw attention to the loss of resources occasioned by this kind of 
underemployment, which he called 'rural leisure'. One of the present 
authors has analysed this problem in 'Una hip6tesis sobre el sistema 
economico de Mexico', El Trimestye Econ6mico, March I9,5I, and, 
more fully, in Estabilidad de Cambios, el Cilco y el DesaYt'ollo Econ6mico, 
Mexico, 1951. 
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The problem of underemployment in backward economies 
may be represented graphically as follows : 
o~------------~--~~--~------
£p £e £p' En 
N=National product. E=level of Employment. N=f (E). 
Let us assume that the employed labour force is OEn. The 
production curve N expresses the national product obtained 
with given productive equipment at different levels of employ-
ment. Beyond OP, no matter how much the labour force in-
creases, total output will increase no more. The given produc-
tive resources, other than labour, have reached their maximum 
productivity and the national product can be increased only 
if new productive equipment is added and we pass to a new 
production curve N'. 
The nominal employment level En is a situation in which 
there is hidden underemployment, and where the marginal 
productivity of the factor labour equals zero ; indeed, it equals 
zero anywhere beyond the effective employment level Ee. 
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where the national product ceases to increase. If OS represents 
the average wage rate, then productive employment Ep is 
that where marginal productivity equals the real wage rate. 
Beyond the point of effective employment, Ee, a greater quan-
tity of factor labour no longer yields any increment to total 
output, total wages R become stationary-in other words, 
the wage curve becomes discontinuous, since there can be 
no real remuneration for zero productivity, and a national 
product of equal size will now have to be apportioned to a 
greater number of workers. Underemployment is OEn- OEp. 
When productive equipment increases, the production curve 
is displaced to N', hidden underemployment disappears and, 
by and large, nominal employment En will coincide with 
effective employment Ee'. Productive employment will have 
risen to Ep', on the assumption of constant average wage 
rates ;1 there still remains a residue of underemployment OEn 
~ OEp', which will be absorbed in productive employment in 
the measure in which availability of complementary resources 
(fixed and circulating capital, organization, technical 
knowledge) increases. 
Let En be the nominal volume of employment, Ep produc-
tive employment (where the marginal productivity of labour 
equals the real wage rate), and Ec 'full employment', defined 
as a situation in which there is neither underemployment nor 
unemployment (productive equipment and effective demand 
are adequate, there is a sufficiency of complementary resources, 
the productivity of labour is at its maximum and optimum). 
The following definitions then hold : En> Ep < Ec =under-
employment ; En = Ep = Ec = full employment ; En =EP 
<Ec = unemployment; and En<EP> Ec = overfull employ-
ment.2 
From the above analysis it follows that a positive policy 
to combat underemployment (disguised, hidden or due to 
expansion) in underdeveloped economies requires a stream of 
1 If average wage rates increase, the argument is substantially the 
same, although the new level of productive employment will be some-
what lower. 
2 We speak of overfull employment when, at a given size and pro-
ductivity of the labour force, there is full employment and a rise in the 
demand for investment goods. Cf. B. Ohlin, The Problem of Employ-
ment Stabilization (New York, 1949). 
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investment expenditure at a rate and of a composition adequate 
for the absorption of the net annual underemployment which 
arises at the very time when the average productivity of the 
factor labour increases through greater supplies of capital 
goods, raw materials and complementary resources (including 
training and technical education). This is the way to turn 
investment programmes into powerful weapons of employment 
policy. 
The necessary rate of investment expenditure must not be 
determined simply as a function of aggregate demand and of 
its distribution among consumption and other needs ; it is 
essential to consider, above all, the investment's net generation 
of productive employment and to avoid loss of real production 
through underutilization of existing human resources. The 
net contribution of the newly created employment to the 
national product must be the greatest possible, in terms of 
the difference between the value of gross product and the 
monetary cost occasioned by the increase in productive activity 
during the period of the planned investment. 
The process of shifting labour units from a position of under· 
employment to more productive activities requires the incen-
tive of higher rewards. Such a rise is difficult to achieve when 
prices are constant or even falling, but is encouraged when 
prices are allowed to rise moderately, so that marginal profits 
exceed marginal production costs. In such a situation, aggre-
gate demand for merchandise will be in excess of current 
production (if we assume constancy of the reserves of gold and 
foreign exchange, of the levels of foreign credits and domestic 
stocks, and if we further assume the absence of suppressed 
inflation) ; consequently, the demand for labour will increase. 
In time, the available supply of labour will be used up, the 
scarcity of labour will, in turn, become a stimulus to the 
rationalization of methods of production. In this manner, 
labour will be shifted from less productive into more productive 
occupations, and the national product will grow. 
This paper must not be concluded without stressing the 
dangers inherent in a policy of large productive investments, 
which are indispensable for combating underemployment in 
backward economies. These dangers include maldistribution 
of the profits conditioned by rising prices, the probable loss of 
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gold and foreign exchange reserves with resulting disequilibrium 
in the balance of payments, and finally distortion in the com-
position of national investment. The kind of investment policy 
outlined above must be accompanied by various restrictive 
and selective measures of monetary, credit and fiscal policy 
(the more so since inflation accentuates underemployment of 
expansion), as well as by exchange and foreign trade controls. 
Summing up, the most effective remedy for underemploy-
ment is a policy which combines an adequate rate of well-
balanced investment with a moderate rise in prices, at levels 
of full productive employment, growing national output and 
rising real per capita incomes. 
THE FACTOR-PROPORTIONS PROBLEM 
IN UNDERDEVELOPED AREAS* 
by R. S. Eckaus 
THE CONCEPTS 'STRUCTl:RAL DISEQUILIBRIUM', 'OVERPOPULA-
tion', 'technological unemployment' and 'underemployment' 
appear frequently in the literature on underdeveloped areas 
and there is considerable discussion of the comparative de-
sirability for use in such areas of relatively labour-intensive 
or capital-intensive techniques. This paper is intended to help 
clarify some of the underlying issues and to begin to provide a 
theoretical basis for their analysis. 
Many of the underdeveloped areas of the world have large 
agrarian populations in which there is either persistent open 
unemployment or in which the marginal productivity of the 
working force is so low that it is commonly believed that 
withdrawal of a sizable fraction would not significantly affect 
output. This seems to be the case to varying degrees for much 
of Asia and the Middle East. Other countries, such as Italy, 
show persistent urban as well as rural unemployment or under-
employment. It is a common feature of the unemployment in 
these countries that it fails to respond to fiscal policy measures 
designed to increase employment by stimulating effective 
demand. Use of conventional income-generating techniques 
appears in fact to create inflationary pressures and balance-
of-payments difficulties long before full employment is 
approached. 
This interpretation of the condition of many underdeveloped 
areas has led to the formulation of a number of alternative 
explanatory hypotheses which are presented in Section I. 
*The American Economic Review, September 1955· Reprinted by 
permission of the American Economic Association and the author. 
The author wishes to express his gratitude to the Center for International 
Studies, under whose auspices he did the work upon which this paper is 
based, to the seminar group of the Center for criticism and encourage-
ment and especially to F. M. Bator and P. N. Rosenstein-Rodan. 
He is also indebted to P. A. Samuelson and R. Solow for their interest. 
An Italian translation of this article appeared in L'Indusiria, November 
1955· 
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One of these hypotheses appears, at this stage of investigation, 
to be particularly fruitful in casting light on some of the out-
standing characteristics of underdeveloped areas and is elabo-
rated in Section II. Two approaches to the problems of empirical 
testing of the hypotheses are outlined in Section IlL 
The hypotheses presented below suggest that the unem-
ployment difficulties of underdeveloped areas are not basically 
due to lack of effective demand but stem from 'market imper-
fections', limited opportunities for technical substitution of 
factors and inappropriate factor endowments.1 The techniques 
of analysis of factor-market imperfections are well known. 2 
The implications of limited technical substitutability of factors 
were first analysed by Abraham Wald3 and more recently by 
the linear programming techniques.4 Further development 
of the theoretical analysis in this paper consists mainly of an 
elaboration of geometrical techniques, which are used to apply 
the theory specifically to the problems of underdeveloped 
areas. 
I. THE FACTOR-PROPORTIONS HYPOTHESES 
The analysis which follows has grown out of the suggestion 
by C. P. Kindleberger that underdeveloped areas such as Italy 
are characterized by 'structural disequilibrium at the factor 
level'. This concept, formulated by Kindleberger and E. 
Despres, is identified as follows : 
Disequilibrium at the factor level may arise either because a 
single factor receives different returns in different uses or because 
1 The hypotheses and analysis have come to be known at the Center 
for International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 
as the • factor-proportions' problem. 
2 E.g., Joan Robinson, Essays in the Theory of Employment, znd ed. 
(Oxford, 1947), ch. 2. 
3 A. Wald, 'Uber einige Gleichungssysteme der mathematischen 
Okonomie', Zeitschr. f. Nationalokon., Dec. 1936, Vll, 636-70; cf. 
also, W. L. Valk, Production, Pricing and Employment in the Static 
State (London, 1937), p. 58. 
4 E.g., R. Dorfman, Application of Linear Programming to the 
Theory of the Firm (Berkeley, U.S.A., 1951). In his paper 'Full 
Employment and Fixed Coefficients of Production' (Quarterly journal 
of Economics, Feb. 1955, pp. 23-44), M. Fukuoka. also relates 
the assumption of fixed coefficients in production to the problem of 
unemployment. 
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the price relationships among factors are out of line with factor 
availabilities.1 
This suggestion has been the starting point for two types of 
explanation of unemployment or underemployment in under-
developed areas. The first type assumes that available techno-
logy would permit full use of the working force at some set 
of relative prices and finds the source of unemployment in 
various types of 'imperfections' in the price system. The 
second type suggests that there are limitations in the existing 
technology or the structure of demand which lead to a redun-
dancy of labour in densely populated, underdeveloped areas. 
The two types of hypotheses are combined in Section II to 
obtain a more general analysis. 
The Market Imperfections Hypotheses 
In the accompanying figure the vertical axis represents 
the rate of real wages and the horizontal axis the amount of 
labour. The curves DD' and SS' represent the aggregate supply 
and demand relations for a typical industry if factor markets 
are competitive. Under competitive conditions the wage rate 







Suppose, however, that 
trade union pressures, 
immobility of labour, 
government social legis-
lation or other factor-
market imperfections 
maintain the wage rate 
at W rather than allow-
ing it to fall to E. The 
effective labour supply 
curve would be WS'. At 
the higher wage rate the 
demand for labour 
L------------- would not absorb all 
Qu.anriry of hbour Senicrs 
Figure I 
the labour available and 
i-t could be said, as 
1 C. P. Kindleberger and E. Despres, 'The Mechanism for Adjustment 
in International Payments--The Lessons of Post-war· Experience', 
The American Economic Rtmiew, Proceedings, May 1952. 
• Fixed supply and demand curves such as those in Figure 1, suppose, 
of course, constant resources, technology and consumer tastes. 
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Kindleberger does, that, ceteris paribus, the wage rate does 
not represent factor endowments. 
To isolate the influence of various types of imperfections let 
us now consider a case in which factor mobility, or lack of it, 
is not important and continue to confine the analysis to a 
closed economy. If the system had become adjusted to a 
particular complex of rigidities there would be no need for 
factor mobility in the absence of changes in techniques or 
tastes.1 
The comparative use of the factors of production, depending 
as it does on the factor-price ratios and technology, would, 
however, reflect the 'true availability' of labour only if wages 
were kept at E in Figure r. If wages are kept at W there is 
an 'artificially' high ratio of the price of labour to the price of 
capital. Since we are explicitly assuming that factor substitu-
tion is, in fact, possible, a structure of production may result 
with a higher capital-labour ratio than otherwise. If the dia-
gram were representative of large parts of an economy, as 
output increased full employment of the given labour force 
would require the use of more capital than if the structure of 
production were adjusted to a lower labour-capital price ratio, 
unle~~ t~~uQ.stitq,ti.wl.. effects ~re..offscl..b~easiug r.eiw:ns 
to~qle. In !1-.ss>Jinl.!:Y_in~cb..~ital ~ scar~and U~Il}­
ploY.!!!,~Ut _oj ~t:able_~tude, tJ].tLa.i.teJll¢ .to a.cllie'lt 
full ~IDWQyiOWJ>;¥-use.. of...relatWely capital-imtnsive in_ye_s£-
meut~ b~ore likelx. t.Q le~d to ill.fiation ancl..llal<m~-of­
payl!lents di.fii.Qlllies... s}wrtJ>f fnll employment.Jhall..iL.more 
labou!.:i~~iy~ t~chniqu~ were-used. 
The development of social policy in economically under-
developed areas frequently proceeds more rapidly than econo-
mic growth. Imitation of the techniques of more advanced 
countries is not confined to technology. Elaborate social 
security legislation and aggressive government-encouraged 
union movements are often found in densely populated, low 
per capita income countries which are just on the threshold of 
1 'If effective demand always moved up and down in the same well-
worn channels, a supply of each type of labour would always be ready 
waiting to meet demand for it, when effective demand expanded, and 
the question of mobility would not arise.' Joan Robinson, op. cit., 
p. 30. 
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economic advancement. There is little or no scope for such 
devices for raising wages except in the relatively more advanced 
and well-organized sectors. Tae£2ore. new ...iru;hlstiilJ,l J;liOj~tJ 
m~Jace..tqe prosz.ct of wage rates guite diffe~nUrQl!!.Jb.ose 
P!~aiJjng_jn_ th.e handicrafi...wg agrari~ ~ect<;>rL agi th.us 
m21 be ~mpelle~o ~se different ~r ..£E.O:e?rtJ~ These 
considerations suggest that the foregoing analysis may be 
quite relevant for underdeveloped areas. 
The next step in the analysis is to abandon the assumptions 
of co~ta.uj: tecbnsy~ consumer tastes and to investigate 
the effects ot changes in the composition of demand for goods 
and factors due to such influences as changes in methods of 
production or in the directions or levels of demand as a result 
of changes in tastes or foreign competition. In this second 
case, as the level of aggregate effective demand rises, goods 
will be demanded in different proportions than formerly and 
the location and magnitudes of the demand for factors of 
production will shift. If labour is not mobile, or if it takes 
considerable wage increases to shift it, then factor disequili-
brium such as depicted in Figure I for the preceding case of 
constant tastes and technology would develop in certain in-
dustries. An increase in the level of effective demand would 
push other industries to the limits of capacity relatively quickly 
in this second case. Money wages and prices would begin to 
rise, not uniformly but in the 'bottleneck' sectors, prior 
to the achievement of general full employment. New invest-
ment in these sections would tend to increase still further the 
substitution of capital for labour while offsetting tendencies 
in the relatively stagnant sectors would work slowly, if at all. 
The balance of payments under the pressure of growing domes-
tic inflationary pressures and increased demand for capital 
imports would tend also to develop deficits at an earlier stage 
in the expansion of national income. This could all be superim-
posed upon and could aggravate the 'factor disequilibrium' 
previously discussed. It would be distinguishable, however, 
as there would be evidence of excess capacity and stranded 
capital-goods resources indicating an original misallocation 
or a structural shift. 
There is at least superficial evidence to suggest that the 
factors stressed in this hypothesis may be operative in some 
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underdeveloped countries. For example, although Italy has a 
persistent unemployment of about 2 million in a population 
of around 47 million, there are also some sectors of the Italian 
economy, such as shipbuilding, in which there is persistent 
unused physical capital plant and equipment. Moreover, we 
would expect that in underdeveloped areas the working force 
would be even more bound by tradition, reluctance to change 
location and barriers to social as well as physical movement 
than is the case in more advanced, industrialized countries ; 
this would also contribute to the problems created by structural 
change. 
Closely related to this second hypothesis is an explanation 
which locates the source of factor disequilibrium in barriers 
to the entry of new firms into profitable industries whose 
expansion is limited by various types of monopolistic restric-
tions. This and the other types of 'imperfections' could aggra-
vate the 'factor disequilibrium'. 
One further related hypothesis remains to be considered 
here.1 Suppose that, whatever the actual characteristics of 
the production function and degree of technical substitutability 
of factors, businessmen believe that they face a production 
function with constant coefficients, i.e., no factor substitution 
is possible. Indian businessmen, for example, may believe 
that the 'American way' of producing is the best and only 
way and that this always involves high ratios of capital to 
labour. Plant engineers accustomed to emulating 'Western' 
technology may not be sensitive to the range of choice 
actually available in manufacturing processes and may 
impose unnecessary technical constraints on managers 
in underdeveloped countries. Thus in Figure 2, although 
the solid lines, x1, x2 ..• may represent the real contours 
of the production function, businessmen may regard 
the dashed lines x' 1, x' 2 ••• as the ones along which they 
must move. 
In this case the expansion path P would be independent 
of the factor-price ratios, and, therefore, of the supply 
curve of labour such as indicated in Figure I. Expan-
sion of effective demand would tend to run into 
1 I am indebted to F. M. Bator for the suggestion of this case. 
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K the limits impos-
ed by capital 





ry tendencies and 
balance - of- pay-
ments difficulties. 
This could take 
place even if 
Figure 2 were 
not characteristic 




The Technological Restraints Hypothesis 
It is fairly common for observers to report finding modern, 
capital-intensive equipment and techniques used in under-
developed areas where relative factor prices would suggest 
the use of more labour-intensive techniques. I should now 
like to suggest that the use of the 'modem' techniques is not 
necessarily irrational emulation but the result of real limitations 
in the technological choices available, and that this, in tum, 
is a major source of labour-employment problems in under-
developed areas. At this point the exposition will be over-
simplified to indicate in stark outline the nature of the argu-
ment. In the next section the hypothesis will be combined with 
some of the market-imperfections hypotheses in an attempt 
to describe some of the major characteristics of underdeveloped 
and overpopulated areas by the use of a relatively simple 
theoretical framework. 
The basic assumptions of the following analysis are: {I) 
in large sectors of an economy there are only a few alternative 
processes which can be utilized; (2) these processes are 
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relatively capital-intensive.1 There have been frequent com-
ments which describe certain features of underdeveloped and 
overpopulated areas as essentially the result of limited varia-
bility in the coefficients of production. An example of this 
kind of comment is the frequently observed 'underemploy-
ment' in agriculture, where this is taken to mean that, with 
agricultural techniques remaining unchanged, withdrawal of 
farm labour would not reduce output. 
The Case of One Good, Two Factors and One Process. In the 
first, most simple case to be considered, suppose that only one 
good is produced in the economy, national product, which 
requires two factors, capital and labour.2 Assume also that 
only one process can be used K 
to produce national product, 
i.e., that the factors must be 
used in fixed proportions. This x
1 
situation is represented in 
Figure 3, where the heavy black 
line represents national output, x, 
x1 of I unit ; the lighter lines 
represent higher outputs. Quite 
irrespective of relative factor x, 
prices, points a, b, c, etc., re-
present the combinations of 
factors which will be used to 0 L-.. _________ _..., 
produce output and the slope Figure 3 
of the line joining these points 
is equal to the constant, capital-labour ratio. 
Only when the factors of production are actually available 
in proportions equal to the fixed capital-labour ratio is there 
the possibility that both can simultaneously be fully utilized. 
If the actual factor endowment is off the line Oabc, for example, 
at point E, there must inevitably be some unemployment of 
labour which is not amenable to any fiscal or monetary policy 
1 A production 'process' is a way of combining different factors of 
production whose proportions are determined by technology, although 
the scale of production and thus the absolute quantities of the factors 
used may be freely variable. 
1 Confining the analysis to only two factors is not essential but highly 
convenient for geometrical demonstrations. 
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for its alleviation. Labour is a redundant factor and only by 
increasing capital stock in the amount indicated by the length 
of the dashed line can the unemployment be eliminated.1 
Conventional compensatory fiscal policy would, in this case, 
only result in inflationary pressures. The persistent open and 
'disguised' unemployment in underdeveloped countries may 
be at least partially of this kind. 
Two or More Processes. Suppose now that a second and a 
third relatively more labour-intensive process is developed 
for the production of the same good, national output, so that 
three processes are now available. This is represented in Figure 
4 by the existence of two more right-angled constant-product 
lines for a unit of output and two additional expansion paths, 
Ocd and Oef. 
In addition to the alternative combinations of factors which 
may be used to produce a unit of output represented by points 
a and c and e, the lines ac and ce also represent combinations 
of factors which will yield a unit of output. It is possible to 
be between a and c on line ac, for example, by using the first 
process and the second process in different combinations. 
If the resources are taken away from the first process, output 
would fall. But if these resources are then used in the second 
process, output would rise. It can be shown rigorously2 and 
may be appreciated intuitively that there is some withdrawal 
of factors from process I and subsequent use in process 2 
which will restore output to the unit level. Correspondingly 
the line bd represents combinations of process I and process 2 
and of the two factors capital and labour which are optimal 
for the production of the x2 level of output. 
3 
In this second case where several processes are available 
the proportions in which the two factors can be used are not 
confined to either the expansion path of the first process or 
1 I recognize that it is stretching a definition considerably to call 
redundant factors 'unemployed'. However, since it is specifically the 
hypothesis of this paper that the labour called 'unemployed' or 
'underemployed' in underdeveloped areas is redundant, I shall, with 
this warning, use the terms interchangeably. 
I Cf. Dorfman, op. cit., pp. 39-41. 
• It can be seen by drawing a line from a to e that, for any output, 
any combination involving processes I and 3 would require more of 
at least one factor than a combination of processes 2 and 3· 
















the expansion path of the second process, or both, but may be 
any place within the area bounded by Oab and Oef. Thus the 
factor endowment E 1, while inevitably implying some un-
employment of labour when only the first process was avail-
able, can now be fully utilized by using the first process on a 
smaller scale and switching some of the capital to the second 
process. If, however, the factor endowment should be outside 
the area bounded by the two expansion paths, at E 2 or E 3, 
for example, structural unemployment of capital capacity or 
of labour would ensue in exactly the same manner as in the 
preceding case of one process, regardless of factor-price ratios 
or fiscal policy. 
If more than two processes are available to the economy, 
full employment of all factors will be possible at a nonzero 
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wage so long as the proportions in which factors are endowed 
fall on or within the limits set by the processes with the most 
extreme factor-use ratios. This suggests an observation which 
is, by now, almost trite: reduction of underemployment in 
overpopulated areas requires the addition of scarce factors. 
This, may, however, be accomplished in a variety of ways, 
such as the use of dry-farming methods and drought- and 
heat-resistant hybrids which increase the land available for 
farming. 
In the case in which just one process is available, changes 
in relative factor prices cannot affect the proportions in which 
factors are used. This is not true when there are two or more 
processes available. In this case factor proportions employed 
will, in competitive markets, vary with factor prices and the 
achievement of full employment, if technologically possible 
with the given factor endowment, will depend on factor prices. 
In Figure 4, rl> r 2 and r 3 are constant-expenditure lines illus-
trating three possible sets of factor prices. The line r 2 has the 
special feature that its slope is equal to that of the constant-
product curve between points a and c.1 
If the price ratio of factors were of the r1 or r 3 types only 
one process and one ratio of factors would be used. To employ 
completely each of the factors in an endowment like E 1, the 
very special factor-price ratio r 2 would be necessary. A factor-
price ratio slightly different from r 2 would be sufficient to move 
factor-use ratios away from E 1 to one of the isoquant vertices. 
Moreover, having reached a vertex of an isoquant it would be 
possible for large changes in relative factor prices to occur 
without leading to factor substitution. 
Two Goods and Two Factors. An interesting question is 
whether the restriction of the analysis to only a single good is 
responsible for the character of the conclusion. By use of an 
Edgeworth-Bowley type box diagram we can continue to 
have the advantage of graphic techniques without loss of 
simplicity and extend the analysis to the case of two goods. 
Let us now assume that we have two goods x1 and x2, each 
of which can be produced by two, fixed-proportions processes, 
1 Constant expenditure lines r4 and r5 could be drawn analogously 
to r 1 , and r 1, with a slope equal to that of ce, and less than that of ce 
respectively. 
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and that constant returns to scale prevail ;1 only two factors, 
capital, K, and labour, L, are used. Figure sa shows a few of 
the infinity of equal-product lines which could be drawn for 
different outputs of the two goods. The solid lines refer to 
product I, the dashed lines to product 2. In Figure Sb, these 
isoquants are used to construct a box diagram. The dimen-
sions of each side of the box represent the total amount of 
factors available. Any point within the box simultaneously 
represents four quantities : the amount of capital and the 
amount of labour used in producing x1 which is determined 
by measurement from the lower left-hand corner, and the 
amount of capital and the amount of labour used in the x 2 
industry, measured from upper right-hand corner. 
Figure Sb provides the basis for the derivation of the 'effici-
ency locus' for the two goods x1 and x2• If production takes 
place at any point off this locus, it is possible by recom-
bination of factors to produce more of one good without 
diminishing the output of the other. If along the efficiency 
locus corresponding amounts of the two goods are read off 
and plotted on a chart as in Figure sc, the transformation 
or production-possibility curve between x1 and x2 is obtained. 
To locate a point on the efficiency locus we must specify a 
K 
Process x; 
Figure sa Figure sb 
1 The assumption of constant returns to scale is, of course, maintained 
not because it is considered the best description of reality but for its 
analytical convenience. Some comments on the effects on the ana.lysis 









particular amount of x1 to 
be produced and find the 
maximum of x2 which can 
simultaneously be produced. 
Graphically, we must move 
along the specified x1 isoquant 
crossing x2 equal~product lines 
until we reach the highest 
x 2 isoquant obtainable. The 
optimum positions achieved 
will thus be located at tan-
xz gencies of the x1 and x 2 equal-
product lines where the lines 
just touch without crossing. 
Since, in the present case, each equal~product line is made 
up of segments of straight lines, the optimal positions will 
be comer tangencies. By repetition of this maximizing process 
for a series of points the entire efficiency locus can be 
determined. 
Since in the present case the efficiency locus for the two 
goods is a rather complicated succession of line segments we 
shall trace it out carefully. Starting at 0 1, zero output of x1, 
the maximum output of x 2 obtainable is indicated at point A 
and could be computed by dividing 0 2A by the scale factor 
applicable to process x' 2• If output of x1 is now increased 
relative to x 2, it will be most efficient, at first, to use process 
x'1 and for x 2 to be produced with process x' 2 ; production of 
x1 would then move along the expansion path 0 1B and x 2 
should decrease along the expansion path x' 2 to point B. In 
this first stage capital is a redundant factor and labour is 
relatively scarce. The economic system adjusts to this condition 
by directing the use of the most capital-intensive processes to 
be used for the production of both goods. 
As production of x1 is expanded beyond point B it would be 
best now to use both process x'1 and process x" 1 in combinations 
indicated by the intersection of 0 2A with the constant-product 
lines for commodity x1 as long as these intersections lie between 
the expansion paths of x' 1 and x,. 1 ; production of x 2 should 
continue to be by means of process x' 2 alone, however. This 
second stage is indicated by the points on the segment BC 
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which belong to both the combination of x' 1 and x* 1 and process 
x' 2• By tracing along an x1 isoquant between B and C it can 
be seen that shifting to the expansion path 0 2A makes possible 
a larger production of x 2 for the particular output of x1 than 
if we had remained on the path 0 1B. As production of x1 is 
expanded in this stage and production of x2 is decreased, capital 
becomes more scarce relative to labour due to the relatively 
high labour-capital ratio of the resources released by the 
decrease in production of x 2• 
In the third stage, as output of x1 is farther increased, it is 
most efficient to use only process x\. But now for any given 
output of x1, the maximum amount of x2 can be obtained by 
use of the more labour-intensive process x" 2 in combination 
with process x' 2• The third stage on the efficiency locus is 
indicated by line CD. 
Finally, still further expansion of production x1 continues 
to be best done along the expansion path of process x" 1 until, 
at point E, x1 is being produced to the complete exclusion of 
x2• In this fourth and final stage the output of x2 should be 
produced only by process x" 2• 
Only in the fourth stage and the first stage of the efficiency 
locus would optimum allocation imply some unemployment 
of one of the factors. In the first stage the unemployment of 
capital for different outputs of x1 and x2 is indicated by the 
vertical distance between lines AB and 0 1B. In the final stage 
the unemployment of labour is measured by the horizontal 
distance between lines DE and D0 2. 
Actually the occurrence and qualitative significance of any 
of the stages depends on both technology and factor endow-
ments. If process x\ were relatively more labour-intensive 
than is shown, its expansion path would pivot to the right and 
stage 2 in Figure 5b would be prolonged. As common sense 
would suggest, development of a sufficiently labour-intensive 
process for x1 could cause stages three and four to disappear 
entirely and with them the possibility that the1e could be an 
'optimal' configuration which involved unemployment of 
labour. A similar effect would result from a decrease in the 
amount of labour endowment. This could be depicted by 
squeezing together the left- and right-hand sides of the box 
in Figure 5b. Increasing the labour supply would mean stretching 
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the box horizontally. This would not only increase the 
range of outputs associated with stage 4 but also, if pushed 
far enough, first eliminate stage r, the capital unemployment 
stage, and then stage 2. 
The points ABCDE on the technical transformation curve 
in Figure sc correspond to the similarly lettered points on the 
efficiency locus in Figure 5b.1 At first when only a little x1 is 
produced and, relatively, a lot of x2, we should move along 
the segment AB using process x' 1 and x' 2• Unemployment of 
capital associated with this segment on Figure sb will be 
reduced as we approach B. Relative labour scarcity is limiting 
along this segment and the slope of the line segment AB will 
depend on the ratio of the labour inputs of output of x 2 to x1• 
The relative labour intensity of process x' 2 compared to process 
x' 1 as drawn on Figure sa accounts for the steepness of the 
segment. 
The line segment ED on Figure sc has an exactly analogous 
justification to that for the segment A B. Labour unemployment 
will be reduced as D is approached from point E. Capital is 
the only scarce factor and the relative capital intensity of 
process x" 1 as compared to process x" 2 accounts for the flatness 
of ED. 
Point C is located conveniently relative to points B and D. 
More of x1 is produced at C than at B, though not so much 
more as produced at point D. Likewise less x2 is produced at 
C than at B though not as much less at D. The segments BC 
and CD will be straight lines as can be verified by noting in 
Figure 5b that, due to the assumption of constant returns to 
scale in all processes, there must be a constant ratio between 
changes in output of x2 along the line 0 2A between C and B, 
for example, and changes in output of XJ.. 
It was pointed out with regard to the efficiency locus in 
Figure sb that changes in factor endowment and technology 
could shorten, extend or even completely eliminate various 
stages of the efficiency locus. This applies also to the separate 
1 In the constant-returns-to-scale case, only relative factor endow-
ments are important in determining the shape o£ the transformation 
curve. If the absolute factor endowments were changed while relative 
factor endowments remain constant, it would amount to sliding the 
north-east and south-west vertices of the box on the connecting diagonal. 
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segments of the technical transformation curve. The technical' 
transformation curve of Figure sc illustrates all the possible 
stages which could be produced by this simple case, from unem-
ployment of capital to unemployment of labour. It should not be 
presumed that this range of possibilities will actually exist in a 
particular system at any one time. Rather, it is the hypothesis of 
this paper that technology and factor endowments in underdev-
eloped areas are such that a segment like DE, in which labour 
is redundant, is important in their transformation curves. 
To demonstrate the importance of demand conditions for 
employment when the conditions assumed in the present 
hypothesis exist, we shall draw a transformation curve in 
Figure 6 consisting only of stage CD, along which there is full 
x,f employment of both capital 
and labour, and the labour-
! redundant stage DE. This can 
l be envisaged as the result of a E high rate of population growth ' , which has stretched the labour 
... ' 
axis very far. We can now see 
that actual achievement of full 
employment depends on the 
relative demands for the two 
c x, goods. Market baskets whose 
Figure 6 composition falls along CD will 
allow full employment; along DE labour will be redundant. 
A geometrical demonstration which is suggestive, though lack-
ing in rigour, can be given. Suppose that the lines i 1 and i 2 
represent two different possibilities for the community's 
indifference curve for the two goods. Only in the case in which 
the indifference curve is tangent along CD will optimal output 
imply full employment. The community must face a conflict 
in goals between full employment and maximum value of 
output if i 2 is in fact its indifference curve.
1 Extending the 
1 A major qualification to this analysis, still on the static level, is the 
possibility that the shape and position of the community indifference 
curves might not be independent of the particular processes or com-
binations of processes which are used. To handle this difficulty it would 
be necessary to determine the shifts in income distribution which 
result from changes in factor prices and to explore the differentials in 
tastes of the recipients of the different types of income. 
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analysis to include many goods would widen the range within 
which factor endowments could vary without unemployment 
of one or more factors resulting. There would, however, still 
be no guarantee that the composition of goods demanded 
would always hit on a full-employment point. 
It may also be observed that if it is possible to buy and sell 
in foreign trade at price ratios between the slopes of CD and 
DE, full employment would again be possible though not 
necessary. To determine whether or not it would result, it 
would be necessary to know the reciprocal demands for exports 
and imports. 
It would be possible to elaborate this model now by investi-
gating the implications for the analysis of market imperfections 
such as were considered in the previous section. This extension 
will be postponed to the following section, however, and applied 
to a model of underdeveloped areas designed to be somewhat 
more realistic. As it stands the present analysis gives us, I 
believe, important insight into the problems of underdeveloped 
areas. It presents a hypothesis which helps account for the 
inflationary tendencies of underdeveloped areas under the 
impact of programmes designed to raise effective demand, and 
for the stubbornness of unemployment in such areas. 
The analysis of this section also provides a more precise 
definition for the 'technological unemployment' mentioned in 
Measures for the Economic Development of Underdeveloped 
Countries. 1 Technological unemployment may be a real problem 
for underdeveloped areas if it is defined, as in this section, as 
redundant labour arising from resource and technological 
restraints and the structure of demand. 
II. A MODEL OF UNDERDEVELOPED AND 
0VERPOPULA TED AREAS2 
Though the analysis of the previous section is suggestive, 
it is hard to believe that all of the unemployment and under-
employment in underdeveloped areas represents literally useless 
labour. Moreover, the assumption of only a few alternative 
1 United Nations, Department of Economic Affairs (New York, 
1951). 
I I am particularly indebted toP. N. Rosenstein-Rodan for discussion 
of the issues raised in this section. 
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processes and a quite limited range for substitution of factors 
does not seem to fit well the technological characteristics of a 
number of important industries, as, for example, agriculture. 
I shall attempt therefore to move towards greater realism by 
use of a two-sector model (one section with fixed, and one with 
variable coefficients of production), and investigation of the 
effects of market imperfections in such a system. To the assump-
tion of limited opportunities for substitution in some industries 
is added the hypothesis that in many other industries there 
is a considerable range of variability in the proportions in which 






It will be useful to initiate the discussion under the assump-
tion that each of the two sectors produce the same product. 
Suppose that in Figure 7 the constant-product lines of the 
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fixed-coefficient industry are represented by the lines x1, 
x2, •••• 1 and the constant-product lines of the variable co-
efficient industry by the lines x\, x' a .•.. 
The output x1 could be produced by the factor combination 
and technique represented by point 1 or any of the factor 
combinations using the variable-proportions technique re-
presented by the line x' 1• Moreover, following the reasoning 
on page 356 above, it is also possible to produce x1 by simul-
taneously using both the fixed-coefficients and variable-co-
efficients techniques. All of the lines which could be drawn 
from point 1 to line x' 1 represent a combination of methods 
which would produce output x1 ; all such lines fall between 
the lines la and Ib which are drawn from point 1 just tangent 
to line x'1• 2 The 'efficiency locus' for specified outputs can be 
traced out by determining, for given amounts of one of the 
factors, the minimum amount of the other factor necessary 
to produce the output. If this is done for output x1 when very 
little labour is available it is best to produce by the use of the 
variable-coefficients process alone ; a representative factor 
use for this case is at point p. As more labour becomes available 
the minimum amount of capital required to produce x1 is 
found by sliding down the variable-coefficients constant-
product line to point a. Line al represents different combina-
tions of the variable-coefficients technique located at a and 
the fixed-coefficient process. When the labour available is 
further increased, the minimum amounts of capital necessary 
to produce x1 are found by moving along line ai. As labour 
available is still further increased the line Ib is the next seg-
ment of the efficiency locus used, for reasons analogous to those 
given for the use of segment al. Finally, when labour is in-
creased beyond the amount available at point b, again only the 
variable-coefficients method should be used to produce x1• 
Output x1 could also be produced by process combinations 
and amounts of factors which do not lie on the efficiency locus, 
of course. Line pi represents a series of such combinations, 
1 Although the constant-product lines for the fixed-coefficients sector 
are drawn in Figure 7 as if only one process is available, the demon-
stration is perfectly general and its implications are applicable when 
more than one process is available for the fixed-coefficient industry. 
1 I am indebted to R. Solow for the criticism of a previous paper 
which led to this formulation. 
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using in varying proportions the variable-coefficients techniques 
located at p or n and the fixed-coefficient process located at 
point 1. Any combination of methods along pnl, however, 
would result in higher costs for x1 than a method found on the 
efficiency locus; methods along pnl could also be used to 
produce larger amounts than x1• Of course, many lines like 
pnl could be drawn between al and the vertical portion of the 
fixed-coefficient x1 isoproduct line and, analogously, between 
lb and the horizontal portion of the fixed-coefficient isoproduct 
line. Lines like lm, of which many could also be drawn, re-
present combinations of methods which would also produce 
x1, but require more of both labour and capital than points 
on the efficiency locus. The boundaries of lines such as Im are 
the vertical and horizontal portions of the fixed-coefficients 
x1 isoproduct line. 
Figure 7 embodies the constant-returns-to-scale assumption 
for both the fixed-coefficients and variable-coefficients method. 
This is not necessarily the most realistic or relevant assump-
tion, however, nor does the relative position of the two types 
of curves, or the shape of the variable-coefficients isoquants 
necessarily correspond closely to reality. It is useful to recognize 
other, special cases which may have important empirical signi-
ficance. In Figure 7, for example, only the extremes of the 
isoproduct curves of the variable-coefficients technique were a 
part of the efficiency locus for any particular output, and, as 
drawn, relatively little substitution was possible at such 
extremes. It would, of course, be possible to draw figures in 
which the 'efficient' isoproduct ridge lines follow the variable-
coefficients lines so as to allow substitution of factors over a 
considerable range. 
The effect of divergent rates of return to scale on the shape 
and slope of the constant-product ridge lines is illustrated in 
Figure 8 for one possible set of relations. In the fixed-coefficients 
process it is assumed that there are increasing returns to scale 
(shown by decreasing distances between x1 , x=, x3 , along any 
ray from the origin). In the variable-coefficients method 
constant returns to scale are the rule (shown by constant 
distances between x'1, x' =· x' 3 , along a ray from the origin). 
In this example, the efficient isoproduct lines change their 
shape as output is increased. For output x1 only the variable-
K 
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-----x; 
coefficients constant-product 
line is relevant. For output x1 
the 'efficient' isoproduct ridge 
line involves use of both the 
fixed- and variable-coefficient 
techniques. Finally, for output 
x3, only the fixed-coefficient 
technique is 'efficient' and the 
ridgelinesinvolvingthevariable-
coefficient method necessarily 
have a positive slope. 
L------------"!'L Figure 8 provides the formal 
Figure 8 basis for some useful deductions. 
Changes in factor prices which 
might at one scale of output induce shifts in the proportions 
in which factors are used, may not induce such shifts at 
another scale of output or may only produce smaller shifts. 
Likewise techniques of production not feasible at one scale of 
production may become mandatory for efficiency at another 
scale. 
In Figures 6, 7 and 8 it is particularly clear that in order for 
the system to travel along its most efficient production isoquant 
it is necessary that factor prices be flexible. Factor-price 
rigidities would make parts of the efficient constant-product 
lines unattainable for profit-maximizing businessmen. 
We can now go rapidly through an analysis of the two-sector 
model hypothesis assuming that each sector produces a differ-
ent commodity. The geometrical representation of this, using 
the box diagram technique introduced in the previous section, 
is provided by Figure ga. The assumption that for x1 only two 
alternative processes are available is maintained for conveni-
ence ; the resulting production-possibility curves for x1 are 
shown by the solid lines. The assumption of variable coefficients 
in the production of x 2 is limited to the sector between its 
ridge lines because at these ridge lines the marginal producti-
vity of one of the factors becomes zero and further input of this 
factor would have no effect on output.l 
1 It is assumed that there is no disposal problem and, thus, that the 
production isoquants do not bend back on themselves. 
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The production functions for x1 and x 2 are reproduced in the 
. box diagram in Figure gb : the dimensions of the box are 
determined by the factor endowments. I Using this box diagram 
we can trace out the efficiency locus for the two products by 
repeatingly asking the question, 'For a given amount of x1 
what is the maximum amount of x 2 which can be produced?' 
In the process of tracing out the efficiency locus, the transfor-
mation curve can be drawn for the two goods. 
Starting at 0 1, zero output of xi> the maximum amount of 
x 2 producible is given by 0 2A. If the output of x1 is increased 
relative to x2, it would be most efficient at first to use process 
x' 1 for x1 and to produce x2 by travelling along its most capital-
intensive ridge line, 0 2A. This represents optimal behaviour 
up to point B. In this stage although both products are being 
produced capital is a redundant factor. This results in spite of 
the variability of coefficients in production of x 2 because 
outside the upper ridge line of x 2 capital has zero marginal 
productivity. Stage I is represented on the transformation 
curve in Figure gc as segment AB. 
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The efficiency locus from B to C is traced out by finding 
the succession of points at which the x1 constant-product 
curves touch the highest x, constant-product curves. In this 
stage process x' 1 will be used for x1 and a varying combination 
1 Again only the ratio of the factor endowments is important as 
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B 
of factors for x2• The segment 
of the transformation curve 
for this stage, BC, will be 
curved as equal increases in 
production of x1 along x' 1 will 
not result in constant changes 
in output of X:. Only along 
rays from the origin 0 2 will 
equal distances imply equal 
differences in output of x 2• 
BC will be concave to the 
"----------~A,...--+.:X origin as is 'normal' for 
2 transformation curves ; 
Figure gc 
graphically it can be seen 
that smaller and smaller changes along x'1 are needed 
in order to move across equal changes in output of 
x2• As production moves from B to C the points at which 
x' 1 corners touch the x2 isoquants will be characterized by 
smaller and smaller slopes on the x2 isoquants, corresponding 
to the decreasing capital-labour ratio used in the production 
of x2• At some point, C, the capital-labour ratio in x2' will 
become equal to the capital-labour ratio represented by the 
negatively slanting portion of the x1 isoquants. A ray from 
the origin 0 2 to point C will intersect every x2 isoquant at a 
point with identical slopes. Thus CD, the third stage of the 
efficiency locus and the transformation curve, will be the series 
of tangencies of the negatively slanting portion of the x1 
isoquants, representing combinations of processes x' 1 and x" 1 
and the x2 isoquants along the ray 0 2C. The segment of the 
transformation curve corresponding to CD lies on a ray from 0 2 
and thus the equal jumps across the x1 isoquants will mark 
out constant changes in production of x2 • 
At point D and for further increases in output of x1 relative 
to x2 it would be best to use only process x" 1 for production 
of x1. The segment of the transformation curve, DE, corres-
ponding to DE on the efficiency locus, is curved for reasons 
similar to those which created the curvature of segment BC. 
The final stage of the efficiency locqs is the labour unem-
ployment stage. The marginal productivity of labour has fallen 
to zero in the x2 sector and in a perfect factor market wages 
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would fall to zero. EF represents this final stage on the trans-
formation curve in Figure gc. 
ABCDEF in Figure gc is the full transformation curve for 
this case. There are now curved as well as straight-line seg-
ments, and the kinks characteristic of the previous transforma-
tion curves have disappeared.1 
In Figure gb, as in Figure 5b, it is possible to visualize the 
effects of structural changes by altering the shape and position 
of the production isoquants for each product and the dimensions 
of the box. 
The box diagram approach helps to clarify the implication 
of the differences in substitutability in the fixed-coefficient 
and variable-coefficient sectors. It is clear that the outputs at 
which one or another factor becomes redundant will be deter-
mined by the limits of substitution in the variable-coefficients 
sector and the most extreme labour- and capital-intensive 
processes in the fixed-coefficient sector, not by the discontinui-
ties of the latter sector. These have other important effects, 
however. 
Suppose that the respective demands for output are such 
that a large part of the available capital is drawn into the 
capital-intensive and fixed-coefficient sector. The amollllt of 
labour which can be absorbed in these sectors is dependent on 
the amount of capital available. Since capital is a scarce factor, 
labour employment opportllllities in this sector are limited 
by its availability rather than by demand for output. The 
relatively plentiful labour supply is then pushed into the 
variable-coefficient sector and absorbed there as long as the 
marginal value productivity of labour is higher than the wages 
it receives. 
In this case, as in the models of the preceding sections, 
unemployment is not due to lack of effective demand and as 
a result cannot be relieved by conventional contracyclical 
economic policy designed to stimulate spending. If employment 
opportunities in the fixed-coefficient sectors were limited by 
capital scarcity or some other resource bottleneck, an increase 
in demand rather than stimulating additional output would 
1 Being off the efficiency curve, it may be noted, is like being on an 
isoquant lm in the single-good case. Cf. Figure 7 above. 
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only create inflationary pressures. Likewise, in the variable-
coefficient sectors if the marginal productivity of labour were 
zero, the first effects of an increase in demand for output would 
be an increase in prices without an increase in production. 
If more of the scarce factors were made available to the fixed-
coefficient sectors, more labour could then be employed and 
would be used, if there were an effective demand for its output. 
Additional amounts of the scarce factors in the variable-
coefficients sector would also increase labour productivity 
and output if demand were adequate. 
It is possible in this case of two sectors, one of fixed and one 
of variable coefficients, for a divergence to exist between the 
full-employment output and the output with maximum value, 
just as in the case of fixed-coefficient processes for each of two 
goods, as depicted in Figure 6 above. This could result even 
if there were no market imperfections. If, in Figure gc, the 
community indifference curves were like i 1 rather than i 2 so 
that the tangency occurred in the capital-scarcity, labour-
surplus stage, the divergence could exist. On the other hand, 
community-indifference curves shaped like i 2 would mean 
that it would be possible for full-employment output and 
maximum-value output to be identical. This demonstration 
is subject to the same qualifications applied to the one-good case. 
Without empirical knowledge, it is not possible to evaluate 
certainly the relative importance of each of the stages of the 
transformation curve 9c. However, according to the hypothesis 
advanced here the transformation curve for underdeveloped 
areas would consist mainly of the high labour-intensity and 
labour-unemployment segments such as DE and EF. 
We have thus far in this section assumed the existence of 
competitive markets and profit-maximizing entrepreneurs. 
We have shown that, even under such assumptions, technology, 
factor endowments and final demands may combine in ways 
which make it very difficult for underdeveloped areas to solve 
their problems of unemployment and underemployment. 
It is possible now to broaden the analysis by combining it 
with the analysis of the effects of market imperfections 
discussed in Section I to determine what further problems 
are created when some of the assumptions of competition are 
dropped. 
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Behind the transformation curve lie many fine adjustments 
as factors are shifted from one industry to. another and re-
combined in varying proportions to obtain the maximum 
output from one industry for given outputs of the other indus-
try. It has been assumed in deriving the transformation curve 
that the necessary adjustments would be accomplished as 
they would be in a perfect factor market. But flexibility within 
wide limits is required to achieve every possible position on a 
transformation locus such as that in Figure 9c. When imper-
fections and rigidities of various types obstruct the movements 
of factors and prices, the system will not be able to achieve 
its optimum transformation curve but will instead do no better 
than to move along some other, less than optimal curve. 
Limited factor-price flexibility may be quite serious when at 
least one good is produced with fixed-coefficient processes. 
If rigid factor prices render a relatively labour-intensive process 
unprofitable, the only alternative process may involve a big 
jump to a quite capital-intensive process as well' as a drastic 
obstacle to substitution in the variable-coefficients process. 
Since we are interested in the effect of imperfections in the 
factor markets, it will be useful to distinguish transformation 
curves which assume perfect adjustments in the factor markets ; 
these will be called 'technical transformation curves'. Trans-
formation curves which take into account market imperfections 
will be different from the technical transformation curves ; 
these latter relations will be designated 'market transformation 
curves' .1 Different types of market imperfections will create 
different types of shifts away from the technical transformation 
curve, so there is not one market transformation curve for 
each technical transformation curve but many. 
It may help to approximate reality to assume that factor-
price ratios in the variable-coefficients sector are relatively 
more flexible than those in the fixed-coefficients sector. This 
1 The effect of factor-market imperfections in shifting the market 
transformation curve inside the technical transformation curve has 
been pointed out and analysed for international trade by G. Haberler, 
'Some Problems in the Pure Theory of International Trade', The 
Economic Journal, June 1950, LX, 223-40 and by P. Samuelson, 
'Evaluation of Real National Income', OxjoYd Economic Papeys, 
Jan. 1950, II (N.S.), 18--I9 for welfare economics; others have prob-
ably also noted the effect. 
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might result from differential strength of union organization 
or susceptibility to government wage controls. Suppose, for 
example, that by means of union pressures or minimum wage 
legislation real wages of labour were maintained so that in 
the fixed-coefficients sector the labour-capital price ratio was 
set above that represented by the slope of the constant product 
curve combining processes x' 1 and x" 1 in Figure 9b ; the factor-
price ratio in the variable-coefficients sector may still be 
assumed to vary freely. The cost-minimizing combination of 
factors is determined for any particular output at the point 
at which the production-possibility schedule for that output 
touches the lowest expenditure line. If the production-possibi-
lity schedule has any slope at this point, it is a condition of 
equilibrium that this slope be equal to the factor-price ratio 
which determines the slope of the expenditure line. As a result 
under the present assumptions process x" 1 would never be 
used. It would always be more profitable to use process x' 1 
alone in producing x 1• The transformation curve would be 
ABCGH in Figure 9c; this is below the technical transforma-
tion curve and has a much longer range of unemployment. 
If both sectors were characterized by such high, inflexible 
factor-price ratios, the economy's transformation curve would 
approach ABC j.l 
Barriers to the movement of factors would have the effect 
of moving the market transformation curve even further 
inside the technical transformation curve and increasing the 
range over which a factor is redundant. 
Thus imperfections in factor markets have several undesira-
ble effects. They reduce the amount of goods available and 
create a wider range of combinations of goods over which 
labour may become unemployed, depending on the structure 
of final demand. 
Although the effects of rigid wages on the transformation 
curve of the economy are clear, welfare judgements as to the 
results of removal of the factor-price rigidities are subject to 
the same qualifications as in the previous case. Much depends 
1 Barriers to capital movement created by monopoly may create 
situations analogous to those described above resulting from labour-
market imperfections. 
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on the effects of a change in methods on the income distribu-
tion, and, via income distribution, on community preferences. 
Ill. EMPIRICAL VERIFICATION 
The analysis above is based on hypotheses which can be 
tested empirically and which deserve to be given factual 
content. Empirical testing requires measurement of the pro-
portions in which productive factors can be and are actually 
used. Essentially the objective of such research would be an 
investigation of production functions. 
Although the concept of the production function has been 
familiar for some time, its empirical investigation has, as is 
common, been neglected with important noteworthy 
exceptions. In this connexion it should be noted that even 
though it is sometimes presented as an analysis of productive 
processes and its terminology is taken from the theory of 
production, input-output analysis, as it now stands, does not 
reveal the technologies actually in use in an economy. For 
this purpose a much higher degree of disaggregation would 
be necessary than is currently practiced or appears feasible. 
Interindustry flows may strongly reflect historical incidents 
by which certain technical processes are concentrated in a 
particular sector which subcontracts for other sectors. Or, if 
similar technical processes are widely used, the interindustry 
flows in a particular year may reflect different cyclical patterns 
in industry ; one industry producing at its capacity may 
subcontract to another industry which has equipment capable 
of performing the necessary operations and is cyclically de-
pressed.1 Studies of capital coefficients made for input-output 
tables 9-o indicate, however, a method which can be used for a 
factor-proportions study. 2 
The objective of the process analysis approach newly devel-
oped at the Rand Corporation is exactly the empirical deter-
mination of production functions. The emphasis of the process-
1 This point is made with force by H. Markowitz in Process Analysis 
of the Metal Working Industries, The Rand Corporation (Santa Monica, 
1953), PP· 7-8. 
2 Especially the studies made by the Inter-Industry Analysis 
Branch of the Office of Chief Economist, Bureau of Mines, U. S. 
Department of Interior. 
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analysis approach in establishing all the alternatives on a 
production-possibility schedule, which is essential for program-
ming, is somewhat different from a factor-proportions study. 
For the latter study not only the range of possibilities but 
the relative frequencies of their use and dynamic considerations 
involved in choice are important. The methods of process 
analysis can also be used for a factor-proportions study, 
however. 
For the study of factor proportions two general approaches 
seem to be available. The first, suggested by input-output 
studies of capital coefficients and which will be cal.led the 
'product analysis' method, involves a census in each plant 
studied of the amounts of each type of factor of production 
used in the expansion of the output of a particular product. 
The second method, based on classifications of technical pro-
cesses, requires the determination of the combinations of factors 
actually used by firms to perform certain standardized' tasks'. 
These approaches to the factor-proportions study are not 
necessarily logically separate, nor should they always be 
completely different in application. The great advantage of 
process analysis in precise identification of outputs can com-
pensate for the weakness of product analysis where multi-
product plants are involved. The advantage of product analysis 
in inclusion of all contributing inputs can be important when 
using the process-analysis approach where it is difficult to 
isolate the contributions of all inputs. Thus, it is important 
in particular cases to have in mind a method combining both 
the product and process analyses. 
The application of product analysis can be made in two 
ways: (r) By abstracting the data required from the engin-
eering plans which are prepared when a new investment is 
undertaken and which list the construction, equipment, labour 
and materials required for the operation of the plant. Account-
ing records of new investment expenses could also supply 
part of the necessary information. ( 2) By means of 'factor 
inventories' of existing plants to provide for these plants the 
information which the investment plan analysis provides for 
new expansions. No easy and automatic application of product 
analysis techniques is possible in the face of problems such 
as those raised by multiproduct firms and the measurement 
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of the expansion of capacity. These problems can 
often be overcome, I believe, to make this a fruitful 
method. 
Process analysis is based on the conception that all produc-
tive activity can be divided into separate technical processes 
with similar outputs whose inputs can be identified and com-
pared. Process analysis thus provides another logically satis-
factory approach to study of factor-proportions. The process-
analysis approach can moreover provide the basis for a com-
parison of factor-proportions by final products, and thus for 
·an independent check of factor-proportions computed by the 
product-analysis method. This could be achieved by deter-
mining the appropriate physical processes and levels of 
activity necessary for the output of a particular final 
product and aggregating their factor inputs. The procedure 
just described is, in fact, that actually used in modern 
engineering practice in plant and equipment design and 
layout. 
The disadvantage of the process-analysis approach, however, 
stemming from the kinds of information which would be 
generally available, I believe, occurs precisely where the 
product-analysis method is strong. The information for the 
process-analysis approach must come from the records of 
inputs to particular processes and these records, because of 
the purposes for which they are kept, will seldom be sufficiently 
detailed and comprehensive as to the inputs involved in a 
process. As a result it will often be necessary in using the 
process-analysis approach to estimate the contributions of 
'indirect' inputs to the processes studied. 
A major source of information for the application of the 
process-analysis approach may be the time cards kept by 
many firms. These cards list for each worker the time which 
he takes at each type of machine which he uses to perform the 
operations on the particular piece. These cards would have 
the labour inputs and machines specified for particular tasks 
and often contain other useful data as well. The job sheets 
which accompany production orders are also sources of informa-
tion as they list the time per unit and in total required by 
each type of machine and process to finish a particular 
item. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper a number of different hypotheses have been 
developed and combined for the purpose of explaining out-
standing features of some underdeveloped areas : the persist-
ence of unemployment and underemployment, the coexistence 
of 'modern' capital-intensive techniques and methods using 
a great deal of labour and little capital, and large differentials 
in factor returns in different sectors. I have suggested that to 
a considerable degree these conditions may be the result of a 
few characteristic conditions : factor-market imperfections, 
and limited technical substitutability of factors, with diverg-
ences between the proportions in which goods are demanded 
and in which they can be supplied with full use of available 
factors. 
Factor-market imperfections which limit factor mobility 
create employment problems in underemployed areas with 
low per capita incomes and limited capital resources which 
are not different in kind but are much different in degree from 
those existing in the more advanced countries. 
When the proportions in which factors can be combined are 
variable without limit, i.e., with decreasing but always positive 
marginal returns to labour, additional labour can always 
produce additional output. If the technical substitutability of 
factors is limited, as is suggested here, the possibility of labour 
redundancy arises. Even if there are some sectors in which 
labour always has a positive marginal product there may be a 
divergence between maximum value output and full employ-
ment output if there is insufficient demand for the output of 
these sectors. These possibilities are again more important for 
the underdeveloped areas whose resource endowments are 
often not suited to the factor proportions dictated by the 
technological leadership of advanced countries. Differences 
in income distribution and the range of products may also 
make limited technical substitutability a more pressing problem 
in underdeveloped than in advanced areas. 
6. MODELS OF DEVELOPMENT 
THE MECHANICS OF 
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT* 
by H. W. Singer 
IN WHAT FOLLOWS, WE SHALL CONSIDER SOME OF THE 
important relations in development planning for underdevel-
oped countries, first (Sections I, II and III) with the help of 
a numerical illustration (hopefully thought of as reasonably 
realistic) and then (Section IV) with the help of a more general 
model of the type made familiar by the work of Domar, Harrod 
and Hicks. It is hoped that this approach will help toward an 
understanding of some of the problems involved in develop-
ment planning, and their mutual interrelation. 
I 
The model on page 382 shows in its top part the typical 
structure of an underdeveloped economy. 
The 'model scheme' assumes that 70 per cent of the popula-
tion is in the agricultural sector ; that the share of agriculture 
in the total 'national' income is 40 per cent ; that the ratio 
of agricultural per capita income to average per capita income 
is 57 per cent. It is of considerable interest to note that in 
1799-r86o, when the U.S. per capita national income was 
$2r6 of rg26 purchasing power, 72 · 8 per cent of the population 
was in agriculture, agriculture accounted for 39 · 3 per cent 
of the total national income, and the ratio of per capita 
incomes in agriculture to the average was 54 per t:ent. 1 
These figures come remarkably close to those assumed in the 
scale model. 
* The Indian Economic Review, August 1952. Reprinted by per-
mission of the editor of the Indian Economic Review and the author. 
The author is a member of the U. N. Secretariat, but the views 
expressed in this article are his personal views and not necessarily 
those of the United Nations Organization. 
1 Robert F. Martin, 'National Income in the U.S., 1799-1938 ', 
National Industrial Conference Board, New York, 1939; quoted by 
Simon Kuznets, 'National Income Estimates for the U.S. prior to 
1870', Journal of Economic History, Spring 1952. 
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MODEL SCHEME 
r,ooo persons at$roo each =total 'national' income $roo,ooo 
AGRICULTURE 
700 persons at $57 each 
= $40,000 
NON-AGRICULTURE 
300 persons at $zoo each 
= $60,000 
Natural increase each year 12.5 persons I. 25% 
70% in agriculture 30% outside agriculture 
+ 8·75 persons + 3'75 persons 
- 8·75 persons Transfer from Agriculture: + 8·75 persons 
'Industrialization' 
o persons + 12 ·so persons 
DEVELOPMENT OUTLINE 
A. 'INDUSTRIALIZATION' (Transfer) 
Cost : $4,ooo per worker transferred 
$I,6oo per person transferred 
(8·75 persons) = $q,ooo (Yield 17%) 
Increased annual net 
output = $2,333 
(Capital/Income Ratio 6 : I) 
B. AGRICULTURAL INVESTMENT 
Cost: $4,8oo Benefit: 3% of agricultural production 
(Yield: zs%) = $r,zoo 
(Capitaljlncome Ratio 4: 1) 
C. PROVISION OF ADDITIONAL CAPITAL FOR 3 · 75 PERSONS 
OUTSIDE AGRICULTURE ($800 per person) 
Cost : $3,000 Benefit : $750 
(Capitaljincome Ratio 4 : I) 
ToTAL CosT (A + B + C) : 
$zr,8oo 
'Naturally 
available'.. $ 6,ooo 
Deficit $rs,8oo 




Case I I3 (II\ 
Case II 50 (zJ) 
Case III never (67) 
TOTAL BENEFIT: $4,283 per 
annum of which $3,033 is increase 
per capita. 
Disposition of 
per capita increase 
New Increase in 
Development Consumption 
$I,5oo (so%) h,soo 
$ 6oo (zo%) $2,400 
$ r8o ( 6%) $z.8zo 
The Mechanics of Economic Development 
We consider a group of I,ooo persons in an underdeveloped 
community, and assign to this community a per capita income 
of $100 each at current prices. As far as national income 
fignres can be relied upon, this would represent a community 
which could be considered as about average for the under-
developed parts of the world. The totai 'national' income of 
the group would then be $mo,ooo. We are not concerned here 
with the difficulties of accurate measurement of national 
income, or of their meaning, in underdeveloped communities. 
We shall merely assume that a satisfactory way has been found 
of measuring incomes. We shall leave it open whether the figure 
represents a measurement of economic welfare, of material 
resources or only of resources entering into the market economy. 
Either definition will do as long as it is consistently kept in mind. 
We next divide our group into an agricultural sector and a 
non-agricultural sector. It is one of the characteristics of under-
developed communities that 6o-8o per cent of the population 
are engaged in agriculture. We assume 70 per cent in agriculture 
and 30 per cent outside. This is a proportion which seems to 
be pretty closely correlated with the income levels assumed. 
Next, the model assigns a per capita income of $57 to the 
700 persons in the agricultural sector, and $zoo to the non-
agricultural sector. The available statistics-for what they 
are worth-seem to be remarkably unanimous in determining 
per capita income in the agricultural sector of underdeveloped 
economies as around 55-60 per cent of the average per capita 
income.1 
In view of the small size of the non-agricultural sector, the 
assignment of 57 per cent of the average per capita fignre to 
the agricultural sector carries with it the corollary of twice the 
national average in the non-agricultural sector. 2 
1 It is remarkable that this relation also applies to more developed 
countries. In the U.S., income per head in agriculture in 1930 was 59 
per cent of the average national income, in the U.K. 63 per cent. 
In Sweden, it was 58 per cent in 1920, but this seemed to have dropped 
to 40 per cent in 1930 (figures taken from E.M. Ojala : Agriculture 
and Economic Progress, Oxford University Press, London 1952, Table li). 
2 This latter figure is, of course, higher than the corresponding figures 
for the U.S., U.K. and Sweden, since the non-agricultural sector is much 
larger there. In none of these three countries did non-agricultural 
income approach twice the national average, although Sweden in 
1870 came fairly close to that ratio. (loc. cit.) 
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A high ratio of average income in the non-agricultural sector 
to the national average is in accordance with observed facts 
and general impressions. 
In considering the assumed per capita income levels in the 
agricultural sector and the non-agricUltural sector, it may be 
useful to recall again that income is not necessarily used here 
as a measure of relative welfare in the two sectors. 
It follows for our model-and for reality if our assumptions 
are realistic-that national income originating in agriculture 
accounts for only 40 per cent of the total national income, even 
though the bulk of the population is engaged in the agricultural 
sector. Thus, it is only with reference to employment and not 
with reference to national income that agriculture can, in 
strict truth, be described as the 'basic' activity in under-
developed countries. This point is worth making since reports 
of missions and similar documents abound with statements 
that improvements in agriculture are in some sense 'more 
important' than non-agricultural improvements, since agricul-
ture is the 'basic activity'. 
So much for the present structure of our underdeveloped 
group. Economic development for this group will mean a 
structural change. The proportion of population in agriculture 
will have to fall, and the non-agricultural sector will have to 
~xpand. It may be noted that for our present purposes it is 
entirely irrelevant whether this structural change is considered 
as the 'purpose' or 'objective' of economic development, or 
as its consequence. \Vhether we start off with industrialization, 
with agricultural development, or in whatever way, rising 
income levels will have to be accompanied by a corresponding 
change in structure :i.e., a relative shrinkage of the agricultural 
sector. If a 70 : 30 ratio of agriculture is typical of under-
developed countries, something like a 20 : So or rs : S5 ratio 
is typical of countries at a high state of economic development, 
which are assumed to 9e closed systems (or after allowance 
has been made for surpluses of exports or imports of agricultural 
products). 
The speed or rate of economic development may then be 
described by the rate at which the 70 : 30 ratio in economic 
structure is approximated to the 20 : So ratio which represents 
ultimate equilibrium at a high level of development. 
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A convenient assumption for an economy in a fairly rapid 
process of economic development is to assume that the agricul-
tural population will remain constant in absolute numbers, 
and that the change in structure is brought about by a con-
centration of the natural increase in population in the non-
agricultural sector. This assumption has been satisfied with a 
fair degree of approximation in a number of countries going 
through a process of development in an area of settled 
population.t 
Thus, over long periods of British, Swedish, Russian and 
Japanese development, the agricultural population remained 
approximately constant in absolute size. This assumption of 
constant absolute size of the agricultural population has been 
incorporated in our model. It should be emphasized, however, 
that this represents fairly rapid economic development. 2 
The model could be adjusted to any other slower rate of 
development. Thus, it could be assumed that one-third or 
one-half of the natural increase in population goes into agricul-
ture, or that the rate of increase in the non-agricultural sector 
is twice or three times or five times that in the agricultural 
sector, etc. 
In our model, we assume an increase in population by I· 25 
per cent per annum. This is the estimated actual figure in the 
underdeveloped world as a whole. Contrary to a general im-
pression, 'there is no dear-cut evidence that the population in 
the underdeveloped world as a whole increases significantly 
faster than in the more developed parts. a The model population 
of I,ooo will thus increase by I2 · 5 in the first year. 
In accordance with our assumption, the agricultural popula-
tion remains at 700, and the total increase of I2t persons is 
added to the 300 persons in the non-agricultural sector, resulting 
in a rate of growth of about 4 per cent per annum in the 
1 Excluding such countries as the U.S .. Canada, Australia, etc., 
where development was associated with new settlement, and agricul-
ture and non-agriculture expanded together. 
1 Although it would take Io8 years on this assumption for a 70 : 30 
ratio to be converted into a 20 : So ratio, assuming a rate of population 
increase over the whole period of I l per cent per annum. 
• The contrary impression may be due largely to a fixation on a 
few areas (often islands) of rapid population growth, such as Puerto 
Rico, Ceylon and others. It may also partly be due to comparison with 
the low birth-rate of industrialized countries in the nineteen-thirties. 
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non-agricultural sector. The structural ratio on this assumption 
is changed from 70: 30 to 69 ·I: 30 · g, approximately. If the 
rate of population increase should slacken in the course of 
economic development, the resulting degree of structural 
change each year would be correspondingly less. 
The increase in the non-agricultural sector of 12 · 5 persons 
may be divided up into 3·75 persons representing the natural 
increase of population in the non-agricultural sector,1 and of 
8 ·75 persons representing the transfer of the natural increase 
of population in the agricultural sector from that sector to the 
non-agricultural sector. This distinction between the two 
increments in the non-agricultural sector may or may not be 
considered relevant in a numerical model approach. One could 
either assume that the increase from whatever source has to 
be provided with new capital on standards identical to both 
groups, or else one may assume different standards. For 
instance, in our model we consider the two increments 
separately. We shall assume that the natural increase of popu-
lation in the non-agricultural sector (the 3 · 75 persons) is fitted 
into the non-agricultural sector at prevailing standards of 
productivity and capital equipment, whereas the 8 · 75 persons, 
representing transfer from agriculture, are the labour spearhead 
of a more advanced technology amounting to some 'deepen-
ing' in the non-agricultural sector. 
II 
We are now in a position to consider a Development Outline 
for our underdeveloped community. The community is faced 
with three tasks : 
(a) to equip the 8 · 75 persons transferred from the agricul-
tural to the non-agricultural sector in such a manner that they 
can become the spearhead of an improved technology. This 
transfer may be called, for short, 'industrialization', provided 
that we remain conscious of the fact that it includes transfer 
to commercial, financial, personal services, etc. ; 
(b) to increase agricultural production, with the constant 
number of persons employed in agriculture, sufficiently to pro-
vide food for the increased population in the non-agricultural 
1 Assuming that the natural rate of increase in population is the 
same in the agricultural and non·agricultural sectors. 
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sector, and also to provide for such increases in consumption 
as are part of the development programme ; 
(c)" to provide for the natural increase of population in the 
non-agricultural sector at prevailing standards. 
We shall consider these three steps in tum. 
(a) The cost and results of 'industrialization' will depend 
on the specific circumstances of the individual country. The 
cost may best be estimated as a dollar investment per person 
transferred or per worker. Cost per worker will be high where 
the proportion of public utilities and heavy industries included 
in the development programme is high, and also where large-
scale units of production at advanced standards of technology 
are provided. Some years ago, the cost of providing additional 
employments of a non-agricultural type was frequently esti-
mated to be $2,500 per worker transferred, or $r,ooo per 
person transferred. For our present purposes, this figure would 
have to be somewhat increased, partly because of the rise in 
prices since then, partly because a community at a standard 
of $roo national income per capita would have to include in a 
long-range development programme a high proportion of 
capital-intensive basic services and utilities. The standard of 
technologies will partly depend on what technologies are 
available, and since technological research is centred in capital-
rich countries, and since capital goods will have to be largely 
imported, it follows that the standard of technology will have 
to be more advanced than what would naturally correspond 
to the circumstances of the underdeveloped group. It may 
be noted that overpopulation, while it makes 'industrializa-
tion' more necessary, also tends to make it cheaper, provided 
that the right kind of labour-intensive technologies are at the 
disposal of the underdeveloped countries. Hence, it is true 
only in a restricted sense that 'overpopulation' is an obstacle 
to economic development. 
We shall assume a cost of $4,000 per worker transferred, or 
$r,6oo per person transferred. This would provide at present 
prices for a reasonable proportion of such capital-intensive 
installations as large-scale irrigation, power and railways, while 
at the same time assuming a modest standard of technology and 
leaning towards smaller scale and lighter industries, as well as 
towards commercial and personal services. It makes some slight 
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allowance for housing provision and urban community services, 
but would still involve considerable strain in that respect. 
On the basis of this assumption, the transfer of 8 ·75 pe'rsons 
would cost our underdeveloped community $J4,ooo per annum 
or I4 per cent of the 'national' income of $Ioo,ooo. 
What yield can be expected from this investment of $I4,ooo 
on 'industrialization'? At this point, we shall have to discard 
the economist's bias in favour of assuming a high 'marginal 
productivity' in underdeveloped countries. In underdeveloped 
countries, it is rarely possible simply to add a piece of directly 
productive equipment, and at the same time observe the ceteris 
paribus of marginal productivity. Basic services, such as power, 
transport, etc., are already overstrained and it is not possible 
to add to the load without also including in the investment 
an extension of basic services itself (or else taking away services 
from other enterprises thus again diminishing true social 
marginal productivity). Thus, although marginal productivity 
in underdeveloped countries may be assumed to be high, in 
view of the universal shortage of capital, in fact it is an irrele-
vant concept. The relevant concept is the productivity of the 
complete 'package' of directly productive capital equipment 
plus that required to produce components or complementary 
goods, plus the provision of basic services required for the 
new investment. If related to this whole 'package', productivity 
may come out quite low, as has been the experience (often 
unanticipated) of many investments in underdeveloped coun-
tries. On the other hand, as investment proceeds and becomes 
cumulative, the productivity of investment begins to increase 
again, as economies of linkage and scale come into operation. 
In our model, since we assume a poor community, in its 
early stages of development, undertaking an all-round invest-
ment programme we will have to assume fairly low producti-
vity (or its converse, a high capital/income ratio). We shall 
assume a productivity of 17 per cent, equivalent to a capitalj 
income ratio of 6 : 1.1 
1 In view of some of the subsequent argument, it may be useful to 
add here that this capital/income ratio is based on the assumption 
of orthodox forms of investment ; i.e., exclusive of special utilization 
of unemployed and underemployed labour for direct capital forma-
tion, or other unorthodox forms of investment. 
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On this assumption, the investment of $I4,000 will yield an 
annual net income of $2,333, or 2 ·3 per cent of the initial 
'national' income. 
(b) The agricultural investment target can be derived from 
the rate of structural change. Since the total population in-
creases by It per cent per annum, while the agricultural popu-
lation remains constant, it follows that agricultural productivity 
(output per person) must increase by at least If per cent per 
annum if food supplies are to be maintained. I 
This It per cent increase in productivity is, however, in the 
nature of a minimum. In practice, agricultural productivity 
will have to be increased by more. In the first place, it is not 
enough to produce I i per cent of more food ; it is also necessary 
to transfer it to the non-agricultural sector. In fact, transfer 
of food must increase by at least 4 per cent per annum if food 
supplies in the non-agricultural sector are to be maintained. 
In practice, in order to increase the transfer of food by 4 per 
cent it will be necessary to increase the productivity by more 
than I! per cent, since farmers will not normally transfer their 
total increase in food production. They will want to consume 
some of it themselves. The supply curve of farmers in under-
developed countries is notoriously inelastic or even backward 
rising. Furthermore, in the process of economic development, 
it will be necessary to provide for at least a moderate increase 
in consumption in the non-agricultural sector. Short of strong-
arm methods, some kind of incentive will have to be given 
both to farmers themselves and to the population in the non-
agricultural sector. Assuming that consumption per capita 
is to be increased by at least I per cent per annum-a small 
improvement-and assuming that farmers will transfer one-
half of their increased production, it follows that the increase 
in agricultural productivity must be at least 3 per cent. Since 
present agricultural output is $4o,ooo in our model com-
munity, an increase of $I,2oo must be achieved. This is the 
agricultural target, consistent with the general development 
outline. 
How much will it cost to achieve this increase of $1,200 per 
annum in agricultural production ? Again, circumstances differ. 
1 In underdeveloped countries, food supplies may often be considered 
as representative, for practical purposes, of consumption in general. 
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In this case, overpopulated countries may find it more expen-
sive to increase agricultural output than countries with a 
plentiful supply of land. In nearly all underdeveloped countries, 
opportunities exist for raising agricultural output by compara-
tively cheap methods, such as improved seeds, local irrigation, 
better rotation, better tools, etc. Assuming that such opportuni-
ties exist and are systematically used, it has been estimated 
that a yield of 25 per cent (or a capital/income ratio of 4 : 1) 
would be possible in agricultural investment.l 
If we accept this estimate, it would be possible to achieve 
the required increase of $1,200 per annum in the agricultural 
sector by a capital investment of $4,800. It should be under-
stood, however, that this is based on optimistic assumptions, 
and in some countries at all stages, and in most countries at 
some stages, it may be more expensive to achieve this agricul-
tural target. 
(c) We have next to consider the cost of providing for the 
natural increase of population in the non-agricultural sector. 
We shall assume that no attempt is made to provide the 
natural increase of population with a more advanced techno-
logy than that corresponding to the present level of the group 
under review. This means that 3 ·75 persons representing the 
natural increase in the non-agricultural sectors should be 
equipped with sufficient capital to produce $200 per capita 
per annum. The capital/income ratio presently obtaining in the 
non-agricultural sector is assumed to be 4 : I. This corresponds 
to a net yield of 25 per cent per annum. This assumption seems 
to fit in with the scattered data available as to net yield outside 
agriculture in underdeveloped countries. It assumes a lower 
capital/income ratio than in the case of a more advanced 
technology, because of a higher proportion of personal services, 
commercial activities and very small scale enterprise-all of 
them containing, in underdeveloped countries, an element of 
underemployment or disguised unemployment. On the other 
hand, the yield is assumed to be somewhat lower (or the capital/ 
income ratio somewhat higher} than in more developed 
countries. The reason for this is the strain on public services, 
1 Measures for the Economic Development of Underdeveloped Countries, 
a report by a group of experts appointed by the. Secretary-General 
of the United Nations, New York, May 1951, page 76, table 2. 
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lack of external economies, lower managerial standards, less 
reliable flows of raw materials and difficulties in skilled labour 
supply. The absence of a technology suitable to the abundance 
of labour and shortage of capital also makes the capital income 
ratio higher than it otherwise would be. 
If the above assumption of yield of 25 per cent is correct, it 
would take an investment of $8oo for each of the 3 ·75 persons 
representing the increase in population to be fitted into the 
non-agricultural sector. This results in a total investment of 
$3,000 and an increase in annual net income by $750. 
III 
We are now in a position to consider the aggregate cost and 
benefits of the outlined development programme, and assess 
its feasibility in relation to the available resources. The total 
cost of the development programme is $2r,8oo. Of this, $I4,ooo 
represents the cost of 'industrialization', $4,800 represents 
the cost of agricultural development, and $3,000 represents 
the cost of providing for the natural increase of population in 
the non-agricultural sector. 
The benefits from this investment add up to a $4,283 increase 
in net income per annum. This represents an increase in the 
total 'national' income of 4 ·3 per cent. When allowance is 
made for the increase in population, the increase in per capita 
income is 3 per cent. This is a fairly rapid rate of increase, 
partly because of the assumed rapid rate of structural change, 
and partly because of the assumed increase in the rate of con-
sumption as a necessary accompaniment of the structural 
change assumed. The figure of 3 per cent increase in per capita 
national income could be reduced if milder assumptions were 
made in both these respects. 
The total cost of $2r,8oo represents 22 per cent of the 
assumed national income. This is a rate of investment which, 
at low income levels, has been occasionally achieved under 
special conditions,! but clearly cannot be assumed to be 
financed by voluntary savings, even if supplemented by the 
1 Thus rates of investment exceeding 20 per cent have been estimated 
for early stages of Japanese, Russian and perhaps also British economic 
development. 
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moderate budget surpluses possible by fiscal techniques prac-
ticable in underdeveloped countries. Nor can it be expected 
that the mild degree of inflation which would still be compatible 
with the execution of a rational development programme, 
could result in 'forced savings' of anything like this degree. 
If we assume that net savings available for new investment 
of a per capita income level of $100 are no more than 6 per cent, 
it follows that only $6,ooo out of the $21,8oo required would 
be available for the financing of this development outline. 
(Six per cent net savings at this income level represents the 
present state of affairs in underdeveloped countries ; the 
assumption that all these net savings are available for the 
financing of a development programme represents a considera-
ble improvement over what is now actually achieved.) Our 
underdeveloped group is, therefore, faced with a deficit of 
$15,8oo in the financing of its development programme. 
The conclusion at which we have thus arrived is that a 
community of the type considered in the model cannot finance 
a programme of rapid economic development through capital 
investment from its presently available domestic resources. 
Unless we admit defeat at this point, there are four possible 
approaches : 
(1) The first would be to reduce the cost of the development 
programme by lowering the capital/income ratio (or increasing 
the yield per unit of capital employed). This would require 
adoption of labour-intensive technology, and possibly unortho-
dox forms of investment based on utilization of the unemployed 
and underemployed labour of our underdeveloped group. 
(2) A second approach would be to increase net savings 
through attempts at reducing consumption below the initial 
level of $94 per capita assumed to be voluntarily accepted 
with the existing distribution of income. 
(3) The third approach would be to reduce the rate of 
population increase. This would, in our model, reduce capital 
requirements in three ways: (a) less people would have to be 
transferred out of agriculture, in order to keep agricultural 
population constant in size ; (b) accordingly, the increase in 
food production would have to be less, and thus the agricul-
tural investment programme could be cut, and (c) natural 
increase of population in the non-agricultural sector would 
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be smaller. Thus, in our model, total expenditure on the 
development programme would decline exactly in proportion 
to the rate of increase in population. 
(4) Finally, it would be possible to carry out the develop-
ment programme if the domestic resources of the group are 
supplemented from outside. 
The first three cases are perhaps more conveniently sum-
marized in the more general form of 'dynamic equation' of 
the Domar-Harrod type rather than in a numerical modeL 
This is done in the last section of this article. Before doing so, 
however, the fourth case may be illustrated with the help of 
the lower section of the Model Scheme on page 382. 
If we assume that the total deficit of $r5,8oo in the initial 
year, and the deficits in subsequent years, are covered by an 
influx of foreign capital, the questions arising-all of them 
related-are: For how long has the influx of foreign capital 
to continue until development can be financed from domestic 
resources ? What will be the resulting final capital debt ? 
What balance of payments surplus will the receiving country 
have to achieve to repay the debt initially incurred ? 
Obviously the answers to these questions depend largely on 
the disposition of the increments in output achieved in the 
course of economic development. In the limiting case, if the 
whole increase is consumed and net savings remain at $6,ooo 
annually, the problem is clearly insoluble. Since requirements 
will gradually increase with the increase in aggregate popula-
tion, the deficit will increase, the period over which foreign 
capital is required will be infinite, and the final debt burden 
will be infinite. I 
The Model Scheme on page 382 incorporates three different 
assumptions about the disposition of the per capita increase 
in income. In the first instance, (I), a high marginal rate of 
savings of 50 per cent bas been assumed; in the second instance, 
(II), a still high marginal rate of savings of 20 per cent; in the 
third instance, (III), it has been assumed that the marginal 
rate of savings is no higher than the average rate of savings, 
i.e. 6 per cent. The Model Scheme shows that in the first 
1 Or at least it will last until the structure of the economy has been 
changed to the 2ojxo ratio between agriculture and non-agriculture 
which has been defined as the structure of a mature economy. 
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instance, development becomes self-supporting in 13 years; 
in the second instance, so years; in the third instance, never 
at all. The last conclusion is rather interesting : since the total 
cost of the development programme increases by It per cent 
each year, i.e. by $197 in the first year and cumulatively 
more in subsequent years, it follows that a constant increase 
in savings by $r8o each year will be as useless for achieving 
self-promoting development as no savings at all. 
It will also be noted that a reduction in the marginal rate 
of savings from so per cent to 20 per cent will increase the 
period over which the influx of foreign capital is required (and 
thus the ultimate capital debt) not twice but fourfold. This 
shows that the final debt burden is highly elastic in respect of 
marginal rates of savings. A little austerity now will save a 
lot of austerity later. 
The Model thus illustrates the strategic role of marginal rates 
of savings. Present incomes of underdeveloped countries are 
so low that there are fairly strict limits to the volume of savings 
out of present incomes. The main hope for increased savings 
rests in saving a high proportion of the increments in income 
arising in the course of economic development. This also 
indicates the importance of giving priority in development 
programmes to those kind of projects in which a high propor-
tion of the benefits can be recaptured for new investment. 
Simple benefit/cost calculations are only part of the story. 
A simple calculation from the Model will show that if the 
marginal rate of savings is as high as so per cent-i.e., if con-
sumption per capita increases at the rate of It per cent, while 
income per capita increases at the rate of 3 per cent-the total 
influx of foreign capital required over a period of 13 years will 
be approximately $roo,ooo. Assuming that this debt carries 
an average interest burden of 8 per cent, but that no amortiza-
tion is required, the repayment burden would be $8,ooo per 
annum. This would represent approximately 5 per cent of the 
national income at the moment when development has become 
self-supporting, and a falling proportion after that as the 
national income continues to increase. Over the average of 
30 years after development has become self-supporting, the 
repayment burden would amount to 3 per cent of the national 
income. S:Uce the underdeveloped countries as a whole export 
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about 20 per cent of their estimated national income, the 
initial repayment burden would require additional exports 
amounting to about one-quarter of present 'normal' exports 
falling to an export surplus of around 15 per cent over the 
average of the first 30 years of self-supporting development. 
These figures would, of course, be increased if the initial capital 
debt had to be repaid as well as serviced, but the initial burden 
of repayment would be compensated by the subsequent 
reduction in interest charges. 
These figures in proportion do not look unfeasible, but it 
should be remembered that they are based on an extraordinarily 
high rate of marginal savings, viz. so per cent. 
If the marginal rate of savings is 20 per cent (Case II), the 
required total influx of capital would amount to $4oo,ooo 
and the repayment burden after so years, when development 
becomes self-supporting, will be over 8 per cent of the national 
income, even without repayment. In view of the large capital 
debt, repayment would add heavily to the annual burden. 
Thus in the second case, the influx of foreign capital would 
not only have to be long sustained, but it would also either 
presuppose a heavily export-oriented economic development, 
or else create balance-of-payments troubles (unless, of course, 
the repayment burden is lightened through waivers, grants-
in-aid or defaults). 
In Case III, with the marginal rate of savings no higher than 
the average rate of savings, obviously, since the deficit increases 
each year by more than the assumed increment to savings of 
$I8o per annum, development will never become self-
supporting. 
The above calculations are made on the assumption of a 
constant absolute increment to net savings, equal to so per 
cent, 20 per cent, and 6 per cent respectively, of the initial 
increase in per capita incomes. This may be a somewhat pes-
simistic assumption, in view of the fact that national income 
per capita increases over the period contemplated by 3 per cent 
per annum. In spite of the fact that recent research seems to 
have shown that the income schedule of a rising propensity 
to save does not seem to hold over periods beyond trade cycles, 
it may be hopefully assumed that the annuai increment to 
savings ·will also rise by 3 per cent per annum. In that case, 
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of course, the period when development becomes self-support-
ing will be shortened, and the ultimate repayment burden 
correspondingly less. The results, on this assumption, are also 
shown in the Model Scheme on page 382, in brackets. 
It will be noted that if the increment in savings is assumed 
to rise by 3 per cent per annum, development becomes self-
supporting even in the third case when marginal savings are 
assumed to be only 6 per cent. In that case, even though 
additional savings fail to meet additional costs of development 
in the first years, they ultimately make self-supporting devel-
opment possible, since they rise at the rate of 3 per cent per 
annum, whereas the cost of development only increases at 
the rate of ri per cent per annum. Even so, 67 years are 
required for development to become self-supporting, and the 
ultimate capital debt would be very high. However, if national 
income doubles every IS years, the total national income in 
6o years would be around $r · 6 million (instead of the present 
$Ioo,ooo), and the resulting repayment burden would not 
necessarily be very high. It is not so much a high repayment 
burden, but rather the very long period of time over which 
the capital influx would have to be steadily maintained, which 
makes this approach to economic development seem unfeasible. 
IV 
We may now try to look at this problem in a more general 
fashion. A very simple, almost tautological, equation can be 
constructed which links D, the rate of economic development 
(defined as growth of per capita income and assumed to be 
proportionate to growth of per capita capital) with the rate of 
net savings (s), the productivity of new investment per unit 
of capital (p)1, and the rate of annual increase of population (r). 
The equation reads as follows : D = sp r. 
This equation can be used to answer four different questions, 
and it provides a surprising amount of insight into the mecha-
nics of development. 
I. Given the rate of net savings, productivity and population 
increase-what is the possible rate of development ? 
1 (p) also represents the inverted capital/income ratio previously 
mentioned. 
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2. Given the target rate of economic development, and 
given the productivity of capital and rate of population 
increase-what net savings are necessary to support the 
stipulated rate of development ? 
3· Given the stipulated rate of economic development, and 
given the rate of savings and of productivity, what rate of 
population increase can be supported ? 
4· Given the stipulated rate of economic development, and 
given the rate of savings and population increase-what must 
be the productivity of new investment per unit of capital 
employed ? The answer to this last question is of particular 
interest. 
The answer to all these questions can be obtained by sub-
stituting parameters in the equation. 
In illustrating the answers to he obtained, we shall stipulate 
a rate of economic development of 2 per cent annual increase 
in per capita income; a rate of net savings of 6 per cent of net 
national income; a rate of population increase of It per 
cent ; and a capitaljincome ratio for normal investment 
of 5: I.l 
The answer to Question I is as follows. With 6 per cent net 
savings, a capitalfincome ratio of 5: I and a rate of population 
increase of It per cent, no improvement in the national per 
capita income, and no economic development by means of invest-
ment is possible. The economy is a stationary economy. Since 
the estimated parameters for savings, population increase 
and capital/income ratio are believed to be fairly realistic, 
the equation would seem to explain the absence of spontan-
eous development in so many underdeveloped countries at very 
low income levels. 
2. The answer to Question 2. With a stipulated rate of dev-
elopment of 2 per cent per annum, a capital/income ratio of 5 : I 
and a rate of population increase of It per cent, a rate of net 
savings of I6i per cent is necessary, to make possible the stipulated 
rate of development. This rate of savings is about three times 
the rate actually observed in underdeveloped countries. 
1 The assumptions correspond fairly closely to those underlying 
the table on page 76 of a U.N. report by a group of experts, Measures 
for the Economic Development of Underdeveloped Countries, U.N. Depart-
ment of Economic Affairs, New York, May 1951. 
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3. Answer to Question 3· With a stipulated rate of develop-
ment of 2 per cent, a rate of net savings "Of 6 per cent and a capital/ 
income ratio of 5: I, no increase in population can be supported. 
Development at the stipulated rate would only be possible in 
a society of stationary population. 
4· Answer to Question 4· With a stipulated rate of economic 
development of 2 per cent per annum, a rate of net savings of 
6 per cent and population increasing at the rate of It per cent 
per annum, the productivity of investment per unit of capital 
would have to be 54 per cent (or a capital/income ratio of less than 
2 : I). If the normal productivity of investment is 20 per cent 
(or the capital/income ratio 5 : I} this means that the-stipulat-
ed rate of economic development can only be sustained· if 
technologies can be found using little more than one-third the 
amount of capital per unit of output than orthodox capital 
investment. 
The last result gives us the crux of the problem. Assuming 
that the yield of capital is only 20 per cent and that the tech-
nology is fixed at a capital/income ratio of 5 : I, no economic 
progress by investment is possible, unless output can be 
increased by direct utilization of unemployed and under-
employed manpower and natural resources with no, or practi-
cally no, further application of capital. Alternatively, the whole 
technology of all new investment must be diluted in the 
direction of labour intensity ; the equation indicates the 
degree to which such dilution will be necessary. 
There is yet another approach : If the required yield per 
unit of capital is 54 per cent, but the annual yield is only 20 
per cent, it might still be possible to sustain the stipulated rate 
of economic development, provided that an increase in output 
I· 7 times that achieved by new investment can be achieved 
by increasing the productivity of existing capital. Since the 
annual increase in output is 3! per cent (2 per cent per capita 
and It per cent increase in population), and since the increase 
in output is assumed to be associated with a corresponding 
increase in the amount of capital, i.e. by 3! per cent per annum, 
it follows that a further increase in output· of I· 7 times as much 
again can only be obtained by increasing the productivity of 
existing capital by (I· 7 X 3 · 25 per cent) or 5 · 525 per cent. 
The stipulated rate of development can be sustained if in addition 
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to normal investment, the productivity of existing capital is at 
the same time increased by a little over st per cent per annum. 
Studies of the cotton textile industries in Latin-American 
countries, among other studies, have shown the scope for 
improvement in the productivity of existing capital.l 
A last word may be indicated about the r (rate of population 
increase) in the equation (D = sp - r). It will be noted that 
in the equation r appears as a negative factor, with a minus 
sign. This must not be interpreted as 'proof' of the view that 
'population is an obstacle to economic development'. If the 
r -the rate of population increase-appears as a negative 
factor, this does by no means exclude the possibility that a 
high r may have such an effect on s or p that the net effect of 
an increased r may not be as negative as the formula seems 
to show, and may even be positive. The effect on s is not likely 
to be especially helpful, but the relation between r and p is 
a different kettle of fish. A state of overpopulation-the result 
of a high previous r -as well as a high current rate of increase 
in population-a high current r -provides not only a challenge 
but also an opportunity. An opportunity, that is, so to adjust 
the technology of new investment that p -increased output 
per unit of capital-rises ; and also so to increase the produc-
tivity of existing capital by the application of additional 
labour that p is again increased. 
1 Labour Productivity of the Cotton Textile Industry in Five Latin-
American Countries, United Nations Publications, Sale No.: 1951 : II. 
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ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT WITH 
UNLIMITED SUPPLIES OF LABOUR* 
. 
by W. Arthur Lewis 
THIS ESSAY IS WRITTEN IN THE CLASSICAL TRADITION, MAKING 
the classical assumption, and asking the classical question. 
The classics, from Smith to Marx, all assumed, or argued, 
that an unlimited supply of labour was available at subsistence 
wages. They then enquired how production grows through 
time. They found the answer in capital accumulation, which 
they explained in terms of their analysis of the distribution 
of income. Classical systems thus determined simultaneously 
income distribution and income growth, with the relative 
prices of commodities as a minor by-product. 
Interest in prices and in income distribution survived into 
the neo-classical era, but labour ceased to be unlimited in 
supply, and the formal model of economic analysis was no 
longer expected to explain the expansion of the system through 
time. These changes of assumption and of interest served well 
enough in the European parts of the world, where labour was 
indeed limited in supply, and where for the next half century 
it looked as if economic expansion could indeed be assumed to 
be automatic. On the other hand over the greater part of Asia 
labour is unlimited in supply, and economic expansion certainly 
cannot be taken for granted. Asia's problems, however, 
attracted very few economists during the neo-classical era 
(even the Asian economists themselves absorbed the assump-
tions and pre-occupations of European economics) and hardly 
any progress has been made for nearly a century with the 
kind of economics which would throw light upon the problems 
of countries with surplus populations. 
When Keynes's General Theory appeared, it was thought 
at first that this was the book which would illuminate the 
problems of countries with surplus labour, since it assumed 
an unlimited supply of labour at the current price, and also, 
• The Manchester School, May 1954· Reprinted by permission of 
The Manchester School and the author. 
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in its final pages, made a few remarks on secular economic 
expansion. Further reflection, however, revealed that Keynes's 
book assumed not only that labour is unlimited in supply, but 
also, and more fundamentally, that land and capital are 
unlimited in supply-more fundamentally both in the short-
run sense that once the monetary tap is turned the real limit 
to expansion is not physical resources but the limited supply 
of labour, and also in the long-run sense that secular expansion 
is embarrassed not by a shortage but by a superfluity of saving. 
Given the Keynesian remedies the neo-classical system comes 
into its own again. Hence, from the point of view of countries 
with surplus labour, Keynesianism is only a footnote to 
neo-classicism-albeit a long, important and fascinating 
footnote. The student of such economies has therefore to 
work right back to the classical economists before he finds 
an analytical framework into which he can relevantly fit his 
problems. 
The purpose of this essay is thus to see what can be made 
of the classical framework in solving problems of distribution, 
accumulation, and growth, first in a closed and then in an open 
economy. It is not primarily an essay in the history of econo-
mic doctrine, and will not therefore spend time on individual 
writers, inquiring what they meant, or assessing its validity 
or truth. Our purpose is rather to bring their framework up-
to-date, in the light of modern knowledge, and to see how far 
it then helps us to understand the contemporary problems of 
large areas of the earth. 
THE CLOSED EcoNOMY 
We have to begin by elaborating the assumption of an 
unlimited supply of labour, and by establishing that it is a 
useful assumption. We are not arguing, let it be repeated, 
that this assumption should be made for all areas of the world. 
It is obviously not true of the United Kingdom. or of North-
west Europe. It is not true either of some of the countries 
usually now lumped together as underdeveloped ; for example 
there is an acute shortage of male labour in some parts of 
Africa and of Latin America. On the other hand it is obviously 
the relevant assumption for the economies of Egypt, of India, 
or of Jamaica. Our present task is not to supersede neo-classical 
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economics, but merely to elaborate a different framework for 
those countries which the neo-classical (and Keynesian) 
assumptions do not fit. 
In the first place, an unlimited supply of labour may be 
said to exist in those countries where population is so large 
relatively to capital and natural resources, that there are large 
sectors of the economy where the marginal productivity of 
labour is negligible, zero, or even negative. Several writers 
have drawn attention to the existence of such 'disguised' 
unemployment in the agricultural sector, demonstrating in 
each case that the family holding is so small that if some 
members of the family obtained other employment the remain-
ing members could cultivate the holding just as well (of course 
they would have to work harder: the argument includes the 
proposition that they would be willing to work harder in these 
circumstances). The phenomenon is not, however, by any 
means confined to the countryside. Another large sector to 
which it applies is the whole range of casual jobs-the workers 
on the docks, the young men who rush forward asking to carry 
your bag as you appear, the jobbing gardener, and the like. 
These occupations usually have a multiple of the number they 
need, each of them earning very small sums from occasional 
employment ; frequently their number could be halved with-
out reducing output in this sector. Petty retail trading is 
also exactly of this type ; it is enormously expanded in over.: 
populated economies ; each trader makes only a few sales ; 
markets are crowded with stalls, and if the number of stalls 
were greatly reduced the consumers would be no whit worse 
off-they might even be better off, since retail margins might 
fall. Twenty years ago one could not write these sentences 
without having to stop and explain why in these circumstances, 
the casual labourers do not bid their earnings down to zero, 
or why the farmers' product is not similarly all eaten up in 
rent, but these propositions present no terrors to contemporary 
economists. 
A little more explanation has to be given of those cases 
where the workers are not self-employed, but are working for 
wages, since it is harder to believe that employers will pay 
wages exceeding marginal productivity. The most important 
of these sectors is domestic service, which is usually even more 
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inflated in overpopulated countries than is petty trading 
(in Barbados 16 per cent of the population is in domestic 
service). The reason is that in overpopulated countries the 
code of ethical behaviour so shapes itself that it becomes good 
form for each person to offer as much employment as he can. 
The line between employees and dependents is very thinly 
drawn. Social prestige requires people to have servants, and 
the grand seigneur may have to keep a whole army of retainers 
who are really little more than a burden upon his purse. This 
is found not only in domestic service, but in every sector of 
employment. Most businesses in underdeveloped countries 
employ a large number of 'messengers', whose contribution 
is almost negligible ; you see them sitting outside office doors, 
or hanging around in the courtyard. And even in the severest 
slump the agricultural or commercial employer is expected to 
keep his labour force somehow or other-it would be immoral. 
to tum them out, for how would they eat, in countries where 
the only form of unemployment assistance is the charity of 
relatives ? So it comes about that even in the sectors where 
people are working for wages, and above all the domestic 
sector, marginal productivity may be negligible or even zero. 
Whether marginal productivity is zero or negligible is not. 
however, of fundamental importance to our analysis. The 
price of labour, in these economies, is a wage at the subsistence 
level (we define this later). The supply of labour is therefore 
'unlimited' so long as the supply of labour at this price exceeds 
the demand. In this situation, new industries can be created, 
or old industries expanded without limit at the existing wage ; 
or, to put it more exactly, shortage of labour is no limit to the 
creation of new sources of employment. If we cease to ask 
whether the marginal productivity of labour is negligible and 
ask instead only the question from what sectorS would addi-
tional labour be available if new industries were created offer-
ing employment at subsistence wages, the answer becomes 
even more comprehensive. For we have then not only the 
farmers, the casuals, the petty traders and the retainers 
(domestic and commercial), but we have also three other classes 
from which to choose. 
First of all, there are the wives and daughters of the house-
hold. The employment of women outside the household 
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depends upon a great number of factors, religious and conven-
tional, and is certainly not exclusively a matter of employment 
opportunities. There are, however, a number of countries 
where the current limit is for practical purposes only employ-
ment opportunities. This is true, for example, even inside the 
United Kingdom. The proportion of women gainfully em-
ployed in the U.K. varies enormously from one region to 
another according to employment opportunities for women. 
For example, in 1939 whereas there were 52 women gainfully 
employed for every roo men in Lancashire, there were only 
15 women gainfully employed for every roo men in South 
Wales. Similarly in the Gold Coast, although there is an acute 
shortage of male labour, any industry which offered good 
employment to women would be besieged with applications. 
The transfer of women's work from the household to com-
mercial employment is one of the most notable features of 
economic development. It is not by any means all gain, but 
the gain is substantial because most of the things which women 
otherwise do in the household can in fact be done much better 
or more cheaply outside, thanks to the large-scale economies 
of specialization, and also to the use of capital (grinding grain, 
fetching water from the river, making cloth, making clothes, 
cooking the midday meal, teaching children, nursing the sick, 
etc.). One of the surest ways of increasing the national income 
is therefore to create new sources of employment for women 
outside the home. 
The second source of labour for expanding industries is 
the increase in the population resulting from the excess of 
births over deaths. This source is important in any dynamic 
analysis of how capital accumulation can occur, and employ-
ment can increase, without any increase in real wages. It was 
therefore a cornerstone of Ricardo's system. Strictly speaking, 
population increase is not relevant either to the classical 
analysis, or to the analysis which follows in this article, unless 
it can be shown that the increase of population is caused by 
economic development and would not otherwise be· so large. 
The proof of this proposition was supplied to the classical 
economists by the Malthusian law of population. There is 
already an enormous literature of the genus : 'What Mal thus 
Really Meant', into which we need not enter. Modem 
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population theory has advanced a little by analysing separately 
the effects of economic development upon the birth rate, and 
its effects on the death rate. Of the former, we know little. 
There is no evidence that the birth rate ever rises with econo-
mic development. In Western Europe it has fallen during the 
last eighty years. We are not quite sure why; we suspect that it 
was for reasons associated with development, and we hope that 
the same thing may happen in the rest of the world as develop-
ment spreads. Of the death rate we are more certain. It comes 
down with development from around 40 to around 12 per 
thousand ; in the first stage because better communications 
and trade eliminate death from local famines ; in the second 
stage because better public health facilities banish the great 
epidemic diseases of plague, smallpox, cholera, malaria, yellow 
fever (and eventually tuberculosis) ; and in the third stage 
because widespread facilities for treating the sick snatch from 
the jaws of death many who would otherwise perish in infancy 
or in their prime. Because the effect of development on the 
death rate is so swift and certain, while its effect on the birth 
rate is unsure and retarded, we can say for certain that the 
immediate effect of economic development is to cause the 
population to grow ; after some decades it begins to grow 
(we hope) less rapidly. Hence in any society where the death 
rate is around 40 per thousand, the effect of economic develop-
ment will be to generate an increase in the supply of labour. 
Marx offered a third source of labour to add to the reserve 
army, namely the unemployment generated by increasing 
efficiency. Ricardo had admitted that the creation of machin-
ery could reduce employment. Marx seized upon the argument, 
and in effect generalized it, for into the pit of unemployment 
he threw not only those displaced by machinery, but also the 
self-employed and petty capitalists who could not compete 
with larger capitalists of increasing size, enjoying the benefits 
of the economies of scale. Nowadays we reject this argument 
on empirical grounds. It is clear that the effect of capital accu-
mulation in the past has been to reduce the size of the reserve 
army, and not to increase it, so we have lost interest in argu-
ments about what is 'theoretically' possible. 
When we take account of all the sources we have now listed 
-the farmers, the casuals, the petty traders, the retainers 
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(domestic and commercial), women in the household, and 
population growth-it is clear enough that there can be in an 
overpopulated economy an enormous expansion of new in-
dustries or new employment opportunities without any short-
age of unskilled labour becoming apparent in the labour 
market. From the point of view of the effect of economic develop-
ment on wages, the supply of labour is practically unlimited. 
This applies only to unskilled labour. There may at any 
time be a shortage of skilled workers of any grade-ranging 
from masons, electricians or welders to engineers, biologists or 
administrators. Skilled labour may be the bottleneck in 
expansion, just like capital or land. Skilled labour, however, 
is only what Marshall might have called a 'quasi-bottleneck', 
if he had not had so nice a sense of elegant language. For it 
is only a very temporary bottleneck, in the sense that if the 
capital is available for development, the capitalists or their 
government will soon provide the facilities for training more 
skilled people. The real bottlenecks to expansion are therefore 
capital and natural resources, and we can proceed on the 
assumption that so long as these are available the necessary 
skills will be provided as well, though perhaps with some time lag. 
If unlimited labour is available, while capital is scarce, 
we know from the Law of Variable Proportions that the 
capital should not be spread 
thinly overall the labour. Only 
so much labour should be used 
with capital as will reduce 
the marginal productivity of N 
labour to zero. In practice, 
however, labour is not avail- WI--------'...,_ __ _ 
able at a zero wage. Capital will 
therefore be applied only up to 
the point where the marginal 
productivity of labour equals 0 M R 
the current wage. This is QUANTITY oF LABOUR 
illustrated in Figure r. The F . 
horizontal axis measures the tgure I 
quantity of labour, and the vertical axis its marginal product. 
There is a fixed amount of capital. OW is the current wage. 
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If the marginal product of labour were zero outside the capita-
list sector, OR ought to be employed. But it will pay to employ 
onlyOMin the capitalist sector. WNP is the capitalists' surplus. 
OWPM goes in wages to workers in the capitalist sector, while 
workers outside this sector (i.e. beyond M) earn what they 
can in the subsistence sector of the economy. 
The analysis requires further elaboration. In the first place, 
after what we have said earlier on about some employers in 
these economies keeping retainers, it may seem strange to 
be arguing now that labour will be employed up to the point 
where the wage equals the marginal productivity. Neverthe-
less, this is probably the right assumption to make when we 
are set upon analysing the expansion of the capitalist sector 
of the economy. For the type of capitalist who brings about 
economic expansion is not the same as the type of employer 
who treats his employees like retainers. He is more commer-
cially minded, and more conscious of efficiency, cost and 
profitability. Hence, if our interest is in an expanding capitalist 
sector, the assumption of profit maximization is probably a 
fair approximation to the troth. 
Next, we note the use of the terms 'capitalist' sector and 
'subsistence' sector. The capitalist sector is that part of the 
economy which uses reproducible capital, and pays capitalists 
for the use thereof. (This coincides with Smith's definition 
of the productive workers, who are those who work with 
capital and whose product can therefore be sold at a price 
above their wages.) We can think, if we like, of capitalists 
hiring out their capital to peasants ; in which case, there being 
by definition an unlimited number of peasants, only some will 
get capital, and these will have to pay for its use a price which 
leaves them only subsistence earnings. More usually, however, 
the use of capital is controlled by capitalists, who hire the 
services of labour. The classical analysis was therefore con-
ducted on the assumption that capital was used for hiring 
people. It does not make any difference to the argument, and 
for convenience we will follow this usage. The subsistence 
sector is by difference all that part of the economy which is 
not using reproducible capital. Output per head is lower in 
this sector than in the capitalist sector, because it is not fruc-
tified by capital (this is why it was called 'unproductive' ; 
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the distinction between productive and unproductive had 
nothing to do with whether the work yielded utility, as some 
neo-classicists have scornfully but erroneously asserted). As 
more capital becomes available more workers can be drawn 
into the capitalist from the subsistence sector, and their 
output per head rises as they move from the one sector to 
the other. 
Thirdly we take account of the fact that the capitalist 
sector, like the subsistence sector, can also be subdivided. 
What we have is not one island of expanding capitalist em-
ployment, surrounded by a vast sea of subsistence workers, but 
rather a number of such tiny islands. This is very typical of 
countries in their early stages of development. We find a few 
industries highly capitalized, such as mining or electric power, 
side by side with the most primitive techniques ; a few high 
class shops, surrounded by masses of old style traders ; a few 
highly capitalized plantations, surrounded by a sea of peasants. 
But we find the same contrasts also outside their economic 
life. There are one or two modern towns, with the finest archi-
tecture, water supplies, communications and the like, into 
which people drift from other towns and villages which might 
almost belong to another planet. There is the same contrast 
even between people ; between the few highly westernized, 
trousered, natives, educated in western universities, speaking 
western languages, and glorying in Beethoven, Mill, Marx or 
Einstein, and the great mass of their countrymen who live 
in quite other worlds. Capital and new ideas are not thinly 
diffused throughout the economy ; they are highly concen-
trated at a number of points, from which they spread outwards. 
Though the capitalized sector can be subdivided into islands, 
it remains a single sector because of the effect of competition 
in tending to equalize the earnings on capital. The competitive 
principle does not demand that the same amount of capital 
per person be employed on each 'island', or that average 
profit per unit of capital be the same, but only that the margi-
nal profit be the same. Thus, even if marginal profits were the 
same all round, islands which yield diminishing returns may 
be more profitable than others, the earliest capitalists having 
cornered the vantage points. But in any case marginal profits 
are not the same all round. In backward economies knowledge 
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is one of the scarcest goods. Capitalists have experience of 
certain types of investment, say of trading or plantation 
agriculture, and not of other types, say of manufacturing, 
and they stick to what they know. So the economy is fre-
quently lopsided in the sense that there is excessive invest-
ment in some parts and underinvestment in others. Also, 
financial institutions are more highly developed for some 
purposes than for others-capital can be got cheaply for trade, 
but not for house building or for peasant agriculture, for 
instance. Even in a very highly developed economy the tend-
ency for capital to flow evenly through the economy is very 
weak ; in a backward economy it hardly exists. Inevitably 
what one gets are very heavily developed patches of the 
economy, surrounded by economic darkness. 
Next we must say something about the wage level. The 
wage which the expanding capitalist sector has to pay is 
determined by what people can earn outside that sector. The 
classical economists used to think of the wage as being deter-
mined by what is required for subsistence consumption, and 
this may be the right solution in some cases. However, in 
economies where the majority of the people are peasant 
farmers, working on their own land, we have a more objective 
index, for the minimum at which labour can be had is now set 
by the average product of the farmer; men will not leave the 
family farm to seek employment if the wage is worth less than 
they would be able to consume if they remained at home. This 
objective standard, alas, disappears again if the farmers have 
to pay rent, for their net earnings will then depend upon the 
amount of rent they have to pay, and in overpopulated coun-
tries the rent will probably be adjusted so as to leave them 
just enough for a conventional level of subsistence. It is not, 
however, of great importance to the argument whether earnings 
in the subsistence sector are determined objectively by the 
level of peasant productivity, or subjectively in terms of a 
conventional standard of living. Whatever the mechanism, 
the result is an unlimited supply of labour for which this is the 
minimum level of earnings. 
The fact that the wage level in the capitalist sector depends 
upon earnings in the subsistence sector is sometimes of im-
mense political importance, since its effect is that capitalists 
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have a direct interest in holding down the productivity of the 
subsistence workers. Thus, the owners of plantations have no 
interest in seeing knowledge of new techniques or new seeds 
conveyed to the peasants, and if they are influential in the 
government, they will not be found using their influence to 
expand the facilities for agricultural extension. They will not 
support proposals for land settlement, and are often instead 
to be found engaged in turning the peasants off their lands. 
(Cf. Marx on 'Primary Accumulation'.) This is one of the 
worst features of imperialism, for instance. The imperialists 
invest capital and hire workers ; it is to their advantage to 
'keep wages low, and even in those cases where they do not 
actually go out of their way to impoverish the subsistence 
economy, they will at least very seldom be found doing any-
thing to make it more productive. In actual fact the record of 
every imperial power in Africa in modern times is one of im-
poverishing the subsistence economy, either by taking away 
the people's land, or by demanding forced labour in the capita-
list sector, or by imposing taxes to drive people to work for 
capitalist employers. Compared with what they have spent on 
providing facilities for European agriculture or mining, their 
expenditure on the improvement of African agriculture has been 
negligible. The failure of imperialism to raise living standards 
is not wholly to be attributed to self interest, but there are 
many places where it can be traced directly to the effects of 
having imperial capital invested in agriculture or in mining. 
Earnings in the subsistence sector set a floor to wages in 
the capitalist sector, but in practice wages have to be higher 
than this, and there is usually a gap of 30 per cent or more 
between capitalist wages and subsistence earnings. This gap 
may be explained in several ways. Part of the difference is 
illusory, because of the higher cost of living in the capitalist 
sector. This· may be due to the capitalist sector being concen-
trated in congested towns, so that rents and transport costs 
are higher. All the same, there is also usually a substantial 
difference in real wages. This may be required because of the 
psychological cost of transferring from the easy going way of 
life of the subsistence sector to the more regimented and 
urbanized environment of the capitalist sector. Or it may be 
a recognition of the fact that even the unskilled worker is of 
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more use to the capitalist sector after he has been there for 
some time than is the raw recruit from the.country. Or it may 
itself represent a difference in conventional standards, workers 
in the capitalist sector acquiring tastes and a social prestige 
which have conventionally to be recognized by higher real 
wages. That this last may be the explanation is suggested 
by cases where the capitalist workers organize themselves into 
trade unions and strive to protect or increase their differential. 
But the differential exists even where there are no unions. 
The effect of this gap is 
shown diagrammatically in 
Figure 2, which is drawn on 
the same basis as Figure r. 
OS now represents subsist- N .----
ence earnings, and OW the 
capitalist wage (real not 
money). To borrow an Wt-------~Q 
analogy from the sea, the S ----------------- -- ... ----
frontier of competition bet-
ween capitalist and subsis-
tence labour now appears o.__ __________ _ 
not as a beach but as a 
cliff. 
QUANTITY OF LABOUR 
Figure 2 
This phenomenon of a gap between the earnings of com-
peting suppliers is found even in the most advanced economies. 
Much of the difference between the earnings of different classes 
of the population (grades of skill, of education, of responsibility 
or of prestige) can be described only in these terms. Neither 
is the phenomenon confined to labour. We know of course 
that two firms in a competitive market need not have the 
same average profits if one has some superiority to the other; 
we reflect this difference in rents, and ask only that marginal 
rates of profit should be the same. We know also that marginal 
rates will not be the same if ignorance prevails-this point we 
have mentioned earlier. What is often puzzling in a competitive 
industry is to find a difference in marginal profits, or marginal 
costs, without ignorance, and yet without the more efficient 
firm driving its rivals out of business. It is as if the more effici-
ent says : 'I could compete with you, but I won't', which is 
also what subsistence labour says when it does not transfer to 
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capitalist employment unless real wages are substantially 
higher. The more efficient firm, instead of competing wherever 
its real costs are marginally less than its rivals, establishes 
for itself superior standards of remuneration. It pays its workers 
more and lavishes welfare services, scholarships and pensions 
upon them. It demands a higher rate on its marginal invest-
ments ; where its competitors would be satisfied with IO per 
cent, it demands 20 per cent, to keep up its average record. 
It goes in for prestige expenditure, contributing to hospitals, 
universities, flood relief and such. Its highest executives spend 
their time sitting on public committees, and have to have 
deputies to do their work. When all this is taken into account 
it is not at all surprising to find a competitive equilibrium in 
which high cost firms survive easily side by side with firms of 
much greater efficiency. 
So far we have merely been setting the stage. Now the play 
begins. For we can now begin to trace the process of economic 
expansion. 
The key to the process is the use which is made of the capi-
talist surplus. In so far as this is reinvested in creating new 
capital, the capitalist sector expands, taking more people 
into capitalist employment out of the subsistence sector. The 
surplus is then larger still, capital formation is still greater, 
and so the process continues 
until the labour surplus 
disappears. N 4 
OS is as before average N3·---
subsistence earnings, and ~ ~ 
OW the capitalist wage. 
WN1Q1 represents the 
surplus in the initial stage. w 1----=---"'-=;....,..:::..;_.;;..;;:...;-:a. 
Since some of this is S --- -- -- -- --- --- - - --
reinvested, the amount of 
fixed capital increases. 
Hence the schedule of the 0 '------------
marginal productivity of QUAN~ITY OF LA80Uit 
labour is now raised F~gure 3 
throughout, to the level of N 2Q 2• Both the surplus and capitalist 
employment are now larger. Further reinvestment raises the 
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schedule of the marginal productivity of labour to N 3Q3• And 
the process continues so long as there is surplus labour. 
Various comments are needed in elaboration. First, as 
to the relationship between capital, technical progress, and 
productivity. In theory it should be possible to distinguish 
between the growth of capital and the growth of technical 
knowledge, but in practice it is neither possible nor necessary 
for this analysis. As a matter of statistical analysis, differen-
tiating the effects of capital and of knowledge in any industry 
is straightforward if the product is homogeneous through 
time, if the physical inputs are also unchanged (in kind) and 
if the relative prices of the inputs have remained constant. 
But when we try to do it for any industry in practice we usually 
find that the product has changed, the inputs have changed 
and relative prices have changed, so that we get any number 
of indices of technical progress from the same data, according 
to the assumptions and the type of index number which we· 
use. In any case, for the purpose of this analysis it is unneces-
sary to distinguish between capital formation and the growth 
of knowledge within the capitalist sector. Growth of technical 
knowledge outside the capitalist sector would be fundamentally 
important, since it would raise the level of wages, and so reduce 
the capitalist surplus. But inside the capitalist sector know-
ledge and capital work in the same direction, to raise the 
surplus and to increase employment. They also work together. 
The application of new technical knowledge usually requires 
new investment, and whether the new knowledge is capital-
saving (and thus equivalent to an increase in capital) or labour-
saving (and thus equivalent to an increase in the marginal 
productivity of labour) makes no difference to our diagram. 
Capital and technical knowledge also work together in the 
sense that in economies where techniques are stagnant savings 
are not so readily applied to increasing productive capital; 
in such economies it is more usual to use savings for building 
pyramids, churches, and other such durable consumer goods. 
Accordingly, in this analysis the growth of productive capital 
and the growth of technical knowledge are treated as a single 
phenomenon (just as we earlier decided that we could treat 
the growth of the supply of skilled labour and the growth of 
capital as a single phenomenon in long-run analysis). 
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Next we must consider more closely the capitalist surplus. 
Malthus wanted to know what the capitalists would do with 
this ever-growing surplus ; surely this would be an embarrass-
ing glut of commodities ? Ricardo replied that there would be 
no glut ; what the capitalists did not consume themselves, 
they would use for paying the wages of workers to create more 
fixed capital (this is a free interpretation, since the classical 
economists associated the expansion of employment with an 
increase of circulating rather than of fixed capital). This new 
fixed capital would then in the next stage make possible the 
employment of more people in the capitalist sector. Malthus 
persisted; why should the capitalists '}:>roduce more capital to 
produce a larger surplus which could only be used for produc-
ing still more capital and so ad infinitum? To this Marx 
supplied one answer : capitalists have a passion for accumulat-
ing capital. Ricardo supplied another : if they don't want to 
accumulate, they will consume instead of saving ; provided 
there is no propensity to hoard, there will be no glut. Employ-
ment in the next stage will not be as big as it would have been 
if they had created more fixed capital and so brought more 
workers into the capitalist sector, but so long as there is no 
hoarding it makes no difference to the current level of employ-
ment whether capitalists decide to consume or to save. Malthus 
then raised another question ; suppose that the capitalists 
do save and invest without hoarding, surely the fact that 
capital is growing more rapidly than consumption must so 
lower the rate of profit on capital that there comes a point 
when they decide that it is not worth while to invest ? This 
Ricardo replied, is impossible ; since the supply of labour is 
unlimited, you can always find employment for any amount of 
capital. This is absolutely correct, for his model ; in the neo-
classical model capital grows faster than labour, and so one 
has to ask whether the rate of profit will not fall, but in the 
classical model the unlimited supply of labour means that the 
capital/labour ratio, and therefore the rate of surplus, can be 
held constant for any quantity of capital (i.e. unlimited 
'widening' is possible). The only fly in the ointment is that 
there may develop a shortage of natural resources, so that 
though the c:apitalists get any amount of labour at a constant 
wage, they have to pay ever rising rents to landlords. This 
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was what worried Ricardo ; it was important to him to dis-
tinguish that part of the surplus which goes to landlords from 
that part which goes to capitalists, since he believed that 
economic development inevitably increases the relative scarcity 
of land. We are not so certain of this as he was. Certainly 
development increases the rent of urban sites fantastically, 
but its effect on rural rents depends on the rate of technical 
progress in agriculture, which Malthus and Ricardo both 
gravely underestimated. If we assume technical progress in 
agriculture, no hoarding, and unlimited labour at a constant 
wage, the rate of profit on capital cannot fall. On the contrary 
it must increase, since all the benefit of technical progress in 
the capitalist sector accrues to the capitalists. 
Marx's interest in the surplus was ethical as well as scientific. 
He regarded it as robbery of the workers. His descendants are 
less certain of this. The surplus, after all, is only partly con-
sumed ; the other part is used for capital formation. As for 
the part which is consumed, some of it is a genuine payment 
for service rendered-for managerial or entrepreneurial ser-
vices, as well as for the services of public administrators, 
whether these are paid salaries out of taxes, or whether they 
live off their rents or rentes while performing unpaid public 
duties as magistrates, lord-lieutenants, or the like. Even in 
the U.S.S.R. all these functionaries are paid out of the surplus, 
and handsomely paid too. It is arguable that these services 
are overpaid; this is why we have progressive taxation, and 
it is also one of the more dubious arguments for nationaliza-
tion (more dubious because the functionaries of public cor-
porations have to be paid the market rate if the economy is 
only partially nationalized). But it is not arguable that all 
this part of the surplus (i.e. the part consumed) morally belongs 
to the workers, in any sense. As for the part which is used for 
capital formation, the experience of the U.S.S.R. is that this 
is increased, and not reduced, by transforming the ownership 
of capital. Expropriation deprives the capitalists of control 
over this part of the surplus, and of the right to consume this 
part at some later date, but it does nothing whatever to 
transfer this part of the surplus to the workers. Marx's emo-
tional approach was a natural reaction to the classical writers, 
who sometimes in unguarded moments wrote as if the capitalist 
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surplus and its increase were all that counted in the national 
income (cf. Ricardo, who called it 'the net revenue' of produc-
tion). All this, however, is by the way; for our present interest 
is not in ethical questions, but in how the model works. 
The central problem in the theory of economic develop-
ment is to understand the process by which a community 
which was previously saving and investing 4 or 5 per cent of 
its national income or less, converts itself into an economy 
where voluntary saving is running at about 12 to 15 per cent 
of national income or more. This is the central problem because 
the central fact of economic development is rapid capital 
accumulation (including knowledge and skills with capital). 
We cannot explain any' industrial' revolution (as the economic 
historians pretend to do) until we can explain why saving 
increased relatively to national income. 
It is possible that the explanation is simply that some 
psychological change occurs which causes people to be more 
thrifty. This, however, is not a plausible explanation. We are 
interested not in the people in general, but only say in the 
10 per cent of them with the largest incomes, who in countries 
with surplus labour receive up to 40 per cent of the national 
income (nearer 30 per cent in more developed countries). The 
remaining go per cent of the people never manage to save 
a significant fraction of their incomes. The important question 
is why does the top 10 per cent save more? The reason may 
be because they decide to consume less. but this reason does 
not square with the facts. There is no evidence of a fall in 
personal consumption by the top 10 per cent at a time when 
industrial revolutions are occurring. It is also possible that, 
though they do not save any more, the top IO per cent spend 
less of their income on durable consumer goods (tombs, coun-
try houses, temples) and more on productive capital. Certainly, 
if one compares different civilizations this is a striking differ-
ence in the disposition of income. Civilizations in which there 
is a rapid growth of technical knowledge or expansion of other 
opportunities present more profitable outlets for investment 
than do technologically stagnant civilizations, and tempt 
capital into productive channels rather than into the building 
of monuments. But if one takes a country only over the course 
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of the hundred years during which it undergoes a revolution 
in the rate of capital formation, there is no noticeable change 
in this regard. Certainly, judging by the novels, the top 10 
per cent in England were not spending noticeably less on 
durable consumer goods in r8oo than they were in 1700. 
Much the most plausible explanation is that people save 
more because they have more to save. This is not to say merely 
that the national income per head is larger, since there is no 
clear evidence that the proportion of the national income 
saved increases with national income per head-at any rate 
our fragmentary evidence for the United Kingdom and for the 
United States suggests that this is not so. The explanation is 
much more likely to be that saving increases relatively to the 
national income because the incomes of the savers increase 
, relatively to the national income. The central fact of economic 
development is that the distribution of incomes is altered in 
favour of the saving class. 
Practically all saving is done by people who receive profits 
or rents. Workers' savings are very small. The middle-classes 
save a little, but in practically every community the savings of 
the middle-classes out of their salaries are of little consequence 
for productive investment. Most members of the middle-class 
are engaged in the perpetual struggle to keep up with the 
Jones's; if they manage to save enough to buy the house in 
which they live, they are doing well. They may save to educate 
their children, or to subsist in their old age, but this saving 
is virtually offset by the savings being used up for the same 
purposes. Insurance is the middle-class's favourite form of 
saving in modern societies, yet in the U.K., where the habit 
is extremely well developed, the annual net increase in insur-
ance funds from all classes, rich, middle, and poor is less than 
r}- per cent of the national income. It is doubtful if the wage 
and salary classes ever anywhere save as much as 3 per cent 
of the national income, net (possible exception: Japan). If 
we are interested in savings, we must concentrate attention 
upon profits and rents. 
For our purpose it does not matter whether profits are 
distributed or undistributed; the major source of savings is 
profits, and if we find that savings are increasing as a propor-
tion of the national income, we may take it for granted that 
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this is because the share of profits in the national income is 
increasing. (As a refinement, for highly taxed communities, 
we should say profits net of taxes upon profits, whether per-
sonal income or corporate taxes.) Our problem then becomes 
what are the circumstances in which the share of profits in 
the national income increases ? 
The modified classical model which we are using here has 
the virtue of answering the question. In the beginning, the 
national income consists almost entirely of subsistence income. 
Abstracting from population growth and assuming that the 
marginal product of labour is zero, this subsistence income 
remains constant throughout the expansion, since by definition 
labour can be yielded up to the expanding capitalist sector 
without reducing subsistence output. The process therefore 
increases the capitalist surplus and the income of capitalist 
employees, taken together, as a proportion of the national 
income. It is possible to imagine conditions in which the 
surplus nevertheless does not increase relatively to national 
income. This requires that capitalist employment should 
expand relatively much faster than the surplus, so that within 
the capitalist sector gross margins or profit plus rent are falling 
sharply relatively to wages. We know that this does not 
happen. Even if gross margins were constant, profits in our 
model would be increasing relatively to national income. But 
gross margins are not likely to be constant in our model, which 
assumes that practically the whole benefit of capital accumu-
lation and of technical progress goes into the surplus; because 
real wages are constant, all that the workers get out of the 
expansion is that more of them are employed at a wage above 
the subsistence earnings. The model says, in effect, that if 
unlimited supplies of labour are available at a constant real 
wage, and if any part of profits is reinvested in productive 
capacity, profits will grow continuously relatively to the 
national income, and capital formation will also grow relatively 
to the national income. 
The model also covers the case of a technical revolution. 
Some historians have suggested that the capital for the British 
Industrial Revolution came out of profits made possible by a 
spate of inventions occurring together. This is extremely hard to 
fit into the neo-classical model, since it involves the assumption 
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that these inventions raised the marginal productivity of 
capital more than they raised the marginal productivity of 
labour, a proposition which it is hard to establish in any 
economy where labour is scarce. (If we do not make this 
assumption, other incomes rise just as fast as profits, and 
investment does not increase relatively to national income.) 
On the other hand the suggestion fits beautifully into the 
modified classical model, since in this model practically the 
whole benefit of inventions goes into the surplus, and becomes 
available for further capital accumulation. 
This model also helps us to face squarely the nature of the 
economic problem of backward countries. If we ask, 'Why do 
they save so little?', the truthful answer is not 'Because they 
are so poor', as we might be tempted to conclude from the 
path-breaking and praiseworthy correlations of Mr Colin 
Clark. The truthful answer is 'Because their capitalist sector 
is so small' (remembering that 'capitalist' here does not mean 
private capitalist, but wo.uld apply equally to state capitalist). 
If they had a larger capitalist sector, profits would be a greater 
part of their national income, and saving and investment 
would also be relatively larger. (The state capitalist can accu-
mulate capital even faster than the private capitalist, since 
he can use for the purpose not only the profits of the capitalist 
sector, but also what he can force or tax out of the subsistence 
sector.) 
Another point which we must note is that though the 
increase of the capitalist sector involves an increase in the 
inequality of incomes, as between capitalists and the rest, mere 
inequality of income is not enough to ensure a high level of 
saving. In point of fact the inequality of income is greater in 
overpopulated underdeveloped countries than it is in advanced 
industrial nations, for the simple reason that agricultural 
rents are so high in the former. Eighteenth century British 
economists took it for granted that the landlord class is given 
to prodigal consumption rather than to productive investment, 
and this is certainly true of landlords in underdeveloped coun-
tries. Hence, given two countries of equal incomes, in which 
distribution is more unequal in one than in the other, savings 
may be greater where distribution is more equal if profits are 
higher relatively to rents. It is the inequality which goes with 
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profits that favours capital formation, and not the inequality 
which goes with rents. Correspondingly, it is very hard to 
argue that these countries cannot afford to save more, when 
40 per cent or so of the national income is going to the top IO 
per cent, and so much of rent incomes is squandered. 
Behind this analysis also lies the sociological problem of 
the emergence of a capitalist class, that is to say of a group of 
men who think in terms of investing capital productively. 
The dominant classes in backward economies-landlords, 
traders, moneylenders, priests, soldiers, princes-do not nor· 
mally think in these terms. What causes a society to grow a 
capitalist class is a very difficult question, to which probably, 
there is no general answer. Most countries seem to begin by 
importing their capitalists from abroad; and in these days 
many (e.g. U.S.S.R., India) are growing a class of state capital-
ists who, for political reasons of one sort or another, are deter-
mined to create capital rapidly on public account. As for 
indigenous private capitalists, their emergence is probably 
bound up with the emergence of new opportunities, especially 
something that widens the market, associated with some new 
technique which greatly increases the productivity of labour 
if labour and capital are used together. Once a capitalist sector 
has emerged, it is only a matter of time before it becomes 
sizeable. If very little technical progress is occurring, the 
surplus will grow only slowly. But if for one reason or another 
the opportunities for using capital productively increase 
rapidly, the surplus will also grow rapidly, and the capitalist 
class with it. 
In our model so far capital is created only out of profits 
earned. In the real world, however, capitalists also create 
capital as a result of a net increase in the supply of money-
especially bank credit. We have now also to take account 
of this. 
In the neo-classical model capital can be created only by 
withdrawing resources from producing .consumer goods. In 
our model, however, there is surplus labour, and if (as we 
shall assume) its marginal productivity is zero, and if, also, 
capital can be created by labour without withdrawing scarce 
land and capital from other use5~> then capital can be created 
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without reducing the output of consumer goods. This second 
proviso is important, since if we need capital or land to make 
capital the results in our model are the same as the results in 
the neo-classical model, despite the fact that there is surplus 
labour. However, in practice the proviso is often fulfilled. 
Food cannot be grown without land, but roads, viaducts, 
irrigation channels and buildings can be created by human 
labour with hardly any capital to speak of-witness the 
Pyramids, or the marvellous railway tunnels built in the mid-
nineteenth century almost with bare hands. Even in modern 
industrial countries constructional activity, which lends itself 
to hand labour, is as much as so or 6o per cent of gross fixed 
investment, so it is not difficult to think of labour creating 
capital without using any but the simplest tools. The classical 
economists were not wrong in thinking of lack of circulating 
capital as being a more serious obstacle to expansion in their 
world than lack of fixed capital. In the analysis which follows 
in this section we assume that surplus labour cannot be used to 
make consumer goods without using up more land or capital, 
but can be used to make capital goods without using any 
scarce factors. 
If a community is short of capital, and has idle resources 
which can be set to creating capital, it seems very desirable 
on the face of the matter that this should be done, even if it 
means creating extra money to finance the extra employment. 
There is no loss of other output while the new capital is being 
made, and when it comes into use it will raise output and 
employment in just the same way as would capital financed 
not by credit creation but out of profits. The difference between 
profit-financed and credit-financed capital is not in the ultimate 
effects on output, but in the immediate effects on prices and 
on the distribution of income. 
Before we come to the effects on prices, however, we should 
pause a moment to notice what happens to the output of con-
sumer goods in this model and the others while credit-financed 
capital is being created, but before it begins to be used. In the 
neo-classical model an increase in capital formation has to be 
accompanied by a corresponding fall in the output of consumer 
goods, since scarce resources can do one or the other. In the 
Keynesian model an increase in capital formation also increases 
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the output of consumer goods, and if the multiplier exceeds 2, 
the output of consumer goods increases even more than capital 
formation. In our model capital formation goes up, but the 
output of consumer goods is not immediately affected. This is 
one of those crucial cases where it is important to be certain 
that one is using the right model when it comes to giving 
advice on economic policy. 
In our model, if surplus labour is put to capital formation 
and paid out of new money, prices rise, because the stream of 
money purchases is swollen while the output of consumer goods 
is for the time being constant. What is happening is that the 
fixed amount of consumer goods is being redistributed, towards 
the workers newly employed, away from the rest of the com-
munity (this is where the lack of circulating capital comes into 
the picture). This process is not 'forced saving' in the useful 
sense of that term. In the neo-classical model the output of 
consumer goods is reduced, forcing the community as a whole 
to save. In our model, however, consumer-goods output is 
not at any time reduced ; there is a forced redistribution of 
consumption, but not forced saving. And, of course, as soon 
as the capital goods begin to yield output, consumption begins 
to rise. 
This inflationary process does not go on for ever ; it comes 
to an end when voluntary savings increase to a level where 
they are equal to the inflated level of investment. Since savings 
are a function of profits, this means that the inflation con-
tinues until profits increase so much relatively to the national 
income that capitalists can now finance the higher rate of 
investment out of their profits without any further recourse 
to monetary expansion. Essentially equilibrium is secured by 
raising the ratio of profits to the national income. The equili-
brator need not however be profits ; it might equally be govern-
ment receipts, if there is a structure of taxes such that the 
ratio of government receipts to the national income rises 
automatically as the national income rises. This seems to be 
just about what happened in the U.S.S.R. In the crucial 
years when the economy was being transformed from a 5 per 
cent to a (probably) 20 per cent net saver, there was a tre-
mendous inflation of prices (apparently prices rose about 
700 per cent in a decade), but the inflationary profits largely 
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went to the government in the form of turnover tax, and by 
the end of the decade a new equilibrium was in sight. 
It is not, however, always a simple matter to raise profits 
relatively to national income simply by turning on the mone-
tary tap. The simplest and most extreme model of an inflation 
would be to assume that when the capitalists finance capital 
formation by creating credit, the money all comes back to 
them in the very next round in the form of an increase in 
their profits. In such a model profits, voluntary savings and 
capital formation can be raised to any desired level in a very 
short time, with only a small increase in prices. Something 
like this may well apply in the U.S.S.R. In real terms, however, 
this implies that there has been a fall in the share of the 
national income received by' other people, including a fall in 
their real consumption, since they have had to 'release consumer 
goods for the previously unemployed who are now engaged in 
capital formation. It may be the farmers who are worse off, 
this showing itself in the prices of manufactures rising relatively 
to farm prices. Or it may be the workers in the capitalist sector 
who are worse off, because farm prices and the prices of manu-
factures rise faster than their wages. Or the blow may be 
falling upon salaried workers, pensioners, landlords or creditors. 
Now in the real world none of these classes will take this lying 
down. In the U.S.S.R., where the intention was that the 
capital formation should be at the expense of the farmers, it 
led in the end to organized violence on both sides. In our 
model it is hard to get away with it at the expense of the 
workers, since the wage in the capitalist sector must stand at a 
certain minimum level above subsistence earnings if labour 
is to be available. Generally, what happens as prices rise is 
that new contracts have to be made to take account of rising 
price levels. Some classes get caught, but only temporarily. 
Now, if one pursued this argument logically, it would lead 
to the conclusion that equilibrium could never be reached-
at any rate, so long as the banking system is content to supply 
all 'legitimate' demands for money. If none of the other 
classes can be soak_ed, it seems impossible for profits to rise 
relatively to the national income for more than a temporary 
space, and it therefore seems impossible to reach an equilibrium 
level of savings equal to the new level of investment. The 
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inflation, once begun, goes on for ever. This, however, is not 
possible for another reason, namely the fact that the real 
national income is not fixed, but rising, as a result of the 
capital formation. Therefore all that is required is that capi-
talists' real incomes rise faster than other people's. Beyond 
the first year or two, when the additional consumer goods 
begin to appear, it is not necessary for any class to reduce its 
consumption. By the time the process of recontracting has 
begun, output has also begun to rise, and it is therefore possible 
to reach a modus vivendi. 
We can give an exact description of this equilibrium in our 
modified classical model. In this model the average subsist-
ence real income is given, and so also therefore is the real 
wage in the capitalist sector. It i~ not possible, by inflation or 
otherwise, to reach a new equilibrium in which the capitalist 
surplus has increased at the expense of either of these. If, 
therefore, the capitalists begin to finance capital formation 
out of credit, they lower the real incomes of the others only 
temporarily. Wages would then be chasing prices continuously 
but for the fact that, since output is growing all the time, 
profits are growing all the time. Hence the part of the invest-
ment which is financed out of credit is diminishing all the 
time, until equilibrium is reached. For example, suppose that 
an investment of £roo a year yields £zo a year profit, of which 
£ro a year is saved. Then, if capitalists invest an extra £roo 
a year, all of which in the first year is financed out of credit, 
by the eleventh year profits will be £zoo a year greater, savings 
will be £roo a year greater and there will be no further mon-
etary pressure on prices. All that will remain from the episode 
is that there will be £r,ooo more useful productive capital at 
work than there would have if the credit creation had not 
taken place. 
Thus we have two simple models marking the extreme 
cases. In the first, all the credit created comes back to the 
capitalists at once as profits (or to the state capitalist as taxes). 
Equilibrium is then reached easily, with the capitalists gaining 
at the expense of all others. In the other model the capitalists 
can only gain temporarily ; equilibrium then takes much 
longer to reach, but it is reached· eventually. In the first case 
we need only an expansion of money income ; but in the second 
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case it is the expansion of real income which eventually brings 
the capitalists the required proportion of the national income. 
The fact that capital formation increases real output must 
also be borne in mind in the analysis of the effects of credit 
creation upon prices. The inflations which loom most in our 
minds are those which occur in war-time, when resources are 
being withdrawn from producing consumer goods. If the 
supply of money is increasing while the output of goods is 
falling, anything can happen to prices. Inflation for the purpose 
of capital formation, however, is a very different kettle of fish. 
For it results in increasing consumer-goods output, and this 
results in falling prices if the quantity of money is held constant. 
Perhaps it may be as well to illustrate a simple case. Suppose 
that £roo is invested every year, in the first instance by creat-
ing credit, and that each investment yields £30 a year in its 
second year and after. Suppose that it costs nothing to reap 
the yield ; the price of £30 charged for the product being pure 
rent derived from its scarcity tinvestment in an irrigation 
works is a nearly perfect illustration). Then, if we use the 
Keynesian formula for a demand inflation, and assume the 
multiplier to be z, money income will rise to an equilibrium 
level of + £zoo a year. Output, however, will begin to increase 
by + £30 a year from the second year onward. By the eighth 
year output will have increased by £zro, while money 
income will have increased only by slightly less than £zoo. 
Thereafter prices will be below the initial level, and will fall 
continuously. The alleged precision of this analysis is of course 
subject to all the usual objections against applying multiplier 
analysis to inflationary conditions, namely the instability of 
the propensity to consume, the effect of secondary investment, 
and the dangers of cost inflation. But though the precision is 
spurious, the result is nevertheless real. Inflation for purposes 
of capital formation is self-destructive. Prices begin to rise, 
but are sooner or later overtaken by rising output, and may, 
in the last state, end up lower than they were at the beginning. 
W.e may now sum up this section. Capital formation is 
financed not only out of profits but also out of an expansion of 
credit. This speeds up the growth of capital, and the growth 
of real income. It also results in some redistribution of the 
national income, either temporarily or permanently, according 
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to the assumptions one makes-in the model we are using, the 
redistribution is only temporary. It also prevents prices from 
falling, as they otherwise would (if money is constant and 
output rising), and it may drive prices up substantially if (as in 
our model) the distribution of income cannot be altered per-
manently by monetary measures, since prices will then con-
tinue to rise until real output has risen enough to effect the 
required redistribution. Thereafter prices fall further, since 
inflation raises prices while capital is being created, but the 
increased output which then results brings them down again. 
One point remains. We have seen that if new money is 
used to finance capital formation the rise of prices eventually 
peters out, as savings grow into equilibrium with investment ; 
and reverses itself, as the output of consumer goods begins to 
pour out. The new equilibrium, however, may take a long 
time to reach, and if also the flow of new money is substantial 
the resulting rise of prices may strike fear into the hearts of the 
public. People do not panic if prices rise for two or three years ; 
but after that they may begin to lose confidence in money, and 
it may become necessary to call a drastic halt. This is the 
most important practical limitation on the extent to which 
capital formation can be financed in this way. This is why the 
banking authorities have always tended to alternate short 
periods of easy credit with sharp periods of restriction. Bank 
credit moves three steps up and one step down instead of 
moving up continuously. This also brings us to the threshold 
of the h"ade cycle. If capital were financed exclusively out of 
profits, and if there were also no hoarding, capital formation 
would proceed steadily. It is mainly the existence of an elastic 
credit system which makes the trade cycle an integral part 
of the mechanism of economic development in an unplanned 
economy. It is not necessary, however, for us to enter into 
analysis of the cycle since in this respect the model we are 
using does not yield results different from those of other models. 
We have said very little so far about the activities of gov;ern-
ment, since our basic model uses only capitalists, their em-
ployees, and subsistence producers. Governments affect the 
process of capital accumulation ·in many ways, however, 
and not least by the inflations into which they run. Many 
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governments in backward countries are also currently anxious 
to use surplus manpower for capital formation, and as there 
is a great deal that can be done with labour and a few tools 
(roads, irrigation, river walls, schools and so on), it is useful to 
say something on the subject. We shall therefore in this section 
analyse the effect of inflation-financed government formation 
of capital, and thereby also give ourselves the chance to recapi-
tulate the analysis of the previous section. 
The results, it will be remembered, lie within two extremes. 
At one extreme all the money spent by the government comes 
back to it in taxes, and this is accepted by all classes. In this 
case, prices rise very little. At the other extreme, all classes 
refuse to accept a redistribution between themselves and the 
government. In this case prices tend to rise continuously, 
except that rising output (as a result of the capital formed) 
sooner or later catches up with prices and brings them down 
again. Rising output will also increase the government's 
'normal' share of the national income, and all monetary 
pressure will cease when the ' normal' share has risen to the 
level of the inflated share which it was trying to get. 
These results give us the questions we must ask. (r) What 
part of marginal income returns automatically to the govern-
ment? (2) What effect does inflation have upon the various 
classes ? And (3) What effect has government capital forma-
tion upon output ? 
(One other point must be remembered. In all this analysis 
so far we have assumed a closed economy. In an open economy 
inflation plays havoc with the balance of payments. We have 
therefore to assume that the government has strict control over 
foreign transactions. This assumption holds for some back-
ward economies ; others would get into an awful mess if they 
launched upon inflationary finance.) 
It is not possible that all the money spent by the govern-
ment should come back to it in the first round, since this would 
presume that the government took roo per cent of marginal 
income. If the government takes any part of marginal income, 
some of the money will come back to it; but even the Keynes-
ian multiplier will not bring it all back unless taxation is the 
only leakage (i.e. there is no saving). The larger the government's 
share of marginal incomes, the more it will get back, the 
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quicker it will get it, and the smaller will be the effect on 
prices. 
Since the second world war a number of governments of 
modern industrial states seem to be taking around 40 to so per 
cent of marginal incomes in taxation, and this is one of the 
major reasons why their price levels have not risen more, 
despite heavy pressure on resources for capital formation, 
defence, etc. In backward countries, however, governments 
take only a very small part of marginal incomes. The best 
placed governments from this point of view are those in coun-
tries where output is concentrated in a few large units (mines, 
plantations) and therefore easily taxed, or where foreign trade 
is a large part of the national income, and is thus easily reached 
by import and export duties. One of the worst off is India, 
with a large part of its output produced by subsistence pro-
ducers and small scale units, hard to reach, and with less than 
10 per cent of national income passing in foreign trade. In 
many cases, marginal taxation is less than average taxation, 
for when money incomes rise, the government continues to 
charge the same prices for railway travel or for stamps, and 
hesitates to raise land taxes on the peasants, with the result 
that money incomes rise faster than government receipts. 
No government should consider deficit financing without 
assuring itself that a large part of increases in money income 
will automatically come back to itself. By contrast, the 
U.S.S.R., with its very high rate of turnover tax, automatically 
mops up surplus funds injected into the system, before they 
are able to generate much demand inflation via the multiplier 
process. 
The next question is the effect of inflation upon the distri-
bution of income. The surplus money raises prices, some more 
than others. The government will probably try to prevent 
prices from rising, but will succeed better with some than with 
others. It is easy to apply price control to large-scale enter-
prises, but very hard to prevent the farmers from raising food 
prices, or the petty traders from making big margins. From 
the point of view of capital formation, the best thing that can 
happen is for the surplus money to roll into the pockets of 
people who will reinvest it productively. The merchant classes 
would probably use it mainly for speculation in those commodities 
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that are getting scarce. The middle-classes would mainly 
buy big American cars with it, or go on trips to Europe, wang-
ling the foreign exchange somehow. The peasants ought to 
use it to improve their farms, but probably most would use it 
only to pay off debt, or to buy more land. There is really only 
one class that is pretty certain to reinvest its profits produc-
tively, and that is the class of industrialists. The effects of an 
inflation on secondary capital formation therefore depend 
first on how large the industrial class is, and secondly on 
whether the benefit goes largely to this class. In countries 
which have only a small industrial class, inflation leads mainly 
to speculation in commodities and in land, and to the hoarding 
of foreign exchange. But in any country which has a substantial 
industrialist class, with the passion this class has for ruling 
over bigger and better factories, even the most frightening 
inflations (e.g. Germany from 1919) leave behind a substantial 
increase in capital formation. {Have we hit here upon some 
deep psychological instinct which drives the industrialist to 
use his wealth more creatively than others ? Probably not. 
It is just that his job is of the kind where passion for success 
results in capital formation. The peasant farmer wants to have 
more land, not more capital on his land [unless he is a modern 
capitalist farmer] so his passion is dissipated merely in changes 
in the price and distribution of land. The merchant wants to 
have a wider margin, or a quicker turnover, neither of which 
increases fixed capital. The banker wants more deposits. Only 
the industrialist's passion drives towards using profits to create 
a bigger empire of bricks and steel.) It follows that it is in 
industrial communities that inflations are most helpful to 
capital formation ; whereas in countries where the industrial 
class is negligible there is nothing to show for the inflation 
when it is over, except the original investment which started 
it off. We should also note that many governments do not 
like the fact that inflation enables industrialists to earn the 
extra profits with which they create fixed capital, since this 
results in an increase of private fortunes. They therefore do 
all they can to prevent the inflation from increasing the profits 
of industrialists. More especially, they clamp down on industrial 
prices, which are also from the administrative point of view 
the easiest prices to control. Since it is the industrialist class 
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which saves most, the result is to exacerbate the inflation. It 
would be much sounder to pursue policies which would result 
in the profits of industrialists rising more rapidly than other 
incomes, and then to tax these profits away, either immediately, 
or at death. 
Inflation continues to be generated so long as the com-
munity is not willing to hold an amount equal to the increased 
investment expenditure. It is not therefore enough that sav-
ings should increase to this extent, for if these savings are 
£ 
used for additional investment the initial gap still remains. 
The gap is closed only if the savings are hoarded, or used to 
buy government bonds, so that the government can now 
finance its investments by borrowing, instead of by creating 
new money. Hence in practice, if the government wishes the 
inflation to be ended without reducing its investment, it must 
find means of bringing into its coffers as much in taxes or in 
loans as it is spending. If it is failing to do this, the inflation 
will continue ; it is then better that it should continue because 
capitalists are spending their profits on further capital forma-
tion than because other classes are chasing a limited output 
of consumer goods ; but if it is desired to end inflation as 
soon as possible, all classes should be encouraged to invest in 
government bonds rather than to spend in other ways. 
Finally we come to the relation between capital and output. 
If the intention is to finance capital formation by creating 
credit, the best objects for such a policy are those which yield 
a large income quickly. To finance school building by creating 
credit is asking for trouble. On the other hand, there are a 
lot of agricultural programmes (water supplies, fertilizers, 
seed farms, extension) where quick and substantial results may 
be expected from modest expenditure. If there are idle re-
sources available for capital formation it is foolish not to use 
them simply because of technical or political difficulties in 
raising taxes. But it would be equally foolish to use them on 
programmes which take a long time to give a small result, 
when there are others which could give aJarge result quickly. 
We may sum up as follows. If labour is abundant and phy-
sical resources scarce, the primary effect on output is exactly 
the same whether the government creates capital out of taxa-
tion or out of credit creation : the output of consumer goods 
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is unchanged, but is redistributed. Hence credit creation must 
be seen primarily as an alternative to taxation, which is worth 
the troubles it brings only if trying to raise taxes would bring 
even more troubles. Credit creation has however one further 
lead upon taxation in that if it also redistributes income 
towards the industrial class (if there is an industrial class), 
it will speed up capital formation out of profits. If it is im-
possible to increase taxation, and the alternative is between 
creating capital out of credit, and not creating it at all, the 
choice one has then to make is between stable prices or rising 
output. There is no simple formula for making this choice. 
In some communities any further inflation of prices would 
ruin their fragile social or political equilibrium ; in others this 
equilibrium will be destroyed if there is not a sharp increase in 
output in the near future ; and in still others the equilibrium 
will be ruined either way. 
We may now resume our analysis. We have seen that if 
unlimited labour is available at a constant real wage, the 
capitalist surplus wilt rise continuously, and annual investment 
will be a rising proportion of the national income. Needless 
to say, this cannot go on for ever. 
The process must stop when capital accumulation has 
caught up with population, so that there is no longer surplus 
labour. But it may stop before that. It may stop of course 
for any number of reasons which are outside our system of 
analysis, ranging from earthquake or bubonic plague to social 
revolution. But it may also stop for the economic reason that, 
although there is a labour surplus, real wages may nevertheless 
rise so high as to reduce capitalists' profits to the level at which 
profits are all consumed and there is no net investment. 
This may happen for one of four reasons. First, if capital 
accumulation is proceeding faster than population growth, and 
is therefore reducing absolutely the number of people in the 
subsistence sector, the average product per man in that sector 
rises automatically, not because production alters, but because 
there are fewer mouths to share the product. After a while 
the change actually becomes noticeable, and the capitalist 
wage begins to be forced up. Secondly, the increase in the size 
of the capitalist sector relatively to the subsistence sector may 
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turn the terms of trade against the capitalist sector (if they are 
producing different things) and so force the capitalists to pay 
workers a higher percentage of their product, in order to keep 
their real income constant. Thirdly, the subsistence sector may 
also become more productive in the technical sense. For exam-
ple, it may begin to imitate the techniques of the capitalist 
sector ; the peasants may get hold of some of the new seeds, 
or hear about the new fertilizers or rotations. They may also 
benefit directly from some of the capitalist investments, e.g., 
in irrigation works, in transport facilities, or in electricity. 
Anything which raises the productivity of the subsistence 
sector (average person) will raise real wages in the capitalist 
sector, and will therefore reduce the capitalist surplus and the 
rate of capital accumulation, unless it at the same time more 
than correspondingly moves the terms of trade against the 
subsistence sector. Alternatively, even if the productivity of 
the capitalist sector is unchanged, the workers in the capitalist 
sector may imitate the capitalist way of life, and may thus 
need more to live on. The subsistence level is only a conven-
tional idea, and conventions change. The effect of this would 
be to widen the gap between earnings in the subsistence sector, 
and wages in the capitalist sector. This is hard to do, if labour 
is abundant, but it may be achieved by a combination of trade 
union pressure and capitalist conscience. If it is achieved, it 
will reduce the capitalist surplus, and also the rate of capital 
accumulation. 
The most interesting of these possibilities is that the terms 
of trade may move against the capitalist sector. This assumes 
that the capitalist and subsistence sectors are producing differ-
ent things. In practice this is a question of the relationship 
between industry and agriculture. If the capitalists are invest-
ing in plantation agriculture side by side with their investment 
in industry, we can think of the capitalist sector as self-con-
tained. The expansion ef this sector does not then generate 
any demand for anything produced in the subsistence sector, 
and there are therefore no terms of trade to upset the picture 
we have drawn. To bring the terms of trade in, the simplest 
assumption to make is that the subsistence sector consists of 
peasants producing food, while the capitalist sector produces 
everything else. 
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Now if the capitalist sector produces no food, its expansion 
increases the demand for food, raises the price of food in terms 
of capitalist products, and so reduces profits. This is one of the 
senses in which industrialization is dependent upon agricultural 
improvement ; it is not profitable to produce a growing volume 
of manufactures unless agricultural production is growing 
simultaneously. This is also why industrial and agrarian rev-
olutions always go together, and why economies in which 
agriculture is stagnant do not show industrial development. 
Hence, if we postulate that the capitalist sector is not produc-
ing food, we must either postulate that the subsistence sector 
is increasing its output, or else conclude that the expansion of 
the capitalist sector will be brought to an end through adverse 
terms of trade eating into profits. (Ricardo's problem of in-
creasing rents is first cousin to this conclusion ; he worried 
about rents increasing inside the capitalist sector, whereas we 
are dealing with rents outside the sector.) 
On the other hand, if we assume that the subsistence sector 
is producing more food, while we escape the Scylla of adverse 
terms of trade we may be caught by the Charybdis of real 
wages rising because the subsistence sector is more productive. 
We escape both Scylla and Charybdis if rising productivity 
in the subsistence sector is more than offset by improving terms 
of trade. However, if the subsistence sector is producing food, 
the elasticity of demand for which is less than unity, increases 
in productivity will be more than offset by reductions in price. 
A rise in the productivity of the subsistence sector hurts the 
capitalist sector if there is no trade between the two, or if the 
demand of the capitalist sector for the subsistence sector's 
product is elastic. On the assumptions we have made, a rise 
in food productivity benefits the capitalist sector. Nevertheless, 
when we take rising demand into account, it is not at all un-
likely that the price of food will not fall as fast as productivity 
increases, and this will force the capitalists to pay out a larger 
part of their product as wages. 
If there is no hope of prices falling as fast as productivity 
increases (because demand is increasing), the capitalists' next 
best move is to prevent the farmer from getting all his extra 
production. In Japan this was achieved by raising rents against 
the farmers, and by taxing them more heavily, so that a large 
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part of the rapid increase in productivity which occurred 
(between 188o and 1910 it doubled) was taken away from the 
farmers and used for capital formation ; at the same time the 
holding down of the farmers' income itself held down wages, 
to the advantage of profits in the capitalist sector. Much the 
same happened in the U.S.S.R., where farm incomes per head 
were held down, in spite of farm mechanization and the con-
siderable release of labour to the towns ; this was done jointly 
by raising the prices of manufactures relatively to farm pro-
ducts, and also by levying heavy taxes upon the collective 
farms. 
This also defines for us the case in which it is true to say 
that it is agriculture which finances industrialization. If the 
capitalist sector is self-contained, its expansion is in no way 
dependent upon the peasants. The surplus is wholly 'at the 
expense' of the workers in the capitalist sector. But if the 
capitalist sector depends upon the peasants for food, it is 
essential to get the peasants to produce more, while if 
at the same time they can be prevented from enjoying 
the full fruit of their extra production, wages can be reduc-
ed relatively to the capitalist surplus. By contrast a state 
which is ruled by peasants may be happy and prosperous, 
but it is not likely to show such a rapid accumulation of 
capital. (E.g., will China and the U.S.S.R. diverge in this 
respect?) 
We conclude, therefore, that the expansion of the capitalist 
sector may be stopped because the price of subsistence goods 
rises, or because the price is not falling as fast as subsistence 
productivity per head is rising, or because capitalist workers 
raise their standard of what they need for subsistence. Any of 
these would raise wages relatively to the surplus. If none of 
these processes is enough to stop capital accumulation, the 
capitalist sector will continue to expand until there is no sur-
plus labour left. This can happen even if population is growing. 
For example, if it takes 3 per cent of annual income invested to 
employ I per cent more people, an annual net investment of 
12 per cent can cope with as much as a 4 per cent increase in 
population. But population in Western Europe at the relevant 
times grew only by I per cent or so per annum (which is also 
the present rate of growth in India), and rates of growth 
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exceeding zt per cent per annum are even now rather rare. 
We cannot say that capital will always grow faster than labour 
(it obviously has not done so in Asia), but we can say that if 
conditions are favourable for the capitalist surplus to grow 
more rapidly than population, there must come a day when 
capital accumulation has caught up with labour supply. 
Ricardo and Malthus did not provide for this in their models, 
because they overestimated the rate of growth of population. 
Marx did not provide for it either, because he had persuaded 
himself that capital accumulation increases unemployment 
instead of reducing it. (He has a curious model in which the 
short-run effect of accumulation is to reduce unemployment, 
raise wages and thus provoke a crisis, while the long-run effect 
is to increase the reserve army of unemployed.) Of the classical 
economists only Adam Smith saw clearly that capital accumula-
tion would eventually create a shortage of labour, and raise 
wages above the subsistence level. 
When the labour surplus disappears our model of the closed 
economy no longer holds. Wages are no longer tied to a sub-
sistence level. Adam Smith thought they would then depend 
upon the degree of monopoly (a doctrine which was re-presented 
in the 1930s as one of the novelties of modern economic analy-
sis). The neo-classicists invented the doctrine of marginal 
productivity. The problem is not yet solved to anyone's satis-
faction, except in static models which take no account of 
capital accumulation and of technical progress. It is, however, 
outside the terms of reference of this essay and we will not 
pursue it here. 
Our task is not, however, finished. In the classical world 
all countries have surplus labour. In the neo-classical world 
labour is scarce in all countries. In the real world, however, 
countries which achieve labour scarcity continue to be sur-
rounded by others which have abundant labour. Instead of 
concentrating on one country, and examining the expansion 
of its capitalist sector, we now have to see this country as part 
of the expanding capitalist sector of the world economy as a 
whole, and to enquire how the distribution of income inside 
the country and its rate of capital accumulation, are affected 
by the fact that there is abundant labour available elsewhere 
at a subsistence wage. 
Models of Development 
THE OPEN EcoNor.rY 
When capital accumulation catches up with the labour 
supply, wages begin to rise above the subsistence level, and the 
capitalist surplus is adversely affected. However, if there is 
still surplus labour in other countries, the capitalists can avoid 
this in one of two ways, by encouraging immigration or by 
exporting their capital to countries where there is still abund-
ant labour at a subsistence wage. We must examine each of 
tlfese in turn. 
Let us first clear out of the way the effects of the immigra-
tion of skilled workers, since our main concern is with an 
abundant immigration of unskilled workers released by the 
subsistence sectors of other countries. It is theoretically possible 
that the immigration of skilled workers may reduce the 
demand for the services of native unskilled workers, but this 
is most unlikely. More probably it will make possible new 
investments and industries which were not possible before, and 
will thus increase the demand for all kinds of labour, relatively 
to its supply. 
We must also get out of the way relatively small immigra-
tions. If Ioo,ooo Puerto Ricans emigrate to the United States 
every year, the effect on U.S. wages is negligible. U.S. wages 
are not pulled down to the Puerto Rican level ; it is Puerto 
Rican wages which are then pulled up to the U.S. level. 
Mass immigration is quite a different kettle of fish. If there 
were free immigration from India and China to the U.S.A., 
the wage level of the U.S.A. would certainly be pulled down 
towards the Indian and Chinese levels. In fact in a competitive 
model the U.S. wage could exceed the Asian wage only by an 
amount covering migration costs plus the 'cliff' to which we 
have already referred. The result is the same whether one 
assumes increasing or diminishing returns to labour. Wages 
are constant at subsistence level plus. All the benefit of in-
creasing returns goes into the capitalist surplus. 
This is one of the reasons why, in every country where the 
wage level is relatively high, the trade unions are bitterly 
hostile to immigration, except of people in special categories, 
and take steps to have it restricted. The result is that real 
wages are higher than they would otherwise be, while profits, 
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capital resources, and total output are smaller than they would 
otherwise be. 
The export of capital is therefore a much easier way out 
for the capitalists, since trade unions are quick to restrict 
immigration, but much slower in bringing the export of capital 
under control. 
The effect of exporting capital is to reduce the creation of 
fixed capital at home, and therefore to reduce the demand for 
labour. Labour will still be required to create the capital 
(e.g. to make machines for export), but domestic labour will 
no longer be required to work with the capital, as it would 
also be if the capital were invested at home. 
This, however, is only one side of the picture, for the capital 
may be used in foreign countries in ways which raise the 
standard of living of the capital-exporting cou1,1try (and so 
offset wholly or partly the first effect), or in ways which lower 
it (thus aggravating the first effect). The result depends on the 
type of competition which there is between the capital-export-
ing and the capital-importing countries. 
Let us assume, to begin with, that there is no competition, 
and even no trade. Both countries are self-sufficient. Wages 
however are rising in country A, while labour is abundant in 
country B. A's capitalists therefore invest their capital in B. 
Trade returns show first the export surplus from A, represent-
ing the transfer of capital, and later the import surplus re-
presenting the return home of dividends. There is no effect on 
the workers in A other than that their wages cease to rise, as 
they would have if the capital were invested instead at home. 
If A's resources and B' s resources are exactly the same, wages 
cannot rise in A until capital accumulation in B has wiped out 
B' s labour surplus. 
Now in the real world the resources of two countries are 
not exactly alike, and it cannot be taken for granted that it 
will be more profitable to invest in B if profits are falling in A 
(which also cannot be taken for granted). The profitability of 
investing in a country depends upon its natural resources, upon 
its human material, and upon the amount of capital already 
invested there. 
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The most productive investments are those which are made 
to open up rich, easily accessible natural resources, such as 
fertile soil, ores, coal or oil. This is the principal reason why 
most of the capital exported in the last hundred years went 
to the Americas and to Australasia rather than to India or to 
China, where the known resources were already being used. 
In the well developed parts of the world (in the resource sense) 
the main opportunity for productive investment lies in im-
proving techniques-these countries are well (even over-) 
developed in the resource sense, but underdeveloped in their 
techniques. It is profitable to use capital to introduce new 
techniques, but this is not as profitable as using capital to 
make available both new techniques and also new resources. 
This also explains why the United Kingdom rapidly became a 
capital-exporting country (the limits of its natural resources 
were soon reached), whereas the United States is very late in 
reaching this stage, since its natural resources are so extensive 
that capital investment at home is still very profitable even 
though wages are very high. 
Productivity depends also on the human material. Even 
though the genetic composition of peoples may be much the 
same, as far as potential productivity may be concerned, their 
cultural inheritance is very different. Differences in literacy, 
forms of government, attitudes to work, and social relations 
generally may make a big difference to productivity. Capita-
lists naturally find it more profitable and safer to invest in 
countries where the atmosphere is capitalist than they do in 
widely different cultures. 
But this is not all. For the productivity of investment in 
B depends not only upon B's natural resources and its human 
institutions, but also upon the efficiency of all other industries 
whose services the new investment would require to use. This 
depends partly upon how highly capitalized these other in-
dustries are. The productivity of one investment depends upon 
other investments having been made before. Hence it may be 
more profitable to invest capital in countries which already 
have a lot of capital than to invest it in a new country. If this 
were always so, no capital would be exported, and the gap 
between wages in the surplus (labour) and non-surplus coun-
tries would not diminish but would widen. In practice capital 
Economic Development with Unlimited Supplies of Labour 439 
export is small, and the gap does widen, and we cannot at all 
exclude the possibility that there is a natural tendency for 
capital to flow towards the capitalized, and to shun the un-
capitalized. 
If we could assume that there is a natural tendency for the 
rate of profit to fall in a closed economy, we could say that 
however low the rate may be in other countries, the rate in the 
closed economy must ultimately fall towards the level else-
where, after which capital export must begin. Practically all 
the best known economists of every school, in every century, 
have affirmed that such a tendency exists, though their reasons 
have varied widely. The most notable exception is Marshall, 
who gave the right answer, which is that increasing capital 
per head tends to lower the yield of capital, while increasing 
technical knowledge tends to raise it. Thus, said Marshall, the 
yield fell from IO per cent in the Middle Ages to 3 per cent 
in the middle of the eighteenth century-a long period of slow 
technical growth-after which the decline was arrested by the 
great increase in opportunities for using capital. This being so, 
the natural tendency for the yield of capital to fall is nothing 
but a popular myth. The yield may fall or it may not ; we 
cannot foretell. 
We get a different answer, however, if we turn from the 
rate of profit on capital in general to the rate in particular 
lines of investment. In any particular line the possibilities 
of further expansion are soon exhausted, or at any rate greatly 
reduced. All industries develop on a logistic pattern, growing 
fairly slowly at first, then rapidly, and later on growing again 
quite slowly. Hence the investors in any particular line sooner 
or later come to a point where there is not much more scope 
for investment in that line at home. It is open to them to put 
their accumulating profits into quite different industries. 
But there is also the temptation to stick to the field in which 
they have specialized knowledge, and to use their profits to 
take the industry into new countries. 
What brings about the exportation of capital is not in-
evitably falling home profits, or rising wages at home, but 
simply the fact that foreign countries having different re-
sources unutilized in different degrees there are some profitable 
opportunities for investment abroad. This is not even dependent 
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on capital accumulation having caught up with surplus 
labour at home; for even if there is still surplus labour at home, 
available at subsistence wages, investment opportunities 
abroad may be more profitable. Many capitalists residing in 
surplus labour countries invest their capital in England or the 
United States. 
We must therefore beware of saying that a country will 
begin to export capital as soon as capital accumulation at 
home catches up with labour supply. All the same, countries do 
export capital, and we can say that if labour is scarce in those 
CQuntries, the effect is to reduce the demand for labour in 
those countries and thus to prevent wages from rising as much 
as they otherwise would. 
Let us now assume that the two countries do not compete, 
but trade with each other. There are two variants of this case. 
One where the two countries produce only one good, but a 
different good in each. Here wage levels are not determined in 
relation to each other. In the second case, each country pro-
duces two or more goods, one of which is common to both, 
and is the good produced in the subsistence sector. 
Suppose that in the first case country A produces wheat, 
and country B produces peanuts. Relative prices are deter-
mined solely by supply and demand. Assume that a capitalist 
sector develops in A, applying new techniques to wheat pro-
duction. At first it may get unlimited labour at an average 
wage in wheat related to average subsistence wheat production. 
In due course, however, the surplus is eliminated and wheat 
wages start to rise. If the capitalist techniques which fruc-
tified wheat production are equally applicable to peanuts, 
it will pay to export capital to B, where unlimited labour 
is available at a wage related to average subsistence output 
of peanuts. 
As in the case discussed before, wages in A will be held 
down by the profitability of investing capital in B. A new 
element, however enters into consideration, because of the 
effects of investment on the terms of trade. When capital is 
being invested in A, and raising the output of wheat, the price 
of peanuts will rise relatively. Hence the capitalist workers in 
A as well as subsistence workers in A will be worse off in terms 
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of peanuts, though earning the same real wage in wheat. 
And the workers in B will be better off in terms of wheat, 
while earning the same in peanuts. When capital is invested 
in B the opposite happens : the terms of trade are moved 
against the B workers in favour of the A workers. 
The moral is that capital export may benefit the workers on 
balance if it is applied to increasing the supply of things they 
import. For example, in the Britain of I85o exclusive invest-
ment at home in the cotton industry, while tending to raise 
wages, might also still more have depressed the terms of trade 
against the cotton industry. 
When we pass to the second case, the result is the same, 
except that the terms of trade are now determinate. Assume 
that both countries produce food, but do not trade in it. 
Country A also produces steel, and country B also produces 
rubber. If B can release unlimited supplies of labour from 
subsistence food production, wages in B will equal average 
(not marginal) product in food (abstracting from the difference 
between subsistence and capitalist wages). In A also the wage 
cannot fall below productivity in the food industry. We may 
simplify by assuming in the first instance that labour is the 
sole factor of production and that one day's labour 
in A produces 3 food or 3 steel 
in B , I , or I rubber. 
Earnings in A will then be three times earnings . in B (the 
difference in food productivity). And the rate of exchange will 
be I food = I steel = I rubber. Suppose now that productivity 
increases in B's rubber industry only, so that one day's labour 
produces instead 3 rubber. This is excellent for the workers 
in A, since I steel will now buy 3 rubber. But it will do the 
workers in B no good whatsoever (except in so far as they 
purchase rubber), since their wage will continue to be I food. 
If on the other hand the subsistence economy became more 
productive, wages would rise correspondingly. Suppose that 
I day's labour in B now produced 3 food or I rubber, wages 
would be as high in B as in A, and the price of rubber would 
now be I rubber 3 steel. Workers in A are benefited if 
productivity in B increases in what they buy, and are worse 
off if productivity in B increases in B's subsistence sector. 
Workers in B are benefited only if productivity increases in 
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their subsistence sector ; all other increases in productivity are 
lost in the terms o~ trade. 
We have here the key to the question why tropical produce 
is so cheap. Take for example the case of sugar. This is an 
industry in which productivity is extremely high by any bio-
logical standard. It is also an industry in which output per 
acre has about trebled over the course of the last 75 years, 
a rate of growth of productivity which is unparalleled by any 
other major industry in the world-certainly not by the wheat 
industry. Nevertheless workers in the sugar industry continue 
to walk barefooted and to live in shacks, while workers in wheat 
enjoy among the highest living standards in the world. The 
reason is that wages in the sugar industry are related to the 
fact that the subsistence sectors of tropical economies are 
able to release however many workers the sugar industry may 
want, at wages which are low, because tropical food produc-
tion per head is low. However vastly productive the sugar 
industry may become, the benefit accrues chiefly to industrial 
purchasers in the form of lower prices for sugar. (The capita-
lists who invest in sugar do not come into the argument 
because their earnings are determined not by productivity in 
sugar but by the general rate of profit on capital ; this is why 
our leaving capital out of this and subsequent analysis of the 
effects of changing productivity upon wages and the terms of 
trade simplifies the analysis without significantly affecting its 
results.) To raise the price of sugar, you must increase the 
productivity of the tropical subsistence food economies. Now 
the contribution of the temperate world to the tropical world, 
whether in capital or in knowledge, has in the main been con-
fined to the commercial crops for export, where the benefit 
mainly accrues to the temperate world in lower prices. The 
prices of tropical commercial crops will always permit only 
subsistence wages until, for a change, capital and knowledge 
are put at the disposal of the subsistence producers to increase 
the productivity of tropical food production for home con-
sumption. 
The analysis applies to all tropical commercial products of 
which an unlimited supply can be produced because unlimited 
natural resources exist, in relation to demand--e.g. land of 
suitable quality. It does not apply where natural resources 
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of a particular kind are scarce. For example, the lands suitable 
for cultivating sugar or peanuts are very extensive. But 
mineral-bearing lands, or lands with just the right suitability 
for cocoa, are relatively scarce. Hence the price of a mineral, 
or of cocoa, may rise to any level consistent with demand. 
If the lands are owned by capitalists, employing workers, this 
will make little difference to their wages. But if these scarce 
lands are owned by peasants, the peasants may of course 
become rich. In general the peasants have got little out of 
their mineral-bearing lands, especially when these have been 
expropriated by imperial governments (or declared to be 
Crown property) and sold to foreign capitalists for a song. 
Cocoa is the only case (a doubtful one) where it seems that a 
world scarcity of suitable land may now permanently bring to 
the peasants earnings higher than they could obtain from 
subsistence food production. 
This is not to say that the tropical countries gain nothing 
from having foreign capital invested in commercial production 
for export. They gain an additional source of employment, 
and of taxation. The accumulation of fixed capital in their 
midst also brings nearer the day when the demand for labour 
will catch up with the supply (though even this will not raise 
wages in any one tropical country until they start to rise in all, 
since capital would otherwise merely transfer itself to the 
countries where there is still a surplus). What they do not gain 
is rising real wages; the whole benefit of increasing productivity 
in the commercial sector goes to the foreign consumer, at least 
in the early stages. In the latest stages they may also gain if 
their peasants imitate the capitalist techniques, so that sub-
sistence productivity rises ; or if the continual increase in the 
output of commercial crops moves the terms of trade in favour 
of subsistence food production ; either of these changes would 
react upon real wages (see pages 43I-S), but would do so effec-
tively only when the changes have extended throughout the 
tropical world. 
In the next case we assume that the two countries can 
produce the same things, and trade with each other. A is the 
country where labour is scarce, B the country where unlimited 
labour is available in the subsistence (food) sector. Using the 
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classical framework for the Law of Comparative Costs we write 
that one day's labour 
in A produces 3 food or 3 cotton manufactures 
in B 2 , or I , 
This, of course, gives the wrong answer to the question 'who 
should specialize in which', since we have written the average 
instead of the marginal products. We can assume that these 
coincide in A, and also in cotton manufacture in B. Then we 
should write, in marginal terms, · 
in A produces 3 food or 3 cotton manufactures 
in B o , or I , 
B should specialize in cotton manufacture and import food. 
In practice, however, wages will be 2 food in B and between 
3 food and 6 food in A, at which levels it will be 'cheaper' 
for B to export food and import cotton. 
This divergence between the actual and what it ought to 
be is the most serious difference which the existence of surplus 
labour makes to the neo-classical theory of international trade. 
It has caught out many economists, who have wrongly advised 
underdeveloped countries on the basis of current money costs, 
instead of lifting the veil to see what lies beneath. It has also 
caught out many countries which have allowed (or been forced 
to allow) their industries to be destroyed by cheap foreign 
imports, with the sole effect of increasing the size of the labour 
surplus, when the national income would have been increased 
if the domestic industries had instead been protected against 
imports. The fault is not that of the Law of Comparative Costs, 
wbich remains valid if written in real marginal terms, but of 
those who have forgotten that money costs are entirely mis-
leading in economies where there is surplus labour at the 
ruling wage. 
Of course if labour is a free good but the two industries 
use some scarce resource, such as land or capital, the compari-
son has to be made not in terms of labour cost but in terms of 
the scarce resource. Thus, even though labour is unemployed, 
it may be more economic to use capital to increase the produc-
tion of food than to use it in creating new manufacturing 
industries. Adam Smith was as usual on the ball; this was the 
substance of his argument that a tariff could not raise the 
national income even if it increased employment, since it 
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would simply be diverting capital from more to less productive 
uses. (The Keynesian model doesn't help, since it assumes 
unlimited capital as well as unemployment.) All the same, 
there may be cases where it is more economic to use capital 
to create new industries, rather than to fructify old ones, and 
where this is nevertheless not the most profitable thing to do, 
in the financial sense, because labour has to be paid a wage 
when its marginal productivity is really zero. Moreover, many 
manufacturing activities do not in fact use any other scarce 
resource but labour. The handicraft and cottage industries 
especially, which may provide employment for up to ro per 
cent of the people in backward countries, use no capital 
resources to speak of. Yet these are the very first industries to 
be destroyed by cheap imports of manufactures (e.g. the havoc 
wrought to the Indian cotton industry in the first half of the 
nineteenth century). 
The Law of Comparative Costs, rightly applied, enables· 
us to predict the pattern of international trade. We can say 
that those countries which have inadequate agricultural 
resources in relation to their populations (e.g. India, Japan, 
Egypt, Great Britain, Jamaica) must live by importing agri-
cultural products and exporting manufactures ; metal manu-
factures if they have the coal and ores (India, Great Britain) 
and light manufactures if they have not (Japan, Egypt, 
Jamaica). Correspondingly countries which are rich in agricul-
tural land (U.S.A., Argentina), should be net exporters of 
agricultural products at relatively good terms of trade. Cur-
rently this pattern is distorted by the divergence between 
money and real costs. But if world population continues to 
grow at its current rate, this pattern must emerge in due 
course, unless there are revolutionary developments in agricul-
tural science. 
Let us, however, continue to examine this case, assuming 
that no distortion is taking place. As before A is developed 
while B has surplus labour in food. Suppose that one day's 
labour 
in A produces 5 food or 5 cotton manufactures 
in B I , or 3 (average). 
Bought to specialize in cotton, and ·will actually do so. Wages 
and prices are determinate. The wage in B will be r food, the 
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price of cotton will be r cotton equals l food, the wage in A 
will be 5 food, and A v.ill get all the benefit of the exchange. 
Suppose now that productivity increases in B's cotton indus-
try. B's wage is unchanged, and the whole benefit accrues to A. 
But if productivity increases in B's food industry (the average 
rising say from r to 2) B's wage will rise (from r food to 2 
food). A's wage will still be 5 food, but cotton will now be 
dearer (r cotton equals f food), to the advantage of B and 
disadvantage of A. (B' s wage is determinate because there is 
unljmited labour available at a subsistence wage ; and all the 
benefit of the exchange goes to A because B is producing both 
commodities.) 
It is time to say a word about the effect of increasing the 
subsistenc~ productivity in countries with surplus labour. The 
analysis is the same as we made for the closed economy (pages 
431-5), except that we must now think of the world as a 
whole as the closed economy. We must also think of the 
commercial sector of these economies as being a part of the 
world capitalist sector. 
Then, if the world capitalist sector is not dependent on 
the peasants for food, even to feed its plantation and mining 
labourers in the surplus countries, an increase in the pro-
ductivity of the peasants must raise wages against the capita-
lists. To have this effect, however, productivity must rise in 
all these countries, otherwise the capitalists will simply trans-
fer from those countries where subsistence productivity has 
risen to those where it has not. 
If, on the other hand, we assume that the capitalists need 
the peasants' food, and that the demand for food is inelastic, 
then increased productivity reduces the price of food even 
more, and so reduces the share of capitalist workers in the 
capitalist product. This again assumes that the changes are 
world-wide; if one country raises its productivity, the price of 
food will not fall; wages will rise in that country, and capita-
lists will move elsewhere. However, even if the price of food 
falls, the peasants eat most of their output, and will still be 
better off. For example, suppose a peasant produces roo food, 
eats So food, and sells 20 food for 20 manufactures. Suppose 
now that his productivity increases to zoo, reducing the price 
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of food by more than half, say to o · 4· The peasant can now 
have 30 manufactures, costing 75 food, and still eat 125 food 
instead of 8o. The standard of living in the surplus countries 
is thus raised nearer to that of the advanced countries, but 
the terms of trade move against both the food and the com-
mercial products of the surplus countries (would move in 
favour of the commercial products if the elasticity of demand 
for food were r·o or more}. 
In practice, food production in tropical countries with 
surplus labour is only a small part of world food production 
(Asia and Africa together produce less than 20 per cent of the 
world's food). Hence increases in food productivity in the 
tropics could not reduce the price of food pari passu. Real 
wages would therefore rise, and the terms of trade would move 
in favour of tropical commercial products. This would hurt 
labour in the industrial countries in so far as it was buying 
such products, and benefit it in so far as tropical countries 
were competing in industrial production. 
This brings us finally to the case where the two countries 
A and B produce competing goods to sell in third markets. 
This need not detain us long. If capital is exported in ways 
which raise subsistence productivity ir.. the capital-importing 
country, the workers in the capital-exporting country will 
benefit, since the wages of their rivals will be raised. If, how-
ever, it is exported to increase productivity in the exporting 
sector of the capital-importing country, the workers in the 
capital-exporting country will be doubly hit, first by the reduced 
capital accumulation at home, and then again by the fall in 
their rivals' prices. 
We may conclude as follows. Capital export tends to reduce 
wages in capital-exporting countries. This is wholly or partly 
offset if the capital is applied to cheapening the things which 
the workers import, or to raising wage costs in countries which 
compete in third markets (by raising productivity in their 
subsistence sectors). The reduction in wages is however aggra-
vated if the capital is invested in ways which raise the cost of 
imports (by increasing productivity in subsistence sectors}, 
or which increase the productivity of competing exports. 
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We have also seen that capital-importing countries with surplus 
labour do not gain an increase in real wages from having foreign 
capital invested in them, unless this capital results in increased 
productivity in the commodities they produce for their own 
consumption. 
SuMMARY 
We may summarize this article as follows: 
r. In many economies an unlimited supply of labour is 
available at a subsistence wage. This was the classical model. 
The neo-classical model (including the Keynesian) when applied 
to such economies gives erroneous results. 
2. The main sources from which workers come as economic 
development proceeds are subsistence agriculture, casual 
labour, petty trade, domestic service, wives and daughters in 
the household, and the increase of population. In most but not 
all of these sectors, if the country is overpopulated relatively 
to its natural resources, the marginal productivity of labour is 
negligible, zero, or even negative. 
3· The subsistence wage at which this surplus labour is 
available for employment may be determined by a conventional 
view of the minimum required for subsistence; or it may be 
equal to the average product per man in subsistence agriculture, 
plus a margin. 
4· In such an economy employment expands in a capitalist 
sector as capital formation occurs. 
5. Capital formation and technical progress result not in 
raising wages, but in raising the share of profits in the national 
income. 
6. The reason why savings are low in an undeveloped 
economy relatively to national income is not that the people 
are poor, but that capitalist profits are low relatively to national 
income. As the capitalist sector expands, profits grow relatively, 
and an increasing proportion of national income is re-invested. 
7· Capital is formed not only out of profits but also out 
of credit creation. The real cost of capital created by inflation 
is zero in this model, and this capital is just as useful as what 
is created in more respectable fashion (i.e. out of profits). 
8. Inflation for the purpose of getting hold of resources 
for war may be cumulative; but inflation for the purpose of 
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creating productive capital is self-destructive. Prices rise as 
the capital is created, and fall again as its output reaches the 
market. 
9· The capitalist sector cannot expand in these ways in-
definitely, since capital accumulation can proceed faster than 
population can grow. When the surplus is exhausted, wages 
begin to rise above the subsistence level. 
ro. The country is still, however, surrounded by other 
countries which have surplus labour. Accordingly as soon as its 
wages begin to rise, mass immigration and the export of capital 
operate to check the rise. 
II. Mass immigration of unskilled labour might even raise 
output per head, but its effect would be to keep wages in all 
countries near the subsistence level of the poorest countries. 
12. The export of capital reduces capital formation at home, 
and so keeps wages down. This is offset if the capital export 
cheapens the things which workers import, or raises wage 
costs in competing countries. But it is aggravated if the capital 
export raises the cost of imports or reduces costs in competing 
countries. 
13. The importation of foreign capital does not raise real 
wages in countries which have surplus labour, unless the capital 
results in increased productivity in the commodities which they 
produce for their own consumption. 
14. The main reason why tropical commercial produce is 
so cheap, in terms of the standard of living it affords, is the 
inefficiency of tropical food production per man. Practically all 
the benefit of increasing efficiency in export industries goes to 
the foreign consumer; whereas raising efficiency in subsistence 
food production would automatically make commercial produce 
dearer. 
15. The Law of Comparative Costs is just as valid in coun-
tries with surplus labour as it is in others. But whereas in the 
latter it is a valid foundation of arguments for free trade, in 
the former it is an equally valid foundation of arguments for 
protection. 
THE ROLE OF INDUSTRIALIZATION 
IN DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMMES* 
by Hollis B. Chenery 
INDUSTRIALIZATION IS THE MAIN HOPE OF MOST POOR COUNTRIES 
trying to increase their levels of income. It is also the most 
controversial aspect of the problem of economic development. 
Attempts to apply general economic principles to this field 
have usually proven inconclusive. This result has been due to 
an incomplete theoretical formulation of the problem as well 
as to inadequate data. In most cases there remains a wide 
margin of disagreement between the advocates of international 
specialization and investment in primary production on the 
one hand and the proponents of 'balanced growth' and 
industrialization on the other. 
Most of the participants in this controversy would probably 
accept the proposition that the primary aim of a developing 
country is to secure the greatest increase in its income (total 
or per capita) from its available resources in the long run. 
The main problem lies in evaluating the amount of scarce 
resources which will actually be required by alternative types 
of production. For a number of reasons, the price system, 
which makes this evaluation fairly accurate in more highly 
developed economies, is often a rather unreliable guide to the 
desirability of investment in an underdeveloped economy. 
Even when corrections have been made for the more obvious 
defects in prices, such as tariffs and subsidies, there remain 
two sets of factors which make a partial equilibrium analysis 
based on existing prices very difficult : (r) the existence of 
structural disequilibrium in the use of factors of product-
ion, with labour commonly underemployed and capital and 
foreign exchange rationed; and (2) the interconnectedness of 
* The American Economic Review, May 1955· Reprinted by permis-
sion of the American Economic Association and the author. This 
paper is based on a study of Resource Allocation in Development 
Programmes which was made possible by a grant from the Stanford 
Committee for Research in the Social Sciences. 
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productive sectors, as a result of which investment in one may 
make investment in others more profitable-often called 
'external economies' .1 
Both of these factors are particularly important in evaluating 
industrial investments. Less than half of the total use of pri-
mary factors takes place directly in the average sector produc-
ing an industrial commodity ; the remainder is scattered 
throughout the economy in the sectors producing raw materials, 
producer services, and other industrial commodities. In con-
trast, most of the requirements of capital, labour, raw materials, 
and foreign exchange for agricultural and mineral production 
and services occur directly in the producing sector. It is there-
fore possible to take account of the existence of structural 
disequilibrium fairly well in evaluating non-industrial invest-
ments, but both the existing disequilibrium and the effects 
of future investment complicate judgements on industrial 
investment. 
The present paper will investigate the influence of these two 
factors-structural disequilibrium and external economies-
on the optimum amount and composition of industrial invest-
ment in a development programme. Such an analysis can only 
be made in the context of a general equilibrium model because 
intersectoral relations are the essence of the problem. The 
empirical background for the model is taken from an overall 
study of the Italian economy2 and of the development pro-
grammes for Southern Italy. 3 
The paper consists of three parts. The first summarizes the 
essential features of the model and the method of application. 
1 The distinction between these 'pecuniary' external economies and 
the more traditional 'technological' external economies has been 
pointed out by Scitovsky in 'Two Concepts of External Economies', 
Thf!] ournal of Political Economy, April 1954 (reprinted here, pp. 295-308). 
Rosenstein-Rodan was among the first to analyse this factor in 'Prob-
lems of Industrialization of Eastern and South-Eastern Europe', The 
Economic Journal, 1943, pp. 202-n (reprinted here, pp. 245-55). 
1 Preliminary results have been published in H. B. Chenery, P. G. 
Clark, and V. C;l.o Pinna, The Structure and Growth of the I tal ian Economy 
(Rome: U.S. Mutual Security Agency, 1953). 
8 Empirical data for the analysis of development programmes 
within the framework of a regional input-output model is being collected 
by the Input-Output Unit of the Italian government and the Associa-
tion for the Industrialization of Southern Italy, to which the author 
is a consultant. 
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The second part shows the effect on industrial investment of 
variation in three key factors reflecting the factor endowments 
of a given area : the labour supply, the availability of foreign 
exchange, and the rate of growth. The third part shows the 
difference between an optimum programme which takes into 
account external economies and one which does not. It also 
tries to shed some light on the general problem of investment 
priorities. 
I. A MODEL OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
General Characteristics. In order to throw light on the 
problems I have just outlined, the analytical model must 
include the following elements : (r) the use of capital, labour, 
and purchased materials and services in each type of produc-
tion; (z) the foreign exchange cost of possible imports; (3) the 
foreign demand for possible exports ; (4) restrictions on the 
commodity composition of any increase in national income ; 
(5) availability of labour, foreign exchange, investment funds, 
and other scarce resources. 
The statistical basis for such an analysis is provided by an 
input-output table, augmented by studies of consumer demand, 
export demand, etc. The solution to the problem involves 
choice between domestic production and imports, between 
production for the home market and exports, and maximiza-
tion of output within the given restraints. The analytical tech-
nique, therefore, must be the more general one of linear pro-
gramming, which in this case is a straightforward extension of 
input-output methods. 
The purpose of the investment programme is to secure a 
specified increase in national income with a minimum use of 
investment funds, subject to limitations on the composition 
of national income, export demand, labour supply, and foreign 
exchange availability. In the case of Southern Italy, invest-
ment funds are variable through subsidies from the central 
government, and total investment is therefore variable within 
limits. In other cases, the maximum growth achievable from a 
given rate of saving could be estimated by varying the time 
period of the analysis. 
The several restrictions in the model are incorporated in the 
solution in various ways: 
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I. The division of national income between consumption 
and investment is taken as fixed. Consmpption is assumed 
to be a function of per capita income only, as described below. 
All elements in final demand are therefore determined by the 
assumed increase in national income. 
2. Total investment must equal savings plus the excess of 
imports over exports, summed over the time period involved 
(ten years). We are not concerned with the time path of pro-
duction during the period, however, but only with the flow of 
goods and services at its end. If necessary, the amount of in-
vestment included in final demand may be modified in a 
successive approximation. 
3· The excess of imports over exports must correspond to 
the required amount of external investment funds determined 
by the solution. Solutions must be determined for several 
possible levels of the trade deficit to meet this coadition. 
4· The price of labour must be such that total demand does 
not exceed the total supply. 
The size of the model used represents a compromise between 
the need for sufficient detail to illustrate the interdependence 
actually existing among productive sectors and the necessity 
to hold down costs of computation. Since the interconnexions 
among the industrial sectors are the most significant, the test 
model contains nine industrial sectors, two sectors of primary 
production, and three service sectors. Five export sectors have 
been distinguished, while imports are possible in ten of the 
fourteen sectors. This model represents a considerable aggrega-
tion of the original Italian input-output study, which contained 
sixty sectors, and of the matrix for Southern Italy, which 
contained twenty-eight sectors. 
Elements in the Model. The following paragraphs will in-
dicate the conceptual nature of the various elements in the 
model. For pr~sent purposes, it is sufficient to consider the 
numerical data as fairly realistic estimates of the parameters 
involved. The input coefficients and consumption estimates 
result from extensive statistical investigations, while most of 
the other relations are based on scantier evidence or (where 
indicated) on pure hypothesis. 
r. Total Requirements. As the model is formulated, a specific 
set of final consumption levels for the several commodity 
454 Models of Development 
groups is taken as the goal of the investment programme. 
These requirements can in most cases be satisfied from either 
production or imports. The Gross National Product in the 
target year will equal the total of these final demands less 
the import surplus. To simplify the analysis, I assume that 
capacity in the base year is fully utilized and that in no case 
will it be efficient to shut down existing production. Present 
production (net of inter-industry use) can then be subtracted 
from the given final demands to determine the total require-
ments by sector to be supplied from either increased produc-
tion (requiring new investment) or imports. These two sets of 
estimates are shown in Table 3 on page 458. 
Final demand consists of government consumption, private 
consumption, investment, and exports. (The estimates of 
final demand were made in Italy by the collaborating groups 
noted above. They were taken as data for the present test, 
with the exception of some exports, which were allowed to 
vary as explained below.) The magnitude of investment was 
based on the estimated sum of domestic savings and the 
import surplus (as indicated above) while government consump-
tion was projected from past trends; the composition of both 
was kept unchanged. A more detailed study was made of 
private consumption. Consumption estimates for some seventy 
commodity groups were based on population growth and income 
elasticities related to prospective increases in per capita incomes. 
They were then aggregated to the present number of sectors. 
2. Production Possibilities. Each of the commodity groups 
in the model represents an aggregation of many subgroups. 
For this test, I have secured average input coefficients through 
aggregating the intersectoral flows into fourteen groups. I have 
retained the variation in capitalfoutput ratios within each 
sector, however, by arranging the subsectors in the order of 
their capital intensity and assuming that their output will be 
required in fixed proportions. On this assumption, it will be 
economical to produce those commodities within each sector 
which have low direct capital requirements and import those 
having higher capital requirements, since the indirect capital 
use within each major sector is assumed to be the same for 
all subsectors. (If this assumption is not made, the number of 
sectors must be increased.) 
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For the linear programming model, the alternative ways of 
satisfying the given requirements in sectors where imports 
are possible consist of mixtures of domestic production and 
imports. The input requirements for domestic production are 
given in Table r, and the capital and labour requirements in 
Table 2A. Some allowance must be made in using minimum 
investment as a test of efficiency for the fact that capital goods 
have different degrees of durability. This was done here in 
the case of land reclamation and other agricultural construc-
tion through reducing the capital requirement by the estimated 
present value of the capital stock twenty-five years hence. 
An alternative would be to treat capital consumption as a 
separate input. The assumed variation in capital coefficients 
within each sector is largely hypothetical, as are the labour 
coefficients. The capital coefficients in industry were based 
on a sample of some seventy-five investment projects which 
were actually undertaken in the past few years. Imports are 
assumed to require one unit of foreign exchange in each sector 
except agriculture (assumed to require r · 25). 
The choice between domestic production and imports is 
made by comparing the marginal direct and indirect use of 
capital in domestic production with the domestic price of 
imports. This procedure results in a decrease in the proportion 
of requirements in each sector which is imported as the price 
of foreign exchange rises. 
3· Exports. The assumed demand functions for exports 
are given in Table 2B. The optimum level of exports in each 
sector will be that at which the marginal (direct and indirect) 
cost of producing exports is equal to the domestic value of the 
marginal revenue from increased exports. This optimum level 
will increase for higher prices of foreign exchange. 
Solution. The techniques of solving linear programming 
problems need not concern us here, but the concepts are useful. 
In the present case it was possible to take advantage of the 
fact that the matrix of input coefficients can be made almost 
triangular-i.e., the interdependence is almost all in one direc-
tion, as shown in Table r. This characteristic makes it possible 
to solve the problem without inverting the matrix of coefficients, 
which saves on solution time and also makes it easy to handle 
the demand functions for exports which have been assumed. 
Table 1 : Input Coefficients1 
Sector I II III IV v VI VII VIII IX X XI XII XIII XIV 
------ --- --- --- --- --- ------ --· --- --- ---
I. Clothing .. +·917 - - •001 •001 - - - - - - - - -
II. Textiles .. '254 + ·615 •OOI '003 •016 - - '001 - - ·oo8 - '001 -
III. Construction .. - - + ·819 ·013 ·oii - •010 - - - •004 - '001 -
IV. Mechanical .. •003 - ·063 + ·897 •0!2 - ·OOI - - - •OOI - - -
V. Other 
industries .. ·oo5 '001 '033 '037 +·857 '001 '003 - '037 - ·oo8 - '001 -
VI. Food .. .. 
I 
'027 '001 - - •001 +·873 ·001 '021 - ·oo6 '023 '001 '002 -
VII. Metallurgy .. ·oor - ·o8r '221 ·or8 '004 +. 515 - - - '011 - - -
VIII. Agriculture .. '003 . 138 •002 - . 149 '430 '002 +·899 •Oil - '023 ·oo5 •001 '001 
IX. Transport .. •OOI ·oo5 '011 ·Oil '049 '021 '017 •022 +·966 '032 •012 •151 - -
X. Petroleum .. '002 ·oo8 '027 '017 '010 ·oo5 '019 '004 '253 +·987 '0151 ·Oil '003 ·or8 
XI. Chemicals .. ·or8 '059 '042 ·017 ·o89 ·oo6 ·o5o '023 ·oo~ '013 +·691 '032 - '001 
XII. Mining .. ·001 ·oo5 ·o58 '003 '002 '004 '055 •001 '048 •211 '071 +·995 - ' 035 
XIII. Services .. '357 ·168 '043 '141 . 193 '192 '007 • 169 '027 ·o84 '132 •o67 + '957 ·oro 
XIV. Power .. .. •001 •007 ·oo5 ·009 '004 '003 '049 '002 '0381 - '035 '0131 '005 + '994 
1 Per unit of output (in value terms). 
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The concept of 'shadow price' plays a key role in the solution. 
It measures the total use of scarce resources in the economy 
to produce a given commodity. In the present case shadow 
prices are expressed in terms of investment cost. The shadow 
prices of other basic factors whose supply is limited-foreign 
exchange and labour-are measured by their opportunity 
costs. Given the prices of these resources, the shadow price of 
Table 2A : Capital and Labour Coefficients 
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II. Textile .. 
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XI. Chemical 
XII. Mining .. 
XIII. Services .. 






































each commodity consists of its direct capital cost plus the 
sum of all its inputs multiplied by their shadow prices. The 
optimum solution is reached by comparing the cost of securing 
each commodity by alternative methods with the value given 
by its shadow price. This method is well suited to handle 
alternative production techniques when such data are known. 
The usual method of solving a linear programming problem 
involves fixing the resource availabilities and output require-
1 In 1,ooo employees per billion lira of output. 
a Where d is the ratio of domestic production to total requirements 
in each sector. 
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ments and determining the optimum combination of activities 
which corresponds to these limitations. In the present case it 
has proved useful to examine the implications of varying levels 
Table 2B: Assumed Demand for Exports 
Sector I Export LeveP -------------------------·----------
I. E Clothing 
II. E Textiles 
IV. E Mechanical 
VI. E Food 
XI. E Chemical .. 
200 (1 -P) 
300(1-P) 
6oo (1 -P) 
2,000 (I·I -P) 
200 (I -P) 
of availability of foreign exchange and labour. I have therefore 
assumed several combinations of the prices of labour and foreign 
exchange and determined the use of these resources corres-
ponding to the assumed prices. The results can be plotted in a 
Table 3: Total Requirements by Sector 
Sector 
Final I Total 
Demand1 l Requirements3 
I. Clothing 278 !62 
II. Textiles 195 191 
III. Construction 447 280 
IV. Mechanical 427 383 
v. Other industries e • j 163 144 
VI. Food .. ! I,J08 443 
VII. Metallurgy 36 31 
VIII. Agriculture 639 g8 
IX. Transport 70 24 
X. Petroleum 225 r68 
XI. Chemicals 132 149 
XII. Mining 63 68 
XIII. Services 148 40 
XIV. Power .. 59 22 
Total 4·!90 2,203 
1 Where P is the price in foreign currency. All functions are purely 
hypothetical. 
8 Including 416 billion of exports for which the demand is taken as 
given. 
3 Final demand less domestic production in excess of inter-industry 
demand in the base year; i.e., the excess of projected total dexnand 
over net domestic availabilities in th~ base year. Total requirements 
are equal to the increase in GNP plus the excess of imports over exports. 
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graph, as in Figure 2 on page 463, from which it is possible to 
determine the optimum prices corresponding to any levels of 
foreign exchange and labour. These prices in turn determine 
the activities used and investment in each sector. 
For each set of parameters, we have made several trials with 
varying prices of foreign exchange, holding the other para-
meters constant.l The results of these trials are shown in 
Table 4· Each one represents the solution requiring the mini-
mum investment under the stated assumptions as to the values 
of the parameters. In the first three trials, an interpolation 
has been made at a constant deficit of 284, which was estimated 
to be the average amount of external resources necessary to 
achieve the desired increase in GNP within a ten-year period. 
II. KEY FACTORS IN INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT 
I will now investigate the effects of differences in resource 
endowments, factor proportions, savings levels, and other basic 
factors on the optimum patterns of economic development. 
The hypothesis underlying this study is that industrialization 
may play a very diverse role in different types of country. 
Where structural disequilibrium exists, it is almost impdssible 
to determine from the price system the true weight which 
should be given to these factors in investment decisions. 
Variation in the underlying structural factors is reflected in 
a formal model through differing values of some of the para-
meters. Here I will analyse effects of variation in the parameters 
related to three basic characteristics of developing economies : 
(r) factor proportions; (2) availability of foreign exchange ; 
(3) the rate of growth. 
Factor Proportions. The optimum pattern of economic devel-
opment obviously varies widely with the endowment of avail-
able economic resources. Individual mineral resources, specific 
types of agricultural land, etc., are reflected in the capital 
requirements of individual sectors and determine the desirabi-
lity of specific types of primary production. They require little 
comment. The relative abundance of larger categories of 
economic factors-aggregate natural resources, labour, and 
1 All the calculations on the aggregated model were made by 
Kenneth Kretschmer. 
Table 4: Results of Trial Solutions 
AI A2~~ A4 As 
Price of foreign exchange 2'7 2'8 2'9 3'0 2' 841 
Price of labour . . .. 0 0 0 0 0 
Requirements• . . .. I'O 1'0 I'O 1'0 I'O 
--- --------
Exports .. . . . . 686 714 739 7661 725 
Imports .. .. .. 1,163 1,062 944 832 r,oo9 
Trade deficit . . .. 477 348 205 66 284 
Increase in GNP .. · · 1,391 1,524 1,672 1,812 1,590 
1--------
Investment in : 
Industry .. .. ·. 1,436 1,6oo 1,789 1,959 1,685 
Agriculture . . .. 389 519 676 838 589 
Services .. .. . . 66g 7171 772 818 742 




Totallaboura .. . . 2,839 3·042 J,270 3.473 3.145 
1'79311·861 1'937 
-----
Ratio of investment to 
increase in GNP 1'994 1'895 
1 Interpolated. 
1 Fraction of requirements sector given in Table 3· 
• Excluding labour in agriculture. 
' I I 
Br B2 B3 Cr . C21 C3 
--------------
3'01 3'3 3'5 3'5 3'8 3'7191 
'3 '3 . 3 ·6 •6 ·6 
1'0 I ·o 1'o 1'0 1'0 I'O 
----------
597 68o 737 582 666 643 
1,278 964 739 1,208 823 927 
681 284 2 626 158 284 
1,150 1,553 I,f534 1,187 1,652 1,527 
1,4681 1,348 1,063 1,494 1,824 1,023 
376 840 1,231 625 1,289· I,IIO 
579 720 818 592 746 7°4 
2,019 3,054• 3.874 2,240 3,503 3,162 
-- ---- --
2,346 2,929 3.347 2,298 2,923 2,755 
--I~ 
1'755 r · 966!2 · ny · 887 2'120 2'057 
I 
Dr D2 D3 E 
2'7 3'0 3'60 
0 0 0 
'5 '5 1'o 
-- -- -- ---
686 766 651 
8611 629 926 
175 -137 276 
953 r,o5r 1,598 
---- ----
1,033 1,448 1,629 
293 637 789 
436 555 740 
1,736 2,640 3,158 
-------
1,914 2,423 3,001 
1-
1'850 2'513 1'976 
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investment funds-is subject to more general analysis. The 
most significant relationship is that between population or 
labour force as a whole and natural resources plus capital stock. 
It is often suggested that in the 'overpopulated' areas, where 
pressure on the developed resources-primarily agricultural-
is high, industrialization is more desirable than in countries 
where a shift of the labour force from agriculture to industry 
(without investment or technological improvement) would 
cause a significant fall in agricultural output. 
Population pressure may affect several parameters in the 
model. In the first place, it means that there will be a fairly 
unlimited supply of labour available for non-agricultural em-
ployment. This labour is not a free good because-at least in 
part-it must be moved to towns, housed, and trained. In 
our system, this means that labour will have a shadow price 
or capital cost greater than zero but in all probability con·-
siderably less than the actual wage rate. In other cases, the 
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Figure I. S1tbstittJtion between Capital and Labour 
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The overall possibility of substituting labour for capital 
with :fixed input coefficients is shown in Figure r. Point C 
corresponds roughly to existing wage rates in Southern Italy, 
while point A represents the optimum solution with labour as a 
free good. The variation in total capital requirements corres-
ponding to this change in the use of labour is not large-about 
5 per cent-because the composition of imports and exports 
is the only factor which has been allowed to vary ; techniques 
of.-production and the composition of :final demand have been 
kept constant. 
This variation in the optimum investment pattern takes 
place largely in the industrial sector. When the price of non-
agricultural labour is taken at approximately the existing 
wage rate (no opportunity cost is assigned to agricultural 
labour, on the theory that even the most successful investment 
programme will leave it in surplus supply), the fraction of 
total investment going into industry in the optimum programme 
is 43 per cent. ('Industry' includes mining and manufacturing 
and excludes power and other services. See Table 4 on page 460.) 
When both types of labour are 'free', the optimum share of 
industry is increased to 55 per cent. (These proportions refer to 
'productive' investment, which is perhaps 70 per cent of the 
total investment taking place.) 
Population pressure is also likely to be reflected in the 
relative levels of the marginal capital coefficients in agriculture 
and industry. In an overpopulated area, land is utilized more 
intensively in agriculture, and the capital required to extend 
the land under cultivation through reclamation, irrigation, 
etc., is greater. Densely populated areas are also likely to have 
fragmented land holdings which make mechanization less 
productive. To take two rather extreme examples, the marginal 
capital requirements per unit of output in agriculture in 
Southern Italy are perhaps three times as high as they are 
in Turkey. There is little difference in the capital requirement 
in industry, however. 
A variation in the capital/output ratio in agriculture will 
be reflected in changes in the desirable levels of investment 
in all the industrial sectors if a given increase in GNP is to be 
achieved. In the present instance, a lowering of the agricultural 
capital coefficient by about 15 per cent produced a decrease 
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in the share of investment going to industry of about 20 per 
cent. Only the food-processing industries increased their 
output. These particular values of course depend on the varia-
bility of capital coefficients within agriculture and industry. 
Both of these aspects of the factor proportions problem thus 
appear to be quite significant in determining the role to be 
given to industrial investment. The importance of the 'em-
ployment ratio' may be overstressed in actual practice, how-
ever, when it is divorced from the overall test of increasing 
national income. 
Availability of Foreign Exchange. The ability of a country to 
secure foreign exchange is another key factor in determining 
the desirable extent of industrial development. Industrializa-
tion consists primarily in the substitution of domestic produc-
tion of manufactured goods for imports. The choice between 
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Figure 2. Effect of the Price of Foreign Exchange 
on the Trade Deficit 
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resources required by each alternative. In a linear program-
ming model, this. decision is based on the shadow price of foreign 
exchange, which is determined by the opportunity cost of 
domestic production in the marginal importing and exporting 
sectors. In equilibrium, the price of foreign exchange becomes 
the reciprocal of the marginal productivity of investment in 
these sectors. 
The effect of changes in the price of foreign exchange on 
imports and exports is shown in Figure 2. The import curve 
represents the total demand of the economy for imports, taking 
account of optimum readjustments in domestic production 
at each price of foreign exchange. 
The effect on the investment decision in any sector of a rise 
in the price of foreign exchange will be determined by three 
factors: (1) the rise in the price of imports of the commodity 
produced; (z) the variation in direct capital and labour costs 
in the sector ; (3) the rise in the cost of materials purchased 
from other sectors. Investment in other sectors will cause the 
price of purchased materials to rise less than the price of im-
ports. These external economies will affect primarily the 
finished-goods sectors, where investment will be more attrac-
tive. As will be noted below, errors of partial analysis are largest 
in those sectors. 
The export curve represents the combined effects of variations 
in supply and demand at each price of foreign exchange. 
Although constant capital coefficients were assumed, the rise 
in price of materials purchased by the export sectors serves 
to reduce the elasticity of supply, particularly for finished 
goods. 
The optimum or equilibrium price of foreign exchange is 
determined by the ability of the area to sustain an excess of 
imports over exports through external borrowing or subsidies. 
In the present example, substantial subsidies are necessary 
to achieve the desired increase in national income, and the 
annual trade deficit is almost 7 per cent of GNP. One effect of 
such outside assistance is to permit the region to specialize to 
a greater extent in the less capital-intensive activities and 
secure a given increase in regional income with a somewhat 
smaller use of capital. Since many branches of industry are 
less capital intensive than agriculture in the present model, a 
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higher deficit results in a greater proportion of investment 
going to industry. In other countries, the opposite result might 
well occur, however. 
Since the equilibrium price of foreign exchange determines 
the limits to which investment should be carried in each sector 
where exports and imports are possible, it is the most crucial 
parameter in formulating a development programme. If too 
low a value is used, for example, the trade deficit will be larger 
than can be financed and emergency measures to stimulate 
exports or reduce imports will have to be taken. These will 
lead to investment at lower rates of productivity than would 
be the case if the proper exchange rate had been used through-
out the programme. The resulting increase in total cost of the 
programme is illustrated in Section III (page 467)· 
The Rate of Growth. The rate of growth affects the pattern of 
investment in two different ways. In the first place, foreign 
exchange earnings are fairly independent of the rate of growth. 
Except for improvements in technology or possible economies 
of scale in export production arising from a larger domestic 
market, foreign exchange earnings depend on the exchange 
rate and the elasticity of foreign demand for such exports. 
1000 
500 
Price of labour • 0 
Price of foreicn exchance (P,) as indicated 
20 60 80 
PER CENT INCREASE IN GNP 
Figure 3· Effect of Growth on Import Requirements 
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Imports, however, will increase with the rate of growth unless 
the exchange rate is changed, as shown in Figure 3. Even if 
foreign borrowing depends to some extent on the growth in 
national income, there will be a tendency for the net deficit 
to be greater at higher rates of growth. 
In order to limit the trade deficit of foreign exchange avail-
abilities a higher price must be given to foreign exchange. 
In the present example, an increase in the rate of growth by 
IO per cent would have increased the exchange rate needed 
to maintain a constant deficit by 2 per cent. The marginal 
productivity of investment would fall by the same amount. 
Although this effect is not significant for small variations, 
when the growth rate is greatly accelerated it may become 
quite important. Higher growth rates lead to a greater 
need for self-sufficiency unless export demand is highly 
elastic. 
The rate of growth will also act on the composition of invest-
ment through its effects on final demand. As per capita incomes 
increase, the proportion of income spent on manufactured 
consumer goods of all kinds may be expected to increase. The 
study of consumption in Southern Italy on which the final 
demand in the present model is based showed an income 
elasticity of demand of I· 35 for all manufactured goods (except 
food). The proportion of national income spent on investment 
goods is also likely to increase. Both of these factors will lead 
to an increasing proportion of investment in industry. 
Both the increased demand for imports and the shift in the 
composition of final demand to more manufactured goods tend 
to give an increased importance to industrial investment at 
higher rates of growth. The increased pressure on foreign 
exchange may affect the desirability of investment in agricul-
ture as much as in industry in some countries, but there are 
more likely to be technological limits to a rapid increase in 
agricultural output through increased investment. Throughout 
this discussion I have left out of account technological improve-
ment in agriculture, which may be one of the most important 
elements in increased output. The rate of technological progress 
in agriculture is limited by other factors, however. This con-
clusion appears to have particular force in an overpopulated 
area like Southern Italy, where a further increase in the rate of 
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growth in the agricultural sector can only be secured at very 
high capital/output ratios. 
III. STRUCTURAL INTERDEPENDENCE AND 
INVESTMENT PRIORITIES 
The preceding section has illustrated the way in which the 
decisions affecting industrialization depend on resource avail-
abilities and investment in requirements in all sectors. The 
interdependence among sectors introduces errors into any 
method of making investment decisions based only on the 
characteristics of single sectors or projects. I shall now try to 
analyse these errors and suggest methods of improving partial 
methods from the experience gained in solving a general equi-
librium model. 
Errors in Partial Analysis. Partial analysis uses the same 
general test for investment allocation as does linear program-
ming : the marginal productivity of investments included in the 
programme should be greater than those which are excluded. 
The marginal productivity may not be equal in each sector 
because of limitations on the commodity composition of output 
even though a perfect price system would bring about such 
equality. With either method, an optimum programme satisfy-
ing the various resource limitations can only be arrived at by 
trial and error. There are various routes by which the final 
solution can be reached, but a convenient method in both 
cases is to assume a marginal productivity of investment, to 
exclude projects falling below this figure, and then to see 
whether investment funds have been exhausted and other 
limitations satisfied. In the partial analysis it is possible to 
take account of some errors in the price system, such as the 
existence of a tariff on imports of the product, but not of the 
indirect effects of such errors on the price of purchased 
materials. I 
As has been pointed out earlier, the partial analysis is subject 
to two general types of error arising out of interconnectedness : 
inability to determine how much of a given commodity will be 
1 A suggested method using partial sector analysis has been given 
in my 'Application of Investment Criteria', Quarterly journal of 
Economics, February 1953, pp. 76-96. 
Models of Development 
required and the omission of external economies due to invest-
ment in other sectors. The first type of error is probably of 
greater quantitative significance. To measure it would require 
a comparison of the output forecasts which would be made in 
ignorance of the input-output pattern with the results of the 
present model. These errors would be small for finished goods 
and larger for intermediate products and producer services. 
Since the latter sectors have higher capital coefficients, the 
errors in estimating investment requirements would be greater 
than those in forecasting output. They cannot be measured 
here for lack of a basis of comparison, however. 
The second type of error-omission of external economies-
can be isolated by assuming the same knowledge of the inter-
dependence of output in both cases and the use of constant 
current prices in determining which commodities shall be 
domestically produced and which imported. The partial method 
would therefore assume a constant ratio of value-added to 
total output in each trial. To compare this method to the 
linear programming model, I have made a solution correspond-
ing approximately to trial As in Table 4 in that the increase 
in GNP is almost the same (see trial E, Table 4). The differences 
between these two solutions show the magnitude and also the 
nature of the errors in the partial method. 
In terms of the overall test of capital requirements (labour 
being assumed free in this trial), the difference of about II5 
billion lira (corrected for the difference in GNP) is not large-
about 4 per cent of total investment requirements. If we limit 
the comparison to the marginal cases in which external econ-
omies have some significance, however, this difference is much 
more important. 
The best indication of the inefficiency of the partial method 
is the fact that the marginal productivity of investment (the 
reciprocal of the price of foreign exchange) with the partial 
method is much lower-28 per cent as compared with 35 per 
cent for linear programming. This difference results from the 
fact that external economies are not taken into account and 
underinvestment in some sectors results. In other sectors, 
investment must be pushed to lower levels of productivity to 
secure the same increase in GNP. There will be underinvestment 
in the sectors which purchase a large amount from other 
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sectors, as in the production of finished goods. Textile produc-
tion in the present case was 40 per cent lower with the partial 
method than with linear programming. Conversely, there will 
be overinvestment in primary production and basic industries 
to compensate for the first error ; agriculture is 30 per cent 
higher with the partial method. 
Regardless of the values of the various parameters, there 
will be this systematic bias in favour of primary production 
and basic industries and against finished goods when external 
economies are ignored. These biases also extend to the export 
sectors. 
Planning Ind~tstrial Development. To improve on partial 
analysis, some of the effects of structural interdependence 
must be taken into account. The methodology which has been 
used here may be helpful even when all the elements are not 
known. This method takes advantage of the fact that inter-
dependence in the economy is not general, but is largely 'one 
way'. The demand for basic materials depends on the demand 
for finished goods ; the demand for minerals and agricultural 
products depends on the first two categories ; and, finally, the 
demand for fuels, power, transport, and producer services 
depends on all of the others. The extent of this one-way 
interdependence in the Italian economy is shown in Table I ; 
less than 5 per cent of the interindustry flows occur to 
the right of the diagonal when the sectors are arranged 
in such a way as to minimize such circular interdependence. 
To compute output requirements we should start with 
the sectors at the top of the list, while to trace out the 
effects of external economies on prices we should start at 
the bottom. 
A procedure which will introduce some of the elements of a 
general equilibrium analysis into the usual sector approach is 
the following : 
I. Divide the economy into as many sectors as can be 
managed and arrange them in the order of maximum one-way 
interdependence as indicated in Tabler. 
2. Within each sector, rank projects according to 
their marginal return on investment, using expected 
prices and correcting for tariffs, subsidies, etc., where 
possible. 
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3. Estimate the final demands in the economy which would 
result from the increase in income expected from the invest-
ment programme. 
4· Using an assumed marginal productivity of investment, 
exclude projects in each sector which have lower returns, 
wherever there is the alternative of importing. Include all 
export projects which exceed this rate of return. Start at 
the bottom of the list in making this estimate (with services 
and primary production) and revise the cost of purchased 
materials where possible on the basis of previous decisions as 
to imports or domestic production. 
5· Starting at the top of the list of sectors, compute the requir-
ed output in each from the final demand and the estimated 
use in preceding sectors. Compute imports, exports, and the 
payments deficit. 
6. Revise the size of the programme downward if the avail-
able investment funds have been exceeded. Revise the pro-
ductivity of investment downward if the trade deficit is exces-
sive. Repeat the calculation until limits on investment, foreign 
exchange, and other resources are satisfied. 
It would require a paper much longer than the present one 
to explore the practical problems involved in each of these 
steps. They will vary greatly depending on the type of informa-
tion available. One great advantage of using such a framework 
for investment analysis, however, is that it can incorporate 
whatever fragmentary information is available from a variety 
of sources-engineering studies, demand analyses, import 
statistics, etc. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The role of industrialization in economic development 
capnot be evaluated by looking only at individual sectors. 
This paper has explored the ways in which our judgements 
may be modified by looking at the total effects of an invest-
ment programme. To make this investigation, I have had to 
abandon the ceteris paribus assumptions of partial equilibrium 
analysis and work with a general equilibrium system. Although 
some of the parameters are estimated from very inadequate 
evidence, the most important elements-the input coefficients 
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-are the most reliable. Few of the above conclusions would 
have been changed by large deviations in the other parameters. 
Knowledge of structural interdependence is particularly 
important in the industrial sectors of the economy. The external 
economies which occur in these sectors provide the justification 
for investment in 'social overhead' facilities and in much of 
primary production. The desired level of output in each indus-
trial sector depends on developments in the others. We have 
seen that factor proportions, comparative advantage, and the 
rate of growth all affect the amount and type of industrial 
investment which is desirable. My main result, therefore, has 
been to stress the need for overall analysis in planning industrial 
development. 
THE APPEAL o-F CONFISCATION 
IN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT* 
by M. Bronfenbrenner 
'What's mine is mine, and what's yours is mine too.' 
Apocryphal Communist Proverb 
THE APPEAL OF CONFISCATION IN FINANCING ECONOMIC 
development is not 'pure propaganda' in the sense of economic 
fallacy. It must be taken seriously, not shrugged off by easy 
analogies to 'a shot in the arm' or 'the goose that laid the 
golden eggs'. For confiscation of capital has not killed the goose 
that laid the golden eggs in the Soviet Union, in China, or in 
the other 'people's democracies'. It seems rather to have been 
an important device permitting these countries to develop 
and industrialize rapidly, while other countries, in which the 
influence of Western ethics has been stronger, are lagging 
behind. It is questionable whether the lagging countries can 
be expected permanently to eschew the device of confiscating 
capital under their control unless capital is made available 
to them from abroad in large amounts at attractive terms ; 
it is likewise questionable whether such largesse is in the econ-
omic interest of the lending countries. 
The issue we discuss is not whether confiscation can be 
justified by some accepted or conventional Occidental standard 
of morals or propriety, but merely whether it brings the 
pragmatic results desired, namely economic development 
without sacrifice to the scale of living of the mass of the popula-
tion. It will be our contention that confiscation has done so, 
is doing so, and will continue to do so, by shifting income to 
developmental investment from capitalists' consumption, 
from transfer abroad, and from unproductive 'investment' 
like luxury housing. Therein lies the appeal of confiscation, 
although it is argued persuasively on the other side in 
*Economic Development and Cultural Change, Vol. III, No. 3, April 
1955. Reprinted by permission of the University of Chicago Press and the 
author. 
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developed countries that these accomplishments require totali-
tarian dictatorship for their realization and that development 
is not worth this price. 
Historical demonstration of the effects of confiscation past 
and present requires data from developing and developed 
economies on both sides of the Iron Curtain, which are not 
yet available in reliable form, and which may never become 
available at all. As an admittedly inferior substitute for his-
torical data, I propose to 'illustrate' the power of confiscation 
by hypothetical models of an underdeveloped overpopulated 
economy. The salient characteristics of this economy I shall 
seek to render fairly realistic for a large group of countries, 
but there will be others for which the model will remain 
completely meaningless. (The reader with time to spare may 
spend some of it in creating an alternative which will fit 
both Greenland and India, both Puerto Rico and Outer 
Mongolia.) The model will be sufficiently simple to remain 
within the bounds of primary school arithmetic. This limita-
tion of technique will prevent consideration of bottlenecks, 
cyclical oscillations, balance-of-payments problems, struc-
tural relations between economic sectors, and other impor-
tant effects which have been treated formally in more 
elaborate applications of 'process analysis' to economic 
development.l 
Model I. Our hypothetical economy has a net national and 
personal income of roo, after depreciation and before direct 
taxes. Income, both before and after taxes, is divided between 
service income2 and property income in the proportion of 85 
1 For three such applications, see: J. J. Polak, 'Balance of Pay-
ments Problems of Countries Reconstructing with the Help of Foreign 
Loans', Quartel'ly ]ou!'nal of Economics, LVII (February 1943), 208-40; 
reprinted in American Economic Association, Readings in the Theol'y 
of Intemational T!'ade; H. W. Singer, 'The Mechanics of Economic 
Development', The Indian Economic Review (August 1952), reprinted 
in the present volume, pp. 381-99; Trygve Haavelmo, A Study in the 
TheOI'y of Economic Evolution (Amsterdam, 1954). 
1 'Service income' includes both compensation of employees and 
gross profits of proprietors of unincorporated enterprises. Its recipients 
include, along with the proletariat and peasantry, the bulk of those 
bourgeois segments classified in Mainland China as 'petty' or 
'national'. 
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to 15.1 While tax progression may be on the statute books, it 
plays no significant role in modifying either the functional or 
the personal distribution of income.2 (Throughout this study, 
the reader is invited to substitute his own estimates when mine 
appear imaginative or fantastic.) 
1 This property share is too high for areas in which population is 
scanty and land rent low. It is probably too low for densely populated 
areas with rich agricultural or mining land. A few statistical estimates, 
given below, are the best available, but refer to countries in which 
the property share may be lower than it is in the bulk of the under-
developed world. 
Percentage Distribution of Income 
I 
Continent and Unincor-
Country Employee porated Property Transfer Com pen- Enter- Income Payments sation prises 
Africa 
Northern Rhodesia 
(I949) .. .. 63·6 32"7 I "4 2•3 
Southern Rhodesia 
(1949) . . .. 55"4 33"() 8·I 3"5 
Asia 
Ceylon (I95I) .. 74"7 13"I s·s 6·6 
Japan (I949) .. 46·8 49"7 I·9 I •6 
North A me rica 
Puerto Rico (I948-9) 52"7 39"I 8·2 
South America 
I Peru (I947) .. .. 44"4 36·o 13•1 6·s 
Sources: For Ceylon, unpublished data of the Central Bank of 
Ceylon, made available to the writer by the courtesy of Professor 
Theodore Morgan; for other countries, United Nations Statistical 
Office, 'National Income and Its Distribution in Underdeveloped 
Countries', United Nations Statistical Papers, Series E, No. 3 (New 
York, I95I), p. I8. 
t One or more of the three following reasons often explains the 
disappointing results of progressive taxation in underdeveloped coun-
tries: (I) the extremely limited number of technically competent 
administration and enforcement officials; (2) the susceptibility of 
underpaid and overworked civil servants to direct or indirect corrup-
tion ; and (3) class systems which render it improper for the mere 
tax-office clerk to question the returns or statements of wealthy 
merchants or landowners who are his social superiors. 
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Of the assumed property share of IS, one-third, or s. com-
prises net saving (above depreciation of capital).1 I ignore net 
savings out of service income as unimportant quantitatively. 
Of the total net savings of s. 40 per cent (or 2) takes forms 
available for domestic economic development, either as capital 
goods or as 'social overhead capital'. The remainder (or 3) is 
dissipated in foreign investments, inventories, or residential 
housing of a luxury or semi-luxury variety. 2 Population is 
growing at the rate of I· S per cent a year. Aggregate net income 
is growing at the rate of I· 7 per cent a year. This last figure 
is compounded of a IS per cent return on developmental in-
vestment (including a substantial write-up for external econ-
omies), a 6o per cent return on population growth (where any 
figure under IOO per cent indicates 'diminishing returns'), 
and a flat o · S per cent for 'entrepreneurship' or innovation, 
including particularly the introduction of methods already in 
vogue in other countries. 3 
1 Gross saving (and investment) percentages would of course be 
much larger. An estimate by the United Nations Economic Commission 
for Latin America, for example, concludes that 14 per cent of the total 
income of this area entered into gross savings in 1953. but that this 
savings coefficient was 'barely sufficient for an annual per capita 
growth of 0·9 per cent'. International Co-operation in a Latin American 
Development Policy (New York, I954). 
1 Dissipation in hoards, or in bidding up the values of land and other 
existing assets, may also exist. I do not consider it here because such 
dissipation can be counteracted with relative ease by deficit financing 
on the part of the government. Dissipation such as is listed in the text 
requires diversion of real goods from developmental investment to 
exports, inventories, or residential construction. 
For two independent estimates, one more sanguine than ours and 
one less so, consider the following running quotation from Joseph J. 
Spengler, 'Demographic Patterns', in Harold F. Williamson and John 
A. Buttrick (eds.), Economic Development: Principles and Patterns 
(New York, I954), pp. 77 f.: 
' The movement of aggregate income is dominated by: (I) equip-
ment or income-producing wealth; (2) technical and related forms of 
progress; and (3) the magnitude of the labour force. With factors (2) 
and (3) constant, a I per cent increase in the amount of "capital" in 
use will be accompanied by an increase of o· 25 too· 35 per cent in aggre-
gate net income. With factors (1) and (2) constant, a I per cent increase 
in the labour force will be accompanied by an income increase of o·65 
to 0·75 per cent. On the basis of these estimates and of growth actually 
recorded in various national incomes, the forces included under (2) 
have been increasing net incomes in advanced countries something 
like I per cent per year. 
'Somewhat similar results were obtained by E. C. Olson in a study 
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With population growing at I· 5 per cent per year and 
aggregate income at I· 7 per cent, the annual growth rate of 
per capita income is only, to a first approximation, o · 2 per cent.l 
If there is no change in the income distribution, per capita 
service income also grows at this same rate (o·2 per cent per 
year). This is near-stagnation, which widens annually the 
developmental gap separating this economy from the advanced 
countries of the Western World. 
These figures are summarized and presented as Table I. 
This table has been expanded to include the results of 5, IO, 
and 20 years of growth compounded according to the assump-
tions which we have made. 
Table I: The Status Quo: Economic Stagnation 
Line Cur- After After After 
No. Units rent 5 years IO 20 years _xears 
I. Real income .. Absolute IOO·O I08·8 II8·4 J40•I 
2. Service income .. 
" 8s·o 92·5 
I00·6 ng·I 
3. Property income 
" IS·O I6·3 I7·8 
2I·O 




2·0 2•0 2•0 2•0 
6. Population growth 
rate . . .. 
" I·S I·S I·S I·S 7· Aggregate income 
growth rate .. 
" I•7 I•7 I•7 I•7 8. Per capita income I 
growth rate , 0•2 0•2 0•2 0•2 
9· Per capita income (ndex No. IOO·O IOI·O I02•0 I04•I 
IO. Per capita service 
income . . . . , 8s·o 8s·g 86·7 88·5 
Notes: (Line 7) =·IS (Line 5) + ·6o (Line 6) + o·s 
(Line 8) = (Line 7) - (Line 6) (Approximation) 
based on international comparisons. He found that a I per cent increase 
in the employed population was accompanied by only about o · 25 per cent 
increase in the national income ; and that I per cent increases, respect-
ively, in the total amounts of energy and livestock used, were accompani-
ed by increases of about o · 5 and o · 25 per cent in the national income.' 
1 The United Nations Economic Commission for Asia and the 
Far East (ECAFE) is more pessimistic. With population growing at 
I· 5 per cent per annum, ECAFE estimates 6 to 7 per cent net invest-
ment to be required for maintenance of existing per capita income under 
East Asian coDditions. 'Some Financial Aspects of Development 
Programmes in Asian Countries', Economic Bulletin for Asia and the 
Far East (Jan.-June I952), pp. I f. 
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Model II. 'Comes the Revolution.' It may indeed be a social 
revolution, with or without substantial violence and destruc-
tion. It may be a capital levy at rates close to 100 per cent. 
It may be 'nationalization', with compensation wiped out by 
rapid inflation.1 At any rate, all capital goods which yield 
incomes become State property. Certain consumer durable 
goods which can be converted to income-yielding uses, or sold 
abroad for capital imports, also become State property. All 
income from this property goes to the State, none to the former 
property owners, even though they may retain the bare legal 
title to certain of the assets. None of the income from property 
is paid to the service-income classes directly; there is no imme-
diate redistribution or 'social dividend' in this model. Because 
of the absence of redistribution I call this model 'Confiscation, 
Russian Style', with special reference to the period of the first 
four Five-Year Plans, although the figures I shall use cannot 
be applied realistically to actual Soviet experience.2 
More precisely, let us suppose that two-thirds of what had 
previously been property income (or 10 per cent of the total 
national i~me), is used by the State for development purposes 
broadly conceived, i.e., including not only capital goods but 
also 'social overhead capital'. The other third of what had 
previously been property income (or 5 per cent of the total 
national income) is dissipated by additional 'non-productive' 
government expenditures3 (public buildings, armaments, mili-
tary and police personnel, etc.), or into symbolic compensation 
for the former property-owners. The five per cent leakage also 
includes income which would have been earned by private 
1 'Nationalization' with approximately full compensation, on the 
British model, will not in itself bring about the increases in saving and 
investment which are postulated below. 
1 A critic has suggested that they might have been realistic for a 
Soviet Union which had succeeded in remaining neutral during World 
War II, or located in a world free from major wars. 
3 There is much to be said for rehabilitation of the classical econ-
omists' distinction between productive and non-productive activities, 
the former contributing to the maintenance or expansion of the level 
of economic development and the latter not. We must grant the dis-
tinction to be invalid in terms of the creation of utilities, and it is 
inaccurate to identify this distinction, as the classical economists did, 
with the distinction between the production of goods and the produc-
tion of services. Cf. Paul Baran, 'Economic Progress and Economic 
Surplus', Science and Society, VII (Fall 1953), pp. 290-300. 
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parties but which is not earned under public ownership, either 
because of damage during revolutionary upheaval or because 
of inefficient allocation by the public authorities. Income 
created by conversion of nationalized consumer durables (e.g., 
crops grown on former hunting preserves or golf courses) will 
be a deduction from the leakage, as will income acquired from 
foreign sale of other nationalized durables like jewelry and art 
objects. 
An important point in this discussion of leakages is often 
misunderstood, both by Socialists and by their opponents. 
The Socialist need not deny the technical superiority of private 
gain to public interest in allocating land and capital to their 
most productive uses, although he usually feels compelled to 
do so, sometimes with reason. Neither need the Socialist deny, 
as he often does, the involuntary social service performed 
by the landlord, capitalist, or entrepreneur who makes the 
more efficient allocation. The Socialist need deny only that 
this service is worth 10, IS, or 2S per cent of the national 
income of a poor country, a far less plausible proposi-
tion. The Socialist can be compared in this ~pect to a 
shabby-genteel buyer of a shabby-genteel used car, who 
should deny only that the new model is worth to him its 
so per cent extra cost but who insists on assuaging his 
ego with •1erbiage about 'they don't make them this good 
any more'. 
Returning to our theoretical scheme : Let the current year 
be one in which 'normalcy' has been restored after the Revolu-
tion. Tne aggregate income growth rate under public control 
has fallen to 12 · 5 per cent of the developmental investment 
rate plus 55 per cent of the population growth rate plus an 
improvement or innovation factor of o · 4 per cent. The corres-
ponding figures in Model I were IS, 6o, and o · s respectively. 
The reductions are further allowances, over and beyond the 
five per cent leakage, for the presumably greater efficiency of 
private over social entrepreneurship. As for population, its 
rate of growth begins to increase, partially in anticipation of 
better days to come and partly in response to improvements 
as they are achieved. Over five years the (geometric) mean 
growth rate is I· 55 per cent, over ro years I· 6o per cent, over 
20 years I· 6s per cent, with an eventual asymptote at I •75 
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per cent.l Nevertheless, comparing Model II with Model I, 
we see immediately a higher growth rate of per capita income, 
which is caused by diversion of the bulk of property income 
to development purposes}& Per capita service income keeps 
pace, despite the absence of direct redistribution, and rises at 
once above the near-stagnation of the status quo. Diversion 
of property income to developmental investment has triumphed 
over both the Malthusian bogey of overpopulation and the 
Brozenian bogey of • Fabian' entrepreneurship.8 The triumph 
is only on paper and is derived from arbitrary figures, but in 
selecting these figures I have attempted 'leaning to one side' 
against the appeal of confiscation, and can imagine no realistic 
assumptions leading to contrary qualitative conclusions in 
societies whose income distributions include high property 
1 A growth rate of I· so per cent in the current year, rising by o·o2 
per cent per year until I ·6o per cent is reached in year 5, then by o•oi 
per cent per year until I ·75 per cent is reached in year 25, will yield 
geometric means close to those in the text. 
1 A query from a cynical critic at this point remains unanswered : 
Can any government but a totalitarian dictatorship devote xo per 
cent of its national income to developmental investment year after 
year without being voted out of office by the partisans of Santa Claus 
here and now ? An American survey of actual Soviet experience under-
lines the criticism.' It may be inferred ... that Soviet industrial growth 
was as rapid as it was because of, rather than despite, the existence of 
central planning and authoritarian control. It seems doubtful that 
the amount and pattern of Soviet investment would ever be duplicated 
in an essentially consumer-oriented market economy ..•. Such a 
level and pattern of investment, and the rapid economic growth which 
results, could only be accomplished by an economic system designed 
to fulfil the wishes of central planners. Resources must be directed, 
despite the needs and desires of households, predominantly into 
machines which produce machines (and weapons) rather than into 
machines which produce consumers' goods and services, including 
housing.' Franklyn D. Holzman, 'Soviet Economic Growth', W O'l'ld 
Politics, VII, No. I (October 1954), p. 144. 
1 Yale Brozen has become the most articulate professional spokes-
man in America for those economists and business leaders who consider 
private entrepreneurship an indispensable ingredient in economic 
development over the long period. His position is summarized in his 
essay, 'Entrepreneurship and Technological Change', in Williamson 
and Buttrick, op. cit., pp. 196-236, and this in tum is summarized in 
a one-sentence quotation from W. T. Easterbrook (ibid., p. 224) : 
'The straightest, perhaps the only, road to social security is via 
entrepreneurial security.' 
An interesting and suggestive classification of entrepreneurship 
into 'innovating', 'imitative', 'Fabian', and 'drone' varieties, due to 
Clarence Danhof, is used by Brozen, ibid., p. 205. 
J 
Models of Development 
shares which are not ploughed back into economic development. 
Table II, summarizing these results, is presented immediately 
below. 
Table II: Confiscation, Russian Style 
Line Cur- After 
After After 
Units IO 20 No. rent 5 years years years 
-
r. Real income .. Absolute 100•0 li3'I 128·4 r66·r 
2. Service income II 85·o g6·2 109·1 141•2 
3· Property income II o·o o·o o·o o·o 
4· Saving ratio .. Per cent IO·O 10·0 ro·o 10·0 
5· Development 
investment ratio II 10·0 ro·o ro·o ro·o 
6. Population growth 
rate . . .. II r·5o r·ss r·6o 1·65 
7· Aggregate income 
growth rate .. II 2•48 z·so 2'53 2'57 
8. Per capita income 
growth rate .. II o·g8 o·gs 0'93 0'92 
9· Per capita income Index No. roo·o 104'9 Il9'7 120'1 
10. Per capita service 
income .. .. II 8s·o 8g·1 93'31 102•1 
Notes: (Line 7) = ·125 (Line 5) + ·ss (Line 6) + o·4o 
(Line 8) = (Line 7) (Line 6) (Approximation) 
(Line 6) and (Line 7) are geometric means over the 
respective time periods. 
Model III. A lower rate of growth after the 'Revolution', 
but higher personal incomes during the earlier years of develop-
ment, can be obtained by diverting part of what was formerly 
property income for consumption purposes. In the third model, 
one-third of property income (5 per cent of national income, 
6 per cent of service income} is redistributed to the recipients 
of service income, as for example by increases in industrial 
real wages or by replacement of high agricultural land rents by 
lower agricultural land taxes. Property income, in this third 
model, has therefore been divided into three equal parts : 
developmental investments, leakages, and transfers to service 
income. This disposal of the proceeds of confiscation to include 
transfers to service income I call 'Chinese style', although the 
--
-
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figures bear no intentional quantitative similarity to actual 
developments in Mainland China.l 
The other assumptions of Model II are retained here, with 
the results presented as Table III. All the unfavourable features 
of Model II are retained ; the leakages, the inefficiencies in 
resource allocation, the slowing of innovation, the increased 
population growth rate. Another 'unfavourable' feature has 
been added, from the developmental point of view : redistribu-
tion of income from savers to spenders. Nevertheless, growth 
is more rapid than under Model I, as measured either by aggre-
gate or per capita income. Growth is slower than under the 
'Russian-style' confiscation of Model II, but it reaches the 
common people more rapidly, due to the redistribution feature. 
(Comparing Tables I and III, no great divergence can be seen 
Table III: Confiscation, Chinese Style 
' 
Line Cur- After After 
No. Units rent 5 10 years years 
------
I. Real income .. Absolute 100•0 109·8 IZ0•8 
2. Service income .. .. go·o 98·8 ro8·7 
3· Property income • .. o·o o·o o·o 
4· Saving ratio .. Per cent s·o 5•0 5·o 
5· Developmental 
investment ratio .. 
6. Population growth 
5'0 s·o 5'0 
rate .. . . .. 1•50 1'55 I•6o 
7· Aggregate income 
growth . . .. .. :r·86 1•88 1·91 
8. Per capita income 
growth rate .. .. 0•36 0•33 0'31 
9· Per capita income Index No. 100•0 
IO. Per capita service 
101•7 103'4 
income .. . . .. I go·o 91'5 93'1 
Notes : (Line 7) = · 125 (Line 5) + ·55 (Line 6) + o · 40 














(Line 6) and (Line 7) are geometric means over the 
respective time periods. 
1 It is conceivable that Russian practice after Stalin's death may 
be shifting closer to this model than to Model II. 
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in the course of income per capita. The divergence in service 
income per capita, the more significant item for the masses, is 
attributable almost entirely to redistribution on the basis of 
these arbitrary figures.) 
Choice as between Models II and III depends upon the 
preferences of revolutionary societies, and still more of revolu-
tionary leaders. Time preferences are important, and likewise 
the choice between high growth rates and income redistribution. 
As this is written (1954-5), Model III seems to exercise the 
greater fascination for the underdeveloped world. 
Neither of the confiscation models, it should be noted, forces 
the common people to finance development themselves in 
terms of lower real incomes at any time, although the attain-
ment of higher real incomes may be postponed in the interests 
of capital accumulation. Comparing either model with the 
status quo, it is difficult to see how any could prefer the latter, 
unless he be an adherent of morality ruat coelum or of Professor 
Ayres' 'Divine Right of Capital'. The popular appeal of con-
fiscation appears to require less economic explanation than does 
the democratic resistance thereto. 
Confiscation of capitalist property and property income is 
credited with no significant part in the economic development 
of Western Europe, North America, Australasia, or Japan. 
If our models possess any verisimilitude, this seems strange 
at first glance. Yet there are a number of reasons which com-
bined to make the developing Western world safe for the cap-
italist in the nineteenth century, which cannot be relied upon 
to make the developing remainder of the world equally safe 
for his biological or spiritual progeny in the twentieth century. 
Some of these considerations relate directly to certain of the 
figures of our models ; others involve social issues which we 
have been unable to reduce to numerical form. I list eight 
factors ; no historical instance rested significantly on all eight, 
and no one of the eight applied significantly to all the economies 
which developed early.1 
1 The development of this section was assisted significantly by 
Benjamin Higgins' paper on 'Economic Development of Underdevel-
oped Areas, Past and Present', (Land Economics. August 1955) 
and by the criticisms by several friends of an earlier draft of the 
present essay. 
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I. Highly important, except in the Japanese case, was the 
the high social mobility which prevailed in the developing 
countries. In most cases, the period of rapid development 
seems to have been an age of 'three generations from shirt-
sleeves to shirt-sleeves'. More significantly, it was an age in 
which entrepreneurship in developmental activity was a 
promising route from the bottom to the top of the social ladder. 
A large part of the population saw its future, or its descendants' 
future, in entrepreneurship and thereafter in property-owner-
ship, however extravagant these visions became in the event. 
As a result, neither egalitarianism nor confiscation could hold 
great popular appeal over long r,eriods. Social mobility in an 
upward direction is exceptional in the underdeveloped com-
munities of today, and such mobility as exists appears to 
exercise little influence on the political and economic attitudes 
of the people. 
2. Expropriation, moreover, has seldom had in the advanced 
capitalist countries the aid of xen?phobia which it has in much 
of the present-day underdeveloped world. Most of the capital 
in the Western countries was held by native citizens, if we 
except specie hoards in Italian, Jewish, or Levantine hands. 
These native citizens were not, like the compradores of China, 
the agents of foreign interests. When capital was foreign-held, 
the owners tended to be similar to native citizens in race, 
religion, and general mores. Ownership of capital was not 
associated with overbearing foreigners prejudiced against 
'the natives' on racial or religious grounds. Such prejudice and 
overbearingness as existed was primarily in the opposite 
direction most of the time, as witness the history of European 
Jewry. The contrast with present-day Asia, Africa, or Latin 
America need not be dwelt on further. 
3. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries there was 
little of the self-conscious haste that infuses the two-to-ten-
year plans of today. (Japan under the Meiji Emperor was a 
partial exception, as was Germany under Bismarck.) There 
was implicit confidence that development would come in time, 
by Adam Smith's 'invisible hand', and relative unconcern 
about the precise date. The United States, for example, waited 
for roo years after independence as a satisfied raw material 
producer, before challenging British primacy in manufacturing 
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on the world market. During the same period, American 
enterprisers extended railroads ahead of their traffic and built 
factories beyond the market capacity for their outputs, relying 
on the next decade or generation (plus tariffs or subsidies, but 
not central planning) to justify their rashness. The under-
developed countries of today, precisely because they have been 
left behind for a century or more, want to catch up in a hurry, 
and have no faith in market forces or private enterprise to 
achieve in 1950 what they did not achieve in r85o or rgoo. 
4· In our Model I, only 13 per cent of property income is 
reinvested in domestic economic development. The appeal of 
confiscation would be less if this figure were higher. The figure 
given is probably too high for much of the present underdevel-
oped world. But it would have been too low for New England, 
Yorkshire, or the Ruhr Valley, during their periods of expan-
sion. For these regions rose to economic greatness when the 
Calvinistic heritage dominated their religious scene, although 
Calvin himself had long passed away. The Calvinist heritage 
meant, in the nineteenth century as well as the sixteenth and 
seventeenth, that high incomes were justified, if at all, by high 
saving and investment, and that luxurious consumption was 
frowned upon as abuse of divine stewardship. Delhi and Ver-
sailles might have exercised the same 'demonstration effect • 
upon developing Boston and Manchester-lowering investment 
and disturbing the balance of payments-which Paris and 
Hollywood exercise on developing Latin America today. But 
they did not, and private capital justified itself by its works. 
In the present underdeveloped world, however, the drive 
of wealthy businessmen 'to accumulate capital and expand 
their enterprises is continuously counteracted by the urgent 
desire (or social compulsion) to imitate in their living habits 
the socially dominant "old families", to prove by their con-
spicuous outlays that they are socially (and therefore also 
politically) not inferior to their aristocratic partners in the 
socially ruling coalition '1• Or, as the matter is summed up by 
Spengler, production dominated consumption in the developing 
West of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, while 
1 Paul A. Baran, 'National Economic Planning', in B. F. Haley (ed.), 
Survey ofContemp01'ary Economics, Vol. II (Homewood, Illinois, 1952), 
p. 378. 
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consumption is tending to dominate production in the under-
developed countries of the twentieth century.l 
s. Conversely, eighteenth- and nineteenth-century govern-
ments were less adequately equipped to execute economic 
development projects than the Iron and Bamboo Curtain 
governments of the twentieth century. To hand over property 
or property income to the typical Stuart, Bourbon, or Roma-
noff monarch or minister would have wasted the returns and 
the principal as well. More chaos than progress would have 
resulted from State Socialism under Charles II, Louis XV, or 
Nicholas II. Leakages would have absorbed 100 per cent of the 
property income. Aesop's fable of the goose and the golden 
eggs would have applied. The classical economists were plati-
tudinously right in listing the security of private property as a 
requisite for economic progress. 2 But as John Stuart Mill 
himself seems to have foreseen, this doctrine can no longer be 
applied without modification. 3 Although many a government 
of a modem underdeveloped country follows the ineffective 
Stuart-Bourbon-Romanoff pattern, there is usually a good 
chance that its revolutionary successor will not. In weighing 
the feasibility of a Socialist alternative to a stagnant capitalism, 
the present character of the existing non-Socialist government 
(viz. the Kuomintang of Chiang Kai-shek) should often be· 
given less weight than the anticipated character of its Socialist 
rival (in this case, the Chinese Communist Party). 
6. Confiscation of capitalist property and its income may 
have played no great part in the economic development of the 
Western world,' but other forms of confiscation were not 
1 Joseph J. Spengler, op. cit., p. 96. 
1 See, e.g., John Stuart Mill, Principles of Political Econotny (ed. 
W. J. Ashley) {London, 1909), pp. 881 f. 
• Ibid., pp. 204--II, including a famous passage (p. 2o8) : 
• If. therefore, the choice were to be made between Communism 
with all its chances, and the present state of society with all its suffer-
ings and injustices; if the institution of private property necessarily 
carried with it as a consequence, that the produce of labour should be 
apportioned as we now see it, almost in an inverse ratio to the labour 
... if this or Communism were the alternative, all the difficulties, 
great or small, of Communism would be but as dust in the balance.' 
'Although Americans, for example, should not forget the wholesale 
debt repudiations of the Midwestern and South Central States follow-
ing the Panic of 1837· 
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avoided. The natural resources of America, Canada, Australia, 
New Zealand, South Africa were confiscated from aboriginal 
tribes. Individual and communal rights of the English peasantry 
were confiscated piecemeal over the three or four centuries of 
the enclosure movement. Feudal baronies in France and 
ecclesiastical properties in England, rice subventions of Japa-
nese samurai, were all confiscated by the State and converted 
largely to private developmental uses as incidents of the French 
Revolution, the English Reformation, and the Westernization 
of Japan. So great was the loot of Bengal that Premier Nehru 
can speak, with no more than pardonable patriotic exaggera-
tion, of the British industrial revolution of the eighteenth 
century being financed through the proceeds of confiscated 
Indian capital. I One is reminded of Karl Marx on 'The Genesis 
of the Industrial Capitalist' : 'If money . . . comes into the 
world with a congenital blood-stain on one cheek, capital 
comes dripping from head to foot, from every pore, with blood 
and dirt. '11 
7· With such exceptions as have been mentioned, the legiti-
macy of private property rights, acquired through purchase or 
bequest, has been recognized throughout the Western world 
throughout the period of Western economic development. 
It has become too fundamental a part of the Western legal 
system to succumb to immediate frontal assault. But under 
the impact of international collectivist ideologies, the 'legiti-
macy • concept of property rights is following the 'legitimacy' 
concept of royal sovereignty into the discard in country after 
country, where it has become less firmly and honourably esta-
blished. This is particularly true when, as in such cases as the 
zamindari of India, or the oil concessions of Iran, 'legitimate' 
ownership rights are traceable to questionable transactions 
in a relatively recent past. 
8. Some developed countries (Japan being perhaps the best 
example) accumulated the bulk of the capital for their dev-
elopment from the masses of the people. In Japan this was 
done by keeping the peasants at the subsistence level through 
1 Jawaharlal Nehru, The Discovery of India (New York: John Day, 
1946), p. 296 f., citing also Brooks Adams, The Law of Civilization and 
Decay. -
• Karl Marx, Capital, Vol. I (Chicago, 1906), p. 834. 
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increasing land taxes (which were shifted generally to the 
tenant farmers),l and holding real wages down through infla-
tion and monopsonistic labour market practices. But the 
peasants and workers of most underdeveloped countries 
have become too well enlightened by Leftist leaders, and 
have come to possess too much military and political 
strength, for such alternatives to confiscation to be widely 
effective in raising capital in the latter half of the twentieth 
century. 2 
Confiscation of property and property income runs counter 
to Western notions of economic morality. More important, it 
runs counter to Western economic interests. For when property 
is expropriated, foreign property will usually be expropriated 
earlier and on less considerate terms than domestic.3 Western 
nations are therefore doubly concerned with the appeal of 
confiscation in underdeveloped countries. If, as I believe, the 
appeal of confiscation makes economic sense, it will probably 
increase with time. The question arises: How should Western 
policy meet the ideological and the practical threats to Western 
interests? 
The optimum solution, from the Western point of view, 
would be a reformist, voluntary 'democratic alternative', 
which would provide growth rates comparable to those of our 
Models II and III without the concomitant expropriation of 
1 Shifting of land taxes to tenants implies a situation in which 
landlords were not exacting maximum rentals from tenants before 
the taxes were imposed or increased. The feudal landlords in Japan 
prior to the Meiji Restoration were far from economic men, and 
probably failed in many cases to collect the full rental value of their 
properties. 
1 The principal exception to this generalization is found where the 
Government forces crop deliv~ries at low fixed prices, and then resells 
them at higher market prices, the profit going largely for development 
purposes. (Thailand and Burma, for example, gain large revenues 
from this system of rice marketing.) If the analysis in the text is 
correct, such regressive taxation of the peasantry will not continue 
politically feasible for many years after the peasants are informed 
(as they are being informed) of the economic significance of the 
two-price policies. 
1 There are many exceptions to this general statement (e.g., 
Yugoslavia under Marshal Tito), usually involving political relations 
between the expropriating country and the homelands of the foreign 
investors. 
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foreign and domestic property.l Many such 'democratic 
alternatives' may· be found on paper: taxation (other than 
capital levies), increased saving by propertied classes, 1 mobi-
lizing' this saving for development purposes, and so on. Efforts 
in these directions are laudable, and nothing said here should 
be interpreted in their disparagement. However, I shall make 
the pessimistic assumption in the remainder of this paper that, 
for much of the underdeveloped world, any 1 democratic' or 
'voluntary' alternative is too little and comes too late-that 
it is, in other words, Utopian-so that the appeal of confisca-
tion must be answered by suppression of revolutionary move-
ments andfor through sweetening of the status quo through 
economic aid from Western sources. 
The traditional way of dealing with backward peoples' 
disregard of advanced Western concepts of property rights has 
been suppression, and the traditional mechanism of suppression 
has been a species of the genus 'imperialism •. The precepts of 
Western business etiquette and the interests of Western 
economic adventurers were enforced simultaneously upon the 
'lesser breeds without the Law'. Offending countries became 
colonies, dependencies, protectorates, satellites, 1 spheres of 
influence', or were otherwise disciplined. This was 1 gunboat 
diplomacy'. But the gunboat diplomacy species of imperialism 
has passed with its prophet, Rudyard Kipling. There will 
doubtless remain for some time areas in which one or another 
Power finds an aerial version of gunboat diplomacy effective 
in enforcing the economic proprieties in the interests of its 
influential citizens. (Kenya in Africa and Guatemala in Central 
America come to mind, in the context of the middle 1950s.) 
But such areas are apparently shrinking rather than expanding, 
and gunboat diplomacy has come not always to pay even 
where it still works. That is to say, the enmities which it creates 
are becom~ng more widespread and therefore more costly to 
combat around the globe a.nd in the long run than is justified 
I Critics have suggested another optimum solution, from the Western 
point of view : the indefinite renunciation of economic development 
by the • backward' two-thirds of the world's population. This is (almost) 
certainly wrong. Almost any development short of autarchy creates 
customers and suppliers for the rest of the world faster than it creates 
competitors--special cases to the contrary notwithstanding. 
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by the value of the capital it preserves in the limited area still 
open to its use. A country forcibly restrained from expropriat-
ing property income this year rna y go 'behind the Curtain' 
in the next. Or its example will be used to move some other 
country Leftward (or Eastward, as the case may be). 
Imperialistic repression of confiscation now operates generally 
in disguise, as a necessary concession to world-wide nationalistic 
aspirations. Its usual present form is the supply of military 
assistance to maintain in power governments in underdeveloped 
countries which can be trusted not to confiscate foreign 
property, however little may be said for them on other grounds 
and however little support they may be able to generate among 
their subjects. But m~y of the objections to gunboat diplomacy 
apparently apply with almost equal force to this successor. 
It too often fails, outside the military orbit of some Western 
power. And when it succeeds, it too may not be worth its cost 
in the long run, when the regime maintained in power is a 
stench in its neighbours' nostrils and the method of mainten-
ance alienates these neighbours politically and economically. 
The expectation of rewards for good behaviour, in the form 
of future foreign loans and investments, seems already much 
more efficacious in forestalling expropriation than is the fear 
of punishment or the bolstering of 'friendly' governments by 
military aid. When a country stands to lose more in future aid 
by confiscating private capital within its control than it stands 
to gain from the value of the capital at stake, it usually exer-
cises a seemly caution and restraint in dealing with private 
interests affiliated with sources of potential largesse. But the 
hope or the promise of reward must be substantial, plausible, 
and contemporary. Crumbs from the table will not do, nor pie 
in the sky when you die. Here lies the rub, for those benevolent 
global planners in the United States and the international 
agencies who hope to forestall confiscatory financing indefinitely 
by a spate of kind words and a few billion dollars spread thinly 
in time and space over the underdeveloped world. 
Once the loans and investments are made, moreover, their 
expansion cannot end easily. Capital sunk at long term in a 
foreign land is, like a wife and children, a hostage to fortune. 
(In this case, a hostage to expropriation.) The hostage may be 
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safeguarded by additional capital, or promises thereof. When 
made, these additional loans and investments become ransoms 
to expropriation. Like other ransoms, they must be large and 
they must eventually be delivered. Unlike other ransoms, 
each payment becomes another hostage to be ransomed. As 
the total hostage of capital increases, the greater the temptation 
it presents to the confiscator, and the greater the ransom 
required for its continued protection. The greater becomes the 
value of existing foreign investment required continuously to 
safeguard it against expropriation.1 
The attempt by the West to bribe or buy its way out of 
confiscation of its investments in the underdeveloped countries 
may yet become the white man's buJilen of the twentieth 
century. It is costly enough in the present, to taxpayers in 
the advanced countries and to victims of inflation and material 
shortages. What is more alarming is that each instalment 
paid on the cost will increase rather than decrease the cost of 
each subsequent instalment, with no upper ~ound in sight 
until the borrowing country has achieved development at a 
rate satisfactory to its leaders. 
In these circumstances, my own suggestion is for withdrawal, 
for 'economic neo-isolation' of the developed from the under-
developed world. It is less a suggestion for a new policy, in 
fact, than a franker and more brutal recognition of the nature 
of present Western policy, and for undeceiving the under-
developed countries regarding prospects for early relaxation. 
Capital remains scarce, despite gloomy forecasts of its super-
fluity in 'mature economies'. It remains scarce for purely 
domestic uses both civil and military. I! Capital being scarce, the 
advanced countries give first priority to their domestic needs, 
and distribute it for development in the rest of the world only on 
acautiousandniggardlyscale. They make it available abroad-
in quantity, that is to say-only at going rates of interest, 
and under acceptable guarantees against not only expropriation 
but also freezing of interest, profits, and principal repayments. 
1 In this discussion I consider the absolute volume of new investment, 
not its proportion to the national inc~me of the investing country. 
• I need not face the issue here as to whether the scarcity would sur-
vive reduction of Western defence expenditures to the level of the 19zos. 
The Appeal of Confiscation in Economic Development 491 
Nee-isolation, as I see it, is little beyond explicit recognition 
of the facts if I see them aright, and a resulting limitation of 
government (and government-guaranteed) development loans 
within the same quantitative limits as the charitable grants 
typified by the American Point Four programme, however 
meagre and unsatisfactory these limits may seem to developing 
countries. Neo-isolation, if adopted as formal policy, would 
mean saying (as against hinting) to the governments of the 
underdeveloped countries : 'We appreciate and sympathize 
with your desire for economic progress. Therefore we recognize 
the appeal of expropriation in financing economic development, 
if not to yourselves then to your successors in office. We recog-
nize as well the economic soundness of confiscation, from your 
point of view. We therefore feel it unsafe to lend you appre-
ciably more than we can afford to present you free of charge. 
We are unwilling to assume a financial "white man's burden" 
of ransoming an increasing volume of existing loans and invest-
ments from confiscation by an increasing volume of new ones. 
If private individuals and international associations are more 
venturesome, well and good, but we are unwilling to under-
write their ventures. ' 
Such bluntness and brutality would lead to an immediate 
disadvantage to the West. It would accelerate, by decades if 
not by generations, the evil day of expropriation of existing 
Western assets in many countries, although {if the previous 
argument is correct) it would reduce total Western losses from 
the expropriation process. Neo-isolation would also raise deli-
cate questions of relations with expropriating governments, 
and questions of possible domestic compensation to the owners 
of the confiscated foreign assets. These questions involve 
details which must be worked out differently in each case, but 
certain general rules may apply and may be useful : 
I. Diplomatic relations with confiscating governments should 
not be broken off. 
2. No more favourable treatment should be demanded for 
Western nationals in the event of confiscation than is given to 
citizens of the confiscating country. (If more favourable treat-
ment is offered, without pressure, there is no reason for non-
acceptance.) Equality of treatment should ordinarily be striven 
for; it cannot always be achieved. 
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3· Domestic compensation for victims of foreign expropria-
tion should neither be promised nor ruled out wholesale. 
Amounts to be paid should be estimated on the merits of in-
dividual cases, with consideration for (a) the manner in which 
the property was acquired, (b) the historical and reproduction 
cost of the assets confiscated, (c) the record of the claimant's 
relations with the government and people of the confiscating 
country prior to confiscation, and (d) the returns already paid 
prior to confiscation .. If guarantees of domestic compensation 
are made to enterprisers of particular foreign projects, they 
should be conditional upon satisfactory performance on points 
(a) and (c) above, upon application of the 'prudent investment' 
principle under point (b), and upon moderation under point (d). 
Compensation should not be paid for unrealized capital gains 
from speculation in real estate or in inventories. 
Underdeveloped areas are not all alike. There are many in 
which our pessimistic models do not apply. There are many 
in which a 'democratic alternative' to both stagnation and 
confiscation is in actual operation. There is no uniform tread-
mill which one may call 'The Political Economy of Backward-
ness'.1 For this reason among others, there are many countries 
in which confiscation is not a near-term problem. In these 
countries, a defeatist neo-isolation policy should not be applied. 
It is not in fact being applied there ; statistical analysis shows 
Western aid concentrated in such countries, to an extent other-
wise incomprehensibly disproportionate.2 
1 For an opposite view, cf. Paul A. Baran, 'On the Political Economy 
of Backwardness', reprinted in the present volume, pp. 75-92, as well 
as other writings already cited in this essay. Baran is more right than 
wrong in his neo-Marxian analyses. His writings are a welcome 
antidote to the Pollyanna pronunciamentos of some official agencies 
and the unfounded confidence in 'pragmatism' (or 'muddling 
through') of the remainder. Baran suffers nevertheless from the over-
simplification of identifying every backward area with every other, 
with the Poland of the inter-war 'Colonels' Clique' al'l the possible 
archetype. 
• Concentration of Western loans and investments in areas where 
confiscation is not tlu;eatened may conceivably, if the results are 
favourable, exercise some degree of contagion on the remainder of the 
underdeveloped world, and reduce somewhat the general threat of 
confiscation. 
The Appeal of Confiscation in Economic Development 493 
What are the underdeveloped areas to which neo-isolation 
is inappropriate ? There would appear to be five major cat-
egories in which large-scale international lending for develop-
ment purposes seems appropriate, and in most of which it is 
in fact being carried on. 
I. Isolation would be mistaken, first of all, in areas which, 
while technically underdeveloped, have already attained high 
living standards and rapid social mobility upwards. Here 
confiscation exercises no more appeal than it did on the nine-
teenth-century American frontier. These are the areas par 
excellence of successful 'democratic alternatives' to both stagna-
tion and expropriation. Alaska, Labrador, and perhaps Brazil 
provide examples. Illustrations from Asia, from Africa, or 
from heavily populated regions generally are difficult if not 
impossible to find. 
2. At the other end of the scale, isolation need not be applied 
in those areas in which there is nothing worth confiscating, 
i.e. in which there is neither property income nor luxury con-
sumption on any scale. Libya, Afghanistan, and Nepal are 
examples. Loans and investments here may or may not be 
productive, but they will probably be safe from expropriation 
unless these countries are taken over by Communist aggression, 
unless the investments themselves create a leisure class as 
target for expropriation, or unless the burden of interest 
charges and principal repayments is set too high for the coun-
tries to meet while still developing at reasonable rates. 
3· Isolation should not apply, thirdly, where the yield of 
capital is high enough to satisfy simultaneously the demands of 
foreign investors and the aspirations of domestic political 
leaders. Regions rich in natural resources, particularly petro-
leum, fall into this category : Saudi Arabia in the Middle 
East, Venezuela in South America, Brunei on the island of 
Borneo. Paradoxically, this category also includes many of 
the 'new democracies', where confiscation has already occurred 
and a rapid growth rate has already been attained. A foreign 
loan to the Soviet Union, which expropriated all pre-1917 
foreign investments in Russia, would be a safer economic 
proposition than a foreign loan to, let us say, Cambodia, in 
which confiscation of Western assets has never been permitted. 
Reluctance or refusal to consider investment in loans to socialist 
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states is ascribable m0re readily to resentment of the past 
than to timorousness for the future. 
4· Isolation is also ill-advised in areas where expropriation 
of property is ruled out by the fundaQlentallaw of a Westem 
Power close enough to exercise effective supervision-tinged 
with imperialism, if you wilL Puerto Rico and Cuba are cases 
in point here. In other areas, such as Portugal, political control 
seems safely in the hands of the propertied classes and their 
religious allies for the next generation or two, and expropria-
tion does not loom presently as a significant political possibility. 
5. The final exception pertains to instances of particularly 
close racial, religious, or cultural ties between developing 
countries and foreign sources of capital, which assuage the 
conflicts of interest that might otherwise occur. It would be 
difficult to imagine Israel, for example, defaulting on its obliga-
tions to Western Jewish communities while it retains its 
independence, or New Zealand defaulting on obligations to 
creditors in Great Britain. 
But these are after all little more than exceptions. They do 
not disturb seriously my general anticipation of an increasing 
appeal of confiscation in economic growth, until the bulk of 
world development is financeii by State expropriation of the 
property share of the national income. Neither do they disturb 
seriously my general recommendation of continued economic 
isolation and withdrawal from most of the non-Socialist under-
developed world as the 'least worst' policy for Western capita-
lism in the face of the threat implied in the appeal of confisca-
tion. These defeatist conclusions apply particularly in Asia, 
where the direct influence of the Russian and Chinese expro-
priations is greatest, and where counter-pressures from the 
West can least easily be brought to bear. 
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